Human reason in one sphere of its cognition is called upon to consider
questions which it cannot decline as they are presented by its own
nature but which it cannot answer as they transcend every faculty of
the mind
It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own It begins
with principles which cannot be dispensed with in the field of
experience and the truth and sufficiency of which are at the same
time insured by experience With these principles it rises in
obedience to the laws of its own nature to ever higher and more remote
conditions But it quickly discovers that in this way its labours must
remain ever incomplete because new questions never cease to present
themselves and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to
principles which transcend the region of experience while they are
regarded by common sense without distrust It thus falls into confusion
and contradictions from which it conjectures the presence of latent
errors which however it is unable to discover because the principles
it employs transcending the limits of experience cannot be tested
by that criterion The arena of these endless contests is called
Metaphysic
Time was when she was the queen of all the sciences and if we take
the will for the deed she certainly deserves so far as regards the
high importance of her objectmatter this title of honour Now it is
the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her and the
matron mourns forlorn and forsaken like Hecuba
Modo maxima rerum
Tot generis natisque potens
Nunc trahor exul inops
Ovid Metamorphoses xiii
At first her government under the administration of the dogmatists
was an absolute despotism But as the legislative continued to show
traces of the ancient barbaric rule her empire gradually broke up and
intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy while the sceptics
like nomadic tribes who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode
of living attacked from time to time those who had organized themselves
into civil communities But their number was very happily small and
thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who
persisted in raising new edifices although on no settled or uniform
plan In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes
settled and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of
physiology of the human understandingthat of the celebrated Locke But
it was found thatalthough it was affirmed that this socalled queen
could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common
experience a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on
her claimsas this genealogy was incorrect she persisted in the
advancement of her claims to sovereignty Thus metaphysics necessarily
fell back into the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism and
again became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been
made to save it At present as all methods according to the general
persuasion have been tried in vain there reigns nought but weariness
and complete indifferentismthe mother of chaos and night in the
scientific world but at the same time the source of or at least the
prelude to the recreation and reinstallation of a science when it has
fallen into confusion obscurity and disuse from ill directed effort
For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such
inquiries the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity
Besides these pretended indifferentists however much they may try to
disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes
on the language of the schools unavoidably fall into metaphysical
declarations and propositions which they profess to regard with so much
contempt At the same time this indifference which has arisen in the
world of science and which relates to that kind of knowledge which
we should wish to see destroyed the last is a phenomenon that well
deserves our attention and reflection It is plainly not the effect of
the levity but of the matured judgement of the age which refuses to
be any longer entertained with illusory knowledge It is in fact a
call to reason again to undertake the most laborious of all tasksthat
of selfexamination and to establish a tribunal which may secure it
in its wellgrounded claims while it pronounces against all baseless
assumptions and pretensions not in an arbitrary manner but according
to its own eternal and unchangeable laws This tribunal is nothing less
than the critical investigation of pure reason
I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems but a critical
inquiry into the faculty of reason with reference to the cognitions
to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience in other
words the solution of the question regarding the possibility or
impossibility of metaphysics and the determination of the origin as
well as of the extent and limits of this science All this must be done
on the basis of principles
This paththe only one now remaininghas been entered upon by me and
I flatter myself that I have in this way discovered the cause ofand
consequently the mode of removingall the errors which have hitherto
set reason at variance with itself in the sphere of nonempirical
thought I have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of
reason by alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the
mind I have on the contrary examined them completely in the light
of principles and after having discovered the cause of the doubts and
contradictions into which reason fell have solved them to its perfect
satisfaction It is true these questions have not been solved as
dogmatism in its vain fancies and desires had expected for it can
only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts and of these I have
no knowledge But neither do these come within the compass of our mental
powers and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which
had their origin in misconceptions whatever darling hopes and valued
expectations may be ruined by its explanations My chief aim in this
work has been thoroughness and I make bold to say that there is not a
single metaphysical problem that does not find its solution or at
least the key to its solution here Pure reason is a perfect unity and
therefore if the principle presented by it prove to be insufficient for
the solution of even a single one of those questions to which the very
nature of reason gives birth we must reject it as we could not be
perfectly certain of its sufficiency in the case of the others
While I say this I think I see upon the countenance of the reader signs
of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt when he hears declarations
which sound so boastful and extravagant and yet they are beyond
comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest author of
the commonest philosophical programme in which the dogmatist professes
to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul or the necessity of a
primal being Such a dogmatist promises to extend human knowledge beyond
the limits of possible experience while I humbly confess that this
is completely beyond my power Instead of any such attempt I confine
myself to the examination of reason alone and its pure thought and I do
not need to seek far for the sumtotal of its cognition because it
has its seat in my own mind Besides common logic presents me with
a complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple operations of
reason and it is my task to answer the question how far reason can go
without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience
So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the execution
of the present task The aims set before us are not arbitrarily
proposed but are imposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself
The above remarks relate to the matter of our critical inquiry As
regards the form there are two indispensable conditions which any one
who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure reason
is bound to fulfil These conditions are certitude and clearness
As regards certitude I have fully convinced myself that in this sphere
of thought opinion is perfectly inadmissible and that everything which
bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be excluded as of no
value in such discussions For it is a necessary condition of every
cognition that is to be established upon a priori grounds that it shall
be held to be absolutely necessary much more is this the case with an
attempt to determine all pure a priori cognition and to furnish the
standardand consequently an exampleof all apodictic philosophical
certitude Whether I have succeeded in what I professed to do it is for
the reader to determine it is the authors business merely to adduce
grounds and reasons without determining what influence these ought to
have on the mind of his judges But lest anything he may have said may
become the innocent cause of doubt in their minds or tend to weaken the
effect which his arguments might otherwise producehe may be allowed
to point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty
although these do not concern the main purpose of the present work He
does this solely with the view of removing from the mind of the reader
any doubts which might affect his judgement of the work as a whole and
in regard to its ultimate aim
I know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into the
nature of the faculty which we call understanding and at the same time
for the determination of the rules and limits of its use than those
undertaken in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic under
the title of Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding
and they have also cost me by far the greatest labourlabour which I
hope will not remain uncompensated The view there taken which goes
somewhat deeply into the subject has two sides The one relates to the
objects of the pure understanding and is intended to demonstrate and
to render comprehensible the objective validity of its a priori
conceptions and it forms for this reason an essential part of the
Critique The other considers the pure understanding itself its
possibility and its powers of cognitionthat is from a subjective
point of view and although this exposition is of great importance it
does not belong essentially to the main purpose of the work because the
grand question is what and how much can reason and understanding apart
from experience cognize and not how is the faculty of thought itself
possible As the latter is an inquiry into the cause of a given effect
and has thus in it some semblance of an hypothesis although as I shall
show on another occasion this is really not the fact it would seem
that in the present instance I had allowed myself to enounce a mere
opinion and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to hold
a different opinion But I beg to remind him that if my subjective
deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of its certitude
at which I aimed the objective deduction with which alone the present
work is properly concerned is in every respect satisfactory
As regards clearness the reader has a right to demand in the first
place discursive or logical clearness that is on the basis of
conceptions and secondly intuitive or aesthetic clearness by means
of intuitions that is by examples or other modes of illustration
in concreto I have done what I could for the first kind of
intelligibility This was essential to my purpose and it thus became
the accidental cause of my inability to do complete justice to the
second requirement I have been almost always at a loss during the
progress of this work how to settle this question Examples and
illustrations always appeared to me necessary and in the first sketch
of the Critique naturally fell into their proper places But I very
soon became aware of the magnitude of my task and the numerous problems
with which I should be engaged and as I perceived that this critical
investigation would even if delivered in the driest scholastic manner
be far from being brief I found it unadvisable to enlarge it still more
with examples and explanations which are necessary only from a popular
point of view I was induced to take this course from the consideration
also that the present work is not intended for popular use that those
devoted to science do not require such helps although they are always
acceptable and that they would have materially interfered with my
present purpose Abbe Terrasson remarks with great justice that if we
estimate the size of a work not from the number of its pages but from
the time which we require to make ourselves master of it it may be said
of many a book that it would be much shorter if it were not so short
On the other hand as regards the comprehensibility of a system of
speculative cognition connected under a single principle we may say
with equal justice many a book would have been much clearer if it had
not been intended to be so very clear For explanations and examples
and other helps to intelligibility aid us in the comprehension of
parts but they distract the attention dissipate the mental power of
the reader and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of
the whole as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system
and the colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his
observing its articulation or organizationwhich is the most important
consideration with him when he comes to judge of its unity and
stability
The reader must naturally have a strong inducement to cooperate
with the present author if he has formed the intention of erecting a
complete and solid edifice of metaphysical science according to the
plan now laid before him Metaphysics as here represented is the only
science which admits of completionand with little labour if it
is united in a short time so that nothing will be left to
future generations except the task of illustrating and applying it
didactically For this science is nothing more than the inventory of all
that is given us by pure reason systematically arranged Nothing can
escape our notice for what reason produces from itself cannot lie
concealed but must be brought to the light by reason itself so soon
as we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek The
perfect unity of this kind of cognitions which are based upon pure
conceptions and uninfluenced by any empirical element or any peculiar
intuition leading to determinate experience renders this completeness
not only practicable but also necessary
Tecum habita et noris quam sit tibi curta supellex
Persius Satirae iv 52
Such a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to publish
under the title of Metaphysic of Nature The content of this work
which will not be half so long will be very much richer than that
of the present Critique which has to discover the sources of this
cognition and expose the conditions of its possibility and at the same
time to clear and level a fit foundation for the scientific edifice In
the present work I look for the patient hearing and the impartiality
of a judge in the other for the goodwill and assistance of a
colabourer For however complete the list of principles for this
system may be in the Critique the correctness of the system requires
that no deduced conceptions should be absent These cannot be presented
a priori but must be gradually discovered and while the synthesis of
conceptions has been fully exhausted in the Critique it is necessary
that in the proposed work the same should be the case with their
analysis But this will be rather an amusement than a labour
Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within
the province of pure reason advances with that undeviating certainty
which characterizes the progress of science we shall be at no loss to
determine If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits
unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought
to follow if we find them after the most elaborate preparations
invariably brought to a stand before the goal is reached and compelled
to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths we may then feel
quite sure that they are far from having attained to the certainty of
scientific progress and may rather be said to be merely groping about in
the dark In these circumstances we shall render an important service to
reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must
travel in order to arrive at any resultseven if it should be found
necessary to abandon many of those aims which without reflection have
been proposed for its attainment
That logic has advanced in this sure course even from the earliest
times is apparent from the fact that since Aristotle it has been
unable to advance a step and thus to all appearance has reached its
completion For if some of the moderns have thought to enlarge its
domain by introducing psychological discussions on the mental faculties
such as imagination and wit metaphysical discussions on the origin
of knowledge and the different kinds of certitude according to
the difference of the objects idealism scepticism and so on or
anthropological discussions on prejudices their causes and remedies
this attempt on the part of these authors only shows their ignorance
of the peculiar nature of logical science We do not enlarge but
disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respective limits and
allow them to run into one another Now logic is enclosed within limits
which admit of perfectly clear definition it is a science which has for
its object nothing but the exposition and proof of the formal laws of
all thought whether it be a priori or empirical whatever be its
origin or its object and whatever the difficultiesnatural or
accidentalwhich it encounters in the human mind
The early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the
narrowness of its field in which abstraction may or rather must
be made of all the objects of cognition with their characteristic
distinctions and in which the understanding has only to deal with
itself and with its own forms It is obviously a much more difficult
task for reason to strike into the sure path of science where it has to
deal not simply with itself but with objects external to itself Hence
logic is properly only a propaedeuticforms as it were the vestibule
of the sciences and while it is necessary to enable us to form a
correct judgement with regard to the various branches of knowledge
still the acquisition of real substantive knowledge is to be sought
only in the sciences properly so called that is in the objective
sciences
Now these sciences if they can be termed rational at all must contain
elements of a priori cognition and this cognition may stand in a
twofold relation to its object Either it may have to determine the
conception of the objectwhich must be supplied extraneously or it
may have to establish its reality The former is theoretical the latter
practical rational cognition In both the pure or a priori element
must be treated first and must be carefully distinguished from that
which is supplied from other sources Any other method can only lead to
irremediable confusion
Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical sciences which have to
determine their objects a priori The former is purely a priori the
latter is partially so but is also dependent on other sources of
cognition
In the earliest times of which history affords us any record
mathematics had already entered on the sure course of science among
that wonderful nation the Greeks Still it is not to be supposed that
it was as easy for this science to strike into or rather to construct
for itself that royal road as it was for logic in which reason has
only to deal with itself On the contrary I believe that it must
have remained longchiefly among the Egyptiansin the stage of
blind groping after its true aims and destination and that it was
revolutionized by the happy idea of one man who struck out and
determined for all time the path which this science must follow
and which admits of an indefinite advancement The history of this
intellectual revolutionmuch more important in its results than the
discovery of the passage round the celebrated Cape of Good Hopeand of
its author has not been preserved But Diogenes Laertius in naming
the supposed discoverer of some of the simplest elements of geometrical
demonstrationelements which according to the ordinary opinion do not
even require to be provedmakes it apparent that the change introduced
by the first indication of this new path must have seemed of the utmost
importance to the mathematicians of that age and it has thus been
secured against the chance of oblivion A new light must have flashed on
the mind of the first man Thales or whatever may have been his name
who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle For he found
that it was not sufficient to meditate on the figure as it lay before
his eyes or the conception of it as it existed in his mind and thus
endeavour to get at the knowledge of its properties but that it was
necessary to produce these properties as it were by a positive a
priori construction and that in order to arrive with certainty at
a priori cognition he must not attribute to the object any other
properties than those which necessarily followed from that which he had
himself in accordance with his conception placed in the object
A much longer period elapsed before physics entered on the highway of
science For it is only about a century and a half since the wise Bacon
gave a new direction to physical studies or ratheras others were
already on the right trackimparted fresh vigour to the pursuit of
this new direction Here too as in the case of mathematics we find
evidence of a rapid intellectual revolution In the remarks which follow
I shall confine myself to the empirical side of natural science
When Galilei experimented with balls of a definite weight on the
inclined plane when Torricelli caused the air to sustain a weight which
he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite column of
water or when Stahl at a later period converted metals into lime and
reconverted lime into metal by the addition and subtraction of certain
elements a light broke upon all natural philosophers They
learned that reason only perceives that which it produces after its
own design that it must not be content to follow as it were in the
leadingstrings of nature but must proceed in advance with principles
of judgement according to unvarying laws and compel nature to reply
its questions For accidental observations made according to no
preconceived plan cannot be united under a necessary law But it is
this that reason seeks for and requires It is only the principles of
reason which can give to concordant phenomena the validity of laws and
it is only when experiment is directed by these rational principles that
it can have any real utility Reason must approach nature with the view
indeed of receiving information from it not however in the character
of a pupil who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him
but in that of a judge who compels the witnesses to reply to those
questions which he himself thinks fit to propose To this single idea
must the revolution be ascribed by which after groping in the dark for
so many centuries natural science was at length conducted into the path
of certain progress
We come now to metaphysics a purely speculative science which occupies
a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of the
teachings of experience It deals with mere conceptionsnot like
mathematics with conceptions applied to intuitionand in it reason is
the pupil of itself alone It is the oldest of the sciences and would
still survive even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of
an alldestroying barbarism But it has not yet had the good fortune to
attain to the sure scientific method This will be apparent if we
apply the tests which we proposed at the outset We find that reason
perpetually comes to a stand when it attempts to gain a priori the
perception even of those laws which the most common experience confirms
We find it compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable instances and
to abandon the path on which it had entered because this does not
lead to the desired result We find too that those who are engaged in
metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves
but that on the contrary this science appears to furnish an arena
specially adapted for the display of skill or the exercise of strength
in mockcontestsa field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in
gaining an inch of ground in which at least no victory was ever yet
crowned with permanent possession
This leads us to inquire why it is that in metaphysics the sure path
of science has not hitherto been found Shall we suppose that it is
impossible to discover it Why then should nature have visited our
reason with restless aspirations after it as if it were one of our
weightiest concerns Nay more how little cause should we have to place
confidence in our reason if it abandons us in a matter about which
most of all we desire to know the truthand not only so but even
allures us to the pursuit of vain phantoms only to betray us in the
end Or if the path has only hitherto been missed what indications do
we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation and to enable us to
hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot of our predecessors
It appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural
philosophy which as we have seen were brought into their present
condition by a sudden revolution are sufficiently remarkable to fix our
attention on the essential circumstances of the change which has proved
so advantageous to them and to induce us to make the experiment of
imitating them so far as the analogy which as rational sciences they
bear to metaphysics may permit It has hitherto been assumed that our
cognition must conform to the objects but all attempts to ascertain
anything about these objects a priori by means of conceptions and thus
to extend the range of our knowledge have been rendered abortive by
this assumption Let us then make the experiment whether we may not
be more successful in metaphysics if we assume that the objects must
conform to our cognition This appears at all events to accord better
with the possibility of our gaining the end we have in view that is to
say of arriving at the cognition of objects a priori of determining
something with respect to these objects before they are given to us We
here propose to do just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain
the celestial movements When he found that he could make no progress by
assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator
he reversed the process and tried the experiment of assuming that the
spectator revolved while the stars remained at rest We may make
the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects If the
intuition must conform to the nature of the objects I do not see how
we can know anything of them a priori If on the other hand the object
conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition I can then easily
conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge Now as I cannot
rest in the mere intuitions butif they are to become cognitionsmust
refer them as representations to something as object and must
determine the latter by means of the former here again there are two
courses open to me Either first I may assume that the conceptions
by which I effect this determination conform to the objectand in this
case I am reduced to the same perplexity as before or secondly I may
assume that the objects or which is the same thing that experience
in which alone as given objects they are cognized conform to my
conceptionsand then I am at no loss how to proceed For experience
itself is a mode of cognition which requires understanding Before
objects are given to me that is a priori I must presuppose in myself
laws of the understanding which are expressed in conceptions a
priori To these conceptions then all the objects of experience must
necessarily conform Now there are objects which reason thinks and
that necessarily but which cannot be given in experience or at least
cannot be given so as reason thinks them The attempt to think these
objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method of
thought which we have adopted and which is based on the principle that
we only cognize in things a priori that which we ourselves place in
them
This attempt succeeds as well as we could desire and promises to
metaphysics in its first partthat is where it is occupied with
conceptions a priori of which the corresponding objects may be given in
experiencethe certain course of science For by this new method we are
enabled perfectly to explain the possibility of a priori cognition and
what is more to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws which lie a
priori at the foundation of nature as the sum of the objects of
experienceneither of which was possible according to the procedure
hitherto followed But from this deduction of the faculty of a priori
cognition in the first part of metaphysics we derive a surprising
result and one which to all appearance militates against the great
end of metaphysics as treated in the second part For we come to the
conclusion that our faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the
limits of possible experience and yet this is precisely the most
essential object of this science The estimate of our rational cognition
a priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phenomena
and that things in themselves while possessing a real existence
lie beyond its sphere Here we are enabled to put the justice of this
estimate to the test For that which of necessity impels us to transcend
the limits of experience and of all phenomena is the unconditioned
which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves
in order to complete the series of conditions Now if it appears that
when on the one hand we assume that our cognition conforms to its
objects as things in themselves the unconditioned cannot be thought
without contradiction and that when on the other hand we assume that
our representation of things as they are given to us does not conform
to these things as they are in themselves but that these objects as
phenomena conform to our mode of representation the contradiction
disappears we shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we
began by assuming for the sake of experiment we may look upon it as
established that the unconditioned does not lie in things as we
know them or as they are given to us but in things as they are in
themselves beyond the range of our cognition
But after we have thus denied the power of speculative reason to make
any progress in the sphere of the supersensible it still remains for
our consideration whether data do not exist in practical cognition
which may enable us to determine the transcendent conception of the
unconditioned to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience
from a practical point of view and thus to satisfy the great ends of
metaphysics Speculative reason has thus at least made room for such
an extension of our knowledge and if it must leave this space vacant
still it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up if we can
by means of practical datanay it even challenges us to make the
attempt
This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure
of metaphysics after the example of the geometricians and natural
philosophers constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative
Reason It is a treatise on the method to be followed not a system of
the science itself But at the same time it marks out and defines both
the external boundaries and the internal structure of this science
For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity that in choosing the
various objects of thought it is able to define the limits of its own
faculties and even to give a complete enumeration of the possible
modes of proposing problems to itself and thus to sketch out the entire
system of metaphysics For on the one hand in cognition a priori
nothing must be attributed to the objects but what the thinking subject
derives from itself and on the other hand reason is in regard to
the principles of cognition a perfectly distinct independent unity in
which as in an organized body every member exists for the sake of
the others and all for the sake of each so that no principle can be
viewed with safety in one relationship unless it is, at the same
time, viewed in relation to the total use of pure reason Hence too
metaphysics has this singular advantagean advantage which falls to the
lot of no other science which has to do with objectsthat if once it
is conducted into the sure path of science by means of this criticism
it can then take in the whole sphere of its cognitions and can thus
complete its work and leave it for the use of posterity as a capital
which can never receive fresh accessions For metaphysics has to deal
only with principles and with the limitations of its own employment as
determined by these principles To this perfection it is therefore
bound as the fundamental science to attain and to it the maxim may
justly be applied
Nil actum reputans si quid superesset agendum
But it will be asked what kind of a treasure is this that we propose
to bequeath to posterity What is the real value of this system of
metaphysics purified by criticism and thereby reduced to a permanent
condition A cursory view of the present work will lead to the
supposition that its use is merely negative that it only serves to
warn us against venturing with speculative reason beyond the limits
of experience This is in fact its primary use But this at once
assumes a positive value when we observe that the principles with which
speculative reason endeavours to transcend its limits lead inevitably
not to the extension but to the contraction of the use of reason
inasmuch as they threaten to extend the limits of sensibility which
is their proper sphere over the entire realm of thought and thus
to supplant the pure practical use of reason So far then as this
criticism is occupied in confining speculative reason within its proper
bounds it is only negative but inasmuch as it thereby at the same
time removes an obstacle which impedes and even threatens to destroy
the use of practical reason it possesses a positive and very important
value In order to admit this we have only to be convinced that there
is an absolutely necessary use of pure reasonthe moral usein which
it inevitably transcends the limits of sensibility without the aid
of speculation requiring only to be insured against the effects of a
speculation which would involve it in contradiction with itself To deny
the positive advantage of the service which this criticism renders
us would be as absurd as to maintain that the system of police is
productive of no positive benefit since its main business is to prevent
the violence which citizen has to apprehend from citizen that so each
may pursue his vocation in peace and security That space and time are
only forms of sensible intuition and hence are only conditions of the
existence of things as phenomena that moreover we have no conceptions
of the understanding and consequently no elements for the cognition
of things except in so far as a corresponding intuition can be given
to these conceptions that accordingly we can have no cognition of
an object as a thing in itself but only as an object of sensible
intuition that is as phenomenonall this is proved in the analytical
part of the Critique and from this the limitation of all possible
speculative cognition to the mere objects of experience follows as a
necessary result At the same time it must be carefully borne in mind
that while we surrender the power of cognizing we still reserve the
power of thinking objects as things in themselves For otherwise
we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance without
something that appearswhich would be absurd Now let us suppose for a
moment that we had not undertaken this criticism and accordingly
had not drawn the necessary distinction between things as objects
of experience and things as they are in themselves The principle of
causality and by consequence the mechanism of nature as determined by
causality would then have absolute validity in relation to all things
as efficient causes I should then be unable to assert with regard to
one and the same being eg the human soul that its will is free and
yet at the same time subject to natural necessity that is not free
without falling into a palpable contradiction for in both propositions
I should take the soul in the same signification as a thing in general
as a thing in itselfas without previous criticism I could not but
take it Suppose now on the other hand that we have undertaken this
criticism and have learnt that an object may be taken in two senses
first as a phenomenon secondly as a thing in itself and that
according to the deduction of the conceptions of the understanding the
principle of causality has reference only to things in the first sense
We then see how it does not involve any contradiction to assert on the
one hand that the will in the phenomenal spherein visible actionis
necessarily obedient to the law of nature and in so far not free
and on the other hand that as belonging to a thing in itself it is
not subject to that law and accordingly is free Now it is true that
I cannot by means of speculative reason and still less by empirical
observation cognize my soul as a thing in itself and consequently
cannot cognize liberty as the property of a being to which I ascribe
effects in the world of sense For to do so I must cognize this being
as existing and yet not in time whichsince I cannot support my
conception by any intuitionis impossible At the same time while
I cannot cognize I can quite well think freedom that is to say my
representation of it involves at least no contradiction if we bear in
mind the critical distinction of the two modes of representation the
sensible and the intellectual and the consequent limitation of the
conceptions of the pure understanding and of the principles which flow
from them Suppose now that morality necessarily presupposed liberty
in the strictest sense as a property of our will suppose that reason
contained certain practical original principles a priori which were
absolutely impossible without this presupposition and suppose at the
same time that speculative reason had proved that liberty was
incapable of being thought at all It would then follow that the
moral presupposition must give way to the speculative affirmation the
opposite of which involves an obvious contradiction and that liberty
and with it morality must yield to the mechanism of nature for
the negation of morality involves no contradiction except on the
presupposition of liberty Now morality does not require the speculative
cognition of liberty it is enough that I can think it that its
conception involves no contradiction that it does not interfere with
the mechanism of nature But even this requirement we could not satisfy
if we had not learnt the twofold sense in which things may be taken and
it is only in this way that the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of
nature are confined within their proper limits For this result
then we are indebted to a criticism which warns us of our unavoidable
ignorance with regard to things in themselves and establishes the
necessary limitation of our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena
The positive value of the critical principles of pure reason in relation
to the conception of God and of the simple nature of the soul admits of
a similar exemplification but on this point I shall not dwell I
cannot even make the assumptionas the practical interests of
morality requireof God freedom and immortality if I do not deprive
speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight For to
arrive at these it must make use of principles which in fact extend
only to the objects of possible experience and which cannot be applied
to objects beyond this sphere without converting them into phenomena
and thus rendering the practical extension of pure reason impossible
I must therefore abolish knowledge to make room for belief The
dogmatism of metaphysics that is the presumption that it is possible
to advance in metaphysics without previous criticism is the true source
of the unbelief always dogmatic which militates against morality
Thus while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy
to posterity in the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in
accordance with the Critique of Pure Reason still the value of such a
bequest is not to be depreciated It will render an important service
to reason by substituting the certainty of scientific method for that
random groping after results without the guidance of principles which
has hitherto characterized the pursuit of metaphysical studies It will
render an important service to the inquiring mind of youth by leading
the student to apply his powers to the cultivation of genuine science
instead of wasting them as at present on speculations which can never
lead to any result or on the idle attempt to invent new ideas and
opinions But above all it will confer an inestimable benefit on
morality and religion by showing that all the objections urged against
them may be silenced for ever by the Socratic method that is to say by
proving the ignorance of the objector For as the world has never been
and no doubt never will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind
or another it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to
render it powerless for harm by closing up the sources of error
This important change in the field of the sciences this loss of its
fancied possessions to which speculative reason must submit does not
prove in any way detrimental to the general interests of humanity The
advantages which the world has derived from the teachings of pure reason
are not at all impaired The loss falls in its whole extent on the
monopoly of the schools but does not in the slightest degree touch the
interests of mankind I appeal to the most obstinate dogmatist whether
the proof of the continued existence of the soul after death derived
from the simplicity of its substance of the freedom of the will in
opposition to the general mechanism of nature drawn from the subtle but
impotent distinction of subjective and objective practical necessity
or of the existence of God deduced from the conception of an ens
realissimumthe contingency of the changeable and the necessity of
a prime mover has ever been able to pass beyond the limits of the
schools to penetrate the public mind or to exercise the slightest
influence on its convictions It must be admitted that this has not been
the case and that owing to the unfitness of the common understanding
for such subtle speculations it can never be expected to take place On
the contrary it is plain that the hope of a future life arises from the
feeling which exists in the breast of every man that the temporal
is inadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature In like
manner it cannot be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties
in opposition to all the claims of inclination gives rise to the
consciousness of freedom and that the glorious order beauty and
providential care everywhere displayed in nature give rise to the
belief in a wise and great Author of the Universe Such is the genesis
of these general convictions of mankind so far as they depend on
rational grounds and this public property not only remains undisturbed
but is even raised to greater importance by the doctrine that the
schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a more profound insight
into a matter of general human concernment than that to which the great
mass of men ever held by us in the highest estimation can without
difficulty attain and that the schools should therefore confine
themselves to the elaboration of these universally comprehensible and
from a moral point of view amply satisfactory proofs The change
therefore affects only the arrogant pretensions of the schools which
would gladly retain in their own exclusive possession the key to the
truths which they impart to the public
Quod mecum nescit solus vult scire videri
At the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of
his just title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits the
public without its knowledgeI mean the Critique of Pure Reason This
can never become popular and indeed has no occasion to be so for
finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little
impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought
against these truths On the other hand since both inevitably force
themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation it
becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon a thorough
investigation of the rights of speculative reason and thus to prevent
the scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure sooner or later
to cause even to the masses It is only by criticism that metaphysicians
and as such theologians too can be saved from these controversies
and from the consequent perversion of their doctrines Criticism
alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism fatalism atheism
freethinking fanaticism and superstition which are universally
injuriousas well as of idealism and scepticism which are dangerous
to the schools but can scarcely pass over to the public If governments
think proper to interfere with the affairs of the learned it would be
more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science as well
as for those of society to favour a criticism of this kind by which
alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis than to
support the ridiculous despotism of the schools which raise a loud cry
of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs of which the
public has never taken any notice and the loss of which therefore it
can never feel
This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason
in pure cognition for pure cognition must always be dogmatic that is
must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles a prioribut to
dogmatism that is to the presumption that it is possible to make
any progress with a pure cognition derived from philosophical
conceptions according to the principles which reason has long been in
the habit of employingwithout first inquiring in what way and by what
right reason has come into the possession of these principles Dogmatism
is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism
of its own powers and in opposing this procedure we must not be
supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which
arrogates to itself the name of popularity nor yet to scepticism which
makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics On the contrary
our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific
system of metaphysics which must perform its task entirely a priori to
the complete satisfaction of speculative reason and must therefore
be treated not popularly but scholastically In carrying out the
plan which the Critique prescribes that is in the future system
of metaphysics we must have recourse to the strict method of the
celebrated Wolf the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers He was the
first to point out the necessity of establishing fixed principles of
clearly defining our conceptions and of subjecting our demonstrations
to the most severe scrutiny instead of rashly jumping at conclusions
The example which he set served to awaken that spirit of profound and
thorough investigation which is not yet extinct in Germany He would
have been peculiarly well fitted to give a truly scientific character to
metaphysical studies had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a
criticism of the organum that is of pure reason itself That he failed
to perceive the necessity of such a procedure must be ascribed to the
dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age and on this point
the philosophers of his time as well as of all previous times have
nothing to reproach each other with Those who reject at once the method
of Wolf and of the Critique of Pure Reason can have no other aim
but to shake off the fetters of science to change labour into sport
certainty into opinion and philosophy into philodoxy
In this second edition I have endeavoured as far as possible to
remove the difficulties and obscurity which without fault of mine
perhaps have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute
thinkers In the propositions themselves and in the demonstrations by
which they are supported as well as in the form and the entire plan of
the work I have found nothing to alter which must be attributed
partly to the long examination to which I had subjected the whole before
offering it to the public and partly to the nature of the case For pure
speculative reason is an organic structure in which there is nothing
isolated or independent but every Single part is essential to all the
rest and hence the slightest imperfection whether defect or positive
error could not fail to betray itself in use I venture further to
hope that this system will maintain the same unalterable character for
the future I am led to entertain this confidence not by vanity but by
the evidence which the equality of the result affords when we proceed
first from the simplest elements up to the complete whole of pure
reason and and then backwards from the whole to each part We find
that the attempt to make the slightest alteration in any part leads
inevitably to contradictions not merely in this system but in
human reason itself At the same time there is still much room for
improvement in the exposition of the doctrines contained in this work
In the present edition I have endeavoured to remove misapprehensions of
the aesthetical part especially with regard to the conception of time
to clear away the obscurity which has been found in the deduction of
the conceptions of the understanding to supply the supposed want of
sufficient evidence in the demonstration of the principles of the pure
understanding and lastly to obviate the misunderstanding of the
paralogisms which immediately precede the rational psychology Beyond
this pointthe end of the second main division of the Transcendental
DialecticI have not extended my alterations partly from want
of time and partly because I am not aware that any portion of the
remainder has given rise to misconceptions among intelligent and
impartial critics whom I do not here mention with that praise which is
their due but who will find that their suggestions have been attended
to in the work itself
In attempting to render the exposition of my views as intelligible as
possible I have been compelled to leave out or abridge various passages
which were not essential to the completeness of the work but which many
readers might consider useful in other respects and might be unwilling
to miss This trifling loss which could not be avoided without swelling
the book beyond due limits may be supplied at the pleasure of the
reader by a comparison with the first edition and will I hope be
more than compensated for by the greater clearness of the exposition as
it now stands
I have observed with pleasure and thankfulness in the pages of
various reviews and treatises that the spirit of profound and thorough
investigation is not extinct in Germany though it may have been
overborne and silenced for a time by the fashionable tone of a licence
in thinking which gives itself the airs of genius and that the
difficulties which beset the paths of criticism have not prevented
energetic and acute thinkers from making themselves masters of the
science of pure reason to which these paths conducta science which is
not popular but scholastic in its character and which alone can hope
for a lasting existence or possess an abiding value To these deserving
men who so happily combine profundity of view with a talent for lucid
expositiona talent which I myself am not conscious of possessingI
leave the task of removing any obscurity which may still adhere to the
statement of my doctrines For in this case the danger is not that
of being refuted but of being misunderstood For my own part I must
henceforward abstain from controversy although I shall carefully attend
to all suggestions whether from friends or adversaries which may be
of use in the future elaboration of the system of this propaedeutic As
during these labours I have advanced pretty far in years this month
I reach my sixtyfourth yearit will be necessary for me to economize
time if I am to carry out my plan of elaborating the metaphysics of
nature as well as of morals in confirmation of the correctness of the
principles established in this Critique of Pure Reason both speculative
and practical and I must therefore leave the task of clearing up the
obscurities of the present workinevitable perhaps at the outsetas
well as the defence of the whole to those deserving men who have made
my system their own A philosophical system cannot come forward armed
at all points like a mathematical treatise and hence it may be quite
possible to take objection to particular passages while the organic
structure of the system considered as a unity has no danger to
apprehend But few possess the ability and still fewer the inclination
to take a comprehensive view of a new system By confining the view to
particular passages taking these out of their connection and comparing
them with one another it is easy to pick out apparent contradictions
especially in a work written with any freedom of style These
contradictions place the work in an unfavourable light in the eyes of
those who rely on the judgement of others but are easily reconciled
by those who have mastered the idea of the whole If a theory possesses
stability in itself the action and reaction which seemed at first to
threaten its existence serve only in the course of time to smooth
down any superficial roughness or inequality andif men of insight
impartiality and truly popular gifts turn their attention to itto
secure to it in a short time the requisite elegance also
Konigsberg April 1787
That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt For
how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into
exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses and
