-entity, but as an individual. Conscience, for its own part, finds its truth to lie in the direct certainty regarding itself. This immediate concrete certainty of itself is true reality. Looking at this certainty from the point of view of the opposition which consciousness involves, its own immediate particularity constitutes the content of moral action ; and the form of moral action is just this very self as a pure process, viz. as the process of knowing, in other words, is private individual conviction. Looking more closely at the unity and the significance of the moments of this stage, we find that moral consciousness conceived itself merely in the form of the inherent principle, or as ultimate essence ; qua conscience, however, it lays hold of its explicit individual self-existence , or its self. The contradiction involved in the moral point of view is resolved, i.e. the distinction, which lay at the basis of its peculiar attitude, proves to be no distinction, and melts into the process of pure negativity. This process of negativity is, however, just the self : a single simple self which is at once pure knowledge and knowledge of itself as this individual conscious life. This self constitutes, therefore, the content of what formerly was the empty essence ; for it is something actual and concrete, which no longer has the significance of being a nature alien to the ultimate essence, a nature independent and with laws of its own. As the negative element, it introduces distinction into the pure essence, a definite content, and one, too, which has a value in its own right as it stands. Further, this self is, qua pure self-identical knowledge, the universal without qualification, so that just this knowledge, being its very own knowledge, being conviction, constitutes duty. Duty is no longer the universal appearing over against and opposed to the self ; duty is known to have in this condition of separation and opposition no validity. It is now the law, which exists for the sake of the self, and not the self for the sake of the law. The law and duty, however, have for that reason not only the significance of existing on their own account, but also of being inherent and essential ; for this knowledge is, in virtue of its identity with itself, just what is inherently essential. This inherent being gets also separated in consciousness from that direct and immediate unity with self-existence : so contrasted and opposed, it is objective being, it is being for something else. Duty itself now, qua duty deserted by the