were they? Ah! that was a difficult matter; there were so many, and the rules which governed them were sometimes so subtle, that mistakes always had and always would be made; it was just this that made it impossible to reduce life to an exact science. There was a rough-and-ready rule-of-thumb test of truth, and a number of rules as regards exceptions which could be mastered without much trouble, yet there was a residue of cases in which decision was difficult - so difficult that a man had better follow his instinct than attempt to decide them by any process of reasoning. Instinct then is the ultimate court of appeal. And what is instinct? It is a mode of faith in the evidence of things not actually seen. And so my hero returned almost to the point from which he had started originally, namely that the just shall live by faith. And this is what the just - that is to say reasonable people - do as regards those daily affairs of life which most concern them. They settle smaller matters by the exercise of their own deliberation; more important ones, such as the cure of their own bodies, and those of any whom they may love, the investment of their money, the extrication of their affairs from any serious mess - these things they generally entrust to others of whose capacity they know little save from general report; they act therefore on the strength of faith, not knowledge. So the English nation entrusts the welfare of its fleet and naval defences to a First Lord of the Admiralty, who, not being a sailor, can know nothing about these matters except by acts of faith. There can be no doubt about faith and not reason being the ultima ratio. Even Euclid who has laid himself as little open to the charge of credulity as any writer who ever lived cannot get beyond this. He has no demonstrable first premise. He requires postulates and axioms which transcend demonstration, and without which he can do nothing. His superstructure indeed is demonstration, but his ground is faith. Nor again can he get further than telling a man that he is a fool if he persists in differing from him. He says »which is absurd,« and declines to discuss the matter further. Faith and authority therefore prove to be as necessary for him as for anyone else. »By faith in what, then,« asked Ernest of himself, »shall a just man endeavour to live at this present time?« He answered to himself, »At any rate not by faith in the supernatural element of the Christian religion