partly of themselves produce representations partly rouse our powers
of understanding into activity to compare to connect or to separate
these and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions
into a knowledge of objects which is called experience In respect of
time therefore no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience but
begins with it
But though all our knowledge begins with experience it by no means
follows that all arises out of experience For on the contrary it is
quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which
we receive through impressions and that which the faculty of cognition
supplies from itself sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion
an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given
by sense till long practice has made us attentive to and skilful
in separating it It is therefore a question which requires close
investigation and not to be answered at first sight whether there
exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience and even of
all sensuous impressions Knowledge of this kind is called a priori
in contradistinction to empirical knowledge which has its sources a
posteriori that is in experience
But the expression a priori is not as yet definite enough adequately
to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started For in
speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience we are wont
to say that this or that may be known a priori because we do not
derive this knowledge immediately from experience but from a general
rule which however we have itself borrowed from experience Thus
if a man undermined his house we say he might know a priori that
it would have fallen that is he needed not to have waited for the
experience that it did actually fall But still a priori he could not
know even this much For that bodies are heavy and consequently that
they fall when their supports are taken away must have been known to
him previously by means of experience
By the term knowledge a priori therefore we shall in the sequel
understand not such as is independent of this or that kind of
experience but such as is absolutely so of all experience Opposed
to this is empirical knowledge or that which is possible only a
posteriori that is through experience Knowledge a priori is either
pure or impure Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no empirical
element is mixed up For example the proposition Every change has
a cause is a proposition a priori but impure because change is a
conception which can only be derived from experience
The question now is as to a criterion by which we may securely
distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition Experience no doubt
teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such and such a
manner but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise Now in
the first place if we have a proposition which contains the idea
of necessity in its very conception it is as if moreover it is not
derived from any other proposition unless from one equally involving
the idea of necessity it is absolutely priori Secondly an empirical
judgement never exhibits strict and absolute but only assumed and
comparative universality by induction therefore the most we can say
isso far as we have hitherto observed there is no exception to this
or that rule If on the other hand a judgement carries with it strict
and absolute universality that is admits of no possible exception it
is not derived from experience but is valid absolutely a priori
Empirical universality is therefore only an arbitrary extension of
validity from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid in
most cases to that which is asserted of a proposition which holds good
in all as for example in the affirmation All bodies are heavy
When on the contrary strict universality characterizes a judgement
it necessarily indicates another peculiar source of knowledge namely
a faculty of cognition a priori Necessity and strict universality
therefore are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical
knowledge and are inseparably connected with each other But as in the
use of these criteria the empirical limitation is sometimes more
easily detected than the contingency of the judgement or the unlimited
universality which we attach to a judgement is often a more convincing
proof than its necessity it may be advisable to use the criteria
separately each being by itself infallible
Now that in the sphere of human cognition we have judgements which are
necessary and in the strictest sense universal consequently pure a
priori it will be an easy matter to show If we desire an example from
the sciences we need only take any proposition in mathematics If we
cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the understanding the
proposition Every change must have a cause will amply serve our
purpose In the latter case indeed the conception of a cause so
plainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an
effect and of a strict universality of the law that the very notion of
a cause would entirely disappear were we to derive it like Hume from
a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes and the
habit thence originating of connecting representationsthe necessity
inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective Besides
without seeking for such examples of principles existing a priori
in cognition we might easily show that such principles are the
indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself and
consequently prove their existence a priori For whence could our
experience itself acquire certainty if all the rules on which it
depends were themselves empirical and consequently fortuitous No one
therefore can admit the validity of the use of such rules as first
principles But for the present we may content ourselves with having
established the fact that we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure
a priori cognition and secondly with having pointed out the proper
tests of such cognition namely universality and necessity
Not only in judgements however but even in conceptions is an a
priori origin manifest For example if we take away by degrees from
our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere
sensuous experiencecolour hardness or softness weight even
impenetrabilitythe body will then vanish but the space which it
occupied still remains and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate
in thought Again if we take away in like manner from our empirical
conception of any object corporeal or incorporeal all properties which
mere experience has taught us to connect with it still we cannot think
away those through which we cogitate it as substance or adhering to
substance although our conception of substance is more determined than
that of an object Compelled therefore by that necessity with which
the conception of substance forces itself upon us we must confess that
it has its seat in our faculty of cognition a priori
Of far more importance than all that has been above said is the
consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the
sphere of all possible experience and by means of conceptions to which
there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding object
seem to extend the range of our judgements beyond its bounds And just
in this transcendental or supersensible sphere where experience affords
us neither instruction nor guidance lie the investigations of reason
which on account of their importance we consider far preferable to
and as having a far more elevated aim than all that the understanding
can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phenomena So high a value
do we set upon these investigations that even at the risk of error we
persist in following them out and permit neither doubt nor disregard
nor indifference to restrain us from the pursuit These unavoidable
problems of mere pure reason are God freedom of will and
immortality The science which with all its preliminaries has for its
especial object the solution of these problems is named metaphysicsa
science which is at the very outset dogmatical that is it confidently
takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous
investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an
undertaking
Now the safe ground of experience being thus abandoned it seems
nevertheless natural that we should hesitate to erect a building with
the cognitions we possess without knowing whence they come and on the
strength of principles the origin of which is undiscovered Instead of
thus trying to build without a foundation it is rather to be expected
that we should long ago have put the question how the understanding can
arrive at these a priori cognitions and what is the extent validity
and worth which they may possess We say This is natural enough
meaning by the word natural that which is consistent with a just and
reasonable way of thinking but if we understand by the term that
which usually happens nothing indeed could be more natural and
more comprehensible than that this investigation should be left
long unattempted For one part of our pure knowledge the science of
mathematics has been long firmly established and thus leads us to form
flattering expectations with regard to others though these may be of
quite a different nature Besides when we get beyond the bounds of
experience we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter
and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that
unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction we
hurry on undoubtingly in our course This however may be avoided if
we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions which
are not the less fictions on that account
Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example how far
independently of all experience we may carry our a priori knowledge
It is true that the mathematician occupies himself with objects and
cognitions only in so far as they can be represented by means of
intuition But this circumstance is easily overlooked because the said
intuition can itself be given a priori and therefore is hardly to be
distinguished from a mere pure conception Deceived by such a proof of
the power of reason we can perceive no limits to the extension of our
knowledge The light dove cleaving in free flight the thin air whose
resistance it feels might imagine that her movements would be far
more free and rapid in airless space Just in the same way did Plato
abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to
the understanding venture upon the wings of ideas beyond it into the
void space of pure intellect He did not reflect that he made no real
progress by all his efforts for he met with no resistance which might
serve him for a support as it were whereon to rest and on which he
might apply his powers in order to let the intellect acquire momentum
for its progress It is indeed the common fate of human reason in
speculation to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as
possible and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the
foundation is a solid one or no Arrived at this point all sorts
of excuses are sought after in order to console us for its want of
stability or rather indeed to enable Us to dispense altogether with
so late and dangerous an investigation But what frees us during the
process of building from all apprehension or suspicion and flatters
us into the belief of its solidity is this A great part perhaps the
greatest part of the business of our reason consists in the analysation
of the conceptions which we already possess of objects By this means we
gain a multitude of cognitions which although really nothing more than
elucidations or explanations of that which though in a confused manner
was already thought in our conceptions are at least in respect of
their form prized as new introspections whilst so far as regards
their matter or content we have really made no addition to our
conceptions but only disinvolved them But as this process does furnish
a real priori knowledge which has a sure progress and useful results
reason deceived by this slips in without being itself aware of it
assertions of a quite different kind in which to given conceptions it
adds others a priori indeed but entirely foreign to them without our
knowing how it arrives at these and indeed without such a question
ever suggesting itself I shall therefore at once proceed to examine the
difference between these two modes of knowledge
In all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is
cogitated I mention affirmative judgements only here the application
to negative will be very easy this relation is possible in two
different ways Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as
somewhat which is contained though covertly in the conception A or
the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A although
it stands in connection with it In the first instance I term the
judgement analytical in the second synthetical Analytical judgements
affirmative are therefore those in which the connection of the
predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity those in which
this connection is cogitated without identity are called synthetical
judgements The former may be called explicative the latter
augmentative judgements because the former add in the predicate
nothing to the conception of the subject but only analyse it into its
constituent conceptions which were thought already in the subject
although in a confused manner the latter add to our conceptions of the
subject a predicate which was not contained in it and which no analysis
could ever have discovered therein For example when I say All bodies
are extended this is an analytical judgement For I need not go beyond
the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it but
merely analyse the conception that is become conscious of the manifold
properties which I think in that conception in order to discover this
predicate in it it is therefore an analytical judgement On the other
hand when I say All bodies are heavy the predicate is something
totally different from that which I think in the mere conception of
a body By the addition of such a predicate therefore it becomes a
synthetical judgement
Judgements of experience as such are always synthetical For it would
be absurd to think of grounding an analytical judgement on experience
because in forming such a judgement I need not go out of the sphere of
my conceptions and therefore recourse to the testimony of experience
is quite unnecessary That bodies are extended is not an empirical
judgement but a proposition which stands firm a priori For before
addressing myself to experience I already have in my conception all the
requisite conditions for the judgement and I have only to extract
the predicate from the conception according to the principle of
contradiction and thereby at the same time become conscious of the
necessity of the judgement a necessity which I could never learn from
experience On the other hand though at first I do not at all include
the predicate of weight in my conception of body in general that
conception still indicates an object of experience a part of the
totality of experience to which I can still add other parts and this I
do when I recognize by observation that bodies are heavy I can
cognize beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the
characteristics of extension impenetrability shape etc all which
are cogitated in this conception But now I extend my knowledge and
looking back on experience from which I had derived this conception
of body I find weight at all times connected with the above
characteristics and therefore I synthetically add to my conceptions
this as a predicate and say All bodies are heavy Thus it is
experience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis of
the predicate of weight with the conception of body because both
conceptions although the one is not contained in the other still
belong to one another only contingently however as parts of a whole
namely of experience which is itself a synthesis of intuitions
But to synthetical judgements a priori such aid is entirely wanting If
I go out of and beyond the conception A in order to recognize another
B as connected with it what foundation have I to rest on whereby to
render the synthesis possible I have here no longer the advantage of
looking out in the sphere of experience for what I want Let us take
for example the proposition Everything that happens has a cause In
the conception of something that happens I indeed think an existence
which a certain time antecedes and from this I can derive analytical
judgements But the conception of a cause lies quite out of the above
conception and indicates something entirely different from that which
happens and is consequently not contained in that conception How
then am I able to assert concerning the general conceptionthat which
happenssomething entirely different from that conception and to
recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it yet as
belonging to it and even necessarily what is here the unknown X
upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found out of
the conception A a foreign predicate B which it nevertheless considers
to be connected with it It cannot be experience because the principle
adduced annexes the two representations cause and effect to the
representation existence not only with universality which experience
cannot give but also with the expression of necessity therefore
completely a priori and from pure conceptions Upon such synthetical
that is augmentative propositions depends the whole aim of our
speculative knowledge a priori for although analytical judgements are
indeed highly important and necessary they are so only to arrive at
that clearness of conceptions which is requisite for a sure and extended
synthesis and this alone is a real acquisition
Mathematical judgements are always synthetical Hitherto this fact
though incontestably true and very important in its consequences seems
to have escaped the analysts of the human mind nay to be in
complete opposition to all their conjectures For as it was found that
mathematical conclusions all proceed according to the principle of
contradiction which the nature of every apodictic certainty requires
people became persuaded that the fundamental principles of the science
also were recognized and admitted in the same way But the notion is
fallacious for although a synthetical proposition can certainly be
discerned by means of the principle of contradiction this is possible
only when another synthetical proposition precedes from which the
latter is deduced but never of itself
Before all be it observed that proper mathematical propositions are
always judgements a priori and not empirical because they carry
along with them the conception of necessity which cannot be given by
experience If this be demurred to it matters not I will then limit my
assertion to pure mathematics the very conception of which implies that
it consists of knowledge altogether nonempirical and a priori
We might indeed at first suppose that the proposition 7 5 12 is a
merely analytical proposition following according to the principle of
contradiction from the conception of a sum of seven and five But if we
regard it more narrowly we find that our conception of the sum of seven
and five contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums into one
whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this single number is which
embraces both The conception of twelve is by no means obtained by
merely cogitating the union of seven and five and we may analyse our
conception of such a possible sum as long as we will still we shall
never discover in it the notion of twelve We must go beyond these
conceptions and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds to
one of the twoour five fingers for example or like Segner in his
Arithmetic five points and so by degrees add the units contained in
the five given in the intuition to the conception of seven For I first
take the number 7 and for the conception of 5 calling in the aid of
the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition I add the units which I
before took together to make up the number 5 gradually now by means of
the material image my hand to the number 7 and by this process I
at length see the number 12 arise That 7 should be added to 5 I have
certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum 7 5 but not that
this sum was equal to 12 Arithmetical propositions are therefore always
synthetical of which we may become more clearly convinced by trying
large numbers For it will thus become quite evident that turn and
twist our conceptions as we may it is impossible without having
recourse to intuition to arrive at the sum total or product by means of
the mere analysis of our conceptions Just as little is any principle
of pure geometry analytical A straight line between two points is the
shortest is a synthetical proposition For my conception of straight
contains no notion of quantity but is merely qualitative The
conception of the shortest is therefore fore wholly an addition and by
no analysis can it be extracted from our conception of a straight line
Intuition must therefore here lend its aid by means of which and thus
only our synthesis is possible
Some few principles preposited by geometricians are indeed really
analytical and depend on the principle of contradiction They serve
however like identical propositions as links in the chain of method
not as principlesfor example a a the whole is equal to itself
or ab a the whole is greater than its part And yet even these
principles themselves though they derive their validity from pure
conceptions are only admitted in mathematics because they can be
presented in intuition What causes us here commonly to believe that
the predicate of such apodictic judgements is already contained in our
conception and that the judgement is therefore analytical is merely
the equivocal nature of the expression We must join in thought a
certain predicate to a given conception and this necessity cleaves
already to the conception But the question is not what we must join
in thought to the given conception but what we really think therein
though only obscurely and then it becomes manifest that the predicate
pertains to these conceptions necessarily indeed yet not as thought
in the conception itself but by virtue of an intuition which must be
added to the conception
The science of natural philosophy physics contains in itself
synthetical judgements a priori as principles I shall adduce two
propositions For instance the proposition In all changes of the
material world the quantity of matter remains unchanged or that In
all communication of motion action and reaction must always be equal
In both of these not only is the necessity and therefore their origin
a priori clear but also that they are synthetical propositions For in
the conception of matter I do not cogitate its permanency but merely
its presence in space which it fills I therefore really go out of and
beyond the conception of matter in order to think on to it something
a priori which I did not think in it The proposition is therefore not
analytical but synthetical and nevertheless conceived a priori and so
it is with regard to the other propositions of the pure part of natural
philosophy
As to metaphysics even if we look upon it merely as an attempted
science yet from the nature of human reason an indispensable one we
find that it must contain synthetical propositions a priori It is not
merely the duty of metaphysics to dissect and thereby analytically to
illustrate the conceptions which we form a priori of things but we seek
to widen the range of our a priori knowledge For this purpose we must
avail ourselves of such principles as add something to the original
conceptionsomething not identical with nor contained in it and by
means of synthetical judgements a priori leave far behind us the limits
of experience for example in the proposition the world must have a
beginning and such like Thus metaphysics according to the proper aim
of the science consists merely of synthetical propositions a priori
It is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of
investigations under the formula of a single problem For in this
manner we not only facilitate our own labour inasmuch as we define it
clearly to ourselves but also render it more easy for others to decide
whether we have done justice to our undertaking The proper problem of
pure reason then is contained in the question How are synthetical
judgements a priori possible
That metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so vacillating a
state of uncertainty and contradiction is only to be attributed to the
fact that this great problem and perhaps even the difference between
analytical and synthetical judgements did not sooner suggest itself
to philosophers Upon the solution of this problem or upon sufficient
proof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge a priori depends
the existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics Among
philosophers David Hume came the nearest of all to this problem yet it
never acquired in his mind sufficient precision nor did he regard the
question in its universality On the contrary he stopped short at the
synthetical proposition of the connection of an effect with its cause
principium causalitatis insisting that such proposition a priori
was impossible According to his conclusions then all that we term
metaphysical science is a mere delusion arising from the fancied
insight of reason into that which is in truth borrowed from experience
and to which habit has given the appearance of necessity Against
this assertion destructive to all pure philosophy he would have been
guarded had he had our problem before his eyes in its universality For
he would then have perceived that according to his own argument there
likewise could not be any pure mathematical science which assuredly
cannot exist without synthetical propositions a priorian absurdity
from which his good understanding must have saved him
In the solution of the above problem is at the same time comprehended
the possibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation and
construction of all sciences which contain theoretical knowledge
a priori of objects that is to say the answer to the following
questions
How is pure mathematical science possible
How is pure natural science possible
Respecting these sciences as they do certainly exist it may with
propriety be asked how they are possiblefor that they must be
possible is shown by the fact of their really existing But as to
metaphysics the miserable progress it has hitherto made and the fact
that of no one system yet brought forward far as regards its true
aim can it be said that this science really exists leaves anyone at
liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence
Yet in a certain sense this kind of knowledge must unquestionably be
looked upon as given in other words metaphysics must be considered
as really existing if not as a science nevertheless as a natural
disposition of the human mind metaphysica naturalis For human
reason without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great
knowledge unceasingly progresses urged on by its own feeling of
need towards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical
application of reason or principles derived therefrom and so there
has ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics It will
always exist so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its power
of speculation And now the question arises How is metaphysics as a
natural disposition possible In other words how from the nature
of universal human reason do those questions arise which pure reason
proposes to itself and which it is impelled by its own feeling of need
to answer as well as it can
But as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the questions which
reason is prompted by its very nature to propose to itself for example
whether the world had a beginning or has existed from eternity it has
always met with unavoidable contradictions we must not rest satisfied
with the mere natural disposition of the mind to metaphysics that is
with the existence of the faculty of pure reason whence indeed some
sort of metaphysical system always arises but it must be possible to
arrive at certainty in regard to the question whether we know or do not
know the things of which metaphysics treats We must be able to arrive
at a decision on the subjects of its questions or on the ability or
inability of reason to form any judgement respecting them and therefore
either to extend with confidence the bounds of our pure reason or to
set strictly defined and safe limits to its action This last question
which arises out of the above universal problem would properly run
thus How is metaphysics possible as a science
Thus the critique of reason leads at last naturally and necessarily
to science and on the other hand the dogmatical use of reason without
criticism leads to groundless assertions against which others equally
specious can always be set thus ending unavoidably in scepticism
Besides this science cannot be of great and formidable prolixity
because it has not to do with objects of reason the variety of which is
inexhaustible but merely with Reason herself and her problems problems
which arise out of her own bosom and are not proposed to her by the
nature of outward things but by her own nature And when once Reason
has previously become able completely to understand her own power in
regard to objects which she meets with in experience it will be easy to
determine securely the extent and limits of her attempted application to
objects beyond the confines of experience
We may and must therefore regard the attempts hitherto made to
establish metaphysical science dogmatically as nonexistent For what of
analysis that is mere dissection of conceptions is contained in one
or other is not the aim of but only a preparation for metaphysics
proper which has for its object the extension by means of synthesis
of our a priori knowledge And for this purpose mere analysis is
of course useless because it only shows what is contained in these
conceptions but not how we arrive a priori at them and this it is
her duty to show in order to be able afterwards to determine their
valid use in regard to all objects of experience to all knowledge in
general But little selfdenial indeed is needed to give up these
pretensions seeing the undeniable and in the dogmatic mode of
procedure inevitable contradictions of Reason with herself have long
since ruined the reputation of every system of metaphysics that has
appeared up to this time It will require more firmness to remain
undeterred by difficulty from within and opposition from without from
endeavouring by a method quite opposed to all those hitherto followed
to further the growth and fruitfulness of a science indispensable to
human reasona science from which every branch it has borne may be cut
away but whose roots remain indestructible
From all that has been said there results the idea of a particular
science which may be called the Critique of Pure Reason For reason
is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge a
priori Hence pure reason is the faculty which contains the principles
of cognizing anything absolutely a priori An organon of pure reason
would be a compendium of those principles according to which alone
all pure cognitions a priori can be obtained The completely extended
application of such an organon would afford us a system of pure reason
As this however is demanding a great deal and it is yet doubtful
whether any extension of our knowledge be here possible or if so
in what cases we can regard a science of the mere criticism of pure
reason its sources and limits as the propaedeutic to a system of
pure reason Such a science must not be called a doctrine but only a
critique of pure reason and its use in regard to speculation would be
only negative not to enlarge the bounds of but to purify our reason
and to shield it against errorwhich alone is no little gain I apply
the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied
with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects so
far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori A system of such
conceptions would be called transcendental philosophy But this again
is still beyond the bounds of our present essay For as such a science
must contain a complete exposition not only of our synthetical a priori
but of our analytical a priori knowledge it is of too wide a range for
our present purpose because we do not require to carry our analysis
any farther than is necessary to understand in their full extent the
principles of synthesis a priori with which alone we have to do This
investigation which we cannot properly call a doctrine but only a
transcendental critique because it aims not at the enlargement but
at the correction and guidance of our knowledge and is to serve as a
touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all knowledge a priori is
the sole object of our present essay Such a critique is consequently
as far as possible a preparation for an organon and if this new
organon should be found to fail at least for a canon of pure reason
according to which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason
whether it extend or limit the bounds of that reason might one day
be set forth both analytically and synthetically For that this is
possible nay that such a system is not of so great extent as to
preclude the hope of its ever being completed is evident For we have
not here to do with the nature of outward objects which is infinite
but solely with the mind which judges of the nature of objects and
again with the mind only in respect of its cognition a priori And the
object of our investigations as it is not to be sought without but
altogether within ourselves cannot remain concealed and in all
probability is limited enough to be completely surveyed and fairly
estimated according to its worth or worthlessness Still less let the
reader here expect a critique of books and systems of pure reason our
present object is exclusively a critique of the faculty of pure reason
itself Only when we make this critique our foundation do we possess
a pure touchstone for estimating the philosophical value of ancient
and modern writings on this subject and without this criterion the
incompetent historian or judge decides upon and corrects the groundless
assertions of others with his own which have themselves just as little
foundation
Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science for which the
Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically
that is from principles with a full guarantee for the validity and
stability of all the parts which enter into the building It is the
system of all the principles of pure reason If this Critique itself
does not assume the title of transcendental philosophy it is only
because to be a complete system it ought to contain a full analysis of
all human knowledge a priori Our critique must indeed lay before us a
complete enumeration of all the radical conceptions which constitute the
said pure knowledge But from the complete analysis of these conceptions
themselves as also from a complete investigation of those derived from
them it abstains with reason partly because it would be deviating from
the end in view to occupy itself with this analysis since this process
is not attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the
synthesis to which our critique is entirely devoted and partly because
it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to burden this
essay with the vindication of the completeness of such an analysis and
deduction with which after all we have at present nothing to do This
completeness of the analysis of these radical conceptions as well as
of the deduction from the conceptions a priori which may be given by the
analysis we can however easily attain provided only that we are
in possession of all these radical conceptions which are to serve as
principles of the synthesis and that in respect of this main purpose
nothing is wanting
To the Critique of Pure Reason therefore belongs all that constitutes
transcendental philosophy and it is the complete idea of transcendental
philosophy but still not the science itself because it only proceeds
so far with the analysis as is necessary to the power of judging
completely of our synthetical knowledge a priori
The principal thing we must attend to in the division of the parts of
a science like this is that no conceptions must enter it which contain
aught empirical in other words that the knowledge a priori must be
completely pure Hence although the highest principles and fundamental
conceptions of morality are certainly cognitions a priori yet they do
not belong to transcendental philosophy because though they certainly
do not lay the conceptions of pain pleasure desires inclinations
etc which are all of empirical origin at the foundation of its
precepts yet still into the conception of dutyas an obstacle to
be overcome or as an incitement which should not be made into a
motivethese empirical conceptions must necessarily enter in the
construction of a system of pure morality Transcendental philosophy is
consequently a philosophy of the pure and merely speculative reason
For all that is practical so far as it contains motives relates to
feelings and these belong to empirical sources of cognition
If we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view of
a science in general it ought to comprehend first a Doctrine of the
Elements and secondly a Doctrine of the Method of pure reason Each
of these main divisions will have its subdivisions the separate reasons
for which we cannot here particularize Only so much seems necessary by
way of introduction of premonition that there are two sources of human
knowledge which probably spring from a common but to us unknown root
namely sense and understanding By the former objects are given to
us by the latter thought So far as the faculty of sense may contain
representations a priori which form the conditions under which objects
are given in so far it belongs to transcendental philosophy The
transcendental doctrine of sense must form the first part of our science
of elements because the conditions under which alone the objects
of human knowledge are given must precede those under which they are
thought
In whatsoever mode or by whatsoever means our knowledge may relate
to objects it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it
immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition To this as the
indispensable groundwork all thought points But an intuition can take
place only in so far as the object is given to us This again is only
possible to man at least on condition that the object affect the
mind in a certain manner The capacity for receiving representations
receptivity through the mode in which we are affected by objects
objects is called sensibility By means of sensibility therefore
objects are given to us and it alone furnishes us with intuitions by
the understanding they are thought and from it arise conceptions But
an thought must directly or indirectly by means of certain signs
relate ultimately to intuitions consequently with us to sensibility
because in no other way can an object be given to us
The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation so far as
we are affected by the said object is sensation That sort of intuition
which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical
intuition The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called
phenomenon That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation
I term its matter but that which effects that the content of the
phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations I call its form But
that in which our sensations are merely arranged and by which they are
susceptible of assuming a certain form cannot be itself sensation It
is then the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori
the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind and consequently
can be regarded separately from all sensation
I call all representations pure in the transcendental meaning of
the word wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation And
accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori the pure form of
sensuous intuitions in general in which all the manifold content of the
phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations This
pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition Thus if I take
away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks
as belonging to it as substance force divisibility etc and also
whatever belongs to sensation as impenetrability hardness colour
etc yet there is still something left us from this empirical
intuition namely extension and shape These belong to pure intuition
which exists a priori in the mind as a mere form of sensibility and
without any real object of the senses or any sensation
The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori I call
transcendental aesthetic There must then be such a science
forming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements in
contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure
thought and which is called transcendental logic
In the science of transcendental aesthetic accordingly we shall first
isolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty by separating from it all
that is annexed to its perceptions by the conceptions of understanding
so that nothing be left but empirical intuition In the next place we
shall take away from this intuition all that belongs to sensation
so that nothing may remain but pure intuition and the mere form of
phenomena which is all that the sensibility can afford a priori From
this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of
sensuous intuition as principles of knowledge a priori namely space
and time To the consideration of these we shall now proceed
By means of the external sense a property of the mind we represent
to ourselves objects as without us and these all in space Herein alone
are their shape dimensions and relations to each other determined
or determinable The internal sense by means of which the mind
contemplates itself or its internal state gives indeed no intuition
of the soul as an object yet there is nevertheless a determinate form
under which alone the contemplation of our internal state is possible
so that all which relates to the inward determinations of the mind is
represented in relations of time Of time we cannot have any external
intuition any more than we can have an internal intuition of space
What then are time and space Are they real existences Or are they
merely relations or determinations of things such however as would
equally belong to these things in themselves though they should never
become objects of intuition or are they such as belong only to the
form of intuition and consequently to the subjective constitution of
the mind without which these predicates of time and space could not be
attached to any object In order to become informed on these points
we shall first give an exposition of the conception of space By
exposition I mean the clear though not detailed representation of
that which belongs to a conception and an exposition is metaphysical
when it contains that which represents the conception as given a priori
Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward
experiences For in order that certain sensations may relate to
something without me that is to something which occupies a different
part of space from that in which I am in like manner in order that
I may represent them not merely as without of and near to each other
but also in separate places the representation of space must already
exist as a foundation Consequently the representation of space cannot
be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through experience
but on the contrary this external experience is itself only possible
through the said antecedent representation
Space then is a necessary representation a priori which serves for
the foundation of all external intuitions We never can imagine or make
a representation to ourselves of the nonexistence of space though
we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it It must
therefore be considered as the condition of the possibility of
phenomena and by no means as a determination dependent on them and
is a representation a priori which necessarily supplies the basis for
external phenomena
Space is no discursive or as we say general conception of the
relations of things but a pure intuition For in the first place we
can only represent to ourselves one space and when we talk of divers
spaces we mean only parts of one and the same space Moreover these
parts cannot antecede this one allembracing space as the component
parts from which the aggregate can be made up but can be cogitated only
as existing in it Space is essentially one and multiplicity in it
consequently the general notion of spaces of this or that space
depends solely upon limitations Hence it follows that an a priori
intuition which is not empirical lies at the root of all our
conceptions of space Thus moreover the principles of geometryfor
example that in a triangle two sides together are greater than the
third are never deduced from general conceptions of line and triangle
but from intuition and this a priori with apodictic certainty
Space is represented as an infinite given quantity Now every
conception must indeed be considered as a representation which
is contained in an infinite multitude of different possible
representations which therefore comprises these under itself but
no conception as such can be so conceived as if it contained within
itself an infinite multitude of representations Nevertheless space
is so conceived of for all parts of space are equally capable of being
produced to infinity Consequently the original representation of space
is an intuition a priori and not a conception
By a transcendental exposition I mean the explanation of a conception
as a principle whence can be discerned the possibility of other
synthetical a priori cognitions For this purpose it is requisite
firstly that such cognitions do really flow from the given conception
and secondly that the said cognitions are only possible under the
presupposition of a given mode of explaining this conception
Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space
synthetically and yet a priori What then must be our representation
of space in order that such a cognition of it may be possible It must
be originally intuition for from a mere conception no propositions can
be deduced which go out beyond the conception and yet this happens in
geometry But this intuition must be found in the mind a
priori that is before any perception of objects consequently must be
pure not empirical intuition For geometrical principles are always
apodictic that is united with the consciousness of their necessity
as Space has only three dimensions But propositions of this kind
cannot be empirical judgements nor conclusions from them
Now how can an external intuition anterior to objects themselves and
in which our conception of objects can be determined a priori exist
in the human mind Obviously not otherwise than in so far as it has its
seat in the subject only as the formal capacity of the subjects being
affected by objects and thereby of obtaining immediate representation
that is intuition consequently only as the form of the external sense
in general
Thus it is only by means of our explanation that the possibility of
geometry as a synthetical science a priori becomes comprehensible
Every mode of explanation which does not show us this possibility
although in appearance it may be similar to ours can with the utmost
certainty be distinguished from it by these marks
Space does not represent any property of objects as things in
themselves nor does it represent them in their relations to each other
in other words space does not represent to us any determination of
objects such as attaches to the objects themselves and would remain
even though all subjective conditions of the intuition were abstracted
For neither absolute nor relative determinations of objects can be
intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they belong and
therefore not a priori
Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the external
sense that is the subjective condition of the sensibility under which
alone external intuition is possible Now because the receptivity or
capacity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily antecedes
all intuitions of these objects it is easily understood how the form
of all phenomena can be given in the mind previous to all actual
perceptions therefore a priori and how it as a pure intuition in
which all objects must be determined can contain principles of the
relations of these objects prior to all experience
It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak
of space extended objects etc If we depart from the subjective
condition under which alone we can obtain external intuition or
in other words by means of which we are affected by objects the
representation of space has no meaning whatsoever This predicate is
only applicable to things in so far as they appear to us that is are
objects of sensibility The constant form of this receptivity which
we call sensibility is a necessary condition of all relations in which
objects can be intuited as existing without us and when abstraction of
these objects is made is a pure intuition to which we give the name
of space It is clear that we cannot make the special conditions of
sensibility into conditions of the possibility of things but only of
the possibility of their existence as far as they are phenomena And
so we may correctly say that space contains all which can appear to us
externally but not all things considered as things in themselves
be they intuited or not or by whatsoever subject one will As to the
intuitions of other thinking beings we cannot judge whether they are or
are not bound by the same conditions which limit our own intuition
and which for us are universally valid If we join the limitation of
a judgement to the conception of the subject then the judgement will
possess unconditioned validity For example the proposition All
objects are beside each other in space is valid only under the
limitation that these things are taken as objects of our sensuous
intuition But if I join the condition to the conception and say All
things as external phenomena are beside each other in space then the
rule is valid universally and without any limitation Our expositions
consequently teach the reality ie the objective validity of space
in regard of all which can be presented to us externally as object and
at the same time also the ideality of space in regard to objects when
they are considered by means of reason as things in themselves that is
without reference to the constitution of our sensibility We maintain
therefore the empirical reality of space in regard to all possible
external experience although we must admit its transcendental ideality
in other words that it is nothing so soon as we withdraw the condition
upon which the possibility of all experience depends and look upon space
as something that belongs to things in themselves
But with the exception of space there is no representation subjective
and referring to something external to us which could be called
objective a priori For there are no other subjective representations
from which we can deduce synthetical propositions a priori as we can
from the intuition of space See SS 3 Therefore to speak accurately
no ideality whatever belongs to these although they agree in this
respect with the representation of space that they belong merely to the
subjective nature of the mode of sensuous perception such a mode for
example as that of sight of hearing and of feeling by means of the
sensations of colour sound and heat but which because they are
only sensations and not intuitions do not of themselves give us
the cognition of any object least of all an a priori cognition My
purpose in the above remark is merely this to guard any one
against illustrating the asserted ideality of space by examples quite
insufficient for example by colour taste etc for these must be
contemplated not as properties of things but only as changes in the
subject changes which may be different in different men For in such
a case that which is originally a mere phenomenon a rose for example
is taken by the empirical understanding for a thing in itself though to
every different eye in respect of its colour it may appear different
On the contrary the transcendental conception of phenomena in space is
a critical admonition that in general nothing which is intuited in
space is a thing in itself and that space is not a form which belongs
as a property to things but that objects are quite unknown to us in
themselves and what we call outward objects are nothing else but mere
representations of our sensibility whose form is space but whose
real correlate the thing in itself is not known by means of these
representations nor ever can be but respecting which in experience
no inquiry is ever made
Time is not an empirical conception For neither coexistence nor
succession would be perceived by us if the representation of time did
not exist as a foundation a priori Without this presupposition we could
not represent to ourselves that things exist together at one and the
same time or at different times that is contemporaneously or in
succession
Time is a necessary representation lying at the foundation of all
our intuitions With regard to phenomena in general we cannot think
away time from them and represent them to ourselves as out of and
unconnected with time but we can quite well represent to ourselves time
void of phenomena Time is therefore given a priori In it alone is all
reality of phenomena possible These may all be annihilated in thought
but time itself as the universal condition of their possibility cannot
be so annulled
On this necessity a priori is also founded the possibility of
apodictic principles of the relations of time or axioms of time in
general such as Time has only one dimension Different times are
