they call a Freethinker, that is to
say, a Deist, or, perhaps, an Atheist; for tho' he did not absolutely deny the
Existence of a God; yet he entirely denied his Providence: A Doctrine which, if
it is not downright Atheism, hath a direct Tendency towards it; and, as Dr.
Clarke observes, may soon be driven into it. And as to Mr. Booth, tho' he was in
his Heart an extreme Well-wisher to Religion (for he was an honest Man) yet his
Notions of it were very slight and uncertain. To say Truth, he was in the
wavering Condition so finely described by Claudian:
 
                               labefacta cadebat
Religio, causoeque viam non sponte sequebar
Alterius; vacuo quoe currere semina motu
Affirmat; magnumque novas per inane figuras
Fortuna non arte regi; quoe numina sensu
Ambiguo, vel nulla putat, vel nescia nostri.
 
This Way of thinking, or rather of doubting, he had contracted from the same
Reasons which Claudian assigns, and which had induced Brutus in his latter Days,
to doubt the Existence of that Virtue which he had all his Life cultivated. In
short, poor Booth imagined, that a larger Share of Misfortunes had fallen to his
Lot than he had merited; and this led him, who (tho' a good classical Scholar)
was not deeply learned in religious Matters, into a disadvantageous Opinion of
Providence. A dangerous Way of reasoning, in which our Conclusions are not only
too hasty, from an imperfect View of Things; but we are likewise liable to much
Error from Partiality to ourselves; viewing our Virtues and Vices as through a
Perspective, in which we turn the Glass always to our own Advantage, so as to
diminish the one, and as greatly to magnify the other.
    From the above Reasons, it can be no Wonder that Mr. Booth did not decline
the Acquaintance of this Person, in a Place which could not promise to afford
him any better. He answered him, therefore, with great Courtesy, as indeed he
was of a very good and gentle Disposition; and after expressing a civil Surprise
at meeting him there, declared himself to be of the same Opinion with regard to
the Necessity of human Actions; adding, however, that he did not believe Men
were under any blind Impulse or Direction of Fate; but that every Man acted
merely from the Force of that Passion which was uppermost in his Mind, and could
do no otherwise.
    A Discourse now ensued between the two Gentlemen, on the Necessity arising
from the Impulse of Fate, and the Necessity arising from the Impulse of