 been starved in infancy, or had met with some
accidents which had developed consumption; and had he then gone on to say that
though he knew all this, and bitterly regretted that the protection of society
obliged him to inflict additional pain on one who had suffered so much already,
yet that there was no help for it, I could have understood the position, however
mistaken I might have thought it. The judge was fully persuaded that the
infliction of pain upon the weak and sickly was the only means of preventing
weakness and sickliness from spreading, and that ten times the suffering now
inflicted upon the accused was eventually warded off from others by the present
apparent severity. I could therefore perfectly understand his inflicting
whatever pain he might consider necessary in order to prevent so bad an example
from spreading further and lowering the Erewhonian standard; but it seemed
almost childish to tell the prisoner that he could have been in good health, if
he had been more fortunate in his constitution, and been exposed to less
hardships when he was a boy.
    I write with great diffidence, but it seems to me that there is no
unfairness in punishing people for their misfortunes, or rewarding them for
their sheer good luck; it is the normal condition of human life that this should
be done, and no right-minded person will complain of being subjected to the
common treatment. There is no alternative open to us. It is idle to say that men
are not responsible for their misfortunes. What is responsibility? Surely to be
responsible means to be liable to have to give an answer should it be demanded,
and all things which live are responsible for their lives and actions should
society see fit to question them through the mouth of its authorized agent.
    What is the offence of a lamb that we should rear it, and tend it, and lull
it into security, for the express purpose of killing it? Its offence is the
misfortune of being something which society wants to eat, and which cannot
defend itself. This is ample. Who shall limit the right of society except
society itself? And what consideration for the individual is tolerable unless
society be the gainer thereby? Wherefore should a man be so richly rewarded for
having been son to a millionaire, were it not clearly provable that the common
welfare is thus better furthered? We cannot seriously detract from a man's merit
in having been the son of a rich father without imperilling our own tenure of
things which we do not wish to jeopardize; if this were otherwise we should not
let him keep his money for a single hour; we would have it ourselves at