not coexistent but successive as different spaces are not successive
but coexistent These principles cannot be derived from experience for
it would give neither strict universality nor apodictic certainty We
should only be able to say so common experience teaches us but not
it must be so They are valid as rules through which in general
experience is possible and they instruct us respecting experience and
not by means of it
Time is not a discursive or as it is called general conception but
a pure form of the sensuous intuition Different times are merely parts
of one and the same time But the representation which can only be
given by a single object is an intuition Besides the proposition that
different times cannot be coexistent could not be derived from a general
conception For this proposition is synthetical and therefore cannot
spring out of conceptions alone It is therefore contained immediately
in the intuition and representation of time
The infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every
determined quantity of time is possible only through limitations of one
time lying at the foundation Consequently the original representation
time must be given as unlimited But as the determinate representation
of the parts of time and of every quantity of an object can only be
obtained by limitation the complete representation of time must not
be furnished by means of conceptions for these contain only partial
representations Conceptions on the contrary must have immediate
intuition for their basis
I may here refer to what is said above SS 5 3 where for or sake of
brevity I have placed under the head of metaphysical exposition that
which is properly transcendental Here I shall add that the conception
of change and with it the conception of motion as change of place is
possible only through and in the representation of time that if this
representation were not an intuition internal a priori no conception
of whatever kind could render comprehensible the possibility of change
in other words of a conjunction of contradictorily opposed predicates
in one and the same object for example the presence of a thing in a
place and the nonpresence of the same thing in the same place It
is only in time that it is possible to meet with two contradictorily
opposed determinations in one thing that is after each other Thus
our conception of time explains the possibility of so much synthetical
knowledge a priori as is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion
which is not a little fruitful
Time is not something which subsists of itself or which inheres
in things as an objective determination and therefore remains when
abstraction is made of the subjective conditions of the intuition of
things For in the former case it would be something real yet without
presenting to any power of perception any real object In the latter
case as an order or determination inherent in things themselves it
could not be antecedent to things as their condition nor discerned or
intuited by means of synthetical propositions a priori But all this is
quite possible when we regard time as merely the subjective condition
under which all our intuitions take place For in that case this form
of the inward intuition can be represented prior to the objects and
consequently a priori
Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense that is
of the intuitions of self and of our internal state For time cannot be
any determination of outward phenomena It has to do neither with
shape nor position on the contrary it determines the relation of
representations in our internal state And precisely because this
internal intuition presents to us no shape or form we endeavour to
supply this want by analogies and represent the course of time by a
line progressing to infinity the content of which constitutes a series
which is only of one dimension and we conclude from the properties of
this line as to all the properties of time with this single exception
that the parts of the line are coexistent whilst those of time are
successive From this it is clear also that the representation of time
is itself an intuition because all its relations can be expressed in an
external intuition
Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever
Space as the pure form of external intuition is limited as a condition
a priori to external phenomena alone On the other hand because all
representations whether they have or have not external things for their
objects still in themselves as determinations of the mind belong to
our internal state and because this internal state is subject to the
formal condition of the internal intuition that is to timetime is a
condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoeverthe immediate condition
of all internal and thereby the mediate condition of all external
phenomena If I can say a priori All outward phenomena are in space
and determined a priori according to the relations of space I can
also from the principle of the internal sense affirm universally All
phenomena in general that is all objects of the senses are in time
and stand necessarily in relations of time
If we abstract our internal intuition of ourselves and all external
intuitions possible only by virtue of this internal intuition and
presented to us by our faculty of representation and consequently take
objects as they are in themselves then time is nothing It is only
of objective validity in regard to phenomena because these are things
which we regard as objects of our senses It no longer objective we
make abstraction of the sensuousness of our intuition in other words
of that mode of representation which is peculiar to us and speak of
things in general Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of
our human intuition which is always sensuous that is so far as we
are affected by objects and in itself independently of the mind
or subject is nothing Nevertheless in respect of all phenomena
consequently of all things which come within the sphere of our
experience it is necessarily objective We cannot say All things are
in time because in this conception of things in general we abstract
and make no mention of any sort of intuition of things But this is
the proper condition under which time belongs to our representation
of objects If we add the condition to the conception and say All
things as phenomena that is objects of sensuous intuition are
in time then the proposition has its sound objective validity and
universality a priori
What we have now set forth teaches therefore the empirical reality of
time that is its objective validity in reference to all objects which
can ever be presented to our senses And as our intuition is always
sensuous no object ever can be presented to us in experience which
does not come under the conditions of time On the other hand we deny
to time all claim to absolute reality that is we deny that it without
having regard to the form of our sensuous intuition absolutely inheres
in things as a condition or property Such properties as belong to
objects as things in themselves never can be presented to us through
the medium of the senses Herein consists therefore the transcendental
ideality of time according to which if we abstract the subjective
conditions of sensuous intuition it is nothing and cannot be
reckoned as subsisting or inhering in objects as things in themselves
independently of its relation to our intuition This ideality like that
of space is not to be proved or illustrated by fallacious analogies
with sensations for this reasonthat in such arguments or
illustrations we make the presupposition that the phenomenon in which
such and such predicates inhere has objective reality while in this
case we can only find such an objective reality as is itself empirical
that is regards the object as a mere phenomenon In reference to this
subject see the remark in Section I
Against this theory which grants empirical reality to time but denies
to it absolute and transcendental reality I have heard from intelligent
men an objection so unanimously urged that I conclude that it must
naturally present itself to every reader to whom these considerations
are novel It runs thus Changes are real this the continual change
in our own representations demonstrates even though the existence of
all external phenomena together with their changes is denied Now
changes are only possible in time and therefore time must be something
real But there is no difficulty in answering this I grant the whole
argument Time no doubt is something real that is it is the real
form of our internal intuition It therefore has subjective reality
in reference to our internal experience that is I have really
the representation of time and of my determinations therein Time
therefore is not to be regarded as an object but as the mode of
representation of myself as an object But if I could intuite myself
or be intuited by another being without this condition of sensibility
then those very determinations which we now represent to ourselves as
changes would present to us a knowledge in which the representation
of time and consequently of change would not appear The empirical
reality of time therefore remains as the condition of all our
experience But absolute reality according to what has been said above
cannot be granted it Time is nothing but the form of our internal
intuition If we take away from it the special condition of our
sensibility the conception of time also vanishes and it inheres not
in the objects themselves but solely in the subject or mind which
intuites them
But the reason why this objection is so unanimously brought against
our doctrine of time and that too by disputants who cannot start any
intelligible arguments against the doctrine of the ideality of space
is thisthey have no hope of demonstrating apodictically the absolute
reality of space because the doctrine of idealism is against them
according to which the reality of external objects is not capable of
any strict proof On the other hand the reality of the object of
our internal sense that is myself and my internal state is clear
immediately through consciousness The formerexternal objects in
spacemight be a mere delusion but the latterthe object of my
internal perceptionis undeniably real They do not however reflect
that both without question of their reality as representations belong
only to the genus phenomenon which has always two aspects the one the
object considered as a thing in itself without regard to the mode
of intuiting it and the nature of which remains for this very reason
problematical the other the form of our intuition of the object
which must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself but in
the subject to which it appearswhich form of intuition nevertheless
belongs really and necessarily to the phenomenal object
Time and space are therefore two sources of knowledge from which a
priori various synthetical cognitions can be drawn Of this we find
a striking example in the cognitions of space and its relations which
form the foundation of pure mathematics They are the two pure forms
of all intuitions and thereby make synthetical propositions a priori
possible But these sources of knowledge being merely conditions of our
sensibility do therefore and as such strictly determine their own
range and purpose in that they do not and cannot present objects as
things in themselves but are applicable to them solely in so far as
they are considered as sensuous phenomena The sphere of phenomena is
the only sphere of their validity and if we venture out of this no
further objective use can be made of them For the rest this formal
reality of time and space leaves the validity of our empirical knowledge
unshaken for our certainty in that respect is equally firm whether
these forms necessarily inhere in the things themselves or only in our
intuitions of them On the other hand those who maintain the absolute
reality of time and space whether as essentially subsisting or only
inhering as modifications in things must find themselves at utter
variance with the principles of experience itself For if they decide
for the first view and make space and time into substances this being
the side taken by mathematical natural philosophers they must admit
two selfsubsisting nonentities infinite and eternal which exist yet
without there being anything real for the purpose of containing in
themselves everything that is real If they adopt the second view of
inherence which is preferred by some metaphysical natural philosophers
and regard space and time as relations contiguity in space or
succession in time abstracted from experience though represented
confusedly in this state of separation they find themselves in that
case necessitated to deny the validity of mathematical doctrines a
priori in reference to real things for example in spaceat all
events their apodictic certainty For such certainty cannot be found in
an a posteriori proposition and the conceptions a priori of space and
time are according to this opinion mere creations of the imagination
having their source really in experience inasmuch as out of relations
abstracted from experience imagination has made up something which
contains indeed general statements of these relations yet of which
no application can be made without the restrictions attached thereto by
nature The former of these parties gains this advantage that they
keep the sphere of phenomena free for mathematical science On the other
hand these very conditions space and time embarrass them greatly
when the understanding endeavours to pass the limits of that sphere The
latter has indeed this advantage that the representations of space
and time do not come in their way when they wish to judge of objects
not as phenomena but merely in their relation to the understanding
Devoid however of a true and objectively valid a priori intuition
they can neither furnish any basis for the possibility of mathematical
cognitions a priori nor bring the propositions of experience into
necessary accordance with those of mathematics In our theory of
the true nature of these two original forms of the sensibility both
difficulties are surmounted
In conclusion that transcendental aesthetic cannot contain any more
than these two elementsspace and time is sufficiently obvious from
the fact that all other conceptions appertaining to sensibility
even that of motion which unites in itself both elements presuppose
something empirical Motion for example presupposes the perception
of something movable But space considered in itself contains nothing
movable consequently motion must be something which is found in space
only through experiencein other words an empirical datum In like
manner transcendental aesthetic cannot number the conception of change
among its data a priori for time itself does not change but only
something which is in time To acquire the conception of change
therefore the perception of some existing object and of the succession
of its determinations in one word experience is necessary
In order to prevent any misunderstanding it will be requisite
in the first place to recapitulate as clearly as possible what
our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous
cognition in general We have intended then to say that all our
intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena that
the things which we intuite are not in themselves the same as our
representations of them in intuition nor are their relations in
themselves so constituted as they appear to us and that if we take away
the subject or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in
general then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and
time but even space and time themselves disappear and that these as
phenomena cannot exist in themselves but only in us What may be
the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without
reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us
We know nothing more than our mode of perceiving them which is peculiar
to us and which though not of necessity pertaining to every animated
being is so to the whole human race With this alone we have to do
Space and time are the pure forms thereof sensation the matter The
former alone can we cognize a priori that is antecedent to all actual
perception and for this reason such cognition is called pure intuition
The latter is that in our cognition which is called cognition a
posteriori that is empirical intuition The former appertain
absolutely and necessarily to our sensibility of whatsoever kind our
sensations may be the latter may be of very diversified character
Supposing that we should carry our empirical intuition even to the very
highest degree of clearness we should not thereby advance one step
nearer to a knowledge of the constitution of objects as things in
themselves For we could only at best arrive at a complete cognition
of our own mode of intuition that is of our sensibility and this
always under the conditions originally attaching to the subject namely
the conditions of space and time while the question What are objects
considered as things in themselves remains unanswerable even after the
most thorough examination of the phenomenal world
To say then that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused
representation of things containing exclusively that which belongs
to them as things in themselves and this under an accumulation of
characteristic marks and partial representations which we cannot
distinguish in consciousness is a falsification of the conception
of sensibility and phenomenization which renders our whole doctrine
thereof empty and useless The difference between a confused and a clear
representation is merely logical and has nothing to do with content
No doubt the conception of right as employed by a sound understanding
contains all that the most subtle investigation could unfold from
it although in the ordinary practical use of the word we are not
conscious of the manifold representations comprised in the conception
But we cannot for this reason assert that the ordinary conception is a
sensuous one containing a mere phenomenon for right cannot appear as
a phenomenon but the conception of it lies in the understanding and
represents a property the moral property of actions which belongs to
them in themselves On the other hand the representation in intuition
of a body contains nothing which could belong to an object considered as
a thing in itself but merely the phenomenon or appearance of something
and the mode in which we are affected by that appearance and this
receptivity of our faculty of cognition is called sensibility and
remains toto caelo different from the cognition of an object in itself
even though we should examine the content of the phenomenon to the very
bottom
It must be admitted that the LeibnitzWolfian philosophy has assigned an
entirely erroneous point of view to all investigations into the nature
and origin of our cognitions inasmuch as it regards the distinction
between the sensuous and the intellectual as merely logical whereas
it is plainly transcendental and concerns not merely the clearness
or obscurity but the content and origin of both For the faculty of
sensibility not only does not present us with an indistinct and confused
cognition of objects as things in themselves but in fact gives us no
knowledge of these at all On the contrary so soon as we abstract in
thought our own subjective nature the object represented with the
properties ascribed to it by sensuous intuition entirely disappears
because it was only this subjective nature that determined the form of
the object as a phenomenon
In phenomena we commonly indeed distinguish that which essentially
belongs to the intuition of them and is valid for the sensuous faculty
of every human being from that which belongs to the same intuition
accidentally as valid not for the sensuous faculty in general but for
a particular state or organization of this or that sense Accordingly
we are accustomed to say that the former is a cognition which represents
the object itself whilst the latter presents only a particular
appearance or phenomenon thereof This distinction however is
only empirical If we stop here as is usual and do not regard the
empirical intuition as itself a mere phenomenon as we ought to do in
which nothing that can appertain to a thing in itself is to be found
our transcendental distinction is lost and we believe that we cognize
objects as things in themselves although in the whole range of the
sensuous world investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly
as we may we have to do with nothing but phenomena Thus we call the
rainbow a mere appearance of phenomenon in a sunny shower and the
rain the reality or thing in itself and this is right enough if we
understand the latter conception in a merely physical sense that is
as that which in universal experience and under whatever conditions of
sensuous perception is known in intuition to be so and so determined
and not otherwise But if we consider this empirical datum generally
and inquire without reference to its accordance with all our senses
whether there can be discovered in it aught which represents an object
as a thing in itself the raindrops of course are not such for they
are as phenomena empirical objects the question of the relation of
the representation to the object is transcendental and not only are the
raindrops mere phenomena but even their circular form nay the space
itself through which they fall is nothing in itself but both are mere
modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous intuition
whilst the transcendental object remains for us utterly unknown
The second important concern of our aesthetic is that it does not obtain
favour merely as a plausible hypothesis but possess as undoubted a
character of certainty as can be demanded of any theory which is to
serve for an organon In order fully to convince the reader of this
certainty we shall select a case which will serve to make its validity
apparent and also to illustrate what has been said in SS 3
Suppose then that space and time are in themselves objective and
conditions of thepossibility of objects as things in themselves In
the first place it is evident that both present us with very
many apodictic and synthetic propositions a priori but especially
spaceand for this reason we shall prefer it for investigation at
present As the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically a
priori and with apodictic certainty I inquire Whence do you obtain
propositions of this kind and on what basis does the understanding
rest in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and universally
valid truths
There is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions as such
and these are given either a priori or a posteriori The latter namely
empirical conceptions together with the empirical intuition on which
they are founded cannot afford any synthetical proposition except such
as is itself also empirical that is a proposition of experience But
an empirical proposition cannot possess the qualities of necessity and
absolute universality which nevertheless are the characteristics of
all geometrical propositions As to the first and only means to arrive
at such cognitions namely through mere conceptions or intuitions a
priori it is quite clear that from mere conceptions no synthetical
cognitions but only analytical ones can be obtained Take for
example the proposition Two straight lines cannot enclose a space
and with these alone no figure is possible and try to deduce it
from the conception of a straight line and the number two or take the
proposition It is possible to construct a figure with three straight
lines and endeavour in like manner to deduce it from the mere
conception of a straight line and the number three All your endeavours
are in vain and you find yourself forced to have recourse to intuition
as in fact geometry always does You therefore give yourself an object
in intuition But of what kind is this intuition Is it a pure a
priori or is it an empirical intuition If the latter then neither an
universally valid much less an apodictic proposition can arise from
it for experience never can give us any such proposition You must
therefore give yourself an object a priori in intuition and upon that
ground your synthetical proposition Now if there did not exist within
you a faculty of intuition a priori if this subjective condition were
not in respect to its form also the universal condition a priori under
which alone the object of this external intuition is itself possible
if the object that is the triangle were something in itself without
relation to you the subject how could you affirm that that which
lies necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a
triangle must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself For
to your conceptions of three lines you could not add anything new that
is the figure which therefore must necessarily be found in the
object because the object is given before your cognition and not by
means of it If therefore space and time also were not a mere form
of your intuition which contains conditions a priori under which alone
things can become external objects for you and without which subjective
conditions the objects are in themselves nothing you could not
construct any synthetical proposition whatsoever regarding external
objects It is therefore not merely possible or probable but
indubitably certain that space and time as the necessary conditions
of all our external and internal experience are merely subjective
conditions of all our intuitions in relation to which all objects are
therefore mere phenomena and not things in themselves presented to us
in this particular manner And for this reason in respect to the form
of phenomena much may be said a priori whilst of the thing in itself
which may lie at the foundation of these phenomena it is impossible to
say anything
In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external as
well as internal sense consequently of all objects of sense as mere
phenomena we may especially remark that all in our cognition that
belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations The
feelings of pain and pleasure and the will which are not cognitions
are excepted The relations to wit of place in an intuition
extension change of place motion and laws according to which this
change is determined moving forces That however which is present in
this or that place or any operation going on or result taking place
in the things themselves with the exception of change of place is not
given to us by intuition Now by means of mere relations a thing cannot
be known in itself and it may therefore be fairly concluded that as
through the external sense nothing but mere representations of relations
are given us the said external sense in its representation can contain
only the relation of the object to the subject but not the essential
nature of the object as a thing in itself
The same is the case with the internal intuition not only because
in the internal intuition the representation of the external senses
constitutes the material with which the mind is occupied but because
time in which we place and which itself antecedes the consciousness
of these representations in experience and which as the formal
condition of the mode according to which objects are placed in the mind
lies at the foundation of them contains relations of the successive
the coexistent and of that which always must be coexistent with
succession the permanent Now that which as representation can
antecede every exercise of thought of an object is intuition and
when it contains nothing but relations it is the form of the intuition
which as it presents us with no representation except in so far as
something is placed in the mind can be nothing else than the mode in
which the mind is affected by its own activity to witits presenting
to itself representations consequently the mode in which the mind is
affected by itself that is it can be nothing but an internal sense in
respect to its form Everything that is represented through the medium
of sense is so far phenomenal consequently we must either refuse
altogether to admit an internal sense or the subject which is the
object of that sense could only be represented by it as phenomenon and
not as it would judge of itself if its intuition were pure spontaneous
activity that is were intellectual The difficulty here lies wholly in
the question How can the subject have an internal intuition of itself
But this difficulty is common to every theory The consciousness of
self apperception is the simple representation of the ego and if by
means of that representation alone all the manifold representations in
the subject were spontaneously given then our internal intuition
would be intellectual This consciousness in man requires an internal
perception of the manifold representations which are previously given in
the subject and the manner in which these representations are given in
the mind without spontaneity must on account of this difference
the want of spontaneity be called sensibility If the faculty of
selfconsciousness is to apprehend what lies in the mind it must all
act that and can in this way alone produce an intuition of self But the
form of this intuition which lies in the original constitution of the
mind determines in the representation of time the manner in which the
manifold representations are to combine themselves in the mind
since the subject intuites itself not as it would represent itself
immediately and spontaneously but according to the manner in which the
mind is internally affected consequently as it appears and not as it
is
When we say that the intuition of external objects and also the
selfintuition of the subject represent both objects and subject in
space and time as they affect our senses that is as they appearthis
is by no means equivalent to asserting that these objects are mere
illusory appearances For when we speak of things as phenomena the
objects nay even the properties which we ascribe to them are looked
upon as really given only that in so far as this or that property
depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject in the relation
of the given object to the subject the object as phenomenon is to be
distinguished from the object as a thing in itself Thus I do not say
that bodies seem or appear to be external to me or that my soul seems
merely to be given in my selfconsciousness although I maintain that
the properties of space and time in conformity to which I set both as
the condition of their existence abide in my mode of intuition and not
in the objects in themselves It would be my own fault if out of that
which I should reckon as phenomenon I made mere illusory appearance
But this will not happen because of our principle of the ideality
of all sensuous intuitions On the contrary if we ascribe objective
reality to these forms of representation it becomes impossible to avoid
changing everything into mere appearance For if we regard space
and time as properties which must be found in objects as things in
themselves as sine quibus non of the possibility of their existence
and reflect on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved
inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence of two infinite
things which are nevertheless not substances nor anything really
inhering in substances nay to admit that they are the necessary
conditions of the existence of all things and moreover that they must
continue to exist although all existing things were annihilatedwe
cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusory
appearances Nay even our own existence which would in this case
depend upon the selfexistent reality of such a mere nonentity as time
would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearancean absurdity
which no one has as yet been guilty of
In natural theology where we think of an objectGodwhich never
can be an object of intuition to us and even to himself can never be
an object of sensuous intuition we carefully avoid attributing to
his intuition the conditions of space and timeand intuition all his
cognition must be and not thought which always includes limitation
But with what right can we do this if we make them forms of objects as
things in themselves and such moreover as would continue to exist as
a priori conditions of the existence of things even though the things
themselves were annihilated For as conditions of all existence in
general space and time must be conditions of the existence of the
Supreme Being also But if we do not thus make them objective forms
of all things there is no other way left than to make them subjective
forms of our mode of intuitionexternal and internal which is called
sensuous because it is not primitive that is is not such as gives in
itself the existence of the object of the intuition a mode of intuition
which so far as we can judge can belong only to the Creator but is
dependent on the existence of the object is possible therefore only
on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is affected
by the object
It is moreover not necessary that we should limit the mode of
intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man It may well
be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this respect
agree with man though as to this we cannot decide but sensibility
does not on account of this universality cease to be sensibility for
this very reason that it is a deduced intuitus derivativus and not
an original intuitus originarius consequently not an intellectual
intuition and this intuition as such for reasons above mentioned
seems to belong solely to the Supreme Being but never to a being
dependent quoad its existence as well as its intuition which its
existence determines and limits relatively to given objects This
latter remark however must be taken only as an illustration and not
as any proof of the truth of our aesthetical theory
We have now completely before us one part of the solution of the grand
general problem of transcendental philosophy namely the question How
are synthetical propositions a priori possible That is to say we have
shown that we are in possession of pure a priori intuitions namely
space and time in which we find when in a judgement a priori we pass
out beyond the given conception something which is not discoverable in
that conception but is certainly found a priori in the intuition which
corresponds to the conception and can be united synthetically with it
But the judgements which these pure intuitions enable us to make never
reach farther than to objects of the senses and are valid only for
objects of possible experience
Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind first of which
is the faculty or power of receiving representations receptivity for
impressions the second is the power of cognizing by means of these
representations spontaneity in the production of conceptions Through
the first an object is given to us through the second it is in
relation to the representation which is a mere determination of the
mind thought Intuition and conceptions constitute therefore the
elements of all our knowledge so that neither conceptions without
an intuition in some way corresponding to them nor intuition without
conceptions can afford us a cognition Both are either pure or
empirical They are empirical when sensation which presupposes the
actual presence of the object is contained in them and pure when no
sensation is mixed with the representation Sensations we may call
the matter of sensuous cognition Pure intuition consequently contains
merely the form under which something is intuited and pure conception
only the form of the thought of an object Only pure intuitions and pure
conceptions are possible a priori the empirical only a posteriori
We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for
impressions in so far as it is in some way affected and on the other
hand we call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations
or the spontaneity of cognition understanding Our nature is so
constituted that intuition with us never can be other than sensuous
that is it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects
On the other hand the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous
intuition is the understanding Neither of these faculties has a
preference over the other Without the sensuous faculty no object
would be given to us and without the understanding no object would
be thought Thoughts without content are void intuitions without
conceptions blind Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its
conceptions sensuous that is to join to them the object in intuition
as to make its intuitions intelligible that is to bring them under
conceptions Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper
function Understanding cannot intuite and the sensuous faculty cannot
think In no other way than from the united operation of both can
knowledge arise But no one ought on this account to overlook the
difference of the elements contributed by each we have rather great
reason carefully to separate and distinguish them We therefore
distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility that is aesthetic
from the science of the laws of the understanding that is logic
Now logic in its turn may be considered as twofoldnamely as logic
of the general or of the particular use of the understanding The first
contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought without which no use
whatsoever of the understanding is possible and gives laws therefore to
the understanding without regard to the difference of objects on which
it may be employed The logic of the particular use of the understanding
contains the laws of correct thinking upon a particular class of
objects The former may be called elemental logicthe latter the
organon of this or that particular science The latter is for the
most part employed in the schools as a propaedeutic to the sciences
although indeed according to the course of human reason it is the
last thing we arrive at when the science has been already matured and
needs only the finishing touches towards its correction and completion
for our knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be
tolerably extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by
which a science of these objects can be established
General logic is again either pure or applied In the former we
abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is
exercised for example the influence of the senses the play of the
fantasy or imagination the laws of the memory the force of habit of
inclination etc consequently also the sources of prejudicein a
word we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions
arise because these causes regard the understanding under certain
circumstances of its application and to the knowledge of them
experience is required Pure general logic has to do therefore merely
with pure a priori principles and is a canon of understanding and
reason but only in respect of the formal part of their use be the
content what it may empirical or transcendental General logic is
called applied when it is directed to the laws of the use of the
understanding under the subjective empirical conditions which
psychology teaches us It has therefore empirical principles although
at the same time it is in so far general that it applies to the
exercise of the understanding without regard to the difference of
objects On this account moreover it is neither a canon of the
understanding in general nor an organon of a particular science but
merely a cathartic of the human understanding
In general logic therefore that part which constitutes pure logic must
be carefully distinguished from that which constitutes applied though
still general logic The former alone is properly science although
short and dry as the methodical exposition of an elemental doctrine of
the understanding ought to be In this therefore logicians must always
bear in mind two rules
As general logic it makes abstraction of all content of the
cognition of the understanding and of the difference of objects and
has to do with nothing but the mere form of thought
As pure logic it has no empirical principles and consequently
draws nothing contrary to the common persuasion from psychology which
therefore has no influence on the canon of the understanding It is a
demonstrated doctrine and everything in it must be certain completely a
priori
What I called applied logic contrary to the common acceptation of this
term according to which it should contain certain exercises for the
scholar for which pure logic gives the rules is a representation
of the understanding and of the rules of its necessary employment
in concreto that is to say under the accidental conditions of the
subject which may either hinder or promote this employment and which
are all given only empirically Thus applied logic treats of attention
its impediments and consequences of the origin of error of the state
of doubt hesitation conviction etc and to it is related pure
general logic in the same way that pure morality which contains only
the necessary moral laws of a free will is related to practical ethics
which considers these laws under all the impediments of feelings
inclinations and passions to which men are more or less subjected and
which never can furnish us with a true and demonstrated science because
it as well as applied logic requires empirical and psychological
principles
General logic as we have seen makes abstraction of all content of
cognition that is of all relation of cognition to its object and
regards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each
other that is the form of thought in general But as we have both pure
and empirical intuitions as transcendental aesthetic proves in like
manner a distinction might be drawn between pure and empirical thought
of objects In this case there would exist a kind of logic in which
we should not make abstraction of all content of cognition for or logic
which should comprise merely the laws of pure thought of an object
would of course exclude all those cognitions which were of empirical
content This kind of logic would also examine the origin of our
cognitions of objects so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to the
objects themselves while on the contrary general logic has nothing
to do with the origin of our cognitions but contemplates our
representations be they given primitively a priori in ourselves or be
they only of empirical origin solely according to the laws which the
understanding observes in employing them in the process of thought in
relation to each other Consequently general logic treats of the form
of the understanding only which can be applied to representations from
whatever source they may have arisen
And here I shall make a remark which the reader must bear well in mind
in the course of the following considerations to wit that not every
cognition a priori but only those through which we cognize that and how
certain representations intuitions or conceptions are applied or are
possible only a priori that is to say the a priori possibility of
cognition and the a priori use of it are transcendental Therefore
neither is space nor any a priori geometrical determination of space
a transcendental Representation but only the knowledge that such a
representation is not of empirical origin and the possibility of its
relating to objects of experience although itself a priori can be
called transcendental So also the application of space to objects
in general would be transcendental but if it be limited to objects of
sense it is empirical Thus the distinction of the transcendental
and empirical belongs only to the critique of cognitions and does not
concern the relation of these to their object
Accordingly in the expectation that there may perhaps be conceptions
which relate a priori to objects not as pure or sensuous intuitions
but merely as acts of pure thought which are therefore conceptions
but neither of empirical nor aesthetical originin this expectation
I say we form to ourselves by anticipation the idea of a science
of pure understanding and rational cognition by means of which we may
cogitate objects entirely a priori A science of this kind which should
determine the origin the extent and the objective validity of such
cognitions must be called transcendental logic because it has not
like general logic to do with the laws of understanding and reason
in relation to empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without
distinction but concerns itself with these only in an a priori relation
to objects
The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a
corner so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or
confess their ignorance and consequently the vanity of their whole art
is this What is truth The definition of the word truth to wit
the accordance of the cognition with its object is presupposed in
the question but we desire to be told in the answer to it what is the
universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition
To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a strong
evidence of sagacity and intelligence For if a question be in itself
absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer it is attended with the
dangernot to mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes
itof seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers and
we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one as the ancients
said milking the hegoat and the other holding a sieve
If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its object
this object must be ipso facto distinguished from all others for a
cognition is false if it does not accord with the object to which it
relates although it contains something which may be affirmed of other
objects Now an universal criterion of truth would be that which is
valid for all cognitions without distinction of their objects But
it is evident that since in the case of such a criterion we make
abstraction of all the content of a cognition that is of all relation
to its object and truth relates precisely to this content it must
be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of
cognition and that accordingly a sufficient and at the same time
universal test of truth cannot possibly be found As we have already
termed the content of a cognition its matter we shall say Of the
truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter no universal test
can be demanded because such a demand is selfcontradictory
On the other hand with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere
form excluding all content it is equally manifest that logic in
so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the
understanding must in these very laws present us with criteria of
truth Whatever contradicts these rules is false because thereby the
understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of thought
that is to contradict itself These criteria however apply solely to
the form of truth that is of thought in general and in so far they
are perfectly accurate yet not sufficient For although a cognition
may be perfectly accurate as to logical form that is not
selfcontradictory it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may
not stand in agreement with its object Consequently the merely logical
criterion of truth namely the accordance of a cognition with the
universal and formal laws of understanding and reason is nothing more
than the conditio sine qua non or negative condition of all truth
Farther than this logic cannot go and the error which depends not
on the form but on the content of the cognition it has no test to
discover
General logic then resolves the whole formal business of understanding
and reason into its elements and exhibits them as principles of all
logical judging of our cognitions This part of logic may therefore be
called analytic and is at least the negative test of truth because all
cognitions must first of an be estimated and tried according to these
laws before we proceed to investigate them in respect of their content
in order to discover whether they contain positive truth in regard to
their object Because however the mere form of a cognition accurately
as it may accord with logical laws is insufficient to supply us with
material objective truth no one by means of logic alone can venture
to predicate anything of or decide concerning objects unless he has
obtained independently of logic wellgrounded information about them
in order afterwards to examine according to logical laws into the use
and connection in a cohering whole of that information or what is
still better merely to test it by them Notwithstanding there lies so
seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like thisan
art which gives to all our cognitions the form of the understanding
although with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly
deficientthat general logic which is merely a canon of judgement has
been employed as an organon for the actual production or rather for
the semblance of production of objective assertions and has thus
been grossly misapplied Now general logic in its assumed character of
organon is called dialectic
Different as are the significations in which the ancients used this
term for a science or an art we may safely infer from their actual
employment of it that with them it was nothing else than a logic of
illusiona sophistical art for giving ignorance nay even intentional
sophistries the colouring of truth in which the thoroughness of
procedure which logic requires was imitated and their topic employed
to cloak the empty pretensions Now it may be taken as a safe and useful
warning that general logic considered as an organon must always be
a logic of illusion that is be dialectical for as it teaches us
nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions but merely
the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding which
do not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects any
attempt to employ it as an instrument organon in order to extend and
enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in mere prating any one
being able to maintain or oppose with some appearance of truth any
single assertion whatever
Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy For
these reasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic dialectic
in the sense of a critique of dialectical illusion and we wish the term
to be so understood in this place
In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding as in
transcendental aesthetic the sensibility and select from our cognition
merely that part of thought which has its origin in the understanding
alone The exercise of this pure cognition however depends upon this
as its condition that objects to which it may be applied be given to
us in intuition for without intuition the whole of our cognition
is without objects and is therefore quite void That part of
transcendental logic then which treats of the elements of pure
cognition of the understanding and of the principles without which no
object at all can be thought is transcendental analytic and at the
same time a logic of truth For no cognition can contradict it without
losing at the same time all content that is losing all reference to an
object and therefore all truth But because we are very easily seduced
into employing these pure cognitions and principles of the understanding
by themselves and that even beyond the boundaries of experience which
yet is the only source whence we can obtain matter objects on which
those pure conceptions may be employedunderstanding runs the risk of
making by means of empty sophisms a material and objective use of
the mere formal principles of the pure understanding and of passing
judgements on objects without distinctionobjects which are not given
to us nay perhaps cannot be given to us in any way Now as it ought
properly to be only a canon for judging of the empirical use of the
understanding this kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ
it as an organon of the universal and unlimited exercise of the
understanding and attempt with the pure understanding alone to judge
synthetically affirm and determine respecting objects in general In
this case the exercise of the pure understanding becomes dialectical
The second part of our transcendental logic must therefore be a critique
of dialectical illusion and this critique we shall term transcendental
dialecticnot meaning it as an art of producing dogmatically
such illusion an art which is unfortunately too current among
the practitioners of metaphysical juggling but as a critique of
understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use This
critique will expose the groundless nature of the pretensions of
these two faculties and invalidate their claims to the discovery
and enlargement of our cognitions merely by means of transcendental
principles and show that the proper employment of these faculties is to
test the judgements made by the pure understanding and to guard it from
sophistical delusion
Transcendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our a priori
knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding
In order to effect our purpose it is necessary 1 That the
conceptions be pure and not empirical 2 That they belong not to
intuition and sensibility but to thought and understanding 3 That
they be elementary conceptions and as such quite different from
deduced or compound conceptions 4 That our table of these elementary
conceptions be complete and fill up the whole sphere of the pure
understanding Now this completeness of a science cannot be accepted
with confidence on the guarantee of a mere estimate of its existence in
an aggregate formed only by means of repeated experiments and attempts
The completeness which we require is possible only by means of an idea
of the totality of the a priori cognition of the understanding and
through the thereby determined division of the conceptions which form
the said whole consequently only by means of their connection in
a system Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from
everything empirical but also completely from all sensibility It is
a unity selfsubsistent selfsufficient and not to be enlarged by any
additions from without Hence the sum of its cognition constitutes
a system to be determined by and comprised under an idea and the
