of the puzzles which had led to all the sceptical confusions. I then pointed to the Cartesian method of doubt and to the domain of the absolutely given, viz., of absolute cognition which comes under the heading of evidence (Evidenz) of the cogitatio. It remained to be shown that the immanence of this cognition makes it an appropriate point of departure for the theory of cognition; that, furthermore, because of this immanence, it is free of the puzzlement which is the source of all sceptical embarrassment. 

Finally, it remained to be shown that immanence is the generally necessary characteristic of all epistemological cognition, and that it is nonsensical not only at the start but also in general to borrow 
from the sphere of transcendence, in other words, to try to found' the theory of cognition on psychology or on any science whatever of the natural sort. 

I may add the following: there is a plausible argument to the effect that the theory of knowledge cannot get started because it questions cog?nition as such and hence regards as questionable every cognition with which, we might begin. Moreover, it is, alleged that if all cognition must be a riddle to the epistemologist, so must any initial cognition with which epistemology itself begins be a riddle. I repeat that this plausible argument is a deception. The deception is due to the vague generality of the wording. Cognition in general "is questioned." Surely, however, it is not denied that there is cognition in general (such denial would lead to contradiction); rather, cognition presents a certain problem, namely, of how it can accomplish a certain task attributed to it, namely, the task of reaching the object: I may even doubt whether this task can be accomplished at all. But doubt as I may, this doubt is a first step toward canceling itself out because some cognitions can be brought to light which render such doubt groundless. Moreover, if I begin by not understanding cognition at all, then this incomprehension with its indeterminate universality admittedly encompasses every cognition. But that is not to say that every cognition I might run up against in the future has to remain forever incomprehensible. It may be that there is a big puzzle to begin with connected with a particular class of cognitions, those that thrust themselves most immediately to the fore, and that I now reach a general embarrassment and say: cognition as such is a riddle, even though it soon appears that the riddle does not belong to certain other kinds of cognition. And, as we shall see presently, this is indeed the case. 

I said that the cognitions with