the multifarious possibilities of error and deception, I might reach such a degree of sceptical despair that I finally say: Nothing is certain, everything is doubtful. But it is at once evident that not everything is doubtful, for while I am judging that everything is doubtful, it is indubitable that I am so judging; and it would be absurd to want to persist in a universal doubt. And in every case of a definite doubt, it is indubitably certain that I have this doubt. And likewise with every cogitation. Howsoever I perceive, imagine, judge, infer, howsoever these acts may be certain or uncertain, whether or not they have ob?jects that exist as far as the perceiving itself is concerned, it is absolutely clear and certain that I am perceiving this or that, and as far as the judg?ment is concerned that I am judging of this or that, etc. Descartes introduced these considerations for other purposes. But with suitable modifications, we can use them here. If we inquire into the essence of cognition, then whatever status it and our doubts about its reaching the object may have one thing is clear: that cognition itself is a name for a manifold sphere of being which can be given to us absolutely, and which can be given absolutely each time in the particular case. The thought processes which I really perform are given to me insofar as I reflect upon them, receive them and set them up in a pure Òseeing." I can speak vaguely about cognition, perception, imagination, experience, judgment, inference, etc.; but then, when I reflect, all that is given, and absolutely given at that, is this phenomenon of vaguely "talking about and intending cognition, experience, judgment, etc." Even this phenomenon of vagueness is one of those that comes under the heading of cognition in the broadest sense. I can, however, have an actual perception and inspect it. I can, moreover, represent to myself in imagination or memory a perception and survey it as so given to imagination. In that case I am no longer / vacuously talking about perception or having a vague intension or idea of it. Instead, perception itself stands open to my inspection as actually or imaginatively given to me. And the same is true of every intellectual process, of every form of thinking and cognizing. I have here put on the same level the "seeing" [act of] reflective perception and [the "seeing" act of reflective] imagination. If one followed the Cartesian view, one would have to emphasize perception first; it would in some measure