completeness and articulation of this system can at the same time
serve as a test of the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of
cognition that belong to it The whole of this part of transcendental
logic consists of two books of which the one contains the conceptions
and the other the principles of pure understanding
By the term Analytic of Conceptions I do not understand the analysis
of these or the usual process in philosophical investigations of
dissecting the conceptions which present themselves according to
their content and so making them clear but I mean the hitherto little
attempted dissection of the faculty of understanding itself in order to
investigate the possibility of conceptions a priori by looking for them
in the understanding alone as their birthplace and analysing the pure
use of this faculty For this is the proper duty of a transcendental
philosophy what remains is the logical treatment of the conceptions in
philosophy in general We shall therefore follow up the pure conceptions
even to their germs and beginnings in the human understanding in which
they lie until they are developed on occasions presented by experience
and freed by the same understanding from the empirical conditions
attaching to them are set forth in their unalloyed purity
When we call into play a faculty of cognition different conceptions
manifest themselves according to the different circumstances and
make known this faculty and assemble themselves into a more or less
extensive collection according to the time or penetration that has been
applied to the consideration of them Where this process conducted as
it is mechanically so to speak will end cannot be determined with
certainty Besides the conceptions which we discover in this haphazard
manner present themselves by no means in order and systematic unity
but are at last coupled together only according to resemblances to
each other and arranged in series according to the quantity of their
content from the simpler to the more complexseries which are anything
but systematic though not altogether without a certain kind of method
in their construction
Transcendental philosophy has the advantage and moreover the duty of
searching for its conceptions according to a principle because these
conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as
an absolute unity and therefore must be connected with each other
according to one conception or idea A connection of this kind however
furnishes us with a ready prepared rule by which its proper place
may be assigned to every pure conception of the understanding and the
completeness of the system of all be determined a prioriboth which
would otherwise have been dependent on mere choice or chance
The understanding was defined above only negatively as a nonsensuous
faculty of cognition Now independently of sensibility we cannot
possibly have any intuition consequently the understanding is no
faculty of intuition But besides intuition there is no other mode of
cognition except through conceptions consequently the cognition of
every at least of every human understanding is a cognition through
conceptionsnot intuitive but discursive All intuitions as sensuous
depend on affections conceptions therefore upon functions By the
word function I understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse
representations under one common representation Conceptions then are
based on the spontaneity of thought as sensuous intuitions are on the
receptivity of impressions Now the understanding cannot make any
other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them As no
representation except an intuition relates immediately to its object
a conception never relates immediately to an object but only to
some other representation thereof be that an intuition or itself a
conception A judgement therefore is the mediate cognition of an
object consequently the representation of a representation of it In
every judgement there is a conception which applies to and is valid for
many other conceptions and which among these comprehends also a given
representation this last being immediately connected with an object
For example in the judgementAll bodies are divisible our
conception of divisible applies to various other conceptions among
these however it is here particularly applied to the conception of
body and this conception of body relates to certain phenomena which
occur to us These objects therefore are mediately represented by the
conception of divisibility All judgements accordingly are functions
of unity in our representations inasmuch as instead of an immediate a
higher representation which comprises this and various others is used
for our cognition of the object and thereby many possible cognitions
are collected into one But we can reduce all acts of the understanding
to judgements so that understanding may be represented as the faculty
of judging For it is according to what has been said above a faculty
of thought Now thought is cognition by means of conceptions But
conceptions as predicates of possible judgements relate to some
representation of a yet undetermined object Thus the conception of body
indicates somethingfor example metalwhich can be cognized by means
of that conception It is therefore a conception for the reason alone
that other representations are contained under it by means of which
it can relate to objects It is therefore the predicate to a possible
judgement for example Every metal is a body All the functions of
the understanding therefore can be discovered when we can completely
exhibit the functions of unity in judgements And that this may be
effected very easily the following section will show
If we abstract all the content of a judgement and consider only the
intellectual form thereof we find that the function of thought in a
judgement can be brought under four heads of which each contains three
momenta These may be conveniently represented in the following table
1
Quantity of judgements
Universal
Particular
Singular
2 3
Quality Relation
Affirmative Categorical
Negative Hypothetical
Infinite Disjunctive
4
Modality
Problematical
Assertorical
Apodeictical
As this division appears to differ in some though not essential points
from the usual technique of logicians the following observations
for the prevention of otherwise possible misunderstanding will not be
without their use
Logicians say with justice that in the use of judgements in
syllogisms singular judgements may be treated like universal ones
For precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all its
predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the
conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest The predicate
is valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general
conception and had extent to the whole of which the predicate applied
On the other hand let us compare a singular with a general judgement
merely as a cognition in regard to quantity The singular judgement
relates to the general one as unity to infinity and is therefore in
itself essentially different Thus if we estimate a singular judgement
judicium singulare not merely according to its intrinsic validity as a
judgement but also as a cognition generally according to its quantity
in comparison with that of other cognitions it is then entirely
different from a general judgement judicium commune and in a complete
table of the momenta of thought deserves a separate placethough
indeed this would not be necessary in a logic limited merely to the
consideration of the use of judgements in reference to each other
In like manner in transcendental logic infinite must be
distinguished from affirmative judgements although in general logic
they are rightly enough classed under affirmative General logic
abstracts all content of the predicate though it be negative and
only considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or denied of the
subject But transcendental logic considers also the worth or content of
this logical affirmationan affirmation by means of a merely negative
predicate and inquires how much the sum total of our cognition gains
by this affirmation For example if I say of the soul It is not
mortalby this negative judgement I should at least ward off error
Now by the proposition The soul is not mortal I have in respect of
the logical form really affirmed inasmuch as I thereby place the soul
in the unlimited sphere of immortal beings Now because of the whole
sphere of possible existences the mortal occupies one part and the
immortal the other neither more nor less is affirmed by the proposition
than that the soul is one among the infinite multitude of things
which remain over when I take away the whole mortal part But by this
proceeding we accomplish only this much that the infinite sphere of
all possible existences is in so far limited that the mortal is excluded
from it and the soul is placed in the remaining part of the extent
of this sphere But this part remains notwithstanding this exception
infinite and more and more parts may be taken away from the whole
sphere without in the slightest degree thereby augmenting or
affirmatively determining our conception of the soul These judgements
therefore infinite in respect of their logical extent are in
respect of the content of their cognition merely limitative and are
consequently entitled to a place in our transcendental table of all
the momenta of thought in judgements because the function of the
understanding exercised by them may perhaps be of importance in the
field of its pure a priori cognition
All relations of thought in judgements are those a of the predicate
to the subject b of the principle to its consequence c of the
divided cognition and all the members of the division to each other In
the first of these three classes we consider only two conceptions in
the second two judgements in the third several judgements in relation
to each other The hypothetical proposition If perfect justice exists
the obstinately wicked are punished contains properly the relation to
each other of two propositions namely Perfect justice exists and
The obstinately wicked are punished Whether these propositions are in
themselves true is a question not here decided Nothing is cogitated
by means of this judgement except a certain consequence Finally the
disjunctive judgement contains a relation of two or more propositions to
each othera relation not of consequence but of logical opposition in
so far as the sphere of the one proposition excludes that of the other
But it contains at the same time a relation of community in so far as
all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the cognition
The disjunctive judgement contains therefore the relation of the parts
of the whole sphere of a cognition since the sphere of each part is a
complemental part of the sphere of the other each contributing to
form the sum total of the divided cognition Take for example the
proposition The world exists either through blind chance or through
internal necessity or through an external cause Each of these
propositions embraces a part of the sphere of our possible cognition
as to the existence of a world all of them taken together the whole
sphere To take the cognition out of one of these spheres is equivalent
to placing it in one of the others and on the other hand to place
it in one sphere is equivalent to taking it out of the rest There is
therefore in a disjunctive judgement a certain community of cognitions
which consists in this that they mutually exclude each other yet
thereby determine as a whole the true cognition inasmuch as taken
together they make up the complete content of a particular given
cognition And this is all that I find necessary for the sake of what
follows to remark in this place
The modality of judgements is a quite peculiar function with this
distinguishing characteristic that it contributes nothing to the
content of a judgement for besides quantity quality and relation
there is nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgement but
concerns itself only with the value of the copula in relation to thought
in general Problematical judgements are those in which the affirmation
or negation is accepted as merely possible ad libitum In the
assertorical we regard the proposition as real true in the
apodeictical we look on it as necessary Thus the two judgements
antecedens et consequens the relation of which constitutes a
hypothetical judgement likewise those the members of the division in
whose reciprocity the disjunctive consists are only problematical In
the example above given the proposition There exists perfect justice
is not stated assertorically but as an ad libitum judgement which
someone may choose to adopt and the consequence alone is assertorical
Hence such judgements may be obviously false and yet taken
problematically be conditions of our cognition of the truth Thus
the proposition The world exists only by blind chance is in the
disjunctive judgement of problematical import only that is to say one
may accept it for the moment and it helps us like the indication of
the wrong road among all the roads that one can take to find out the
true proposition The problematical proposition is therefore that
which expresses only logical possibility which is not objective
that is it expresses a free choice to admit the validity of such a
propositiona merely arbitrary reception of it into the understanding
The assertorical speaks of logical reality or truth as for example
in a hypothetical syllogism the antecedens presents itself in a
problematical form in the major in an assertorical form in the minor
and it shows that the proposition is in harmony with the laws of the
understanding The apodeictical proposition cogitates the assertorical
as determined by these very laws of the understanding consequently as
affirming a priori and in this manner it expresses logical
necessity Now because all is here gradually incorporated with the
understandinginasmuch as in the first place we judge problematically
then accept assertorically our judgement as true lastly affirm it as
inseparably united with the understanding that is as necessary and
apodeicticalwe may safely reckon these three functions of modality as
so many momenta of thought
General logic as has been repeatedly said makes abstraction of all
content of cognition and expects to receive representations from some
other quarter in order by means of analysis to convert them into
conceptions On the contrary transcendental logic has lying before
it the manifold content of a priori sensibility which transcendental
aesthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pure conceptions
of the understanding without which transcendental logic would have no
content and be therefore utterly void Now space and time contain an
infinite diversity of determinations of pure a priori intuition but are
nevertheless the condition of the minds receptivity under which alone
it can obtain representations of objects and which consequently must
always affect the conception of these objects But the spontaneity of
thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain manner
received into the mind and connected in order afterwards to form a
cognition out of it This Process I call synthesis
By the word synthesis in its most general signification I understand
the process of joining different representations to each other and of
comprehending their diversity in one cognition This synthesis is pure
when the diversity is not given empirically but a priori as that in
space and time Our representations must be given previously to any
analysis of them and no conceptions can arise quoad their content
analytically But the synthesis of a diversity be it given a priori or
empirically is the first requisite for the production of a cognition
which in its beginning indeed may be crude and confused and therefore
in need of analysisstill synthesis is that by which alone the
elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain
content consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our
attention if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge
Synthesis generally speaking is as we shall afterwards see the mere
operation of the imaginationa blind but indispensable function of the
soul without which we should have no cognition whatever but of the
working of which we are seldom even conscious But to reduce this
synthesis to conceptions is a function of the understanding by means of
which we attain to cognition in the proper meaning of the term
Pure synthesis represented generally gives us the pure conception of
the understanding But by this pure synthesis I mean that which rests
upon a basis of a priori synthetical unity Thus our numeration and
this is more observable in large numbers is a synthesis according to
conceptions because it takes place according to a common basis of unity
for example the decade By means of this conception therefore the
unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary
By means of analysis different representations are brought under one
conceptionan operation of which general logic treats On the other
hand the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions not
representations but the pure synthesis of representations The first
thing which must be given to us for the sake of the a priori cognition
of all objects is the diversity of the pure intuition the synthesis
of this diversity by means of the imagination is the second but this
gives as yet no cognition The conceptions which give unity to this
pure synthesis and which consist solely in the representation of
this necessary synthetical unity furnish the third requisite for
the cognition of an object and these conceptions are given by the
understanding
The same function which gives unity to the different representation in
a judgement gives also unity to the mere synthesis of different
representations in an intuition and this unity we call the pure
conception of the understanding Thus the same understanding and by
the same operations whereby in conceptions by means of analytical
unity it produced the logical form of a judgement introduces by means
of the synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition a transcendental
content into its representations on which account they are called pure
conceptions of the understanding and they apply a priori to objects a
result not within the power of general logic
In this manner there arise exactly so many pure conceptions of the
understanding applying a priori to objects of intuition in general as
there are logical functions in all possible judgements For there is no
other function or faculty existing in the understanding besides those
enumerated in that table These conceptions we shall with Aristotle
call categories our purpose being originally identical with his
notwithstanding the great difference in the execution
TABLE OF THE CATEGORIES
1 2
Of Quantity Of Quality
Unity Reality
Plurality Negation
Totality Limitation
3
Of Relation
Of Inherence and Subsistence substantia et accidens
Of Causality and Dependence cause and effect
Of Community reciprocity between the agent and patient
4
Of Modality
PossibilityImpossibility
ExistenceNonexistence
NecessityContingence
This then is a catalogue of all the originally pure conceptions of
the synthesis which the understanding contains a priori and these
conceptions alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding inasmuch
as only by them it can render the manifold of intuition conceivable
in other words think an object of intuition This division is made
systematically from a common principle namely the faculty of judgement
which is just the same as the power of thought and has not arisen
rhapsodically from a search at haphazard after pure conceptions
respecting the full number of which we never could be certain inasmuch
as we employ induction alone in our search without considering that in
this way we can never understand wherefore precisely these conceptions
and none others abide in the pure understanding It was a design worthy
of an acute thinker like Aristotle to search for these fundamental
conceptions Destitute however of any guiding principle he picked
them up just as they occurred to him and at first hunted out ten which
he called categories predicaments Afterwards be believed that he
had discovered five others which were added under the name of post
predicaments But his catalogue still remained defective Besides
there are to be found among them some of the modes of pure sensibility
quando ubi situs also prius simul and likewise an empirical
conception motuswhich can by no means belong to this genealogical
register of the pure understanding Moreover there are deduced
conceptions actio passio enumerated among the original conceptions
and of the latter some are entirely wanting
With regard to these it is to be remarked that the categories as the
true primitive conceptions of the pure understanding have also their
pure deduced conceptions which in a complete system of transcendental
philosophy must by no means be passed over though in a merely critical
essay we must be contented with the simple mention of the fact
Let it be allowed me to call these pure but deduced conceptions of
the understanding the predicables of the pure understanding in
contradistinction to predicaments If we are in possession of the
original and primitive the deduced and subsidiary conceptions can
easily be added and the genealogical tree of the understanding
completely delineated As my present aim is not to set forth a complete
system but merely the principles of one I reserve this task for
another time It may be easily executed by anyone who will refer to the
ontological manuals and subordinate to the category of causality
for example the predicables of force action passion to that of
community those of presence and resistance to the categories of
modality those of origination extinction change and so with the
rest The categories combined with the modes of pure sensibility or
with one another afford a great number of deduced a priori conceptions
a complete enumeration of which would be a useful and not unpleasant
but in this place a perfectly dispensable occupation
I purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this treatise
I shall analyse these conceptions only so far as is necessary for the
doctrine of method which is to form a part of this critique In
a system of pure reason definitions of them would be with justice
demanded of me but to give them here would only bide from our view
the main aim of our investigation at the same time raising doubts and
objections the consideration of which without injustice to our main
purpose may be very well postponed till another opportunity Meanwhile
it ought to be sufficiently clear from the little we have already said
on this subject that the formation of a complete vocabulary of pure
conceptions accompanied by all the requisite explanations is not only
a possible but an easy undertaking The compartments already exist
it is only necessary to fill them up and a systematic topic like the
present indicates with perfect precision the proper place to which each
conception belongs while it readily points out any that have not yet
been filled up
Our table of the categories suggests considerations of some importance
which may perhaps have significant results in regard to the scientific
form of all rational cognitions For that this table is useful in the
theoretical part of philosophy nay indispensable for the sketching
of the complete plan of a science so far as that science rests upon
conceptions a priori and for dividing it mathematically according to
fixed principles is most manifest from the fact that it contains all
the elementary conceptions of the understanding nay even the form of a
system of these in the understanding itself and consequently indicates
all the momenta and also the internal arrangement of a projected
speculative science as I have elsewhere shown Here follow some of these
observations
This table which contains four classes of conceptions of the
understanding may in the first instance be divided into two classes
the first of which relates to objects of intuitionpure as well as
empirical the second to the existence of these objects either in
relation to one another or to the understanding
The former of these classes of categories I would entitle the
mathematical and the latter the dynamical categories The former as we
see has no correlates these are only to be found in the second
class This difference must have a ground in the nature of the human
understanding
The number of the categories in each class is always the same
namely threea fact which also demands some consideration because
in all other cases division a priori through conceptions is necessarily
dichotomy It is to be added that the third category in each triad
always arises from the combination of the second with the first
Thus totality is nothing else but plurality contemplated as unity
limitation is merely reality conjoined with negation community is the
causality of a substance reciprocally determining and determined by
other substances and finally necessity is nothing but existence
which is given through the possibility itself Let it not be supposed
however that the third category is merely a deduced and not a
primitive conception of the pure understanding For the conjunction of
the first and second in order to produce the third conception requires
a particular function of the understanding which is by no means
identical with those which are exercised in the first and second Thus
the conception of a number which belongs to the category of totality
is not always possible where the conceptions of multitude and unity
exist for example in the representation of the infinite Or if I
conjoin the conception of a cause with that of a substance it does not
follow that the conception of influence that is how one substance can
be the cause of something in another substance will be understood from
that Thus it is evident that a particular act of the understanding is
here necessary and so in the other instances
With respect to one category namely that of community which is
found in the third class it is not so easy as with the others to
detect its accordance with the form of the disjunctive judgement which
corresponds to it in the table of the logical functions
In order to assure ourselves of this accordance we must observe that in
every disjunctive judgement the sphere of the judgement that is
the complex of all that is contained in it is represented as a whole
divided into parts and since one part cannot be contained in the
other they are cogitated as coordinated with not subordinated to each
other so that they do not determine each other unilaterally as in a
linear series but reciprocally as in an aggregateif one member of
the division is posited all the rest are excluded and conversely
Now a like connection is cogitated in a whole of things for one thing
is not subordinated as effect to another as cause of its existence
but on the contrary is coordinated contemporaneously and
reciprocally as a cause in relation to the determination of the others
for example in a bodythe parts of which mutually attract and repel
each other And this is an entirely different kind of connection from
that which we find in the mere relation of the cause to the effect the
principle to the consequence for in such a connection the consequence
does not in its turn determine the principle and therefore does not
constitute with the latter a wholejust as the Creator does not with
the world make up a whole The process of understanding by which it
represents to itself the sphere of a divided conception is employed
also when we think of a thing as divisible and in the same manner as
the members of the division in the former exclude one another and yet
are connected in one sphere so the understanding represents to itself
the parts of the latter as havingeach of theman existence as
substances independently of the others and yet as united in one
whole
In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there exists one more
leading division which contains pure conceptions of the understanding
and which although not numbered among the categories ought according
to them as conceptions a priori to be valid of objects But in this
case they would augment the number of the categories which cannot
be These are set forth in the proposition so renowned among the
schoolmenQuodlibet ens est UNUM VERUM BONUM Now though the
inferences from this principle were mere tautological propositions
and though it is allowed only by courtesy to retain a place in modern
metaphysics yet a thought which maintained itself for such a length
of time however empty it seems to be deserves an investigation of its
origin and justifies the conjecture that it must be grounded in some
law of the understanding which as is often the case has only been
erroneously interpreted These pretended transcendental predicates are
in fact nothing but logical requisites and criteria of all cognition
of objects and they employ as the basis for this cognition the
categories of quantity namely unity plurality and totality But
these which must be taken as material conditions that is as belonging
to the possibility of things themselves they employed merely in a
formal signification as belonging to the logical requisites of all
cognition and yet most unguardedly changed these criteria of thought
into properties of objects as things in themselves Now in every
cognition of an object there is unity of conception which may be
called qualitative unity so far as by this term we understand only the
unity in our connection of the manifold for example unity of the theme
in a play an oration or a story Secondly there is truth in respect
of the deductions from it The more true deductions we have from a given
conception the more criteria of its objective reality This we might
call the qualitative plurality of characteristic marks which belong
to a conception as to a common foundation but are not cogitated as a
quantity in it Thirdly there is perfectionwhich consists in this
that the plurality falls back upon the unity of the conception and
accords completely with that conception and with no other This we may
denominate qualitative completeness Hence it is evident that these
logical criteria of the possibility of cognition are merely the three
categories of quantity modified and transformed to suit an unauthorized
manner of applying them That is to say the three categories in
which the unity in the production of the quantum must be homogeneous
throughout are transformed solely with a view to the connection of
heterogeneous parts of cognition in one act of consciousness by
means of the quality of the cognition which is the principle of that
connection Thus the criterion of the possibility of a conception
not of its object is the definition of it in which the unity of the
conception the truth of all that may be immediately deduced from it
and finally the completeness of what has been thus deduced constitute
the requisites for the reproduction of the whole conception Thus also
the criterion or test of an hypothesis is the intelligibility of the
received principle of explanation or its unity without help from any
subsidiary hypothesisthe truth of our deductions from it consistency
with each other and with experienceand lastly the completeness of
the principle of the explanation of these deductions which refer
to neither more nor less than what was admitted in the hypothesis
restoring analytically and a posteriori what was cogitated
synthetically and a priori By the conceptions therefore of unity
truth and perfection we have made no addition to the transcendental
table of the categories which is complete without them We have on
the contrary merely employed the three categories of quantity setting
aside their application to objects of experience as general logical
laws of the consistency of cognition with itself
Teachers of jurisprudence when speaking of rights and claims
distinguish in a cause the question of right quid juris from the
question of fact quid facti and while they demand proof of both they
give to the proof of the former which goes to establish right or claim
in law the name of deduction Now we make use of a great number of
empirical conceptions without opposition from any one and consider
ourselves even without any attempt at deduction justified in attaching
to them a sense and a supposititious signification because we have
always experience at hand to demonstrate their objective reality There
exist also however usurped conceptions such as fortune fate which
circulate with almost universal indulgence and yet are occasionally
challenged by the question quid juris In such cases we have great
difficulty in discovering any deduction for these terms inasmuch as we
cannot produce any manifest ground of right either from experience or
from reason on which the claim to employ them can be founded
Among the many conceptions which make up the very variegated web of
human cognition some are destined for pure use a priori independent
of all experience and their title to be so employed always requires
a deduction inasmuch as to justify such use of them proofs from
experience are not sufficient but it is necessary to know how these
conceptions can apply to objects without being derived from experience
I term therefore an examination of the manner in which conceptions can
apply a priori to objects the transcendental deduction of conceptions
and I distinguish it from the empirical deduction which indicates the
mode in which conception is obtained through experience and reflection
thereon consequently does not concern itself with the right but only
with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in such and such a manner We
have already seen that we are in possession of two perfectly different
kinds of conceptions which nevertheless agree with each other in this
that they both apply to objects completely a priori These are
the conceptions of space and time as forms of sensibility and the
categories as pure conceptions of the understanding To attempt an
empirical deduction of either of these classes would be labour in vain
because the distinguishing characteristic of their nature consists in
this that they apply to their objects without having borrowed anything
from experience towards the representation of them Consequently if
a deduction of these conceptions is necessary it must always be
transcendental
Meanwhile with respect to these conceptions as with respect to all our
cognition we certainly may discover in experience if not the principle
of their possibility yet the occasioning causes of their production It
will be found that the impressions of sense give the first occasion
for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition and for the
production of experience which contains two very dissimilar elements
namely a matter for cognition given by the senses and a certain form
for the arrangement of this matter arising out of the inner fountain
of pure intuition and thought and these on occasion given by sensuous
impressions are called into exercise and produce conceptions Such
an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition to
mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions is undoubtedly
of great utility and we have to thank the celebrated Locke for having
first opened the way for this inquiry But a deduction of the pure a
priori conceptions of course never can be made in this way seeing that
in regard to their future employment which must be entirely independent
of experience they must have a far different certificate of birth
to show from that of a descent from experience This attempted
physiological derivation which cannot properly be called deduction
because it relates merely to a quaestio facti I shall entitle an
explanation of the possession of a pure cognition It is therefore
manifest that there can only be a transcendental deduction of these
conceptions and by no means an empirical one also that all attempts
at an empirical deduction in regard to pure a priori conceptions are
vain and can only be made by one who does not understand the altogether
peculiar nature of these cognitions
But although it is admitted that the only possible deduction of pure
a priori cognition is a transcendental deduction it is not for
that reason perfectly manifest that such a deduction is absolutely
necessary We have already traced to their sources the conceptions of
space and time by means of a transcendental deduction and we have
explained and determined their objective validity a priori Geometry
nevertheless advances steadily and securely in the province of pure
a priori cognitions without needing to ask from philosophy any
certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental
conception of space But the use of the conception in this science
extends only to the external world of sense the pure form of the
intuition of which is space and in this world therefore all
geometrical cognition because it is founded upon a priori intuition
possesses immediate evidence and the objects of this cognition are
given a priori as regards their form in intuition by and through the
cognition itself With the pure conceptions of understanding on the
contrary commences the absolute necessity of seeking a transcendental
deduction not only of these conceptions themselves but likewise of
space because inasmuch as they make affirmations concerning objects
not by means of the predicates of intuition and sensibility but of pure
thought a priori they apply to objects without any of the conditions
of sensibility Besides not being founded on experience they are not
presented with any object in a priori intuition upon which antecedently
to experience they might base their synthesis Hence results not only
doubt as to the objective validity and proper limits of their use but
that even our conception of space is rendered equivocal inasmuch as we
are very ready with the aid of the categories to carry the use of this
conception beyond the conditions of sensuous intuitionand for this
reason we have already found a transcendental deduction of it needful
The reader then must be quite convinced of the absolute necessity of
a transcendental deduction before taking a single step in the field of
pure reason because otherwise he goes to work blindly and after he
has wondered about in all directions returns to the state of utter
ignorance from which he started He ought moreover clearly to
recognize beforehand the unavoidable difficulties in his undertaking
so that he may not afterwards complain of the obscurity in which the
subject itself is deeply involved or become too soon impatient of
the obstacles in his path because we have a choice of only two
thingseither at once to give up all pretensions to knowledge
beyond the limits of possible experience or to bring this critical
investigation to completion
We have been able with very little trouble to make it comprehensible
how the conceptions of space and time although a priori cognitions
must necessarily apply to external objects and render a synthetical
cognition of these possible independently of all experience For
inasmuch as only by means of such pure form of sensibility an object can
appear to us that is be an object of empirical intuition space and
time are pure intuitions which contain a priori the condition of the
possibility of objects as phenomena and an a priori synthesis in these
intuitions possesses objective validity
On the other hand the categories of the understanding do not represent
the conditions under which objects are given to us in intuition objects
can consequently appear to us without necessarily connecting themselves
with these and consequently without any necessity binding on the
understanding to contain a priori the conditions of these objects Thus
we find ourselves involved in a difficulty which did not present itself
in the sphere of sensibility that is to say we cannot discover how the
subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity in other
words can become conditions of the possibility of all cognition of
objects for phenomena may certainly be given to us in intuition without
any help from the functions of the understanding Let us take for
example the conception of cause which indicates a peculiar kind of
synthesis namely that with something A something entirely different
B is connected according to a law It is not a priori manifest why
phenomena should contain anything of this kind we are of course
debarred from appealing for proof to experience for the objective
validity of this conception must be demonstrated a priori and it hence
remains doubtful a priori whether such a conception be not quite void
and without any corresponding object among phenomena For that objects
of sensuous intuition must correspond to the formal conditions of
sensibility existing a priori in the mind is quite evident from the
fact that without these they could not be objects for us but that they
must also correspond to the conditions which understanding requires for
the synthetical unity of thought is an assertion the grounds for
which are not so easily to be discovered For phenomena might be so
constituted as not to correspond to the conditions of the unity of
thought and all things might lie in such confusion that for example
nothing could be met with in the sphere of phenomena to suggest a law of
synthesis and so correspond to the conception of cause and effect
so that this conception would be quite void null and without
significance Phenomena would nevertheless continue to present objects
to our intuition for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in
need of the functions of thought
If we thought to free ourselves from the labour of these investigations
by saying Experience is constantly offering us examples of the
relation of cause and effect in phenomena and presents us with abundant
opportunity of abstracting the conception of cause and so at the same
time of corroborating the objective validity of this conception we
should in this case be overlooking the fact that the conception of
cause cannot arise in this way at all that on the contrary it must
either have an a priori basis in the understanding or be rejected as a
mere chimera For this conception demands that something A should
be of such a nature that something else B should follow from it
necessarily and according to an absolutely universal law We may
certainly collect from phenomena a law according to which this or that
usually happens but the element of necessity is not to be found in it
Hence it is evident that to the synthesis of cause and effect belongs a
dignity which is utterly wanting in any empirical synthesis for it is
no mere mechanical synthesis by means of addition but a dynamical one
that is to say the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed to
the cause but as posited by and through the cause and resulting from
it The strict universality of this law never can be a characteristic
of empirical laws which obtain through induction only a comparative
universality that is an extended range of practical application But
the pure conceptions of the understanding would entirely lose all their
peculiar character if we treated them merely as the productions of
experience
There are only two possible ways in which synthetical representation and
its objects can coincide with and relate necessarily to each other
and as it were meet together Either the object alone makes the
representation possible or the representation alone makes the object
possible In the former case the relation between them is only
empirical and an a priori representation is impossible And this is the
case with phenomena as regards that in them which is referable to mere
sensation In the latter casealthough representation alone for of its
causality by means of the will we do not here speak does not produce
the object as to its existence it must nevertheless be a priori
determinative in regard to the object if it is only by means of the
representation that we can cognize anything as an object Now there
are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of objects
firstly intuition by means of which the object though only as
phenomenon is given secondly conception by means of which the object
which corresponds to this intuition is thought But it is evident from
what has been said on aesthetic that the first condition under which
alone objects can be intuited must in fact exist as a formal basis for
them a priori in the mind With this formal condition of sensibility
therefore all phenomena necessarily correspond because it is
only through it that they can be phenomena at all that is can be
empirically intuited and given Now the question is whether there do
not exist a priori in the mind conceptions of understanding also as
conditions under which alone something if not intuited is yet thought
as object If this question be answered in the affirmative it follows
that all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily conformable to
such conceptions since if they are not presupposed it is impossible
that anything can be an object of experience Now all experience
contains besides the intuition of the senses through which an object
is given a conception also of an object that is given in intuition
Accordingly conceptions of objects in general must lie as a
priori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition and
consequently the objective validity of the categories as a priori
conceptions will rest upon this that experience as far as regards the
form of thought is possible only by their means For in that case they
apply necessarily and a priori to objects of experience because only
through them can an object of experience be thought
The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a priori
conceptions is to show that these conceptions are a priori conditions
of the possibility of all experience Conceptions which afford us the
objective foundation of the possibility of experience are for that very
reason necessary But the analysis of the experiences in which they are
met with is not deduction but only an illustration of them because
from experience they could never derive the attribute of necessity
Without their original applicability and relation to all possible
experience in which all objects of cognition present themselves the
relation of the categories to objects of whatever nature would be
quite incomprehensible
The celebrated Locke for want of due reflection on these points and
because he met with pure conceptions of the understanding in experience
sought also to deduce them from experience and yet proceeded so
inconsequently as to attempt with their aid to arrive it cognitions
which lie far beyond the limits of all experience David Hume perceived
that to render this possible it was necessary that the conceptions
should have an a priori origin But as he could not explain how it was
possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the
understanding must nevertheless be thought as necessarily connected in
the objectand it never occurred to him that the understanding itself
might perhaps by means of these conceptions be the author of the
experience in which its objects were presented to ithe was forced
to drive these conceptions from experience that is from a subjective
necessity arising from repeated association of experiences erroneously
considered to be objectivein one word from habit But he proceeded
with perfect consequence and declared it to be impossible with such
conceptions and the principles arising from them to overstep the limits
of experience The empirical derivation however which both of these
philosophers attributed to these conceptions cannot possibly be
reconciled with the fact that we do possess scientific a priori
cognitions namely those of pure mathematics and general physics
The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to
extravagancefor if reason has once undoubted right on its side
it will not allow itself to be confined to set limits by vague
recommendations of moderation the latter gave himself up entirely
to scepticisma natural consequence after having discovered as he
thought that the faculty of cognition was not trustworthy We now
intend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct
reason between these two rocks to assign her determinate limits and
yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate activity
I shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are They
are conceptions of an object in general by means of which its intuition
is contemplated as determined in relation to one of the logical
functions of judgement The following will make this plain The function
of the categorical judgement is that of the relation of subject to
predicate for example in the proposition All bodies are divisible
But in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding it still
remains undetermined to which Of these two conceptions belongs the
function Of subject and to which that of predicate For we could also
say Some divisible is a body But the category of substance when
the conception of a body is brought under it determines that and its
empirical intuition in experience must be contemplated always as subject
and never as mere predicate And so with all the other categories
The manifold content in our representations can be given in an intuition
which is merely sensuousin other words is nothing but susceptibility
and the form of this intuition can exist a priori in our faculty of
representation without being anything else but the mode in which the
subject is affected But the conjunction conjunctio of a manifold in
intuition never can be given us by the senses it cannot therefore
be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition for it is a
spontaneous act of the faculty of representation And as we must to
distinguish it from sensibility entitle this faculty understanding so
all conjunction whether conscious or unconscious be it of the manifold
in intuition sensuous or nonsensuous or of several conceptionsis
an act of the understanding To this act we shall give the general
appellation of synthesis thereby to indicate at the same time that
we cannot represent anything as conjoined in the object without having
previously conjoined it ourselves Of all mental notions that of
conjunction is the only one which cannot be given through objects but
can be originated only by the subject itself because it is an act of
its purely spontaneous activity The reader will easily enough perceive
that the possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the very nature
of this act and that it must be equally valid for all conjunction and
that analysis which appears to be its contrary must nevertheless
always presuppose it for where the understanding has not previously
conjoined it cannot dissect or analyse because only as conjoined by
it must that which is to be analysed have been given to our faculty of
representation
But the conception of conjunction includes besides the conception of
the manifold and of the synthesis of it that of the unity of it also
Conjunction is the representation of the synthetical unity of the
manifold This idea of unity therefore cannot arise out of that of
conjunction much rather does that idea by combining itself with the
representation of the manifold render the conception of conjunction
possible This unity which a priori precedes all conceptions of
conjunction is not the category of unity for all the categories
are based upon logical functions of judgement and in these functions we
already have conjunction and consequently unity of given conceptions
It is therefore evident that the category of unity presupposes
conjunction We must therefore look still higher for this unity as
qualitative in that namely which contains the ground of the
unity of diverse conceptions in judgements the ground consequently of
the possibility of the existence of the understanding even in regard to
its logical use
The I think must accompany all my representations for otherwise
something would be represented in me which could not be thought in
other words the representation would either be impossible or at least
be in relation to me nothing That representation which can be given
previously to all thought is called intuition All the diversity or
manifold content of intuition has therefore a necessary relation to
the I think in the subject in which this diversity is found But this
representation I think is an act of spontaneity that is to say
it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility I call it pure
apperception in order to distinguish it from empirical or primitive
apperception because it is selfconsciousness which whilst it gives
birth to the representation I think must necessarily be capable of
accompanying all our representations It is in all acts of consciousness
one and the same and unaccompanied by it no representation can exist
for me The unity of this apperception I call the transcendental unity
of selfconsciousness in order to indicate the possibility of a priori
cognition arising from it For the manifold representations which are
given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations
if they did not all belong to one selfconsciousness that is as my
representations even although I am not conscious of them as such they
must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together
in a common selfconsciousness because otherwise they would not all
without exception belong to me From this primitive conjunction follow
many important results
For example this universal identity of the apperception of the manifold
given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations and is
possible only by means of the consciousness of this synthesis For the
empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations
is in itself fragmentary and disunited and without relation to the
identity of the subject This relation then does not exist because I
accompany every representation with consciousness but because I join
one representation to another and am conscious of the synthesis of
them Consequently only because I can connect a variety of given
representations in one consciousness is it possible that I
can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these
representations in other words the analytical unity of apperception
is possible only under the presupposition of a synthetical unity The
