as pure abstractions and as bare and simple notions, which should be kept connected with the existence of things, but this gets lost, so that the abstract moment proves to be a pure movement and a universal. This free, self-complete process retains the significance of something objective ; but now appears as a unit. In the process of the inorganic the unit is the inner with no existence. When the process does have existence qua unit, as one and single, it is an organism. The unit qua self-existent or negative entity stands in antithesis to the universal, throws ofi its control, and remains independent by itself, so that the notion, being only realised in the condition of absolute dissociation, fails to find in organic existence its genuine expression, in the sense that it is not there in the form of a universal; it remains an "outer," or, what is the same thing, an " inner " of organic nature. The organic process is merely free implicitly ; it is not so explicitly, " for itself." The explicit phase of its freedom appears in the idea of purpose, has its existence in the form of something else, of a self-directing aim and guidance, that hes outside the mere process. Reason's function of observation thus turns its attention to this aim and guidance, to mind, to the notion actually existuig as universality, or to the purpose existing in the form of purpose ; and what constitutes its own essential nature is now the object before it. Reason here in the activity of observation is directed first to the pure abstract form of its essential nature. But since reason, in its apprehension of the object thus working and moving amidst its own distinctions takes this object as something that exists, observation becomes aware of laws of thought, relations of one constant factor to another constant element. The content of these laws being, however, merely moments, they pass away into the single one of self-consciousness. This new object taken in the same way as existent, is the contingent individual self-consciousness. The process of observation, therefore, keeps within the " conjectured" meaning of mind, and within the contingent relation of conscious to unconscious reality. Mind alone in itself is the necessity of this relation. Observation, therefore, attacks it at closer quarters, and compares its realisation through will and action with its reality when it contemplates and is reflected into itself, a reality which is itself objective. This external aspect, although an utterance of the individual which he himself contains, is at the same time,