form of universal consciousness. The knowing of self is, qua this particular self, different from another self. Language in which all reciprocally recognise and acknowledge each other as acting conscientiously this general equality breaks up into the inequality of each individual existing for himself ; each consciousness turns from its universality back into itself, each is just as much reflected absolutely into itself as it is universal. By this means there necessarily comes about the opposition of individuality to other individuals and to the universal. And this relation and its procedure we have to consider. Or, again, this universality and duty have the absolutely opposite significance ; they signify determinate individuality, exempting itself from what is universal, individuality which looks on pure duty as universality that has appeared merely on the surface and is turned on its outside : " duty is merely a matter of words/' and passes for that whose being is for something else. Conscience, which in the first instance takes up merely a negative attitude towards duty, qua a given determinate duty, feels itself detached from it. But since conscience fills empty duty with a determinate content drawn from its own self, it is positively aware of the fact that it, qua this particular self, makes its own content. Its pure self, as it is empty knowledge, is without content and without definiteness. The content which it supplies to that knowledge is drawn from its own self, qua this determinate self, is drawn from itself as a natural individuality. In speaking of the conscientiousness of its action, it is doubtless aware of its pure self, but in the purpose of its action a purpose which brings in a concrete content it is conscious of itself as this particular individual, and is conscious of the opposition between what it is for itself and what it is for others, of the opposition of universality or duty and its state of being reflected into self away from the universal. While in this way the opposition, into which conscience passes when it acts, finds expression in its inner life, the opposition is at the same time disparity on its outer side, in the sphere of existence the disparity or discordance of its particular individuality with reference to another individual. Its special peculiarity consists in the fact that the two elements constituting its consciousness viz. the self and the inherent nature (Ansich] are unequal in value and significance within it ; in being accepted as valid, they are so determined that certainty of self is the essential fact as against the inherent nature, or the universal, which is taken to be merely a moment. Over against this internal determination there thus stands the element of existence,