thought These representations given in intuition belong all of them
to me is accordingly just the same as I unite them in one
selfconsciousness or can at least so unite them and although
this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of
representations it presupposes the possibility of it that is to
say for the reason alone that I can comprehend the variety of my
representations in one consciousness do I call them my representations
for otherwise I must have as manycoloured and various a self as are
the representations of which I am conscious Synthetical unity of the
manifold in intuitions as given a priori is therefore the foundation
of the identity of apperception itself which antecedes a priori all
determinate thought But the conjunction of representations into a
conception is not to be found in objects themselves nor can it be
as it were borrowed from them and taken up into the understanding by
perception but it is on the contrary an operation of the understanding
itself which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining a priori
and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of
apperception This principle is the highest in all human cognition
This fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception is
indeed an identical and therefore analytical proposition but it
nevertheless explains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifold
given in an intuition without which the identity of selfconsciousness
would be incogitable For the ego as a simple representation presents
us with no manifold content only in intuition which is quite different
from the representation ego can it be given us and by means of
conjunction it is cogitated in one selfconsciousness An understanding
in which all the manifold should be given by means of consciousness
itself would be intuitive our understanding can only think and must
look for its intuition to sense I am therefore conscious of my
identical self in relation to all the variety of representations given
to me in an intuition because I call all of them my representations In
other words I am conscious myself of a necessary a priori synthesis of
my representations which is called the original synthetical unity of
apperception under which rank all the representations presented to me
but that only by means of a synthesis
The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to
sensibility was according to our transcendental aesthetic that all the
manifold in intuition be subject to the formal conditions of space and
time The supreme principle of the possibility of it in relation to the
understanding is that all the manifold in it be subject to conditions
of the originally synthetical unity or apperception To the former
of these two principles are subject all the various representations of
intuition in so far as they are given to us to the latter in so far
as they must be capable of conjunction in one consciousness for
without this nothing can be thought or cognized because the given
representations would not have in common the act Of the apperception I
think and therefore could not be connected in one selfconsciousness
Understanding is to speak generally the faculty Of cognitions These
consist in the determined relation of given representation to an object
But an object is that in the conception of which the manifold in a
given intuition is united Now all union of representations requires
unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them Consequently it is
the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility of
representations relating to an object and therefore of their objective
validity and of their becoming cognitions and consequently the
possibility of the existence of the understanding itself
The first pure cognition of understanding then upon which is founded
all its other exercise and which is at the same time perfectly
independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition is the
principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception Thus the
mere form of external sensuous intuition namely space affords us
per se no cognition it merely contributes the manifold in a priori
intuition to a possible cognition But in order to cognize something
in space for example a line I must draw it and thus produce
synthetically a determined conjunction of the given manifold so that
the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness
in the conception of a line and by this means alone is an object a
determinate space cognized The synthetical unity of consciousness
is therefore an objective condition of all cognition which I do
not merely require in order to cognize an object but to which every
intuition must necessarily be subject in order to become an object for
me because in any other way and without this synthesis the manifold
in intuition could not be united in one consciousness
This proposition is as already said itself analytical although it
constitutes the synthetical unity the condition of all thought for
it states nothing more than that all my representations in any given
intuition must be subject to the condition which alone enables me to
connect them as my representation with the identical self and so to
unite them synthetically in one apperception by means of the general
expression I think
But this principle is not to be regarded as a principle for every
possible understanding but only for the understanding by means of whose
pure apperception in the thought I am no manifold content is given The
understanding or mind which contained the manifold in intuition in and
through the act itself of its own selfconsciousness in other words an
understanding by and in the representation of which the objects of
the representation should at the same time exist would not require a
special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity
of its consciousness an act of which the human understanding which
thinks only and cannot intuite has absolute need But this principle is
the first principle of all the operations of our understanding so that
we cannot form the least conception of any other possible understanding
either of one such as should be itself intuition or possess a sensuous
intuition but with forms different from those of space and time
It is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that all
the manifold given in an intuition is united into a conception of
the object On this account it is called objective and must be
distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness which is a
determination of the internal sense by means of which the said manifold
in intuition is given empirically to be so united Whether I can be
empirically conscious of the manifold as coexistent or as successive
depends upon circumstances or empirical conditions Hence the empirical
unity of consciousness by means of association of representations
itself relates to a phenomenal world and is wholly contingent On the
contrary the pure form of intuition in time merely as an intuition
which contains a given manifold is subject to the original unity of
consciousness and that solely by means of the necessary relation of
the manifold in intuition to the I think consequently by means of
the pure synthesis of the understanding which lies a priori at the
foundation of all empirical synthesis The transcendental unity of
apperception is alone objectively valid the empirical which we do not
consider in this essay and which is merely a unity deduced from the
former under given conditions in concreto possesses only subjective
validity One person connects the notion conveyed in a word with one
thing another with another thing and the unity of consciousness in
that which is empirical is in relation to that which is given by
experience not necessarily and universally valid
I could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians give of
a judgement It is according to them the representation of a relation
between two conceptions I shall not dwell here on the faultiness of
this definition in that it suits only for categorical and not for
hypothetical or disjunctive judgements these latter containing a
relation not of conceptions but of judgements themselvesa blunder from
which many evil results have followed It is more important for our
present purpose to observe that this definition does not determine in
what the said relation consists
But if I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in
every judgement and distinguish it as belonging to the understanding
from the relation which is produced according to laws of the
reproductive imagination which has only subjective validity I find
that judgement is nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions
under the objective unit of apperception This is plain from our use
of the term of relation is in judgements in order to distinguish the
objective unity of given representations from the subjective unity
For this term indicates the relation of these representations to the
original apperception and also their necessary unity even although the
judgement is empirical therefore contingent as in the judgement All
bodies are heavy I do not mean by this that these representations
do necessarily belong to each other in empirical intuition but that by
means of the necessary unity of appreciation they belong to each other
in the synthesis of intuitions that is to say they belong to each
other according to principles of the objective determination of all
our representations in so far as cognition can arise from them
these principles being all deduced from the main principle of the
transcendental unity of apperception In this way alone can there arise
from this relation a judgement that is a relation which has objective
validity and is perfectly distinct from that relation of the very same
representations which has only subjective validitya relation to wit
which is produced according to laws of association According to these
laws I could only say When I hold in my hand or carry a body I feel
an impression of weight but I could not say It the body is
heavy for this is tantamount to saying both these representations
are conjoined in the object that is without distinction as to the
condition of the subject and do not merely stand together in my
perception however frequently the perceptive act may be repeated
The manifold content given in a sensuous intuition comes necessarily
under the original synthetical unity of apperception because thereby
alone is the unity of intuition possible SS 13 But that act of the
understanding by which the manifold content of given representations
whether intuitions or conceptions is brought under one apperception
is the logical function of judgements SS 15 All the manifold
therefore in so far as it is given in one empirical intuition is
determined in relation to one of the logical functions of judgement by
means of which it is brought into union in one consciousness Now the
categories are nothing else than these functions of judgement so far as
the manifold in a given intuition is determined in relation to them Consequently the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily
subject to the categories of the understanding
The manifold in an intuition which I call mine is represented by means
of the synthesis of the understanding as belonging to the necessary
unity of selfconsciousness and this takes place by means of the
category The category indicates accordingly that the empirical
consciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject to a
pure selfconsciousness a priori in the same manner as an empirical
intuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition which is also
a priori In the above proposition then lies the beginning of a
deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding Now as the
categories have their origin in the understanding alone independently
of sensibility I must in my deduction make abstraction of the mode in
which the manifold of an empirical intuition is given in order to
fix my attention exclusively on the unity which is brought by the
understanding into the intuition by means of the category In what
follows SS 22 it will be shown from the mode in which the empirical
intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility that the unity which
belongs to it is no other than that which the category according to SS
16 imposes on the manifold in a given intuition and thus its a
priori validity in regard to all objects of sense being established the
purpose of our deduction will be fully attained
But there is one thing in the above demonstration of which I could not
make abstraction namely that the manifold to be intuited must be given
previously to the synthesis of the understanding and independently of
it How this takes place remains here undetermined For if I cogitate
an understanding which was itself intuitive as for example a divine
understanding which should not represent given objects but by whose
representation the objects themselves should be given or produced the
categories would possess no significance in relation to such a faculty
of cognition They are merely rules for an understanding whose whole
power consists in thought that is in the act of submitting the
synthesis of the manifold which is presented to it in intuition from
a very different quarter to the unity of apperception a faculty
therefore which cognizes nothing per se but only connects and
arranges the material of cognition the intuition namely which must
be presented to it by means of the object But to show reasons for this
peculiar character of our understandings that it produces unity of
apperception a priori only by means of categories and a certain kind
and number thereof is as impossible as to explain why we are endowed
with precisely so many functions of judgement and no more or why time
and space are the only forms of our intuition
To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same
thing In cognition there are two elements firstly the conception
whereby an object is cogitated the category and secondly the
intuition whereby the object is given For supposing that to the
conception a corresponding intuition could not be given it would
still be a thought as regards its form but without any object and no
cognition of anything would be possible by means of it inasmuch as so
far as I knew there existed and could exist nothing to which my
thought could be applied Now all intuition possible to us is sensuous
consequently our thought of an object by means of a pure conception of
the understanding can become cognition for us only in so far as this
conception is applied to objects of the senses Sensuous intuition is
either pure intuition space and time or empirical intuitionof that
which is immediately represented in space and time by means of sensation
as real Through the determination of pure intuition we obtain a priori
cognitions of objects as in mathematics but only as regards their form
as phenomena whether there can exist things which must be intuited
in this form is not thereby established All mathematical conceptions
therefore are not per se cognition except in so far as we presuppose
that there exist things which can only be represented conformably to the
form of our pure sensuous intuition But things in space and time
are given only in so far as they are perceptions representations
accompanied with sensation therefore only by empirical representation
Consequently the pure conceptions of the understanding even when
they are applied to intuitions a priori as in mathematics produce
cognition only in so far as these and therefore the conceptions of the
understanding by means of them can be applied to empirical intuitions
Consequently the categories do not even by means of pure intuition
afford us any cognition of things they can only do so in so far as they
can be applied to empirical intuition That is to say the categories
serve only to render empirical cognition possible But this is what
we call experience Consequently in cognition their application to
objects of experience is the only legitimate use of the categories
The foregoing proposition is of the utmost importance for it determines
the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions of the understanding
in regard to objects just as transcendental aesthetic determined the
limits of the exercise of the pure form of our sensuous intuition
Space and time as conditions of the possibility of the presentation
of objects to us are valid no further than for objects of sense
consequently only for experience Beyond these limits they represent
to us nothing for they belong only to sense and have no reality apart
from it The pure conceptions of the understanding are free from this
limitation and extend to objects of intuition in general be the
intuition like or unlike to ours provided only it be sensuous and not
intellectual But this extension of conceptions beyond the range of our
intuition is of no advantage for they are then mere empty conceptions
of objects as to the possibility or impossibility of the existence of
which they furnish us with no means of discovery They are mere forms
of thought without objective reality because we have no intuition to
which the synthetical unity of apperception which alone the categories
contain could be applied for the purpose of determining an object Our
sensuous and empirical intuition can alone give them significance and
meaning
If then we suppose an object of a nonsensuous intuition to be given
we can in that case represent it by all those predicates which are
implied in the presupposition that nothing appertaining to sensuous
intuition belongs to it for example that it is not extended or in
space that its duration is not time that in it no change the effect
of the determinations in time is to be met with and so on But it
is no proper knowledge if I merely indicate what the intuition of the
object is not without being able to say what is contained in it for I
have not shown the possibility of an object to which my pure conception
of understanding could be applicable because I have not been able to
furnish any intuition corresponding to it but am only able to say that
our intuition is not valid for it But the most important point is
this that to a something of this kind not one category can be found
applicable Take for example the conception of substance that is
something that can exist as subject but never as mere predicate in
regard to this conception I am quite ignorant whether there can really
be anything to correspond to such a determination of thought if
empirical intuition did not afford me the occasion for its application
But of this more in the sequel
The pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects of intuition
in general through the understanding alone whether the intuition be
our own or some other provided only it be sensuous but are for
this very reason mere forms of thought by means of which alone no
determined object can be cognized The synthesis or conjunction of the
manifold in these conceptions relates we have said only to the unity
of apperception and is for this reason the ground of the possibility
of a priori cognition in so far as this cognition is dependent on the
understanding This synthesis is therefore not merely transcendental
but also purely intellectual But because a certain form of sensuous
intuition exists in the mind a priori which rests on the receptivity
of the representative faculty sensibility the understanding as a
spontaneity is able to determine the internal sense by means of the
diversity of given representations conformably to the synthetical
unity of apperception and thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of
the apperception of the manifold of sensuous intuition a priori as the
condition to which must necessarily be submitted all objects of human
intuition And in this manner the categories as mere forms of thought
receive objective reality that is application to objects which are
given to us in intuition but that only as phenomena for it is only of
phenomena that we are capable of a priori intuition
This synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition which is possible
and necessary a priori may be called figurative synthesis speciosa
in contradistinction to that which is cogitated in the mere category
in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general and is
called connection or conjunction of the understanding synthesis
intellectualis Both are transcendental not merely because they
themselves precede a priori all experience but also because they form
the basis for the possibility of other cognition a priori
But the figurative synthesis when it has relation only to the
originally synthetical unity of apperception that is to the
transcendental unity cogitated in the categories must to be
distinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction be entitled the
transcendental synthesis of imagination Imagination is the faculty of
representing an object even without its presence in intuition Now as
all our intuition is sensuous imagination by reason of the subjective
condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the
conceptions of the understanding belongs to sensibility But in so far
as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of spontaneity which is
determinative and not like sense merely determinable and which is
consequently able to determine sense a priori according to its form
conformably to the unity of apperception in so far is the imagination
a faculty of determining sensibility a priori and its synthesis of
intuitions according to the categories must be the transcendental
synthesis of the imagination It is an operation of the understanding on
sensibility and the first application of the understanding to objects
of possible intuition and at the same time the basis for the
exercise of the other functions of that faculty As figurative it is
distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis which is produced
by the understanding alone without the aid of imagination Now in
so far as imagination is spontaneity I sometimes call it also the
productive imagination and distinguish it from the reproductive the
synthesis of which is subject entirely to empirical laws those of
association namely and which therefore contributes nothing to the
explanation of the possibility of a priori cognition and for this
reason belongs not to transcendental philosophy but to psychology
We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox which
must have struck everyone in our exposition of the internal sense SS
6 namelyhow this sense represents us to our own consciousness only
as we appear to ourselves not as we are in ourselves because to wit
we intuite ourselves only as we are inwardly affected Now this appears
to be contradictory inasmuch as we thus stand in a passive relation
to ourselves and therefore in the systems of psychology the internal
sense is commonly held to be one with the faculty of apperception while
we on the contrary carefully distinguish them
That which determines the internal sense is the understanding and its
original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition that is of
bringing this under an apperception upon which rests the possibility
of the understanding itself Now as the human understanding is not in
itself a faculty of intuition and is unable to exercise such a power
in order to conjoin as it were the manifold of its own intuition the
synthesis of understanding is considered per se nothing but the unity
of action of which as such it is selfconscious even apart from
sensibility by which moreover it is able to determine our internal
sense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to it
according to the form of sensuous intuition Thus under the name of a
transcendental synthesis of imagination the understanding exercises an
activity upon the passive subject whose faculty it is and so we
are right in saying that the internal sense is affected thereby
Apperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the
same with the internal sense The former as the source of all our
synthetical conjunction applies under the name of the categories to
the manifold of intuition in general prior to all sensuous intuition of
objects The internal sense on the contrary contains merely the form
of intuition but without any synthetical conjunction of the manifold
therein and consequently does not contain any determined intuition
which is possible only through consciousness of the determination of
the manifold by the transcendental act of the imagination synthetical
influence of the understanding on the internal sense which I have
named figurative synthesis
This we can indeed always perceive in ourselves We cannot cogitate a
geometrical line without drawing it in thought nor a circle without
describing it nor represent the three dimensions of space without
drawing three lines from the same point perpendicular to one another We
cannot even cogitate time unless in drawing a straight line which is
to serve as the external figurative representation of time we fix
our attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifold whereby we
determine successively the internal sense and thus attend also to the
succession of this determination Motion as an act of the subject not
as a determination of an object consequently the synthesis of the
manifold in space if we make abstraction of space and attend merely to
the act by which we determine the internal sense according to its form
is that which produces the conception of succession The understanding
therefore does by no means find in the internal sense any such
synthesis of the manifold but produces it in that it affects this
sense At the same time how I who think is distinct from the I
which intuites itself other modes of intuition being cogitable as at
least possible and yet one and the same with this latter as the same
subject how therefore I am able to say I as an intelligence and
thinking subject cognize myself as an object thought so far as I am
moreover given to myself in intuitiononly like other phenomena not
as I am in myself and as considered by the understanding but merely as
I appearis a question that has in it neither more nor less difficulty
than the questionHow can I be an object to myself or thisHow I
can be an object of my own intuition and internal perceptions But that
such must be the fact if we admit that space is merely a pure form
of the phenomena of external sense can be clearly proved by the
consideration that we cannot represent time which is not an object of
external intuition in any other way than under the image of a line
which we draw in thought a mode of representation without which we
could not cognize the unity of its dimension and also that we are
necessitated to take our determination of periods of time or of points
of time for all our internal perceptions from the changes which
we perceive in outward things It follows that we must arrange the
determinations of the internal sense as phenomena in time exactly in
the same manner as we arrange those of the external senses in space And
consequently if we grant respecting this latter that by means of them
we know objects only in so far as we are affected externally we must
also confess with regard to the internal sense that by means of it we
intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected by ourselves in
other words as regards internal intuition we cognize our own subject
only as phenomenon and not as it is in itself
On the other hand in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold
content of representations consequently in the synthetical unity of
apperception I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself
nor as I am in myself but only that I am This representation is a
thought not an intuition Now as in order to cognize ourselves in
addition to the act of thinking which subjects the manifold of every
possible intuition to the unity of apperception there is necessary a
determinate mode of intuition whereby this manifold is given although
my own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon much less mere
illusion the determination of my existence Can only take place
conformably to the form of the internal sense according to the
particular mode in which the manifold which I conjoin is given in
internal intuition and I have therefore no knowledge of myself as I am
but merely as I appear to myself The consciousness of self is thus
very far from a knowledge of self in which I do not use the categories
whereby I cogitate an object by means of the conjunction of the
manifold in one apperception In the same way as I require for the sake
of the cognition of an object distinct from myself not only the thought
of an object in general in the category but also an intuition
by which to determine that general conception in the same way do I
require in order to the cognition of myself not only the consciousness
of myself or the thought that I think myself but in addition an
intuition of the manifold in myself by which to determine this thought
It is true that I exist as an intelligence which is conscious only of
its faculty of conjunction or synthesis but subjected in relation to
the manifold which this intelligence has to conjoin to a limitative
conjunction called the internal sense My intelligence that is I can
render that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only according to
the relations of time which are quite beyond the proper sphere of the
conceptions of the understanding and consequently cognize itself in
respect to an intuition which cannot possibly be intellectual nor
given by the understanding only as it appears to itself and not as it
would cognize itself if its intuition were intellectual
In the metaphysical deduction the a priori origin of categories was
proved by their complete accordance with the general logical of thought
in the transcendental deduction was exhibited the possibility of the
categories as a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general
At present we are about to explain the possibility of
cognizing a priori by means of the categories all objects which can
possibly be presented to our senses not indeed according to the form
of their intuition but according to the laws of their conjunction or
synthesis and thus as it were of prescribing laws to nature and even
of rendering nature possible For if the categories were inadequate
to this task it would not be evident to us why everything that is
presented to our senses must be subject to those laws which have an a
priori origin in the understanding itself
I premise that by the term synthesis of apprehension I understand
the combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition whereby
perception that is empirical consciousness of the intuition as
phenomenon is possible
We have a priori forms of the external and internal sensuous intuition
in the representations of space and time and to these must the
synthesis of apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon be always
conformable because the synthesis itself can only take place according
to these forms But space and time are not merely forms of sensuous
intuition but intuitions themselves which contain a manifold and
therefore contain a priori the determination of the unity of this
manifold See the Transcendent Aesthetic Therefore is unity of the
synthesis of the manifold without or within us consequently also a
conjunction to which all that is to be represented as determined in
space or time must correspond given a priori along with not in these
intuitions as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension
of them But this synthetical unity can be no other than that of the
conjunction of the manifold of a given intuition in general in a
primitive act of consciousness according to the categories but applied
to our sensuous intuition Consequently all synthesis whereby alone
is even perception possible is subject to the categories And
as experience is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions the
categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and are
therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience
When then for example I make the empirical intuition of a house by
apprehension of the manifold contained therein into a perception the
necessary unity of space and of my external sensuous intuition lies
at the foundation of this act and I as it were draw the form of the
house conformably to this synthetical unity of the manifold in space
But this very synthetical unity remains even when I abstract the form
of space and has its seat in the understanding and is in fact the
category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition that is
to say the category of quantity to which the aforesaid synthesis of
apprehension that is the perception must be completely conformable
To take another example when I perceive the freezing of water I
apprehend two states fluidity and solidity which as such stand
toward each other mutually in a relation of time But in the time which
I place as an internal intuition at the foundation of this phenomenon
I represent to myself synthetical unity of the manifold without which
the aforesaid relation could not be given in an intuition as determined
in regard to the succession of time Now this synthetical unity
as the a priori condition under which I conjoin the manifold of an
intuition is if I make abstraction of the permanent form of my
internal intuition that is to say of time the category of cause by
means of which when applied to my sensibility I determine everything
that occurs according to relations of time Consequently apprehension in
such an event and the event itself as far as regards the possibility
of its perception stands under the conception of the relation of cause
and effect and so in all other cases
Categories are conceptions which prescribe laws a priori to phenomena
consequently to nature as the complex of all phenomena natura
materialiter spectata And now the question arisesinasmuch as these
categories are not derived from nature and do not regulate themselves
according to her as their model for in that case they would be
empiricalhow it is conceivable that nature must regulate herself
according to them in other words how the categories can determine a
priori the synthesis of the manifold of nature and yet not derive their
origin from her The following is the solution of this enigma
It is not in the least more difficult to conceive how the laws of the
phenomena of nature must harmonize with the understanding and with its a
priori formthat is its faculty of conjoining the manifoldthan it
is to understand how the phenomena themselves must correspond with the
a priori form of our sensuous intuition For laws do not exist in the
phenomena any more than the phenomena exist as things in themselves
Laws do not exist except by relation to the subject in which the
phenomena inhere in so far as it possesses understanding just as
phenomena have no existence except by relation to the same existing
subject in so far as it has senses To things as things in themselves
conformability to law must necessarily belong independently of an
understanding to cognize them But phenomena are only representations
of things which are utterly unknown in respect to what they are in
themselves But as mere representations they stand under no law of
conjunction except that which the conjoining faculty prescribes Now
that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination
a mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual
synthesis and sensibility manifoldness of apprehension Now as all
possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension and this
empirical synthesis itself on the transcendental consequently on the
categories it is evident that all possible perceptions and therefore
everything that can attain to empirical consciousness that is all
phenomena of nature must as regards their conjunction be subject to
the categories And nature considered merely as nature in general
is dependent on them as the original ground of her necessary
conformability to law as natura formaliter spectata But the pure
faculty of the understanding of prescribing laws a priori to phenomena
by means of mere categories is not competent to enounce other or more
laws than those on which a nature in general as a conformability to law
of phenomena of space and time depends Particular laws inasmuch
as they concern empirically determined phenomena cannot be entirely
deduced from pure laws although they all stand under them Experience
must be superadded in order to know these particular laws but in regard
to experience in general and everything that can be cognized as an
object thereof these a priori laws are our only rule and guide
We cannot think any object except by means of the categories we cannot
cognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to these
conceptions Now all our intuitions are sensuous and our cognition
in so far as the object of it is given is empirical But empirical
cognition is experience consequently no a priori cognition is possible
for us except of objects of possible experience
But this cognition which is limited to objects of experience is not
for that reason derived entirely from experience butand this
is asserted of the pure intuitions and the pure conceptions of the
understandingthere are unquestionably elements of cognition which
exist in the mind a priori Now there are only two ways in which a
necessary harmony of experience with the conceptions of its objects can
be cogitated Either experience makes these conceptions possible or
the conceptions make experience possible The former of these statements
will not bold good with respect to the categories nor in regard to pure
sensuous intuition for they are a priori conceptions and therefore
independent of experience The assertion of an empirical origin would
attribute to them a sort of generatio aequivoca Consequently nothing
remains but to adopt the second alternative which presents us with a
system as it were of the epigenesis of pure reason namely that on
the part of the understanding the categories do contain the grounds of
the possibility of all experience But with respect to the questions
how they make experience possible and what are the principles of the
possibility thereof with which they present us in their application to
phenomena the following section on the transcendental exercise of the
faculty of judgement will inform the reader
It is quite possible that someone may propose a species of
preformationsystem of pure reasona middle way between the twoto
wit that the categories are neither innate and first a priori
principles of cognition nor derived from experience but are merely
subjective aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with
our existence which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator
that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which
regulate experience Now not to mention that with such an hypothesis
it is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the employment of
predetermined aptitudes the fact that the categories would in this case
entirely lose that character of necessity which is essentially involved
in the very conception of them is a conclusive objection to it The
conception of cause for example which expresses the necessity of an
effect under a presupposed condition would be false if it rested only
upon such an arbitrary subjective necessity of uniting certain empirical
representations according to such a rule of relation I could not then
sayThe effect is connected with its cause in the object that is
necessarily but only I am so constituted that I can think this
representation as so connected and not otherwise Now this is just
what the sceptic wants For in this case all our knowledge depending
on the supposed objective validity of our judgement is nothing but
mere illusion nor would there be wanting people who would deny any such
subjective necessity in respect to themselves though they must feel it
At all events we could not dispute with anyone on that which merely
depends on the manner in which his subject is organized
The foregoing deduction is an exposition of the pure conceptions of the
understanding and with them of all theoretical a priori cognition as
principles of the possibility of experience but of experience as
the determination of all phenomena in space and time in generalof
experience finally from the principle of the original synthetical
unity of apperception as the form of the understanding in relation to
time and space as original forms of sensibility
I consider the division by paragraphs to be necessary only up to this
point because we had to treat of the elementary conceptions As we
now proceed to the exposition of the employment of these I shall not
designate the chapters in this manner any further
General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly
with the division of the higher faculties of cognition These are
understanding judgement and reason This science accordingly treats
in its analytic of conceptions judgements and conclusions in exact
correspondence with the functions and order of those mental powers which
we include generally under the generic denomination of understanding
As this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all content of
cognition whether pure or empirical and occupies itself with the mere
form of thought discursive cognition it must contain in its analytic
a canon for reason For the form of reason has its law which without
taking into consideration the particular nature of the cognition about
which it is employed can be discovered a priori by the simple analysis
of the action of reason into its momenta
Transcendental logic limited as it is to a determinate content that of
pure a priori cognitions to wit cannot imitate general logic in this
division For it is evident that the transcendental employment of reason
is not objectively valid and therefore does not belong to the logic
of truth that is to analytic but as a logic of illusion occupies
a particular department in the scholastic system under the name of
transcendental dialectic
Understanding and judgement accordingly possess in transcendental logic
a canon of objectively valid and therefore true exercise and are
comprehended in the analytical department of that logic But reason
in her endeavours to arrive by a priori means at some true statement
concerning objects and to extend cognition beyond the bounds of possible
experience is altogether dialectic and her illusory assertions cannot
be constructed into a canon such as an analytic ought to contain
Accordingly the analytic of principles will be merely a canon for
the faculty of judgement for the instruction of this faculty in its
application to phenomena of the pure conceptions of the understanding
which contain the necessary condition for the establishment of a priori
laws On this account although the subject of the following chapters is
the especial principles of understanding I shall make use of the
term Doctrine of the faculty of judgement in order to define more
particularly my present purpose
If understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or rules
the faculty of judgement may be termed the faculty of subsumption under
these rules that is of distinguishing whether this or that does or
does not stand under a given rule casus datae legis General logic
contains no directions or precepts for the faculty of judgement nor
can it contain any such For as it makes abstraction of all content of
cognition no duty is left for it except that of exposing analytically
the mere form of cognition in conceptions judgements and conclusions
and of thereby establishing formal rules for all exercise of the
understanding Now if this logic wished to give some general direction
how we should subsume under these rules that is how we should
distinguish whether this or that did or did not stand under them this
again could not be done otherwise than by means of a rule But this
rule precisely because it is a rule requires for itself direction from
the faculty of judgement Thus it is evident that the understanding
is capable of being instructed by rules but that the judgement is a
peculiar talent which does not and cannot require tuition but
only exercise This faculty is therefore the specific quality of the
socalled mother wit the want of which no scholastic discipline can
compensate
For although education may furnish and as it were engraft upon a
limited understanding rules borrowed from other minds yet the power of
employing these rules correctly must belong to the pupil himself and no
rule which we can prescribe to him with this purpose is in the absence
or deficiency of this gift of nature secure from misuse A physician
therefore a judge or a statesman may have in his head many admirable
pathological juridical or political rules in a degree that may enable
him to be a profound teacher in his particular science and yet in the
application of these rules he may very possibly blundereither because
he is wanting in natural judgement though not in understanding and
whilst he can comprehend the general in abstracto cannot distinguish
whether a particular case in concreto ought to rank under the former or
because his faculty of judgement has not been sufficiently exercised by
examples and real practice Indeed the grand and only use of examples
is to sharpen the judgement For as regards the correctness and
precision of the insight of the understanding examples are commonly
injurious rather than otherwise because as casus in terminis they
seldom adequately fulfil the conditions of the rule Besides they often
weaken the power of our understanding to apprehend rules or laws
in their universality independently of particular circumstances of
experience and hence accustom us to employ them more as formulae than
as principles Examples are thus the gocart of the judgement which
he who is naturally deficient in that faculty cannot afford to dispense
with
But although general logic cannot give directions to the faculty of
judgement the case is very different as regards transcendental logic
insomuch that it appears to be the especial duty of the latter to secure
and direct by means of determinate rules the faculty of judgement in
the employment of the pure understanding For as a doctrine that is
as an endeavour to enlarge the sphere of the understanding in regard to
pure a priori cognitions philosophy is worse than useless since from
all the attempts hitherto made little or no ground has been gained
But as a critique in order to guard against the mistakes of the
faculty of judgement lapsus judicii in the employment of the few pure
conceptions of the understanding which we possess although its use is
in this case purely negative philosophy is called upon to apply all its
acuteness and penetration
But transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity that besides
indicating the rule or rather the general condition for rules which is
given in the pure conception of the understanding it can at the same
time indicate a priori the case to which the rule must be applied
The cause of the superiority which in this respect transcendental
philosophy possesses above all other sciences except mathematics lies
in this it treats of conceptions which must relate a priori to their
objects whose objective validity consequently cannot be demonstrated a
posteriori and is, at the same time, under the obligation of presenting
in general but sufficient tests the conditions under which objects can
be given in harmony with those conceptions otherwise they would be
mere logical forms without content and not pure conceptions of the
understanding
Our transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgement will contain
two chapters The first will treat of the sensuous condition under which
alone pure conceptions of the understanding can be employedthat is of
the schematism of the pure understanding The second will treat of those
synthetical judgements which are derived a priori from pure conceptions
of the understanding under those conditions and which lie a priori at
the foundation of all other cognitions that is to say it will treat of
the principles of the pure understanding
In all subsumptions of an object under a conception the representation
of the object must be homogeneous with the conception in other words
the conception must contain that which is represented in the object to
be subsumed under it For this is the meaning of the expression An
object is contained under a conception Thus the empirical conception
of a plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical conception of a
circle inasmuch as the roundness which is cogitated in the former is
intuited in the latter
But pure conceptions of the understanding when compared with empirical
intuitions or even with sensuous intuitions in general are quite
heterogeneous and never can be discovered in any intuition How then
is the subsumption of the latter under the former and consequently
the application of the categories to phenomena possibleFor it is
impossible to say for example Causality can be intuited through the
senses and is contained in the phenomenonThis natural and important
question forms the real cause of the necessity of a transcendental
doctrine of the faculty of judgement with the purpose to wit of
showing how pure conceptions of the understanding can be applied to
phenomena In all other sciences where the conceptions by which the
object is thought in the general are not so different and heterogeneous
from those which represent the object in concretoas it is given it
is quite unnecessary to institute any special inquiries concerning the
application of the former to the latter
Now it is quite clear that there must be some third thing which on the
one side is homogeneous with the category and with the phenomenon on
the other and so makes the application of the former to the latter
possible This mediating representation must be pure without any
empirical content and yet must on the one side be intellectual on the
other sensuous Such a representation is the transcendental schema
The conception of the understanding contains pure synthetical unity of
the manifold in general Time as the formal condition of the
manifold of the internal sense consequently of the conjunction of all
representations contains a priori a manifold in the pure intuition Now
a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with the
category which constitutes the unity thereof that it is universal and
rests upon a rule a priori On the other hand it is so far homogeneous
with the phenomenon inasmuch as time is contained in every empirical
representation of the manifold Thus an application of the category to
phenomena becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination
of time which as the schema of the conceptions of the understanding
mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former
After what has been proved in our deduction of the categories no
one it is to be hoped can hesitate as to the proper decision of
the question whether the employment of these pure conceptions of the
understanding ought to be merely empirical or also transcendental
in other words whether the categories as conditions of a possible
experience relate a priori solely to phenomena or whether as
conditions of the possibility of things in general their application
can be extended to objects as things in themselves For we have
there seen that conceptions are quite impossible and utterly without
signification unless either to them or at least to the elements of
which they consist an object be given and that consequently they
cannot possibly apply to objects as things in themselves without regard
to the question whether and how these may be given to us and further
that the only manner in which objects can be given to us is by means of
the modification of our sensibility and finally that pure a priori
conceptions in addition to the function of the understanding in the
category must contain a priori formal conditions of sensibility of the
internal sense namely which again contain the general condition under
which alone the category can be applied to any object This formal
and pure condition of sensibility to which the conception of the
understanding is restricted in its employment we shall name the
schema of the conception of the understanding and the procedure of the
understanding with these schemata we shall call the schematism of the
pure understanding
The schema is in itself always a mere product of the imagination But
as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single intuition but
merely unity in the determination of sensibility the schema is clearly
distinguishable from the image Thus if I place five points one after
another this is an image of the number five On the other hand if
I only think a number in general which may be either five or a hundred
this thought is rather the representation of a method of representing in
an image a sum eg a thousand in conformity with a conception than
the image itself an image which I should find some little difficulty in
reviewing and comparing with the conception Now this representation
of a general procedure of the imagination to present its image to a
conception I call the schema of this conception
In truth it is not images of objects but schemata which lie at the
foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions No image could ever be
adequate to our conception of a triangle in general For the generalness
of the conception it never could attain to as this includes under
itself all triangles whether rightangled acuteangled etc whilst
the image would always be limited to a single part of this sphere The
schema of the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought and it
indicates a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure
figures in space Still less is an object of experience or an image
of the object ever to the empirical conception On the contrary the
conception always relates immediately to the schema of the imagination
as a rule for the determination of our intuition in conformity with a
certain general conception The conception of a dog indicates a
rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a
fourfooted animal in general without being limited to any particular
individual form which experience presents to me or indeed to any
