from within, but carries no further than to make it a presentation , and let it remain at this level -- and the " ignorance " on the part of this consciousness as to what it really says, are the same kind of connection of higher and lower which, in the case of the living being, nature naively expresses when it combines the organ of its highest fulfilment, the organ of generation, with the organ of urination. The infinite judgment qua infinite would correspond to the fulfilment of life that comprehends itself, while the consciousness of life that remains at the level of presentation would correspond to urination. The Realisation of Eational Self-Consciousness Through Its Own Activity [In this section we have the second form in which rational experience is realised. In " observation " mind is directly aware of itself aa in conscious unity with its object : it makes no effort of its own to realise this unity : it finds the unity by looking on, so to say. But it may have the same experience by creating through its own effort an object constituted and determined solely by its self. Here it does not find the unitj' of itself and its object ; it makes the object at one with itself by moulding the character and content of the object after its own nature. As contrasted with observation, which may be called the operation of " theoretical " reason, this new way of having a rational experience may be called the operation of " practical " reason. In the first we have reason in the form of rational knowledge and science, in the second, reason is the sense of rational action and practice. It is this second way of establishing the experience of reason which is analysed in the following sections. The immediately succeeding section describes the experience in its general features. We have here the sphere of conscious purpose and the foundation of moral and social life.] Self-consciousness found the " thing " in the form of itself, and itself in the form of a thing ; that is to say, self-consciousness is explicitly aware of being in itself the objective realitj^. It is no longer the immediate certainty of being all reality ; it is rather that certainty for which the immediate in general assumes the form of something sublated, so that the objectivity of the immediate is regarded now as merely something superficial, whose inner core and essence is self-consciousness. The object, therefore, to which self-consciousness is positively related, is a self-consciousness. The object has the form and character of a thing, i.e. is independent : but self-consciousness has the