latter apprehends every individual one of them as self, i.e. when it takes up towards them the spiritual relationship just spoken of. The object is, then, partly immediate existence, a thing in general corresponding to immediate consciousness ; partly an alteration of itself, its relatedness, (or existence-for-anotherand existence-for-self ) ) determinateness corresponding to perception ; partly essential being or in the form of a universal corresponding to intelligence or understanding. The object as a whole is the mediated result [the conclusion] or the passing of universality into individuality through specification, as also the reverse process from individual to universal through cancelled individuality or specific determination. These three specific aspects, then, determine the ways in which consciousness must get to know the object in /the form of self. This knowledge of which we are speaking is, however, not knowledge in the sense of pure conceptual comprehension of the object; here this knowledge is to be taken as a developing process, has to be taken in its various moments and set forth in the manner appropriate to consciousness as such ; and the moments of the notion proper, of pure and absolute knowledge, are to assume the form of modes or attitudes of consciousness. For that reason the object does not yet, when present in consciousness as such, appear as the inner essence of Spirit in the way this has just been expressed. The procedure consciousness adopts in regard to the object is not that of considering it either in this totality as such or in the pure conceptual form ; it is partly that of a mode or attitude of consciousness in general, partly a multitude of such modes which we [who analyse the process] gather together, and in which the totality of the moments of the object and of the procedure of consciousness can be shown merely resolved into their separate elements. To understand this method of grasping the object, where apprehension is a form or mode of consciousness, we have here only to recall the previous forms of consciousness which came before us earlier in the argument. As regards the object, then, so far as it is immediate, an indifferent objective entity, we saw Reason, at the stage of "Observation," seeking and finding itself in this indifferent thing i.e. we saw it conscious that its activity is there of an external sort, and at the same time conscious of the object merely as an immediate ob j ect. We saw, too, its specific character take expression at its highest stage in the infinite judgment : " the being of the ego is a thing." And, further, the ego is