possible image that I can represent to myself in concreto This
schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena and their mere
form is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul whose true
modes of action we shall only with difficulty discover and unveil Thus
much only can we say The image is a product of the empirical faculty
of the productive imaginationthe schema of sensuous conceptions of
figures in space for example is a product and as it were a monogram
of the pure imagination a priori whereby and according to which
images first become possible which however can be connected with the
conception only mediately by means of the schema which they indicate
and are in themselves never fully adequate to it On the other hand
the schema of a pure conception of the understanding is something that
cannot be reduced into any imageit is nothing else than the pure
synthesis expressed by the category conformably to a rule of unity
according to conceptions It is a transcendental product of the
imagination a product which concerns the determination of the internal
sense according to conditions of its form time in respect to all
representations in so far as these representations must be conjoined a
priori in one conception conformably to the unity of apperception
Without entering upon a dry and tedious analysis of the essential
requisites of transcendental schemata of the pure conceptions of the
understanding we shall rather proceed at once to give an explanation
of them according to the order of the categories and in connection
therewith
For the external sense the pure image of all quantities quantorum is
space the pure image of all objects of sense in general is time
But the pure schema of quantity quantitatis as a conception of
the understanding is number a representation which comprehends the
successive addition of one to one homogeneous quantities Thus number
is nothing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold in
a homogeneous intuition by means of my generating time itself in my
apprehension of the intuition
Reality in the pure conception of the understanding is that which
corresponds to a sensation in general that consequently the
conception of which indicates a being in time Negation is that the
conception of which represents a notbeing in time The opposition of
these two consists therefore in the difference of one and the same
time as a time filled or a time empty Now as time is only the form of
intuition consequently of objects as phenomena that which in objects
corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects
as things in themselves Sachheit reality Now every sensation has
a degree or quantity by which it can fill time that is to say the
internal sense in respect of the representation of an object more or
less until it vanishes into nothing 0 negatio Thus there is
a relation and connection between reality and negation or rather a
transition from the former to the latter which makes every reality
representable to us as a quantum and the schema of a reality as the
quantity of something in so far as it fills time is exactly this
continuous and uniform generation of the reality in time as we descend
in time from the sensation which has a certain degree down to the
vanishing thereof or gradually ascend from negation to the quantity
thereof
The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time that is
the representation of it as a substratum of the empirical determination
of time a substratum which therefore remains whilst all else changes
Time passes not but in it passes the existence of the changeable To
time therefore which is itself unchangeable and permanent corresponds
that which in the phenomenon is unchangeable in existence that is
substance and it is only by it that the succession and coexistence of
phenomena can be determined in regard to time
The schema of cause and of the causality of a thing is the real which
when posited is always followed by something else It consists
therefore in the succession of the manifold in so far as that
succession is subjected to a rule
The schema of community reciprocity of action and reaction or the
reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents is the
coexistence of the determinations of the one with those of the other
according to a general rule
The schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis of
different representations with the conditions of time in general as
for example opposites cannot exist together at the same time in
the same thing but only after each other and is therefore the
determination of the representation of a thing at any time
The schema of reality is existence in a determined time
The schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all time
It is clear from all this that the schema of the category of quantity
contains and represents the generation synthesis of time itself in
the successive apprehension of an object the schema of quality the
synthesis of sensation with the representation of time or the filling
up of time the schema of relation the relation of perceptions to each
other in all time that is according to a rule of the determination
of time and finally the schema of modality and its categories time
itself as the correlative of the determination of an objectwhether it
does belong to time and how The schemata therefore are nothing but
a priori determinations of time according to rules and these in regard
to all possible objects following the arrangement of the categories
relate to the series in time the content in time the order in time
and finally to the complex or totality in time
Hence it is apparent that the schematism of the understanding by means
of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination amounts to nothing
else than the unity of the manifold of intuition in the internal
sense and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception as a function
corresponding to the internal sense a receptivity Thus the schemata
of the pure conceptions of the understanding are the true and only
conditions whereby our understanding receives an application to objects
and consequently significance Finally therefore the categories are
only capable of empirical use inasmuch as they serve merely to subject
phenomena to the universal rules of synthesis by means of an a priori
necessary unity on account of the necessary union of all consciousness
in one original apperception and so to render them susceptible of a
complete connection in one experience But within this whole of possible
experience lie all our cognitions and in the universal relation to this
experience consists transcendental truth which antecedes all empirical
truth and renders the latter possible
It is however evident at first sight that although the schemata of
sensibility are the sole agents in realizing the categories they do
nevertheless also restrict them that is they limit the categories
by conditions which lie beyond the sphere of understandingnamely in
sensibility Hence the schema is properly only the phenomenon or the
sensuous conception of an object in harmony with the category Numerus
est quantitas phaenomenonsensatio realitas phaenomenon constans
et perdurabile rerum substantia phaenomenonaeternitas necessitas
phaenomena etc Now if we remove a restrictive condition we thereby
amplify it appears the formerly limited conception In this way the
categories in their pure signification free from all conditions of
sensibility ought to be valid of things as they are and not as the
schemata represent them merely as they appear and consequently the
categories must have a significance far more extended and wholly
independent of all schemata In truth there does always remain to the
pure conceptions of the understanding after abstracting every sensuous
condition a value and significance which is however merely logical
But in this case no object is given them and therefore they have no
meaning sufficient to afford us a conception of an object The notion
of substance for example if we leave out the sensuous determination
of permanence would mean nothing more than a something which can be
cogitated as subject without the possibility of becoming a predicate to
anything else Of this representation I can make nothing inasmuch as
it does not indicate to me what determinations the thing possesses which
must thus be valid as premier subject Consequently the categories
without schemata are merely functions of the understanding for the
production of conceptions but do not represent any object This
significance they derive from sensibility which at the same time
realizes the understanding and restricts it
In the foregoing chapter we have merely considered the general
conditions under which alone the transcendental faculty of judgement
is justified in using the pure conceptions of the understanding for
synthetical judgements Our duty at present is to exhibit in systematic
connection those judgements which the understanding really produces a
priori For this purpose our table of the categories will certainly
afford us the natural and safe guidance For it is precisely the
categories whose application to possible experience must constitute all
pure a priori cognition of the understanding and the relation of which
to sensibility will on that very account present us with a complete
and systematic catalogue of all the transcendental principles of the use
of the understanding
Principles a priori are so called not merely because they contain
in themselves the grounds of other judgements but also because they
themselves are not grounded in higher and more general cognitions This
peculiarity however does not raise them altogether above the need of
a proof For although there could be found no higher cognition and
therefore no objective proof and although such a principle rather
serves as the foundation for all cognition of the object this by no
means hinders us from drawing a proof from the subjective sources of the
possibility of the cognition of an object Such a proof is necessary
moreover because without it the principle might be liable to the
imputation of being a mere gratuitous assertion
In the second place we shall limit our investigations to those
principles which relate to the categories For as to the principles
of transcendental aesthetic according to which space and time are
the conditions of the possibility of things as phenomena as also the
restriction of these principles namely that they cannot be applied to
objects as things in themselvesthese of course do not fall within
the scope of our present inquiry In like manner the principles of
mathematical science form no part of this system because they are
all drawn from intuition and not from the pure conception of the
understanding The possibility of these principles however will
necessarily be considered here inasmuch as they are synthetical
judgements a priori not indeed for the purpose of proving their
accuracy and apodictic certainty which is unnecessary but merely to
render conceivable and deduce the possibility of such evident a priori
cognitions
But we shall have also to speak of the principle of analytical
judgements in opposition to synthetical judgements which is the proper
subject of our inquiries because this very opposition will free the
theory of the latter from all ambiguity and place it clearly before our
eyes in its true nature
Whatever may be the content of our cognition and in whatever manner
our cognition may be related to its object the universal although only
negative conditions of all our judgements is that they do not contradict
themselves otherwise these judgements are in themselves even without
respect to the object nothing But although there may exist no
contradiction in our judgement it may nevertheless connect conceptions
in such a manner that they do not correspond to the object or without
any grounds either a priori or a posteriori for arriving at such a
judgement and thus without being selfcontradictory a judgement may
nevertheless be either false or groundless
Now the proposition No subject can have a predicate that contradicts
it is called the principle of contradiction and is a universal but
purely negative criterion of all truth But it belongs to logic alone
because it is valid of cognitions merely as cognitions and without
respect to their content and declares that the contradiction entirely
nullifies them We can also however make a positive use of this
principle that is not merely to banish falsehood and error in so far
as it rests upon contradiction but also for the cognition of truth
For if the judgement is analytical be it affirmative or negative
its truth must always be recognizable by means of the principle of
contradiction For the contrary of that which lies and is cogitated
as conception in the cognition of the object will be always properly
negatived but the conception itself must always be affirmed of the
object inasmuch as the contrary thereof would be in contradiction to
the object
We must therefore hold the principle of contradiction to be the
universal and fully sufficient Principle of all analytical cognition
But as a sufficient criterion of truth it has no further utility or
authority For the fact that no cognition can be at variance with this
principle without nullifying itself constitutes this principle the sine
qua non but not the determining ground of the truth of our cognition
As our business at present is properly with the synthetical part of our
knowledge only we shall always be on our guard not to transgress this
inviolable principle but at the same time not to expect from it any
direct assistance in the establishment of the truth of any synthetical
proposition
There exists however a formula of this celebrated principlea
principle merely formal and entirely without contentwhich contains a
synthesis that has been inadvertently and quite unnecessarily mixed up
with it It is this It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be
at the same time Not to mention the superfluousness of the addition of
the word impossible to indicate the apodictic certainty which ought to
be selfevident from the proposition itself the proposition is affected
by the condition of time and as it were says A thing A which is
something B cannot at the same time be nonB But both B as well
as nonB may quite well exist in succession For example a man who is
young cannot at the same time be old but the same man can very well
be at one time young and at another not young that is old Now the
principle of contradiction as a merely logical proposition must not
by any means limit its application merely to relations of time and
consequently a formula like the preceding is quite foreign to its
true purpose The misunderstanding arises in this way We first of all
separate a predicate of a thing from the conception of the thing and
afterwards connect with this predicate its opposite and hence do
not establish any contradiction with the subject but only with its
predicate which has been conjoined with the subject syntheticallya
contradiction moreover which obtains only when the first and second
predicate are affirmed in the same time If I say A man who is
ignorant is not learned the condition at the same time must be
added for he who is at one time ignorant may at another be learned
But if I say No ignorant man is a learned man the proposition is
analytical because the characteristic ignorance is now a constituent
part of the conception of the subject and in this case the
negative proposition is evident immediately from the proposition of
contradiction without the necessity of adding the condition the
same time This is the reason why I have altered the formula of this
principlean alteration which shows very clearly the nature of an
analytical proposition
The explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgements is a task
with which general logic has nothing to do indeed she needs not even
be acquainted with its name But in transcendental logic it is the most
important matter to be dealt withindeed the only one if the question
is of the possibility of synthetical judgements a priori the conditions
and extent of their validity For when this question is fully decided
it can reach its aim with perfect ease the determination to wit of
the extent and limits of the pure understanding
In an analytical judgement I do not go beyond the given conception
in order to arrive at some decision respecting it If the judgement is
affirmative I predicate of the conception only that which was already
cogitated in it if negative I merely exclude from the conception its
contrary But in synthetical judgements I must go beyond the given
conception in order to cogitate in relation with it something quite
different from that which was cogitated in it a relation which is
consequently never one either of identity or contradiction and by means
of which the truth or error of the judgement cannot be discerned merely
from the judgement itself
Granted then that we must go out beyond a given conception in order
to compare it synthetically with another a third thing is necessary in
which alone the synthesis of two conceptions can originate Now what
is this tertium quid that is to be the medium of all synthetical
judgements It is only a complex in which all our representations are
contained the internal sense to wit and its form a priori time
The synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagination their
synthetical unity which is requisite to a judgement upon the unity
of apperception In this therefore is to be sought the possibility of
synthetical judgements and as all three contain the sources of a priori
representations the possibility of pure synthetical judgements also
nay they are necessary upon these grounds if we are to possess
a knowledge of objects which rests solely upon the synthesis of
representations
If a cognition is to have objective reality that is to relate to an
object and possess sense and meaning in respect to it it is necessary
that the object be given in some way or another Without this our
conceptions are empty and we may indeed have thought by means of them
but by such thinking we have not in fact cognized anything we have
merely played with representation To give an object if this expression
be understood in the sense of to present the object not mediately
but immediately in intuition means nothing else than to apply the
representation of it to experience be that experience real or only
possible Space and time themselves pure as these conceptions are from
all that is empirical and certain as it is that they are represented
fully a priori in the mind would be completely without objective
validity and without sense and significance if their necessary use
in the objects of experience were not shown Nay the representation
of them is a mere schema that always relates to the reproductive
imagination which calls up the objects of experience without which
they have no meaning And so it is with all conceptions without
distinction
The possibility of experience is then that which gives objective
reality to all our a priori cognitions Now experience depends upon the
synthetical unity of phenomena that is upon a synthesis according to
conceptions of the object of phenomena in general a synthesis without
which experience never could become knowledge but would be merely a
rhapsody of perceptions never fitting together into any connected text
according to rules of a thoroughly united possible consciousness and
therefore never subjected to the transcendental and necessary unity
of apperception Experience has therefore for a foundation a priori
principles of its form that is to say general rules of unity in
the synthesis of phenomena the objective reality of which rules as
necessary conditions even of the possibility of experience can
which rules as necessary conditionseven of the possibility of
experiencecan always be shown in experience But apart from this
relation a priori synthetical propositions are absolutely impossible
because they have no third term that is no pure object in which the
synthetical unity can exhibit the objective reality of its conceptions
Although then respecting space or the forms which productive
imagination describes therein we do cognize much a priori in
synthetical judgements and are really in no need of experience for this
purpose such knowledge would nevertheless amount to nothing but a busy
trifling with a mere chimera were not space to be considered as the
condition of the phenomena which constitute the material of external
experience Hence those pure synthetical judgements do relate though
but mediately to possible experience or rather to the possibility of
experience and upon that alone is founded the objective validity of
their synthesis
While then on the one hand experience as empirical synthesis is
the only possible mode of cognition which gives reality to all other
synthesis on the other hand this latter synthesis as cognition a
priori possesses truth that is accordance with its object only in
so far as it contains nothing more than what is necessary to the
synthetical unity of experience
Accordingly the supreme principle of all synthetical judgements is
Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetical
unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience
A priori synthetical judgements are possible when we apply the formal
conditions of the a priori intuition the synthesis of the imagination
and the necessary unity of that synthesis in a transcendental
apperception to a possible cognition of experience and say The
conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same
time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience and
have for that reason objective validity in an a priori synthetical
judgement
That principles exist at all is to be ascribed solely to the pure
understanding which is not only the faculty of rules in regard to that
which happens but is even the source of principles according to which
everything that can be presented to us as an object is necessarily
subject to rules because without such rules we never could attain
to cognition of an object Even the laws of nature if they are
contemplated as principles of the empirical use of the understanding
possess also a characteristic of necessity and we may therefore at
least expect them to be determined upon grounds which are valid a
priori and antecedent to all experience But all laws of nature without
distinction are subject to higher principles of the understanding
inasmuch as the former are merely applications of the latter to
particular cases of experience These higher principles alone therefore
give the conception which contains the necessary condition and as it
were the exponent of a rule experience on the other hand gives the
case which comes under the rule
There is no danger of our mistaking merely empirical principles for
principles of the pure understanding or conversely for the character
of necessity according to conceptions which distinguish the latter
and the absence of this in every empirical proposition how extensively
valid soever it may be is a perfect safeguard against confounding
them There are however pure principles a priori which nevertheless I
should not ascribe to the pure understandingfor this reason that they
are not derived from pure conceptions but although by the mediation
of the understanding from pure intuitions But understanding is the
faculty of conceptions Such principles mathematical science possesses
but their application to experience consequently their objective
validity nay the possibility of such a priori synthetical cognitions
the deduction thereof rests entirely upon the pure understanding
On this account I shall not reckon among my principles those of
mathematics though I shall include those upon the possibility and
objective validity a priori of principles of the mathematical science
which consequently are to be looked upon as the principle of these
and which proceed from conceptions to intuition and not from intuition
to conceptions
In the application of the pure conceptions of the understanding to
possible experience the employment of their synthesis is either
mathematical or dynamical for it is directed partly on the intuition
alone partly on the existence of a phenomenon But the a priori
conditions of intuition are in relation to a possible experience
absolutely necessary those of the existence of objects of a possible
empirical intuition are in themselves contingent Hence the principles
of the mathematical use of the categories will possess a character of
absolute necessity that is will be apodictic those on the other
hand of the dynamical use the character of an a priori necessity
indeed but only under the condition of empirical thought in an
experience therefore only mediately and indirectly Consequently
they will not possess that immediate evidence which is peculiar to the
former although their application to experience does not for that
reason lose its truth and certitude But of this point we shall be
better able to judge at the conclusion of this system of principles
The table of the categories is naturally our guide to the table of
principles because these are nothing else than rules for the objective
employment of the former Accordingly all principles of the pure
understanding are
1
Axioms
of Intuition
2 3
Anticipations Analogies
of Perception of Experience
4
Postulates of
Empirical Thought
in general
These appellations I have chosen advisedly in order that we might
not lose sight of the distinctions in respect of the evidence and the
employment of these principles It will however soon appear thata
fact which concerns both the evidence of these principles and the
a priori determination of phenomenaaccording to the categories of
quantity and quality if we attend merely to the form of these the
principles of these categories are distinguishable from those of the two
others in as much as the former are possessed of an intuitive but
the latter of a merely discursive though in both instances a complete
certitude I shall therefore call the former mathematical and the
latter dynamical principles It must be observed however that by
these terms I mean just as little in the one case the principles of
mathematics as those of general physical dynamics in the other I have
here in view merely the principles of the pure understanding in
their application to the internal sense without distinction of the
representations given therein by means of which the sciences of
mathematics and dynamics become possible Accordingly I have named
these principles rather with reference to their application than their
content and I shall now proceed to consider them in the order in which
they stand in the table
The principle of these is All Intuitions are Extensive Quantities
All phenomena contain as regards their form an intuition in space and
time which lies a priori at the foundation of all without exception
Phenomena therefore cannot be apprehended that is received into
empirical consciousness otherwise than through the synthesis of a
manifold through which the representations of a determinate space
or time are generated that is to say through the composition of the
homogeneous and the consciousness of the synthetical unity of this
manifold homogeneous Now the consciousness of a homogeneous manifold
in intuition in so far as thereby the representation of an object
is rendered possible is the conception of a quantity quanti
Consequently even the perception of an object as phenomenon is possible
only through the same synthetical unity of the manifold of the given
sensuous intuition through which the unity of the composition of the
homogeneous manifold in the conception of a quantity is cogitated
that is to say all phenomena are quantities and extensive quantities
because as intuitions in space or time they must be represented by
means of the same synthesis through which space and time themselves are
determined
An extensive quantity I call that wherein the representation of the
parts renders possible and therefore necessarily antecedes the
representation of the whole I cannot represent to myself any line
however small without drawing it in thought that is without
generating from a point all its parts one after another and in this
way alone producing this intuition Precisely the same is the case with
every even the smallest portion of time I cogitate therein only the
successive progress from one moment to another and hence by means of
the different portions of time and the addition of them a determinate
quantity of time is produced As the pure intuition in all phenomena
is either time or space so is every phenomenon in its character of
intuition an extensive quantity inasmuch as it can only be cognized
in our apprehension by successive synthesis from part to part All
phenomena are accordingly to be considered as aggregates that is as
a collection of previously given parts which is not the case with
every sort of quantities but only with those which are represented and
apprehended by us as extensive
On this successive synthesis of the productive imagination in the
generation of figures is founded the mathematics of extension or
geometry with its axioms which express the conditions of sensuous
intuition a priori under which alone the schema of a pure conception of
external intuition can exist for example between two points only one
straight line is possible two straight lines cannot enclose a space
etc These are the axioms which properly relate only to quantities
quanta as such
But as regards the quantity of a thing quantitas that is to say the
answer to the question How large is this or that object although in
respect to this question we have various propositions synthetical and
immediately certain indemonstrabilia we have in the proper sense of
the term no axioms For example the propositions If equals be added
to equals the wholes are equal If equals be taken from equals
the remainders are equal are analytical because I am immediately
conscious of the identity of the production of the one quantity with
the production of the other whereas axioms must be a priori synthetical
propositions On the other hand the selfevident propositions as to the
relation of numbers are certainly synthetical but not universal like
those of geometry and for this reason cannot be called axioms but
numerical formulae That 7 5 12 is not an analytical proposition
For neither in the representation of seven nor of five nor of the
composition of the two numbers do I cogitate the number twelve
Whether I cogitate the number in the addition of both is not at
present the question for in the case of an analytical proposition
the only point is whether I really cogitate the predicate in the
representation of the subject But although the proposition is
synthetical it is nevertheless only a singular proposition In so far
as regard is here had merely to the synthesis of the homogeneous the
units it cannot take place except in one manner although our use
of these numbers is afterwards general If I say A triangle can
be constructed with three lines any two of which taken together are
greater than the third I exercise merely the pure function of the
productive imagination which may draw the lines longer or shorter and
construct the angles at its pleasure On the contrary the number seven
is possible only in one manner and so is likewise the number twelve
which results from the synthesis of seven and five Such propositions
then cannot be termed axioms for in that case we should have an
infinity of these but numerical formulae
This transcendental principle of the mathematics of phenomena greatly
enlarges our a priori cognition For it is by this principle alone that
pure mathematics is rendered applicable in all its precision to objects
of experience and without it the validity of this application would not
be so selfevident on the contrary contradictions and confusions have
often arisen on this very point Phenomena are not things in themselves
Empirical intuition is possible only through pure intuition of space
and time consequently what geometry affirms of the latter is
indisputably valid of the former All evasions such as the statement
that objects of sense do not conform to the rules of construction in
space for example to the rule of the infinite divisibility of lines or
angles must fall to the ground For if these objections hold good we
deny to space and with it to all mathematics objective validity and
no longer know wherefore and how far mathematics can be applied to
phenomena The synthesis of spaces and times as the essential form of
all intuition is that which renders possible the apprehension of a
phenomenon and therefore every external experience consequently all
cognition of the objects of experience and whatever mathematics in its
pure use proves of the former must necessarily hold good of the latter
All objections are but the chicaneries of an illinstructed reason
which erroneously thinks to liberate the objects of sense from the
formal conditions of our sensibility and represents these although
mere phenomena as things in themselves presented as such to our
understanding But in this case no a priori synthetical cognition of
them could be possible consequently not through pure conceptions of
space and the science which determines these conceptions that is to
say geometry would itself be impossible
The principle of these is In all phenomena the Real that which is an
object of sensation has Intensive Quantity that is has a Degree
Perception is empirical consciousness that is to say a consciousness
which contains an element of sensation Phenomena as objects of
perception are not pure that is merely formal intuitions like space
and time for they cannot be perceived in themselves
They contain then over and above the intuition the materials for an
object through which is represented something existing in space or
time that is to say they contain the real of sensation as a
representation merely subjective which gives us merely the
consciousness that the subject is affected and which we refer to some
external object Now a gradual transition from empirical consciousness
to pure consciousness is possible inasmuch as the real in this
consciousness entirely vanishes and there remains a merely formal
consciousness a priori of the manifold in time and space consequently
there is possible a synthesis also of the production of the quantity of
a sensation from its commencement that is from the pure intuition 0
onwards up to a certain quantity of the sensation Now as sensation in
itself is not an objective representation and in it is to be found
neither the intuition of space nor of time it cannot possess any
extensive quantity and yet there does belong to it a quantity and that
by means of its apprehension in which empirical consciousness can
within a certain time rise from nothing 0 up to its given amount
consequently an intensive quantity And thus we must ascribe intensive
quantity that is a degree of influence on sense to all objects of
perception in so far as this perception contains sensation
All cognition by means of which I am enabled to cognize and determine
a priori what belongs to empirical cognition may be called an
anticipation and without doubt this is the sense in which Epicurus
employed his expression prholepsis But as there is in phenomena
something which is never cognized a priori which on this account
constitutes the proper difference between pure and empirical cognition
that is to say sensation as the matter of perception it follows
that sensation is just that element in cognition which cannot be at
all anticipated On the other hand we might very well term the pure
determinations in space and time as well in regard to figure as to
quantity anticipations of phenomena because they represent a priori
that which may always be given a posteriori in experience But suppose
that in every sensation as sensation in general without any particular
sensation being thought of there existed something which could be
cognized a priori this would deserve to be called anticipation in a
special sensespecial because it may seem surprising to forestall
experience in that which concerns the matter of experience and which
we can only derive from itself Yet such really is the case here
Apprehension by means of sensation alone fills only one moment that
is if I do not take into consideration a succession of many sensations
As that in the phenomenon the apprehension of which is not a successive
synthesis advancing from parts to an entire representation sensation
has therefore no extensive quantity the want of sensation in a moment
of time would represent it as empty consequently 0 That which in
the empirical intuition corresponds to sensation is reality realitas
phaenomenon that which corresponds to the absence of it negation 0
Now every sensation is capable of a diminution so that it can decrease
and thus gradually disappear Therefore between reality in a phenomenon
and negation there exists a continuous concatenation of many possible
intermediate sensations the difference of which from each other is
always smaller than that between the given sensation and zero or
complete negation That is to say the real in a phenomenon has always a
quantity which however is not discoverable in apprehension inasmuch as
apprehension take place by means of mere sensation in one instant and
not by the successive synthesis of many sensations and therefore does
not progress from parts to the whole Consequently it has a quantity
but not an extensive quantity
Now that quantity which is apprehended only as unity and in which
plurality can be represented only by approximation to negation O
I term intensive quantity Consequently reality in a phenomenon has
intensive quantity that is a degree If we consider this reality as
cause be it of sensation or of another reality in the phenomenon for
example a change we call the degree of reality in its character of
cause a momentum for example the momentum of weight and for this
reason that the degree only indicates that quantity the apprehension of
which is not successive but instantaneous This however I touch upon
only in passing for with causality I have at present nothing to do
Accordingly every sensation consequently every reality in phenomena
however small it may be has a degree that is an intensive quantity
which may always be lessened and between reality and negation there
exists a continuous connection of possible realities and possible
smaller perceptions Every colourfor example redhas a degree
which be it ever so small is never the smallest and so is it always
with heat the momentum of weight etc
This property of quantities according to which no part of them is the
smallest possible no part simple is called their continuity Space
and time are quanta continua because no part of them can be
given without enclosing it within boundaries points and moments
consequently this given part is itself a space or a time Space
therefore consists only of spaces and time of times Points and
moments are only boundaries that is the mere places or positions of
their limitation But places always presuppose intuitions which are to
limit or determine them and we cannot conceive either space or time
composed of constituent parts which are given before space or time
Such quantities may also be called flowing because synthesis of the
productive imagination in the production of these quantities is a
progression in time the continuity of which we are accustomed to
indicate by the expression flowing
All phenomena then are continuous quantities in respect both to
intuition and mere perception sensation and with it reality In the
former case they are extensive quantities in the latter intensive
When the synthesis of the manifold of a phenomenon is interrupted there
results merely an aggregate of several phenomena and not properly a
phenomenon as a quantity which is not produced by the mere continuation
of the productive synthesis of a certain kind but by the repetition of
a synthesis always ceasing For example if I call thirteen dollars a
sum or quantity of money I employ the term quite correctly inasmuch as
I understand by thirteen dollars the value of a mark in standard silver
which is to be sure a continuous quantity in which no part is the
smallest but every part might constitute a piece of money which would
contain material for still smaller pieces If however by the words
thirteen dollars I understand so many coins be their value in silver
what it may it would be quite erroneous to use the expression a
quantity of dollars on the contrary I must call them aggregate that
is a number of coins And as in every number we must have unity as the
foundation so a phenomenon taken as unity is a quantity and as such
always a continuous quantity quantum continuum
Now seeing all phenomena whether considered as extensive or intensive
are continuous quantities the proposition All change transition of a
thing from one state into another is continuous might be proved here
easily and with mathematical evidence were it not that the causality
of a change lies entirely beyond the bounds of a transcendental
philosophy and presupposes empirical principles For of the possibility
of a cause which changes the condition of things that is which
determines them to the contrary to a certain given state the
understanding gives us a priori no knowledge not merely because it has
no insight into the possibility of it for such insight is absent in
several a priori cognitions but because the notion of change concerns
only certain determinations of phenomena which experience alone can
acquaint us with while their cause lies in the unchangeable But seeing
that we have nothing which we could here employ but the pure fundamental
conceptions of all possible experience among which of course nothing
empirical can be admitted we dare not without injuring the unity of
our system anticipate general physical science which is built upon
certain fundamental experiences
Nevertheless we are in no want of proofs of the great influence
which the principle above developed exercises in the anticipation of
perceptions and even in supplying the want of them so far as to shield
us against the false conclusions which otherwise we might rashly draw
If all reality in perception has a degree between which and negation
there is an endless sequence of ever smaller degrees and if
nevertheless every sense must have a determinate degree of receptivity
for sensations no perception and consequently no experience is
possible which can prove either immediately or mediately an entire
absence of all reality in a phenomenon in other words it is impossible
ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of empty space or
of empty time For in the first place an entire absence of reality in
a sensuous intuition cannot of course be an object of perception
secondly such absence cannot be deduced from the contemplation of any
single phenomenon and the difference of the degrees in its reality nor
ought it ever to be admitted in explanation of any phenomenon For if
even the complete intuition of a determinate space or time is thoroughly
real that is if no part thereof is empty yet because every reality
has its degree which with the extensive quantity of the phenomenon
unchanged can diminish through endless gradations down to nothing the
void there must be infinitely graduated degrees with which space or
time is filled and the intensive quantity in different phenomena may
be smaller or greater although the extensive quantity of the intuition
remains equal and unaltered
We shall give an example of this Almost all natural philosophers
remarking a great difference in the quantity of the matter of different
kinds in bodies with the same volume partly on account of the momentum
of gravity or weight partly on account of the momentum of resistance
to other bodies in motion conclude unanimously that this volume
extensive quantity of the phenomenon must be void in all bodies
although in different proportion But who would suspect that these for
the most part mathematical and mechanical inquirers into nature should
ground this conclusion solely on a metaphysical hypothesisa sort of
hypothesis which they profess to disparage and avoid Yet this they
do in assuming that the real in space I must not here call it
impenetrability or weight because these are empirical conceptions
is always identical and can only be distinguished according to its
extensive quantity that is multiplicity Now to this presupposition
for which they can have no ground in experience and which consequently
is merely metaphysical I oppose a transcendental demonstration which
it is true will not explain the difference in the filling up of spaces
but which nevertheless completely does away with the supposed necessity
of the abovementioned presupposition that we cannot explain the said
difference otherwise than by the hypothesis of empty spaces This
demonstration moreover has the merit of setting the understanding
at liberty to conceive this distinction in a different manner if the
explanation of the fact requires any such hypothesis For we perceive
that although two equal spaces may be completely filled by matters
altogether different so that in neither of them is there left a single
point wherein matter is not present nevertheless every reality has its
degree of resistance or of weight which without diminution of the
extensive quantity can become less and less ad infinitum before it
passes into nothingness and disappears Thus an expansion which fills
a spacefor example caloric or any other reality in the phenomenal
worldcan decrease in its degrees to infinity yet without leaving the
smallest part of the space empty on the contrary filling it with those
lesser degrees as completely as another phenomenon could with greater
My intention here is by no means to maintain that this is really
the case with the difference of matters in regard to their
specific gravity I wish only to prove from a principle of the pure
understanding that the nature of our perceptions makes such a mode of
explanation possible and that it is erroneous to regard the real in
a phenomenon as equal quoad its degree and different only quoad its
aggregation and extensive quantity and this too on the pretended
authority of an a priori principle of the understanding
Nevertheless this principle of the anticipation of perception must
somewhat startle an inquirer whom initiation into transcendental
philosophy has rendered cautious We must naturally entertain some
doubt whether or not the understanding can enounce any such synthetical
proposition as that respecting the degree of all reality in phenomena
and consequently the possibility of the internal difference of sensation
itselfabstraction being made of its empirical quality Thus it is a
question not unworthy of solution How the understanding can pronounce
synthetically and a priori respecting phenomena and thus anticipate
these even in that which is peculiarly and merely empirical that
namely which concerns sensation itself
The quality of sensation is in all cases merely empirical and cannot
be represented a priori for example colours taste etc But the
realthat which corresponds to sensationin opposition to negation
0 only represents something the conception of which in itself contains
a being ein seyn and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an
empirical consciousness That is to say the empirical consciousness in
the internal sense can be raised from 0 to every higher degree so that
the very same extensive quantity of intuition an illuminated surface
for example excites as great a sensation as an aggregate of many other
surfaces less illuminated We can therefore make complete abstraction
of the extensive quantity of a phenomenon and represent to ourselves
in the mere sensation in a certain momentum a synthesis of homogeneous
ascension from 0 up to the given empirical consciousness All sensations
therefore as such are given only a posteriori but this property
thereof namely that they have a degree can be known a priori It
is worthy of remark that in respect to quantities in general we can
cognize a priori only a single quality namely continuity but in
respect to all quality the real in phenomena we cannot cognize a
priori anything more than the intensive quantity thereof namely that
they have a degree All else is left to experience
The principle of these is Experience is possible only through the
representation of a necessary connection of Perceptions
Experience is an empirical cognition that is to say a cognition
which determines an object by means of perceptions It is therefore a
synthesis of perceptions a synthesis which is not itself contained in
perception but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of
perception in a consciousness and this unity constitutes the essential
of our cognition of objects of the senses that is of experience not
merely of intuition or sensation Now in experience our perceptions
come together contingently so that no character of necessity in their
connection appears or can appear from the perceptions themselves
because apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of
empirical intuition and no representation of a necessity in the
connected existence of the phenomena which apprehension brings together
is to be discovered therein But as experience is a cognition of objects
by means of perceptions it follows that the relation of the existence
of the existence of the manifold must be represented in experience not
as it is put together in time but as it is objectively in time And as
time itself cannot be perceived the determination of the existence of
objects in time can only take place by means of their connection in
time in general consequently only by means of a priori connecting
conceptions Now as these conceptions always possess the character of
necessity experience is possible only by means of a representation of
the necessary connection of perception
The three modi of time are permanence succession and coexistence
Accordingly there are three rules of all relations of time in
phenomena according to which the existence of every phenomenon is
determined in respect of the unity of all time and these antecede all
experience and render it possible
The general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary
unity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical
consciousness perception at every time consequently as this unity
lies a priori at the foundation of all mental operations the principle
rests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena according to their
relation in time For the original apperception relates to our internal
sense the complex of all representations and indeed relates a priori
to its form that is to say the relation of the manifold empirical
consciousness in time Now this manifold must be combined in original
apperception according to relations of timea necessity imposed by the
a priori transcendental unity of apperception to which is subjected all
that can belong to my ie my own cognition and therefore all that
can become an object for me This synthetical and a priori determined
unity in relation of perceptions in time is therefore the rule All
empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of the general
determination of time and the analogies of experience of which we are
now about to treat must be rules of this nature
These principles have this peculiarity that they do not concern
phenomena and the synthesis of the empirical intuition thereof but
merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other in
regard to this existence Now the mode in which we apprehend a thing in
a phenomenon can be determined a priori in such a manner that the rule
of its synthesis can give that is to say can produce this a priori
intuition in every empirical example But the existence of phenomena
cannot be known a priori and although we could arrive by this path at
a conclusion of the fact of some existence we could not cognize that
existence determinately that is to say we should be incapable of
anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of it would be
distinguishable from that of others
The two principles above mentioned which I called mathematical in
consideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of
mathematic phenomena relate to these phenomena only in regard to their
possibility and instruct us how phenomena as far as regards their
intuition or the real in their perception can be generated according
to the rules of a mathematical synthesis Consequently numerical
quantities and with them the determination of a phenomenon as a
quantity can be employed in the one case as well as in the other Thus
for example out of 200000 illuminations by the moon I might compose
and give a priori that is construct the degree of our sensations
of the sunlight We may therefore entitle these two principles
constitutive
The case is very different with those principles whose province it is to
subject the existence of phenomena to rules a priori For as existence
does not admit of being constructed it is clear that they must only
concern the relations of existence and be merely regulative principles
In this case therefore neither axioms nor anticipations are to be
thought of Thus if a perception is given us in a certain relation of
time to other although undetermined perceptions we cannot then say
a priori what and how great in quantity the other perception
necessarily connected with the former is but only how it is connected
quoad its existence in this given modus of time Analogies in
philosophy mean something very different from that which they represent
in mathematics In the latter they are formulae which enounce the
equality of two relations of quantity and are always constitutive so
that if two terms of the proportion are given the third is also
given that is can be constructed by the aid of these formulae But in
philosophy analogy is not the equality of two quantitative but of two
qualitative relations In this case from three given terms I can
give a priori and cognize the relation to a fourth member but not this
fourth term itself although I certainly possess a rule to guide me in
the search for this fourth term in experience and a mark to assist me
in discovering it An analogy of experience is therefore only a rule
according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in
respect to objects phenomena not as a constitutive but merely as
