to establish, without any appeal to experience, the most general truths of experimental physics. Take, for example, two of the most elementary of all laws, the law of inertia and the first law of motion. A body at rest can not, it is affirmed, begin to move unless acted upon by some external force; because, if it did, it must either move up or down, forward or backward, and so forth; but if no outward force acts upon it, there can be no reason for its moving up rather than down, or down rather than up, etc., ergo, it will not move at all. This reasoning I conceive to be entirely fallacious, as indeed Dr. Brown, in his treatise on Cause and Effect, has shown with great acuteness and justness of thought. We have before remarked, that almost every fallacy may be referred to different genera by different modes of filling up the suppressed steps; and this particular one may, at our option, be brought under petitio principii. It supposes that nothing can be a sufficient reason for a body’s moving in one particular direction, except some external force. But this is the very thing to be proved. Why not some internal force? Why not the law of the thing’s own nature? Since these philosophers think it necessary to prove the law of inertia, they of course do not suppose it to be self-evident; they must, therefore, be of opinion that previously to all proof, the supposition of a body’s moving by internal impulse is an admissible hypothesis; but if so, why is not the hypothesis also admissible, that the internal impulse acts naturally in some one particular direction, not in another? If spontaneous motion might have been the law of matter, why not spontaneous motion toward the sun, toward the earth, or toward the zenith? Why not, as the ancients supposed, toward a particular place in the universe, appropriated to each particular kind of substance? Surely it is not allowable to say that spontaneity of motion is credible in itself, but not credible if supposed to take place in any determinate direction. Indeed, if any one chose to assert that all bodies when uncontrolled set out in a direct line toward the North Pole, he might equally prove his point by the principle of the Sufficient Reason. By what right is it assumed that a state of rest is the particular state which can not be deviated from without special cause? Why not a state of motion, and of some particular sort of motion? Why may we not say that the natural state of