1807_Phenomenology_119.topic_1.txt

own account ; and it is so only by sublation of the object ; and it must come to feel its satisfaction, for it is the truth. On account of the independence of the object, therefore, it can only attain satisfaction when this object itself efiectually brings about negation within itself. The object must fer se effect this negation of itself, for it is inherently something negative, and must be for the other what it is. Since the object is in its very self negation, and in being so is at the same time independent, it is Consciousness. In the case of life, which is the object of desire, the negation either lies in an other, namely, in desire, or takes the form of determinateness standing in opposition to an other external individuum indifferent to it, or appears as its inorganic general nature. The above general iudependent nature, however, in the case of which negation takes the form of absolute negation, is the genus as such, or as self-consciousness. Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness. It is in these three moments that the notion of selfconsciousness first gets completed : pure undifferentiated ego is its first inmaediate object. This immediacy is itself, however, thoroughgoing mediation ; it has its being only by cancelling the independent object, in other words it is Desire. The satisfaction of desire is indeed the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, is the certainty which has passed into objective truth. But the truth of this certainty is reaUy twofold reflection, the reduplication of self-consciousness. Consciousness has an object which impUcates its own otherness or affirms distinction as a void distinction, and therein is independent. The individual form dis tinguished, which is only a living form, certainly cancels its independence also in the process of life itself ; but it ceases along with its distinctive difference to be what it is. The object of self-consciousness, however, is still independent in this negativity of itself ; and thus it is for itself genus, universal flux or continuity in the very distinctiveness of its own separate existence ; it is a living self-consciousness. A self-consciousness has before it a self- consciousness. Only so and only then is it self-consciousness in actual fact ; for here first of all it comes to have the unity of itself in its otherness. Ego, which is the object of its notion, is in point of fact not " object." The object of desire, however, is only independent, for it is the universal, ineradicable substance, the fluent self-identical essential