a regulative principle The same holds good also of the postulates of
empirical thought in general which relate to the synthesis of mere
intuition which concerns the form of phenomena the synthesis of
perception which concerns the matter of phenomena and the synthesis
of experience which concerns the relation of these perceptions For
they are only regulative principles and clearly distinguishable from
the mathematical which are constitutive not indeed in regard to the
certainty which both possess a priori but in the mode of evidence
thereof consequently also in the manner of demonstration
But what has been observed of all synthetical propositions and must
be particularly remarked in this place is this that these
analogies possess significance and validity not as principles of the
transcendental but only as principles of the empirical use of the
understanding and their truth can therefore be proved only as such and
that consequently the phenomena must not be subjoined directly under the
categories but only under their schemata For if the objects to which
those principles must be applied were things in themselves it would
be quite impossible to cognize aught concerning them synthetically a
priori But they are nothing but phenomena a complete knowledge
of whicha knowledge to which all principles a priori must at
last relateis the only possible experience It follows that these
principles can have nothing else for their aim than the conditions of
the empirical cognition in the unity of synthesis of phenomena But this
synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of the pure conception of the
understanding of whose unity as that of a synthesis in general the
category contains the function unrestricted by any sensuous condition
These principles will therefore authorize us to connect phenomena
according to an analogy with the logical and universal unity of
conceptions and consequently to employ the categories in the principles
themselves but in the application of them to experience we shall use
only their schemata as the key to their proper application instead of
the categories or rather the latter as restricting conditions under
the title of formulae of the former
In all changes of phenomena substance is permanent and the quantum
thereof in nature is neither increased nor diminished
All phenomena exist in time wherein alone as substratum that is as
the permanent form of the internal intuition coexistence and succession
can be represented Consequently time in which all changes of phenomena
must be cogitated remains and changes not because it is that in which
succession and coexistence can be represented only as determinations
thereof Now time in itself cannot be an object of perception It
follows that in objects of perception that is in phenomena there must
be found a substratum which represents time in general and in which
all change or coexistence can be perceived by means of the relation of
phenomena to it But the substratum of all reality that is of all that
pertains to the existence of things is substance all that pertains
to existence can be cogitated only as a determination of substance
Consequently the permanent in relation to which alone can all
relations of time in phenomena be determined is substance in the
world of phenomena that is the real in phenomena that which as the
substratum of all change remains ever the same Accordingly as this
cannot change in existence its quantity in nature can neither be
increased nor diminished
Our apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon is always successive
is Consequently always changing By it alone we could therefore
never determine whether this manifold as an object of experience is
coexistent or successive unless it had for a foundation something fixed
and permanent of the existence of which all succession and coexistence
are nothing but so many modes modi of time Only in the permanent
then are relations of time possible for simultaneity and succession
are the only relations in time that is to say the permanent is the
substratum of our empirical representation of time itself in which
alone all determination of time is possible Permanence is in fact
just another expression for time as the abiding correlate of all
existence of phenomena and of all change and of all coexistence For
change does not affect time itself but only the phenomena in time just
as coexistence cannot be regarded as a modus of time itself seeing
that in time no parts are coexistent but all successive If we were
to attribute succession to time itself we should be obliged to cogitate
another time in which this succession would be possible It is only
by means of the permanent that existence in different parts of the
successive series of time receives a quantity which we entitle
duration For in mere succession existence is perpetually vanishing and
recommencing and therefore never has even the least quantity Without
the permanent then no relation in time is possible Now time in
itself is not an object of perception consequently the permanent in
phenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all determination of
time and consequently also as the condition of the possibility of
all synthetical unity of perceptions that is of experience and all
existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a mode in
the existence of that which abides unchangeably Therefore in all
phenomena the permanent is the object in itself that is the substance
phenomenon but all that changes or can change belongs only to the
mode of the existence of this substance or substances consequently to
its determinations
I find that in all ages not only the philosopher but even the common
understanding has preposited this permanence as a substratum of all
change in phenomena indeed I am compelled to believe that they
will always accept this as an indubitable fact Only the philosopher
expresses himself in a more precise and definite manner when he says
In all changes in the world the substance remains and the accidents
alone are changeable But of this decidedly synthetical proposition I
nowhere meet with even an attempt at proof nay it very rarely has the
good fortune to stand as it deserves to do at the head of the pure and
entirely a priori laws of nature In truth the statement that substance
is permanent is tautological For this very permanence is the ground
on which we apply the category of substance to the phenomenon and
we should have been obliged to prove that in all phenomena there is
something permanent of the existence of which the changeable is nothing
but a determination But because a proof of this nature cannot be
dogmatical that is cannot be drawn from conceptions inasmuch as it
concerns a synthetical proposition a priori and as philosophers never
reflected that such propositions are valid only in relation to possible
experience and therefore cannot be proved except by means of a
deduction of the possibility of experience it is no wonder that while
it has served as the foundation of all experience for we feel the need
of it in empirical cognition it has never been supported by proof
A philosopher was asked What is the weight of smoke He answered
Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the remaining
ashes and you will have the weight of the smoke Thus he presumed it
to be incontrovertible that even in fire the matter substance does not
perish but that only the form of it undergoes a change In like manner
was the saying From nothing comes nothing only another inference
from the principle or permanence or rather of the everabiding
existence of the true subject in phenomena For if that in the
phenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum of all
determination of time it follows that all existence in past as well as
in future time must be determinable by means of it alone Hence we are
entitled to apply the term substance to a phenomenon only because we
suppose its existence in all time a notion which the word permanence
does not fully express as it seems rather to be referable to future
time However the internal necessity perpetually to be is inseparably
connected with the necessity always to have been and so the expression
may stand as it is Gigni de nihilo nihil in nihilum nil posse
reverti are two propositions which the ancients never parted and
which people nowadays sometimes mistakenly disjoin because they imagine
that the propositions apply to objects as things in themselves and that
the former might be inimical to the dependence even in respect of its
substance also of the world upon a supreme cause But this apprehension
is entirely needless for the question in this case is only of phenomena
in the sphere of experience the unity of which never could be possible
if we admitted the possibility that new things in respect of their
substance should arise For in that case we should lose altogether
that which alone can represent the unity of time to wit the identity
of the substratum as that through which alone all change possesses
complete and thorough unity This permanence is however nothing but
the manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in
the phenomenal world
The determinations of a substance which are only particular modes of
its existence are called accidents They are always real because they
concern the existence of substance negations are only determinations
which express the nonexistence of something in the substance Now
if to this real in the substance we ascribe a particular existence for
example to motion as an accident of matter this existence is called
inherence in contradistinction to the existence of substance which we
call subsistence But hence arise many misconceptions and it would be a
more accurate and just mode of expression to designate the accident
only as the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively
determined Meanwhile by reason of the conditions of the logical
exercise of our understanding it is impossible to avoid separating
as it were that which in the existence of a substance is subject to
change whilst the substance remains and regarding it in relation to
that which is properly permanent and radical On this account this
category of substance stands under the title of relation rather because
it is the condition thereof than because it contains in itself any
relation
Now upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the
conception change Origin and extinction are not changes of that which
originates or becomes extinct Change is but a mode of existence which
follows on another mode of existence of the same object hence all that
changes is permanent and only the condition thereof changes Now since
this mutation affects only determinations which can have a beginning
or an end we may say employing an expression which seems somewhat
paradoxical Only the permanent substance is subject to change the
mutable suffers no change but rather alternation that is when certain
determinations cease others begin
Change when cannot be perceived by us except in substances and origin
or extinction in an absolute sense that does not concern merely a
determination of the permanent cannot be a possible perception for
it is this very notion of the permanent which renders possible the
representation of a transition from one state into another and from
nonbeing to being which consequently can be empirically cognized
only as alternating determinations of that which is permanent Grant
that a thing absolutely begins to be we must then have a point of time
in which it was not But how and by what can we fix and determine
this point of time unless by that which already exists For a void
timeprecedingis not an object of perception but if we connect this
beginning with objects which existed previously and which continue to
exist till the object in question in question begins to be then the
latter can only be a determination of the former as the permanent The
same holds good of the notion of extinction for this presupposes the
empirical representation of a time in which a phenomenon no longer
exists
Substances in the world of phenomena are the substratum of all
determinations of time The beginning of some and the ceasing to be of
other substances would utterly do away with the only condition of the
empirical unity of time and in that case phenomena would relate to two
different times in which side by side existence would pass which is
absurd For there is only one time in which all different times must be
placed not as coexistent but as successive
Accordingly permanence is a necessary condition under which alone
phenomena as things or objects are determinable in a possible
experience But as regards the empirical criterion of this necessary
permanence and with it of the substantiality of phenomena we shall
find sufficient opportunity to speak in the sequel
Principle of the Succession of Time According to the Law of Causality
All changes take place according to the law of the connection of Cause
and Effect
That all phenomena in the succession of time are only changes that
is a successive being and nonbeing of the determinations of substance
which is permanent consequently that a being of substance itself which
follows on the nonbeing thereof or a nonbeing of substance which
follows on the being thereof in other words that the origin or
extinction of substance itself is impossibleall this has been fully
established in treating of the foregoing principle This principle
might have been expressed as follows All alteration succession of
phenomena is merely change for the changes of substance are not origin
or extinction because the conception of change presupposes the same
subject as existing with two opposite determinations and consequently
as permanent After this premonition we shall proceed to the proof
I perceive that phenomena succeed one another that is to say a state
of things exists at one time the opposite of which existed in a former
state In this case then I really connect together two perceptions in
time Now connection is not an operation of mere sense and intuition
but is the product of a synthetical faculty of imagination which
determines the internal sense in respect of a relation of time But
imagination can connect these two states in two ways so that either the
one or the other may antecede in time for time in itself cannot be an
object of perception and what in an object precedes and what follows
cannot be empirically determined in relation to it I am only conscious
then that my imagination places one state before and the other after
not that the one state antecedes the other in the object In other
words the objective relation of the successive phenomena remains
quite undetermined by means of mere perception Now in order that this
relation may be cognized as determined the relation between the two
states must be so cogitated that it is thereby determined as necessary
which of them must be placed before and which after and not conversely
But the conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical
unity can be none other than a pure conception of the understanding
which does not lie in mere perception and in this case it is the
conception of the relation of cause and effect the former of which
determines the latter in time as its necessary consequence and not as
something which might possibly antecede or which might in some cases
not be perceived to follow It follows that it is only because we
subject the sequence of phenomena and consequently all change to the
law of causality that experience itself that is empirical cognition
of phenomena becomes possible and consequently that phenomena
themselves as objects of experience are possible only by virtue of
this law
Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always successive The
representations of parts succeed one another Whether they succeed one
another in the object also is a second point for reflection which
was not contained in the former Now we may certainly give the name of
object to everything even to every representation so far as we are
conscious thereof but what this word may mean in the case of phenomena
not merely in so far as they as representations are objects but only
in so far as they indicate an object is a question requiring deeper
consideration In so far as they regarded merely as representations
are at the same time objects of consciousness they are not to be
distinguished from apprehension that is reception into the synthesis
of imagination and we must therefore say The manifold of phenomena is
always produced successively in the mind If phenomena were things in
themselves no man would be able to conjecture from the succession of
our representations how this manifold is connected in the object for
we have to do only with our representations How things may be in
themselves without regard to the representations through which they
affect us is utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition Now although
phenomena are not things in themselves and are nevertheless the only
thing given to us to be cognized it is my duty to show what sort of
connection in time belongs to the manifold in phenomena themselves
while the representation of this manifold in apprehension is always
successive For example the apprehension of the manifold in the
phenomenon of a house which stands before me is successive Now
comes the question whether the manifold of this house is in itself
successivewhich no one will be at all willing to grant But so
soon as I raise my conception of an object to the transcendental
signification thereof I find that the house is not a thing in itself
but only a phenomenon that is a representation the transcendental
object of which remains utterly unknown What then am I to understand
by the question How can the manifold be connected in the phenomenon
itselfnot considered as a thing in itself but merely as a
phenomenon Here that which lies in my successive apprehension is
regarded as representation whilst the phenomenon which is given
me notwithstanding that it is nothing more than a complex of these
representations is regarded as the object thereof with which my
conception drawn from the representations of apprehension must
harmonize It is very soon seen that as accordance of the cognition
with its object constitutes truth the question now before us can
only relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth and that the
phenomenon in opposition to the representations of apprehension can
only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them if it is subject
to a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension and
which renders necessary a mode of connection of the manifold That in
the phenomenon which contains the condition of this necessary rule of
apprehension is the object
Let us now proceed to our task That something happens that is to say
that something or some state exists which before was not cannot be
empirically perceived unless a phenomenon precedes which does not
contain in itself this state For a reality which should follow upon
a void time in other words a beginning which no state of things
precedes can just as little be apprehended as the void time itself
Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which follows
upon another perception But as this is the case with all synthesis
of apprehension as I have shown above in the example of a house my
apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently distinguished from
other apprehensions But I remark also that if in a phenomenon which
contains an occurrence I call the antecedent state of my perception
A and the following state B the perception B can only follow A in
apprehension and the perception A cannot follow B but only precede
it For example I see a ship float down the stream of a river My
perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its
place higher up the course of the river and it is impossible that
in the apprehension of this phenomenon the vessel should be perceived
first below and afterwards higher up the stream Here therefore the
order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is determined
and by this order apprehension is regulated In the former example my
perceptions in the apprehension of a house might begin at the roof and
end at the foundation or vice versa or I might apprehend the manifold
in this empirical intuition by going from left to right and from right
to left Accordingly in the series of these perceptions there was no
determined order which necessitated my beginning at a certain point in
order empirically to connect the manifold But this rule is always to be
met with in the perception of that which happens and it makes the order
of the successive perceptions in the apprehension of such a phenomenon
necessary
I must therefore in the present case deduce the subjective sequence
of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena for
otherwise the former is quite undetermined and one phenomenon is not
distinguishable from another The former alone proves nothing as to the
connection of the manifold in an object for it is quite arbitrary
The latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a phenomenon
according to which order the apprehension of one thing that which
happens follows that of another thing which precedes in conformity
with a rule In this way alone can I be authorized to say of the
phenomenon itself and not merely of my own apprehension that a certain
order or sequence is to be found therein That is in other words I
cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this order
In conformity with this rule then it is necessary that in that which
antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule according to
which in this event follows always and necessarily but I cannot reverse
this and go back from the event and determine by apprehension that
which antecedes it For no phenomenon goes back from the succeeding
point of time to the preceding point although it does certainly relate
to a preceding point of time from a given time on the other hand
there is always a necessary progression to the determined succeeding
time Therefore because there certainly is something that follows I
must of necessity connect it with something else which antecedes and
upon which it follows in conformity with a rule that is necessarily
so that the event as conditioned affords certain indication of a
condition and this condition determines the event
Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event upon which this event
must follow in conformity with a rule All sequence of perception
would then exist only in apprehension that is to say would be merely
subjective and it could not thereby be objectively determined what
thing ought to precede and what ought to follow in perception In such
a case we should have nothing but a play of representations which
would possess no application to any object That is to say it would
not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon from
another as regards relations of time because the succession in the act
of apprehension would always be of the same sort and therefore there
would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the succession and to
render a certain sequence objectively necessary And in this case I
cannot say that two states in a phenomenon follow one upon the other
but only that one apprehension follows upon another But this is merely
subjective and does not determine an object and consequently cannot be
held to be cognition of an objectnot even in the phenomenal world
Accordingly when we know in experience that something happens we
always presuppose that something precedes whereupon it follows in
conformity with a rule For otherwise I could not say of the object that
it follows because the mere succession in my apprehension if it be
not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding does not
authorize succession in the object Only therefore in reference to
a rule according to which phenomena are determined in their sequence
that is as they happen by the preceding state can I make my
subjective synthesis of apprehension objective and it is only under
this presupposition that even the experience of an event is possible
No doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradiction to all
the notions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the
procedure of the human understanding According to these opinions it
is by means of the perception and comparison of similar consequences
following upon certain antecedent phenomena that the understanding is
led to the discovery of a rule according to which certain events always
follow certain phenomena and it is only by this process that we attain
to the conception of cause Upon such a basis it is clear that this
conception must be merely empirical and the rule which it furnishes
us withEverything that happens must have a causewould be just as
contingent as experience itself The universality and necessity of the
rule or law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it Indeed it
could not possess universal validity inasmuch as it would not in this
case be a priori but founded on deduction But the same is the case
with this law as with other pure a priori representations eg space
and time which we can draw in perfect clearness and completeness from
experience only because we had already placed them therein and by that
means and by that alone had rendered experience possible Indeed
the logical clearness of this representation of a rule determining
the series of events is possible only when we have made use thereof in
experience Nevertheless the recognition of this rule as a condition
of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time was the ground of
experience itself and consequently preceded it a priori
It is now our duty to show by an example that we never even in
experience attribute to an object the notion of succession or effect
of an eventthat is the happening of something that did not
exist before and distinguish it from the subjective succession of
apprehension unless when a rule lies at the foundation which compels
us to observe this order of perception in preference to any other and
that indeed it is this necessity which first renders possible the
representation of a succession in the object
We have representations within us of which also we can be conscious
But however widely extended however accurate and thoroughgoing this
consciousness may be these representations are still nothing more than
representations that is internal determinations of the mind in this or
that relation of time Now how happens it that to these representations
we should set an object or that in addition to their subjective
reality as modifications we should still further attribute to them
a certain unknown objective reality It is clear that objective
significancy cannot consist in a relation to another representation
of that which we desire to term object for in that case the question
again arises How does this other representation go out of itself and
obtain objective significancy over and above the subjective which
is proper to it as a determination of a state of mind If we try to
discover what sort of new property the relation to an object gives to
our subjective representations and what new importance they thereby
receive we shall find that this relation has no other effect than
that of rendering necessary the connection of our representations in a
certain manner and of subjecting them to a rule and that conversely
it is only because a certain order is necessary in the relations of time
of our representations that objective significancy is ascribed to them
In the synthesis of phenomena the manifold of our representations is
always successive Now hereby is not represented an object for by means
of this succession which is common to all apprehension no one thing is
distinguished from another But so soon as I perceive or assume that in
this succession there is a relation to a state antecedent from which
the representation follows in accordance with a rule so soon do I
represent something as an event or as a thing that happens in other
words I cognize an object to which I must assign a certain determinate
position in time which cannot be altered because of the preceding
state in the object When therefore I perceive that something happens
there is contained in this representation in the first place the fact
that something antecedes because it is only in relation to this that
the phenomenon obtains its proper relation of time in other words
exists after an antecedent time in which it did not exist But it can
receive its determined place in time only by the presupposition
that something existed in the foregoing state upon which it follows
inevitably and always that is in conformity with a rule From all this
it is evident that in the first place I cannot reverse the order
of succession and make that which happens precede that upon which
it follows and that in the second place if the antecedent state be
posited a certain determinate event inevitably and necessarily
follows Hence it follows that there exists a certain order in our
representations whereby the present gives a sure indication of some
previously existing state as a correlate though still undetermined of
the existing event which is givena correlate which itself relates to
the event as its consequence conditions it and connects it necessarily
with itself in the series of time
If then it be admitted as a necessary law of sensibility and
consequently a formal condition of all perception that the preceding
necessarily determines the succeeding time inasmuch as I cannot arrive
at the succeeding except through the preceding it must likewise be an
indispensable law of empirical representation of the series of time
that the phenomena of the past determine all phenomena in the succeeding
time and that the latter as events cannot take place except in so
far as the former determine their existence in time that is to say
establish it according to a rule For it is of course only in phenomena
that we can empirically cognize this continuity in the connection of
times
For all experience and for the possibility of experience understanding
is indispensable and the first step which it takes in this sphere is
not to render the representation of objects clear but to render the
representation of an object in general possible It does this by
applying the order of time to phenomena and their existence In other
words it assigns to each phenomenon as a consequence a place in
relation to preceding phenomena determined a priori in time without
which it could not harmonize with time itself which determines a place
a priori to all its parts This determination of place cannot be derived
from the relation of phenomena to absolute time for it is not an
object of perception but on the contrary phenomena must reciprocally
determine the places in time of one another and render these necessary
in the order of time In other words whatever follows or happens must
follow in conformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained
in the foregoing state Hence arises a series of phenomena which by
means of the understanding produces and renders necessary exactly
the same order and continuous connection in the series of our possible
perceptions as is found a priori in the form of internal intuition
time in which all our perceptions must have place
That something happens then is a perception which belongs to a
possible experience which becomes real only because I look upon the
phenomenon as determined in regard to its place in time consequently as
an object which can always be found by means of a rule in the connected
series of my perceptions But this rule of the determination of a thing
according to succession in time is as follows In what precedes may be
found the condition under which an event always that is necessarily
follows From all this it is obvious that the principle of cause and
effect is the principle of possible experience that is of objective
cognition of phenomena in regard to their relations in the succession
of time
The proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the
following momenta of argument To all empirical cognition belongs the
synthesis of the manifold by the imagination a synthesis which is
always successive that is in which the representations therein always
follow one another But the order of succession in imagination is not
determined and the series of successive representations may be taken
retrogressively as well as progressively But if this synthesis is a
synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of a given phenomenon then
the order is determined in the object or to speak more accurately
there is therein an order of successive synthesis which determines an
object and according to which something necessarily precedes and
when this is posited something else necessarily follows If then
my perception is to contain the cognition of an event that is of
something which really happens it must be an empirical judgement
wherein we think that the succession is determined that is it
presupposes another phenomenon upon which this event follows
necessarily or in conformity with a rule If on the contrary when I
posited the antecedent the event did not necessarily follow I should
be obliged to consider it merely as a subjective play of my imagination
and if in this I represented to myself anything as objective I must
look upon it as a mere dream Thus the relation of phenomena as
possible perceptions according to which that which happens is as
to its existence necessarily determined in time by something which
antecedes in conformity with a rulein other words the relation of
cause and effectis the condition of the objective validity of
our empirical judgements in regard to the sequence of perceptions
consequently of their empirical truth and therefore of experience The
principle of the relation of causality in the succession of phenomena is
therefore valid for all objects of experience because it is itself the
ground of the possibility of experience
Here however a difficulty arises which must be resolved The
principle of the connection of causality among phenomena is limited in
our formula to the succession thereof although in practice we find that
the principle applies also when the phenomena exist together in the same
time and that cause and effect may be simultaneous For example there
is heat in a room which does not exist in the open air I look about
for the cause and find it to be the fire Now the fire as the cause is
simultaneous with its effect the heat of the room In this case then
there is no succession as regards time between cause and effect but
they are simultaneous and still the law holds good The greater part of
operating causes in nature are simultaneous with their effects and
the succession in time of the latter is produced only because the cause
cannot achieve the total of its effect in one moment But at the
moment when the effect first arises it is always simultaneous with the
causality of its cause because if the cause had but a moment before
ceased to be the effect could not have arisen Here it must be
specially remembered that we must consider the order of time and not the
lapse thereof The relation remains even though no time has elapsed
The time between the causality of the cause and its immediate effect may
entirely vanish and the cause and effect be thus simultaneous but the
relation of the one to the other remains always determinable according
to time If for example I consider a leaden ball which lies upon a
cushion and makes a hollow in it as a cause then it is simultaneous
with the effect But I distinguish the two through the relation of time
of the dynamical connection of both For if I lay the ball upon the
cushion then the hollow follows upon the before smooth surface but
supposing the cushion has from some cause or another a hollow there
does not thereupon follow a leaden ball
Thus the law of succession of time is in all instances the only
empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the
antecedent cause The glass is the cause of the rising of the
water above its horizontal surface although the two phenomena are
contemporaneous For as soon as I draw some water with the glass from
a larger vessel an effect follows thereupon namely the change of the
horizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into a concave
which it assumes in the glass
This conception of causality leads us to the conception of action that
of action to the conception of force and through it to the conception
of substance As I do not wish this critical essay the sole purpose of
which is to treat of the sources of our synthetical cognition a priori
to be crowded with analyses which merely explain but do not enlarge
the sphere of our conceptions I reserve the detailed explanation of the
above conceptions for a future system of pure reason Such an analysis
indeed executed with great particularity may already be found in
wellknown works on this subject But I cannot at present refrain from
making a few remarks on the empirical criterion of a substance in so
far as it seems to be more evident and more easily recognized through
the conception of action than through that of the permanence of a
phenomenon
Where action consequently activity and force exists substance also
must exist and in it alone must be sought the seat of that fruitful
source of phenomena Very well But if we are called upon to explain
what we mean by substance and wish to avoid the vice of reasoning in
a circle the answer is by no means so easy How shall we conclude
immediately from the action to the permanence of that which acts this
being nevertheless an essential and peculiar criterion of substance
phenomenon But after what has been said above the solution of
this question becomes easy enough although by the common mode
of proceduremerely analysing our conceptionsit would be quite
impossible The conception of action indicates the relation of the
subject of causality to the effect Now because all effect consists
in that which happens therefore in the changeable the last subject
thereof is the permanent as the substratum of all that changes that
is substance For according to the principle of causality actions are
always the first ground of all change in phenomena and consequently
cannot be a property of a subject which itself changes because if this
were the case other actions and another subject would be necessary to
determine this change From all this it results that action alone as
an empirical criterion is a sufficient proof of the presence of
substantiality without any necessity on my part of endeavouring to
discover the permanence of substance by a comparison Besides by this
mode of induction we could not attain to the completeness which the
magnitude and strict universality of the conception requires For that
the primary subject of the causality of all arising and passing away
all origin and extinction cannot itself in the sphere of phenomena
arise and pass away is a sound and safe conclusion a conclusion which
leads us to the conception of empirical necessity and permanence
in existence and consequently to the conception of a substance as
phenomenon
When something happens the mere fact of the occurrence without
regard to that which occurs is an object requiring investigation
The transition from the nonbeing of a state into the existence of it
supposing that this state contains no quality which previously existed
in the phenomenon is a fact of itself demanding inquiry Such an event
as has been shown in No A does not concern substance for substance
does not thus originate but its condition or state It is therefore
only change and not origin from nothing If this origin be regarded as
the effect of a foreign cause it is termed creation which cannot be
admitted as an event among phenomena because the very possibility of
it would annihilate the unity of experience If however I regard all
things not as phenomena but as things in themselves and objects of
understanding alone they although substances may be considered as
dependent in respect of their existence on a foreign cause But this
would require a very different meaning in the words a meaning which
could not apply to phenomena as objects of possible experience
How a thing can be changed how it is possible that upon one state
existing in one point of time an opposite state should follow in
another point of timeof this we have not the smallest conception a
priori There is requisite for this the knowledge of real powers which
can only be given empirically for example knowledge of moving forces
or in other words of certain successive phenomena as movements which
indicate the presence of such forces But the form of every change
the condition under which alone it can take place as the coming into
existence of another state be the content of the change that is the
state which is changed what it may and consequently the succession of
the states themselves can very well be considered a priori in relation
to the law of causality and the conditions of time
When a substance passes from one state a into another state b
the point of time in which the latter exists is different from and
subsequent to that in which the former existed In like manner the
second state as reality in the phenomenon differs from the first in
which the reality of the second did not exist as b from zero That is
to say if the state b differs from the state a only in respect to
quantity the change is a coming into existence of b a which in the
former state did not exist and in relation to which that state is O
Now the question arises how a thing passes from one state a into
another state b Between two moments there is always a certain time
and between two states existing in these moments there is always a
difference having a certain quantity for all parts of phenomena are in
their turn quantities Consequently every transition from one state
into another is always effected in a time contained between two moments
of which the first determines the state which leaves and the second
determines the state into the thing passes The thing leaves and the
second determines the state into which the thing Both moments then are
limitations of the time of a change consequently of the intermediate
state between both and as such they belong to the total of the change
Now every change has a cause which evidences its causality in the whole
time during which the charge takes place The cause therefore does not
produce the change all at once or in one moment but in a time so that
as the time gradually increases from the commencing instant a to its
completion at b in like manner also the quantity of the reality b
a is generated through the lesser degrees which are contained between
the first and last All change is therefore possible only through a
continuous action of the causality which in so far as it is uniform
we call a momentum The change does not consist of these momenta but is
generated or produced by them as their effect
Such is the law of the continuity of all change the ground of which is
that neither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of parts
which are the smallest possible but that notwithstanding the state
of a thing passes in the process of a change through all these parts as
elements to its second state There is no smallest degree of reality
in a phenomenon just as there is no smallest degree in the quantity of
time and so the new state of reality grows up out of the former state
through all the infinite degrees thereof the differences of which one
from another taken all together are less than the difference between o
and a
It is not our business to inquire here into the utility of this
principle in the investigation of nature But how such a proposition
which appears so greatly to extend our knowledge of nature is possible
completely a priori is indeed a question which deserves investigation
although the first view seems to demonstrate the truth and reality of
the principle and the question how it is possible may be considered
superfluous For there are so many groundless pretensions to the
enlargement of our knowledge by pure reason that we must take it as a
general rule to be mistrustful of all such and without a thoroughgoing
and radical deduction to believe nothing of the sort even on the
clearest dogmatical evidence
Every addition to our empirical knowledge and every advance made in
the exercise of our perception is nothing more than an extension of the
determination of the internal sense that is to say a progression
in time be objects themselves what they may phenomena or pure
intuitions This progression in time determines everything and is
itself determined by nothing else That is to say the parts of the
progression exist only in time and by means of the synthesis thereof
and are not given antecedently to it For this reason every transition
in perception to anything which follows upon another in time is a
determination of time by means of the production of this perception
And as this determination of time is always and in all its parts a
quantity the perception produced is to be considered as a quantity
which proceeds through all its degreesno one of which is the smallest
possiblefrom zero up to its determined degree From this we perceive
the possibility of cognizing a priori a law of changesa law
however which concerns their form merely We merely anticipate our own
apprehension the formal condition of which inasmuch as it is itself to
be found in the mind antecedently to all given phenomena must certainly
be capable of being cognized a priori
Thus as time contains the sensuous condition a priori of the
possibility of a continuous progression of that which exists to
that which follows it the understanding by virtue of the unity of
apperception contains the condition a priori of the possibility of a
continuous determination of the position in time of all phenomena and
this by means of the series of causes and effects the former of which
necessitate the sequence of the latter and thereby render universally
and for all time and by consequence objectively valid the empirical
cognition of the relations of time
All substances in so far as they can be perceived in space at the same
time exist in a state of complete reciprocity of action
Things are coexistent when in empirical intuition the perception of the
one can follow upon the perception of the other and vice versawhich
cannot occur in the succession of phenomena as we have shown in the
explanation of the second principle Thus I can perceive the moon and
then the earth or conversely first the earth and then the moon and
for the reason that my perceptions of these objects can reciprocally
follow each other I say they exist contemporaneously Now coexistence
is the existence of the manifold in the same time But time itself is
not an object of perception and therefore we cannot conclude from the
fact that things are placed in the same time the other fact that
the perception of these things can follow each other reciprocally The
synthesis of the imagination in apprehension would only present to us
each of these perceptions as present in the subject when the other is
not present and contrariwise but would not show that the objects are
coexistent that is to say that if the one exists the other also
exists in the same time and that this is necessarily so in order that
the perceptions may be capable of following each other reciprocally
It follows that a conception of the understanding or category of the
reciprocal sequence of the determinations of phenomena existing as
they do apart from each other and yet contemporaneously is requisite
to justify us in saying that the reciprocal succession of perceptions
has its foundation in the object and to enable us to represent
coexistence as objective But that relation of substances in which
the one contains determinations the ground of which is in the other
substance is the relation of influence And when this influence is
reciprocal it is the relation of community or reciprocity Consequently
the coexistence of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience
otherwise than under the precondition of their reciprocal action This
is therefore the condition of the possibility of things themselves as
objects of experience
Things are coexistent in so far as they exist in one and the same time
But how can we know that they exist in one and the same time Only
by observing that the order in the synthesis of apprehension of the
manifold is arbitrary and a matter of indifference that is to say that
it can proceed from A through B C D to E or contrariwise from E
to A For if they were successive in time and in the order let
us suppose which begins with A it is quite impossible for the
apprehension in perception to begin with E and go backwards to A
inasmuch as A belongs to past time and therefore cannot be an object
of apprehension
Let us assume that in a number of substances considered as phenomena
each is completely isolated that is that no one acts upon another
Then I say that the coexistence of these cannot be an object of
possible perception and that the existence of one cannot by any mode of
empirical synthesis lead us to the existence of another For we imagine
them in this case to be separated by a completely void space and thus
perception which proceeds from the one to the other in time would
indeed determine their existence by means of a following perception but
would be quite unable to distinguish whether the one phenomenon follows
objectively upon the first or is coexistent with it
Besides the mere fact of existence then there must be something by
means of which A determines the position of B in time and conversely
B the position of A because only under this condition can substances
be empirically represented as existing contemporaneously Now that alone
determines the position of another thing in time which is the cause of
it or of its determinations Consequently every substance inasmuch
as it can have succession predicated of it only in respect of its
determinations must contain the causality of certain determinations in
another substance and at the same time the effects of the causality of
the other in itself That is to say substances must stand mediately or
immediately in dynamical community with each other if coexistence is
to be cognized in any possible experience But in regard to objects of
experience that is absolutely necessary without which the experience of
these objects would itself be impossible Consequently it is absolutely
necessary that all substances in the world of phenomena in so far
as they are coexistent stand in a relation of complete community of
reciprocal action to each other
The word community has in our language two meanings
and contains the two notions conveyed in the Latin communio and
commercium We employ it in this place in the latter sensethat of a
dynamical community without which even the community of place communio
spatii could not be empirically cognized In our experiences it is easy
to observe that it is only the continuous influences in all parts of
space that can conduct our senses from one object to another that the
light which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies produces a
mediating community between them and us and thereby evidences their
coexistence with us that we cannot empirically change our position
perceive this change unless the existence of matter throughout the
whole of space rendered possible the perception of the positions we
occupy and that this perception can prove the contemporaneous existence
of these places only through their reciprocal influence and thereby
also the coexistence of even the most remote objectsalthough in this
case the proof is only mediate Without community every perception of
a phenomenon in space is separated from every other and isolated and
the chain of empirical representations that is of experience must
with the appearance of a new object begin entirely de novo without the
least connection with preceding representations and without standing
towards these even in the relation of time My intention here is by no
means to combat the notion of empty space for it may exist where our
perceptions cannot exist inasmuch as they cannot reach thereto and
where therefore no empirical perception of coexistence takes place
But in this case it is not an object of possible experience
The following remarks may be useful in the way of explanation In the
mind all phenomena as contents of a possible experience must exist in
community communio of apperception or consciousness and in so far as
it is requisite that objects be represented as coexistent and connected
in so far must they reciprocally determine the position in time of each
other and thereby constitute a whole If this subjective community is
to rest upon an objective basis or to be applied to substances as
phenomena the perception of one substance must render possible the
perception of another and conversely For otherwise succession which
is always found in perceptions as apprehensions would be predicated of
external objects and their representation of their coexistence be thus
impossible But this is a reciprocal influence that is to say a
real community commercium of substances without which therefore the
empirical relation of coexistence would be a notion beyond the reach of
our minds By virtue of this commercium phenomena in so far as
they are apart from and nevertheless in connection with each other
constitute a compositum reale Such composita are possible in many
different ways The three dynamical relations then from which all
others spring are those of inherence consequence and composition
These then are the three analogies of experience They are nothing
more than principles of the determination of the existence of phenomena
in time according to the three modi of this determination to wit the
relation to time itself as a quantity the quantity of existence that
is duration the relation in time as a series or succession finally
the relation in time as the complex of all existence simultaneity
This unity of determination in regard to time is thoroughly dynamical
that is to say time is not considered as that in which experience
determines immediately to every existence its position for this is
impossible inasmuch as absolute time is not an object of perception
by means of which phenomena can be connected with each other On
the contrary the rule of the understanding through which alone
