accordance with the threefold character of the relation which this consciousness takes up to its transcendent and remote reality embodied in specific form. In one it is a pure consciousness; at another time a particular individual who takes up towards actuality the attitude characteristic of desire and labour ; and in the third place it is a consciousness of its self-existence, its existence for itself. We have now to see how these three modes of its being are found and are constituted in that general relation. In the first place, then, regarded as pure consciousness, the unchangeable embodied in definite historical form, seems, since it is an object for pure consciousness, to be established as it is in its self-subsistent reality But this, its reality in and for itself, has not yet come to light, as we already remarked. Were it to be in consciousness as it is in itself and for itself, this would certainly have to come about not from the side of consciousness, but from the unchangeable. But, this being so, its presence here is brought about through consciousness only in a onesided way to begin with, and just for that reason is not found in a perfect and genuine form, but constantly weighted and encumbered with imperfection, with an opposite. But although the " unhappy consciousness " does not possess this actual presence, it has, at the same time, transcended pure thought, so far as this is the abstract thought of Stoicism, Avhich turns away from particulars altogether, and again the merely restless thought of Scepticism -- so far, in fact, as this is merely particularity in the sense of aimless contradiction and the restless process of contradictory thought. It has gone beyond both of these ; it brings and keeps together pure thought and particular existence, but has not yet risen to that level of thinking where the particularity of consciousness is harmoniously reconciled with pure thought itself. It rather stands midway, at the point where abstract thought comes in contact with the particularity of consciousness qua particularity. Itself is this act of contact ; it is the union of pure thought and particularity. Moreover, this thinking individuality, or pure thought, exists for it, and for it too the unchangeable is essentially a particular existence. But that this its object, the unchangeable, which assumes essentially the form of particularity, is its own self, the self which is particularity of consciousness -- this is not established for it. In this first condition, consequently, in which we treat it as piue consciousness, it takes up towards its object an attitude which is not that of thought ; but rather (