which does not make for itself a bare abstract standard out of the consciousness of pure duty, a standard to be set up against 'actual conscious life ; on the contrary, pure duty, as also the sensuous nature opposed to pure duty, are superseded moments. This mode of spirit, in its immediate unity, is a moral being making itself actual, and an act is immediately a concrete embodiment of morality. Given a case of action ; it is an objectVe reality for the knowing mind. The latter, qua cor science, knows it in a direct concrete manner ; and at the same time it is merely as conscience knows it to be. When knowledge is something other than its object, it is contingent in character. Spirit, however, which is sure of its self, is not at all an accidental knowledge of that kind, is not a way of producing inside its own being ideas from which reality is divorced. On the contrary ; since the separation between what is essential or inherent and self has been given up, a case of moral action falls, just as it is per se, directly within immediate conscious certainty, the sensible [feeling] form of knowledge, and it merely is per se as it is in this form of knowledge. Action, then, qua realisation, is in this way the pure form of will the bare conversion of reality, in the sense of a given case, into a reality that is performed and done, the conversion of the bare state of objective knowledge into one of knowledge about reality as something produced and brought about by consciousness. Just as sensuous certainty is directly taken up, or rather converted, into the essential life and substance of spirit, this other transformation is also simple and unmediated, a transition made through pure conception without changing the content, the content being conditioned by some interest on the part of the consciousness knowing it. Further, conscience does not break up the circumstances of the case into a variety of duties. It does not operate as the positive general medium, in which the manifold duties, each for itself, would keep their substantial existence undisturbed. If it did so, either no action could take place at all, because of each concrete case in general containing opposition, and, in the specific case of morality, opposition of duties, and hence there would always be one side injured, one duty violated, when the act took definite shape: or else, if action did take place, the violation of one of the conflicting duties would be the actual result brought about. Conscience is rather the negative single unity, it