correspond to the so-called inner perception of traditional epistemology, though this is an ambivalent concept. 

Every intellectual process and indeed every mental process whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object of a pure Òseeing" and understanding, and is something absolutely given in this Òseeing." It is given as something that is, that is here and now, and, whose being cannot be sensibly doubted. To be sure, I can wonder what sort of being this is and how this mode of being is related to other modes. It is true I can wonder what givenness means here, and reflecting further I can "see" the "seeing" itself in which this givenness, or this mode of being, is constituted. But all the same I am now working on an absolute foundation: namely, this perception is, and remains as long as it lasts, something absolute, something here and now, something that in itself is what it is, something by which I can measure as by an ultimate standard what being and being given can mean and here must mean, at least, obviously, as far as the sort of being and being given is concerned which a "here and now" exemplifies. And that goes for all specific ways of thinking, whenever they are given. All of these, however, can also be data in imagination; they can "as it were" stand before our eyes and yet not stand before them as actualities, as actually accomplished perceptions, judgments, etc.; even then, they are, in a certain sense, data. They are there open to intuition. We talk about them not in just vague hints and empty intention. We inspect them, and while inspecting them we can observe their essence, their constitution, their intrinsic character, and we can make our speech conform in a pure measure to what is "seen" in its full clarity. But this requires to be supplemented / by a discussion of the concept and cognition of essences. 

For the moment we keep it firmly in mind that a sphere of the absolutely given can be indicated at the outset; and this is just the sphere we need if it is to be possible to aim at a theory of knowledge. Indeed, lack of clarity with regard to the meaning or essence of cognition requires a science of cognition; a science whose sole end is to clarify the essential nature of cognition. It is not to explain cognition as a psychological fact; it is not to inquire into the natural causes and laws of the development and occurrence of cognitions. Such inquiry is the