the existence of phenomena can receive synthetical unity as regards
relations of time determines for every phenomenon its position in time
and consequently a priori and with validity for all and every time
By nature in the empirical sense of the word we understand the
totality of phenomena connected in respect of their existence
according to necessary rules that is laws There are therefore certain
laws which are moreover a priori which make nature possible and all
empirical laws can exist only by means of experience and by virtue of
those primitive laws through which experience itself becomes possible
The purpose of the analogies is therefore to represent to us the unity
of nature in the connection of all phenomena under certain exponents
the only business of which is to express the relation of time in so far
as it contains all existence in itself to the unity of apperception
which can exist in synthesis only according to rules The combined
expression of all is this All phenomena exist in one nature and
must so exist inasmuch as without this a priori unity no unity of
experience and consequently no determination of objects in experience
is possible
As regards the mode of proof which we have employed in treating of these
transcendental laws of nature and the peculiar character of we must
make one remark which will at the same time be important as a guide
in every other attempt to demonstrate the truth of intellectual and
likewise synthetical propositions a priori Had we endeavoured to prove
these analogies dogmatically that is from conceptions that is to say
had we employed this method in attempting to show that everything which
exists exists only in that which is permanentthat everything or
event presupposes the existence of something in a preceding state
upon which it follows in conformity with a rulelastly that in the
manifold which is coexistent the states coexist in connection with
each other according to a rule all our labour would have been utterly
in vain For more conceptions of things analyse them as we may cannot
enable us to conclude from the existence of one object to the existence
of another What other course was left for us to pursue This only to
demonstrate the possibility of experience as a cognition in which
at last all objects must be capable of being presented to us if the
representation of them is to possess any objective reality Now in this
third this mediating term the essential form of which consists in
the synthetical unity of the apperception of all phenomena we found
a priori conditions of the universal and necessary determination as
to time of all existences in the world of phenomena without which the
empirical determination thereof as to time would itself be impossible
and we also discovered rules of synthetical unity a priori by means of
which we could anticipate experience For want of this method and from
the fancy that it was possible to discover a dogmatical proof of the
synthetical propositions which are requisite in the empirical employment
of the understanding has it happened that a proof of the principle of
sufficient reason has been so often attempted and always in vain
The other two analogies nobody has ever thought of although they have
always been silently employed by the mind because the guiding thread
furnished by the categories was wanting the guide which alone can
enable us to discover every hiatus both in the system of conceptions
and of principles
That which agrees with the formal conditions intuition and
conception of experience is possible
That which coheres with the material conditions of experience
sensation is real
That whose coherence with the real is determined according to
universal conditions of experience is exists necessary
The categories of modality possess this peculiarity that they do not in
the least determine the object or enlarge the conception to which they
are annexed as predicates but only express its relation to the faculty
of cognition Though my conception of a thing is in itself complete I
am still entitled to ask whether the object of it is merely possible
or whether it is also real or if the latter whether it is also
necessary But hereby the object itself is not more definitely
determined in thought but the question is only in what relation it
including all its determinations stands to the understanding and its
employment in experience to the empirical faculty of judgement and to
the reason of its application to experience
For this very reason too the categories of modality are nothing
more than explanations of the conceptions of possibility reality and
necessity as employed in experience and at the same time restrictions
of all the categories to empirical use alone not authorizing the
transcendental employment of them For if they are to have something
more than a merely logical significance and to be something more than
a mere analytical expression of the form of thought and to have a
relation to things and their possibility reality or necessity they
must concern possible experience and its synthetical unity in which
alone objects of cognition can be given
The postulate of the possibility of things requires also that the
conception of the things agree with the formal conditions of our
experience in general But this that is to say the objective form of
experience contains all the kinds of synthesis which are requisite for
the cognition of objects A conception which contains a synthesis
must be regarded as empty and without reference to an object if its
synthesis does not belong to experienceeither as borrowed from it
and in this case it is called an empirical conception or such as is the
ground and a priori condition of experience its form and in this
case it is a pure conception a conception which nevertheless belongs to
experience inasmuch as its object can be found in this alone For where
shall we find the criterion or character of the possibility of an object
which is cogitated by means of an a priori synthetical conception if
not in the synthesis which constitutes the form of empirical cognition
of objects That in such a conception no contradiction exists is indeed
a necessary logical condition but very far from being sufficient
to establish the objective reality of the conception that is the
possibility of such an object as is thought in the conception Thus in
the conception of a figure which is contained within two straight lines
there is no contradiction for the conceptions of two straight lines and
of their junction contain no negation of a figure The impossibility in
such a case does not rest upon the conception in itself but upon the
construction of it in space that is to say upon the conditions of
space and its determinations But these have themselves objective
reality that is they apply to possible things because they contain a
priori the form of experience in general
And now we shall proceed to point out the extensive utility and
influence of this postulate of possibility When I represent to myself a
thing that is permanent so that everything in it which changes belongs
merely to its state or condition from such a conception alone I never
can cognize that such a thing is possible Or if I represent to myself
something which is so constituted that when it is posited
something else follows always and infallibly my thought contains no
selfcontradiction but whether such a property as causality is to
be found in any possible thing my thought alone affords no means
of judging Finally I can represent to myself different things
substances which are so constituted that the state or condition of one
causes a change in the state of the other and reciprocally but whether
such a relation is a property of things cannot be perceived from these
conceptions which contain a merely arbitrary synthesis Only from the
fact therefore that these conceptions express a priori the relations
of perceptions in every experience do we know that they possess
objective reality that is transcendental truth and that independent
of experience though not independent of all relation to form of an
experience in general and its synthetical unity in which alone objects
can be empirically cognized
But when we fashion to ourselves new conceptions of substances forces
action and reaction from the material presented to us by perception
without following the example of experience in their connection we
create mere chimeras of the possibility of which we cannot discover any
criterion because we have not taken experience for our instructress
though we have borrowed the conceptions from her Such fictitious
conceptions derive their character of possibility not like the
categories a priori as conceptions on which all experience depends
but only a posteriori as conceptions given by means of experience
itself and their possibility must either be cognized a posteriori
and empirically or it cannot be cognized at all A substance which is
permanently present in space yet without filling it like that tertium
quid between matter and the thinking subject which some have tried to
introduce into metaphysics or a peculiar fundamental power of the mind
of intuiting the future by anticipation instead of merely inferring
from past and present events or finally a power of the mind to place
itself in community of thought with other men however distant they may
bethese are conceptions the possibility of which has no ground to rest
upon For they are not based upon experience and its known laws and
without experience they are a merely arbitrary conjunction of thoughts
which though containing no internal contradiction has no claim to
objective reality neither consequently to the possibility of such an
object as is thought in these conceptions As far as concerns reality
it is selfevident that we cannot cogitate such a possibility in
concreto without the aid of experience because reality is concerned
only with sensation as the matter of experience and not with the form
of thought with which we can no doubt indulge in shaping fancies
But I pass by everything which derives its possibility from reality in
experience and I purpose treating here merely of the possibility of
things by means of a priori conceptions I maintain then that the
possibility of things is not derived from such conceptions per se but
only when considered as formal and objective conditions of an experience
in general
It seems indeed as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized
from the conception of it alone which is certainly independent of
experience for we can certainly give to the conception a corresponding
object completely a priori that is to say we can construct it But as
a triangle is only the form of an object it must remain a mere product
of the imagination and the possibility of the existence of an object
corresponding to it must remain doubtful unless we can discover some
other ground unless we know that the figure can be cogitated under the
conditions upon which all objects of experience rest Now the facts
that space is a formal condition a priori of external experience
that the formative synthesis by which we construct a triangle in
imagination is the very same as that we employ in the apprehension of a
phenomenon for the purpose of making an empirical conception of it are
what alone connect the notion of the possibility of such a thing with
the conception of it In the same manner the possibility of continuous
quantities indeed of quantities in general for the conceptions of them
are without exception synthetical is never evident from the conceptions
in themselves but only when they are considered as the formal
conditions of the determination of objects in experience And where
indeed should we look for objects to correspond to our conceptions if
not in experience by which alone objects are presented to us It is
however true that without antecedent experience we can cognize and
characterize the possibility of things relatively to the formal
conditions under which something is determined in experience as an
object consequently completely a priori But still this is possible
only in relation to experience and within its limits
The postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things requires
perception consequently conscious sensation not indeed immediately
that is of the object itself whose existence is to be cognized but
still that the object have some connection with a real perception in
accordance with the analogies of experience which exhibit all kinds of
real connection in experience
From the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to conclude its
existence For let the conception be ever so complete and containing
a statement of all the determinations of the thing the existence of
it has nothing to do with all this but only with the question whether
such a thing is given so that the perception of it can in every case
precede the conception For the fact that the conception of it precedes
the perception merely indicates the possibility of its existence it
is perception which presents matter to the conception that is the sole
criterion of reality Prior to the perception of the thing however and
therefore comparatively a priori we are able to cognize its existence
provided it stands in connection with some perceptions according to the
principles of the empirical conjunction of these that is in conformity
with the analogies of perception For in this case the existence
of the supposed thing is connected with our perception in a possible
experience and we are able with the guidance of these analogies to
reason in the series of possible perceptions from a thing which we do
really perceive to the thing we do not perceive Thus we cognize
the existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the
perception of the attraction of the steelfilings by the magnet
although the constitution of our organs renders an immediate perception
of this matter impossible for us For according to the laws of
sensibility and the connected context of our perceptions we should
in an experience come also on an immediate empirical intuition of
this matter if our senses were more acutebut this obtuseness has
no influence upon and cannot alter the form of possible experience in
general Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches as far as our
perceptions and what may be inferred from them according to empirical
laws extend If we do not set out from experience or do not proceed
according to the laws of the empirical connection of phenomena our
pretensions to discover the existence of a thing which we do not
immediately perceive are vain Idealism however brings forward
powerful objections to these rules for proving existence mediately This
is therefore the proper place for its refutation
IdealismI mean material idealismis the theory which declares the
existence of objects in space without us to be either doubtful
and indemonstrable or 2 false and impossible The first is the
problematical idealism of Descartes who admits the undoubted certainty
of only one empirical assertion assertio to wit I am The second
is the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley who maintains that space
together with all the objects of which it is the inseparable condition
is a thing which is in itself impossible and that consequently the
objects in space are mere products of the imagination The dogmatical
theory of idealism is unavoidable if we regard space as a property
of things in themselves for in that case it is with all to which it
serves as condition a nonentity But the foundation for this kind of
idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental aesthetic
Problematical idealism which makes no such assertion but only alleges
our incapacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves by
means of immediate experience is a theory rational and evidencing a
thorough and philosophical mode of thinking for it observes the rule
not to form a decisive judgement before sufficient proof be shown The
desired proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of
external things and not mere fancies For this purpose we must prove
that our internal and to Descartes indubitable experience is itself
possible only under the previous assumption of external experience
The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence
proves the existence of external objects in space
I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time All
determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something
permanent in perception But this permanent something cannot be
something in me for the very reason that my existence in time is itself
determined by this permanent something It follows that the perception
of this permanent existence is possible only through a thing without
me and not through the mere representation of a thing without me
Consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only
through the existence of real things external to me Now consciousness
in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness of the
possibility of this determination in time Hence it follows that
consciousness in time is necessarily connected also with the existence
of things without me inasmuch as the existence of these things is the
condition of determination in time That is to say the consciousness of
my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the
existence of other things without me
The reader will observe that in the foregoing proof the game
which idealism plays is retorted upon itself and with more justice
It assumed that the only immediate experience is internal and that from
this we can only infer the existence of external things But as
always happens when we reason from given effects to determined causes
idealism has reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty for it
is quite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in
ourselves and that we ascribe it falsely to external things But our
proof shows that external experience is properly immediate that only
by virtue of itnot indeed the consciousness of our own existence
but certainly the determination of our existence in time that is
internal experienceis possible It is true that the representation
I am which is the expression of the consciousness which can accompany
all my thoughts is that which immediately includes the existence of a
subject But in this representation we cannot find any knowledge of the
subject and therefore also no empirical knowledge that is experience
For experience contains in addition to the thought of something
existing intuition and in this case it must be internal intuition
that is time in relation to which the subject must be determined
But the existence of external things is absolutely requisite for this
purpose so that it follows that internal experience is itself possible
only mediately and through external experience
Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of
cognition in the determination of time is in perfect accordance
Its truth is supported by the fact that it is possible to perceive a
determination of time only by means of a change in external relations
motion to the permanent in space for example we become aware of the
suns motion by observing the changes of his relation to the objects
of this earth But this is not all We find that we possess nothing
permanent that can correspond and be submitted to the conception of a
substance as intuition except matter This idea of permanence is not
itself derived from external experience but is an a priori necessary
condition of all determination of time consequently also of the
internal sense in reference to our own existence and that through
the existence of external things In the representation I the
consciousness of myself is not an intuition but a merely intellectual
representation produced by the spontaneous activity of a thinking
subject It follows that this I has not any predicate of intuition
which in its character of permanence could serve as correlate to
the determination of time in the internal sensein the same way as
impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition
From the fact that the existence of external things is a
necessary condition of the possibility of a determined consciousness
of ourselves it does not follow that every intuitive representation
of external things involves the existence of these things for their
representations may very well be the mere products of the imagination
in dreams as well as in madness though indeed these are themselves
created by the reproduction of previous external perceptions which
as has been shown are possible only through the reality of external
objects The sole aim of our remarks has however been to prove
that internal experience in general is possible only through external
experience in general Whether this or that supposed experience be
purely imaginary must be discovered from its particular determinations
and by comparing these with the criteria of all real experience
Finally as regards the third postulate it applies to material
necessity in existence and not to merely formal and logical necessity
in the connection of conceptions Now as we cannot cognize completely
a priori the existence of any object of sense though we can do so
comparatively a priori that is relatively to some other previously
given existencea cognition however which can only be of such an
existence as must be contained in the complex of experience of which
the previously given perception is a partthe necessity of existence
can never be cognized from conceptions but always on the contrary
from its connection with that which is an object of perception But the
only existence cognized under the condition of other given phenomena
as necessary is the existence of effects from given causes in
conformity with the laws of causality It is consequently not the
necessity of the existence of things as substances but the necessity
of the state of things that we cognize and that not immediately but by
means of the existence of other states given in perception according
to empirical laws of causality Hence it follows that the criterion of
necessity is to be found only in the law of possible experiencethat
everything which happens is determined a priori in the phenomenon by
its cause Thus we cognize only the necessity of effects in nature the
causes of which are given us Moreover the criterion of necessity
in existence possesses no application beyond the field of possible
experience and even in this it is not valid of the existence of things
as substances because these can never be considered as empirical
effects or as something that happens and has a beginning Necessity
therefore regards only the relations of phenomena according to the
dynamical law of causality and the possibility grounded thereon of
reasoning from some given existence of a cause a priori to another
existence of an effect Everything that happens is hypothetically
necessary is a principle which subjects the changes that take place in
the world to a law that is to a rule of necessary existence without
which nature herself could not possibly exist Hence the proposition
Nothing happens by blind chance in mundo non datur casus is an
a priori law of nature The case is the same with the proposition
Necessity in nature is not blind that is it is conditioned
consequently intelligible necessity non datur fatum Both laws subject
the play of change to a nature of things as phenomena or which
is the same thing to the unity of the understanding and through
the understanding alone can changes belong to an experience as the
synthetical unity of phenomena Both belong to the class of dynamical
principles The former is properly a consequence of the principle of
causalityone of the analogies of experience The latter belongs to the
principles of modality which to the determination of causality adds the
conception of necessity which is itself however subject to a rule of
the understanding The principle of continuity forbids any leap in the
series of phenomena regarded as changes in mundo non datur saltus and
likewise in the complex of all empirical intuitions in space any
break or hiatus between two phenomena non datur hiatusfor we can so
express the principle that experience can admit nothing which proves
the existence of a vacuum or which even admits it as a part of an
empirical synthesis For as regards a vacuum or void which we may
cogitate as out and beyond the field of possible experience the world
such a question cannot come before the tribunal of mere understanding
which decides only upon questions that concern the employment of given
phenomena for the construction of empirical cognition It is rather a
problem for ideal reason which passes beyond the sphere of a possible
experience and aims at forming a judgement of that which surrounds and
circumscribes it and the proper place for the consideration of it is
the transcendental dialectic These four propositions In mundo non
datur hiatus non datur saltus non datur casus non datur fatum as
well as all principles of transcendental origin we could very easily
exhibit in their proper order that is in conformity with the order
of the categories and assign to each its proper place But the already
practised reader will do this for himself or discover the clue to such
an arrangement But the combined result of all is simply this to admit
into the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break in or
be foreign to the understanding and the continuous connection of all
phenomena that is the unity of the conceptions of the understanding
For in the understanding alone is the unity of experience in which all
perceptions must have their assigned place possible
Whether the field of possibility be greater than that of reality
and whether the field of the latter be itself greater than that of
necessity are interesting enough questions and quite capable
of synthetic solution questions however which come under the
jurisdiction of reason alone For they are tantamount to asking whether
all things as phenomena do without exception belong to the complex and
connected whole of a single experience of which every given
perception is a part which therefore cannot be conjoined with any
other phenomenaor whether my perceptions can belong to more than one
possible experience The understanding gives to experience according
to the subjective and formal conditions of sensibility as well as of
apperception the rules which alone make this experience possible
Other forms of intuition besides those of space and time other forms of
understanding besides the discursive forms of thought or of cognition
by means of conceptions we can neither imagine nor make intelligible
to ourselves and even if we could they would still not belong to
experience which is the only mode of cognition by which objects are
presented to us Whether other perceptions besides those which belong
to the total of our possible experience and consequently whether some
other sphere of matter exists the understanding has no power to decide
its proper occupation being with the synthesis of that which is given
Moreover the poverty of the usual arguments which go to prove the
existence of a vast sphere of possibility of which all that is real
every object of experience is but a small part is very remarkable
All real is possible from this follows naturally according to the
logical laws of conversion the particular proposition Some possible
is real Now this seems to be equivalent to Much is possible that is
not real No doubt it does seem as if we ought to consider the sum of
the possible to be greater than that of the real from the fact that
something must be added to the former to constitute the latter But this
notion of adding to the possible is absurd For that which is not in
the sum of the possible and consequently requires to be added to it
is manifestly impossible In addition to accordance with the formal
conditions of experience the understanding requires a connection with
some perception but that which is connected with this perception is
real even although it is not immediately perceived But that another
series of phenomena in complete coherence with that which is given
in perception consequently more than one allembracing experience is
possible is an inference which cannot be concluded from the data given
us by experience and still less without any data at all That which is
possible only under conditions which are themselves merely possible is
not possible in any respect And yet we can find no more certain ground
on which to base the discussion of the question whether the sphere of
possibility is wider than that of experience
I have merely mentioned these questions that in treating of the
conception of the understanding there might be no omission of anything
that in the common opinion belongs to them In reality however the
notion of absolute possibility possibility which is valid in every
respect is not a mere conception of the understanding which can be
employed empirically but belongs to reason alone which passes the
bounds of all empirical use of the understanding We have therefore
contented ourselves with a merely critical remark leaving the subject
to be explained in the sequel
Before concluding this fourth section and at the same time the system
of all principles of the pure understanding it seems proper to
mention the reasons which induced me to term the principles of modality
postulates This expression I do not here use in the sense which some
more recent philosophers contrary to its meaning with mathematicians
to whom the word properly belongs attach to itthat of a proposition
namely immediately certain requiring neither deduction nor proof For
if in the case of synthetical propositions however evident they may
be we accord to them without deduction and merely on the strength
of their own pretensions unqualified belief all critique of the
understanding is entirely lost and as there is no want of bold
pretensions which the common belief though for the philosopher this is
no credential does not reject the understanding lies exposed to every
delusion and conceit without the power of refusing its assent to those
assertions which though illegitimate demand acceptance as veritable
axioms When therefore to the conception of a thing an a priori
determination is synthetically added such a proposition must obtain if
not a proof at least a deduction of the legitimacy of its assertion
The principles of modality are however not objectively synthetical
for the predicates of possibility reality and necessity do not in
the least augment the conception of that of which they are affirmed
inasmuch as they contribute nothing to the representation of the object
But as they are nevertheless always synthetical they are so merely
subjectively That is to say they have a reflective power and apply
to the conception of a thing of which in other respects they affirm
nothing the faculty of cognition in which the conception originates
and has its seat So that if the conception merely agree with the formal
conditions of experience its object is called possible if it is in
connection with perception and determined thereby the object is real
if it is determined according to conceptions by means of the connection
of perceptions the object is called necessary The principles of
modality therefore predicate of a conception nothing more than the
procedure of the faculty of cognition which generated it Now a
postulate in mathematics is a practical proposition which contains
nothing but the synthesis by which we present an object to ourselves
and produce the conception of it for exampleWith a given line
to describe a circle upon a plane from a given point and such a
proposition does not admit of proof because the procedure which it
requires is exactly that by which alone it is possible to generate the
conception of such a figure With the same right accordingly can we
postulate the principles of modality because they do not augment the
conception of a thing but merely indicate the manner in which it is
connected with the faculty of cognition
It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing
from the category alone but must always have an intuition by which
to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the
understanding Take for example the categories of relation How 1
a thing can exist only as a subject and not as a mere determination of
other things that is can be substance or how 2 because something
exists some other thing must exist consequently how a thing can be a
cause or how 3 when several things exist from the fact that one
of these things exists some consequence to the others follows
and reciprocally and in this way a community of substances can be
possibleare questions whose solution cannot be obtained from mere
conceptions The very same is the case with the other categories for
example how a thing can be of the same sort with many others that is
can be a quantity and so on So long as we have not intuition we cannot
know whether we do really think an object by the categories and where
an object can anywhere be found to cohere with them and thus the truth
is established that the categories are not in themselves cognitions
but mere forms of thought for the construction of cognitions from given
intuitions For the same reason is it true that from categories alone
no synthetical proposition can be made For example In every existence
there is substance that is something that can exist only as a subject
and not as mere predicate or Everything is a quantityto construct
propositions such as these we require something to enable us to go out
beyond the given conception and connect another with it For the same
reason the attempt to prove a synthetical proposition by means of mere
conceptions for example Everything that exists contingently has a
cause has never succeeded We could never get further than proving
that without this relation to conceptions we could not conceive the
existence of the contingent that is could not a priori through the
understanding cognize the existence of such a thing but it does not
hence follow that this is also the condition of the possibility of the
thing itself that is said to be contingent If accordingly we look
back to our proof of the principle of causality we shall find that we
were able to prove it as valid only of objects of possible experience
and indeed only as itself the principle of the possibility of
experience Consequently of the cognition of an object given in
empirical intuition and not from mere conceptions That however
the proposition Everything that is contingent must have a cause is
evident to every one merely from conceptions is not to be denied But
in this case the conception of the contingent is cogitated as involving
not the category of modality as that the nonexistence of which can
be conceived but that of relation as that which can exist only as
the consequence of something else and so it is really an identical
proposition That which can exist only as a consequence has a cause
In fact when we have to give examples of contingent existence we
always refer to changes and not merely to the possibility of conceiving
the opposite But change is an event which as such is possible only
through a cause and considered per se its nonexistence is therefore
possible and we become cognizant of its contingency from the fact that
it can exist only as the effect of a cause Hence if a thing is assumed
to be contingent it is an analytical proposition to say it has a
cause
But it is still more remarkable that to understand the possibility of
things according to the categories and thus to demonstrate the objective
reality of the latter we require not merely intuitions but external
intuitions If for example we take the pure conceptions of relation
we find that for the purpose of presenting to the conception of
substance something permanent in intuition corresponding thereto and
thus of demonstrating the objective reality of this conception we
require an intuition of matter in space because space alone is
permanent and determines things as such while time and with it all
that is in the internal sense is in a state of continual flow
in order to represent change as the intuition corresponding to the
conception of causality we require the representation of motion as
change in space in fact it is through it alone that changes the
possibility of which no pure understanding can perceive are capable
of being intuited Change is the connection of determinations
contradictorily opposed to each other in the existence of one and the
same thing Now how it is possible that out of a given state one
quite opposite to it in the same thing should follow reason without
an example can not only not conceive but cannot even make intelligible
without intuition and this intuition is the motion of a point in space
the existence of which in different spaces as a consequence of opposite
determinations alone makes the intuition of change possible For in
order to make even internal change cognitable we require to represent
time as the form of the internal sense figuratively by a line and the
internal change by the drawing of that line motion and consequently
are obliged to employ external intuition to be able to represent the
successive existence of ourselves in different states The proper ground
of this fact is that all change to be perceived as change presupposes
something permanent in intuition while in the internal sense no
permanent intuition is to be found Lastly the objective possibility
of the category of community cannot be conceived by mere reason and
consequently its objective reality cannot be demonstrated without an
intuition and that external in space For how can we conceive the
possibility of community that is when several substances exist that
some effect on the existence of the one follows from the existence
of the other and reciprocally and therefore that because something
exists in the latter something else must exist in the former which
could not be understood from its own existence alone For this is the
very essence of communitywhich is inconceivable as a property of
things which are perfectly isolated Hence Leibnitz in attributing to
the substances of the worldas cogitated by the understanding alonea
community required the mediating aid of a divinity for from their
existence such a property seemed to him with justice inconceivable But
we can very easily conceive the possibility of community of
substances as phenomena if we represent them to ourselves as in space
consequently in external intuition For external intuition contains
in itself a priori formal external relations as the conditions of the
possibility of the real relations of action and reaction and
therefore of the possibility of community With the same ease can it
be demonstrated that the possibility of things as quantities and
consequently the objective reality of the category of quantity can be
grounded only in external intuition and that by its means alone is the
notion of quantity appropriated by the internal sense But I must avoid
prolixity and leave the task of illustrating this by examples to the
readers own reflection
The above remarks are of the greatest importance not only for the
confirmation of our previous confutation of idealism but still more
when the subject of selfcognition by mere internal consciousness
and the determination of our own nature without the aid of external
empirical intuitions is under discussion for the indication of the
grounds of the possibility of such a cognition
The result of the whole of this part of the analytic of principles is
therefore All principles of the pure understanding are nothing more
than a priori principles of the possibility of experience and to
experience alone do all a priori synthetical propositions apply and
relate indeed their possibility itself rests entirely on this
relation
We have now not only traversed the region of the pure understanding and
carefully surveyed every part of it but we have also measured it and
assigned to everything therein its proper place But this land is an
island and enclosed by nature herself within unchangeable limits It is
the land of truth an attractive word surrounded by a wide and stormy
ocean the region of illusion where many a fogbank many an iceberg
seems to the mariner on his voyage of discovery a new country and
while constantly deluding him with vain hopes engages him in dangerous
adventures from which he never can desist and which yet he never can
bring to a termination But before venturing upon this sea in order
to explore it in its whole extent and to arrive at a certainty whether
anything is to be discovered there it will not be without advantage if
we cast our eyes upon the chart of the land that we are about to
leave and to ask ourselves firstly whether we cannot rest perfectly
contented with what it contains or whether we must not of necessity
be contented with it if we can find nowhere else a solid foundation to
build upon and secondly by what title we possess this land itself
and how we hold it secure against all hostile claims Although in the
course of our analytic we have already given sufficient answers to
these questions yet a summary recapitulation of these solutions may
be useful in strengthening our conviction by uniting in one point the
momenta of the arguments
We have seen that everything which the understanding draws from itself
without borrowing from experience it nevertheless possesses only
for the behoof and use of experience The principles of the pure
understanding whether constitutive a priori as the mathematical
principles or merely regulative as the dynamical contain nothing
but the pure schema as it were of possible experience For experience
possesses its unity from the synthetical unity which the understanding
originally and from itself imparts to the synthesis of the imagination
in relation to apperception and in a priori relation to an agreement
with which phenomena as data for a possible cognition must stand But
although these rules of the understanding are not only a priori true
but the very source of all truth that is of the accordance of our
cognition with objects and on this ground that they contain the basis
of the possibility of experience as the ensemble of all cognition it
seems to us not enough to propound what is truewe desire also to
be told what we want to know If then we learn nothing more by this
critical examination than what we should have practised in the merely
empirical use of the understanding without any such subtle inquiry
the presumption is that the advantage we reap from it is not worth
the labour bestowed upon it It may certainly be answered that no rash
curiosity is more prejudicial to the enlargement of our knowledge than
that which must know beforehand the utility of this or that piece
of information which we seek before we have entered on the needful
investigations and before one could form the least conception of its
utility even though it were placed before our eyes But there is
one advantage in such transcendental inquiries which can be made
comprehensible to the dullest and most reluctant learnerthis namely
that the understanding which is occupied merely with empirical exercise
and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition may exercise
its functions very well and very successfully but is quite unable to do
one thing and that of very great importance to determine namely
the bounds that limit its employment and to know what lies within
or without its own sphere This purpose can be obtained only by
such profound investigations as we have instituted But if it cannot
distinguish whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not it
can never be sure either as to its claims or possessions but must lay
its account with many humiliating corrections when it transgresses as
it unavoidably will the limits of its own territory and loses itself
in fanciful opinions and blinding illusions
That the understanding therefore cannot make of its a priori
principles or even of its conceptions other than an empirical use
is a proposition which leads to the most important results A
transcendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental proposition
or principle when it is referred to things in general and considered
as things in themselves an empirical use when it is referred merely to
phenomena that is to objects of a possible experience That the latter
use of a conception is the only admissible one is evident from the
reasons following For every conception are requisite firstly the
logical form of a conception of thought general and secondly the
possibility of presenting to this an object to which it may apply
Failing this latter it has no sense and utterly void of content
although it may contain the logical function for constructing a
conception from certain data Now object cannot be given to a
conception otherwise than by intuition and even if a pure intuition
antecedent to the object is a priori possible this pure intuition can
itself obtain objective validity only from empirical intuition of which
it is itself but the form All conceptions therefore and with them
all principles however high the degree of their a priori possibility
relate to empirical intuitions that is to data towards a possible
experience Without this they possess no objective validity but are
mere play of imagination or of understanding with images or notions Let
us take for example the conceptions of mathematics and first in its
pure intuitions Space has three dimensionsBetween two points there
can be only one straight line etc Although all these principles
and the representation of the object with which this science occupies
itself are generated in the mind entirely a priori they would
nevertheless have no significance if we were not always able to exhibit
their significance in and by means of phenomena empirical objects
Hence it is requisite that an abstract conception be made sensuous
that is that an object corresponding to it in intuition be forthcoming
otherwise the conception remains as we say without sense that
is without meaning Mathematics fulfils this requirement by the
construction of the figure which is a phenomenon evident to the senses
The same science finds support and significance in number this in its
turn finds it in the fingers or in counters or in lines and points
The conception itself is always produced a priori together with the
synthetical principles or formulas from such conceptions but the proper
employment of them and their application to objects can exist nowhere
but in experience the possibility of which as regards its form they
contain a priori
That this is also the case with all of the categories and the principles
based upon them is evident from the fact that we cannot render
intelligible the possibility of an object corresponding to them without
having recourse to the conditions of sensibility consequently to the
form of phenomena to which as their only proper objects their use
must therefore be confined inasmuch as if this condition is removed
all significance that is all relation to an object disappears and
no example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort of things we
ought to think under such conceptions
The conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that
it is the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how
many times one is placed in it But this how many times is based upon
successive repetition consequently upon time and the synthesis of the
homogeneous therein Reality in contradistinction to negation can be
explained only by cogitating a time which is either filled therewith or
is void If I leave out the notion of permanence which is existence in
all time there remains in the conception of substance nothing but the
logical notion of subject a notion of which I endeavour to realize by
representing to myself something that can exist only as a subject But
not only am I perfectly ignorant of any conditions under which this
logical prerogative can belong to a thing I can make nothing out of
the notion and draw no inference from it because no object to which
to apply the conception is determined and we consequently do not know
whether it has any meaning at all In like manner if I leave out the
notion of time in which something follows upon some other thing in
conformity with a rule I can find nothing in the pure category except
that there is a something of such a sort that from it a conclusion may
be drawn as to the existence of some other thing But in this case
it would not only be impossible to distinguish between a cause and an
effect but as this power to draw conclusions requires conditions of
which I am quite ignorant the conception is not determined as to the
mode in which it ought to apply to an object The socalled principle
Everything that is contingent has a cause comes with a gravity and
selfassumed authority that seems to require no support from without
But I ask what is meant by contingent The answer is that the
nonexistence of which is possible But I should like very well to know
by what means this possibility of nonexistence is to be cognized if we
do not represent to ourselves a succession in the series of phenomena
and in this succession an existence which follows a nonexistence or
conversely consequently change For to say that the nonexistence
of a thing is not selfcontradictory is a lame appeal to a logical
condition which is no doubt a necessary condition of the existence of
the conception but is far from being sufficient for the real objective
possibility of nonexistence I can annihilate in thought every existing
substance without selfcontradiction but I cannot infer from this their
objective contingency in existence that is to say the possibility of
their nonexistence in itself As regards the category of community
it may easily be inferred that as the pure categories of substance and
causality are incapable of a definition and explanation sufficient to
determine their object without the aid of intuition the category
of reciprocal causality in the relation of substances to each other
commercium is just as little susceptible thereof Possibility
existence and necessity nobody has ever yet been able to explain
without being guilty of manifest tautology when the definition has been
drawn entirely from the pure understanding For the substitution of the
logical possibility of the conceptionthe condition of which is that
it be not selfcontradictory for the transcendental possibility of
thingsthe condition of which is that there be an object corresponding
to the conception is a trick which can only deceive the inexperienced
It follows incontestably that the pure conceptions of the understanding
are incapable of transcendental and must always be of empirical use
alone and that the principles of the pure understanding relate only
to the general conditions of a possible experience to objects of the
senses and never to things in general apart from the mode in which we
intuite them
Transcendental analytic has accordingly this important result to wit
that the understanding is competent effect nothing a priori except the
anticipation of the form of a possible experience in general and that
as that which is not phenomenon cannot be an object of experience it
can never overstep the limits of sensibility within which alone
objects are presented to us Its principles are merely principles of
the exposition of phenomena and the proud name of an ontology which
professes to present synthetical cognitions a priori of things in
general in a systematic doctrine must give place to the modest title of
analytic of the pure understanding
Thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object If
the mode of this intuition is unknown to us the object is merely
transcendental and the conception of the understanding is employed only
transcendentally that is to produce unity in the thought of a manifold
in general Now a pure category in which all conditions of sensuous
intuitionas the only intuition we possessare abstracted does not
determine an object but merely expresses the thought of an object in
general according to different modes Now to employ a conception the
function of judgement is required by which an object is subsumed under
the conception consequently the at least formal condition under which
something can be given in intuition Failing this condition of judgement
schema subsumption is impossible for there is in such a case
nothing given which may be subsumed under the conception The merely
transcendental use of the categories is therefore in fact no use at
all and has no determined or even as regards its form determinable
object Hence it follows that the pure category is incompetent to
establish a synthetical a priori principle and that the principles of
the pure understanding are only of empirical and never of transcendental
use and that beyond the sphere of possible experience no synthetical a
priori principles are possible
It may be advisable therefore to express ourselves thus The pure
categories apart from the formal conditions of sensibility have
a merely transcendental meaning but are nevertheless not of
transcendental use because this is in itself impossible inasmuch as
all the conditions of any employment or use of them in judgements are
absent to wit the formal conditions of the subsumption of an object
under these conceptions As therefore in the character of pure
categories they must be employed empirically and cannot be employed
transcendentally they are of no use at all when separated from
sensibility that is they cannot be applied to an object They are
merely the pure form of the employment of the understanding in respect
of objects in general and of thought without its being at the same time
possible to think or to determine any object by their means But there
lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion which it is very
difficult to avoid The categories are not based as regards their
origin upon sensibility like the forms of intuition space and time
they seem therefore to be capable of an application beyond the sphere
of sensuous objects But this is not the case They are nothing but mere
forms of thought which contain only the logical faculty of uniting a
priori in consciousness the manifold given in intuition Apart then
from the only intuition possible for us they have still less meaning
than the pure sensuous forms space and time for through them an object
is at least given while a mode of connection of the manifold when the
intuition which alone gives the manifold is wanting has no meaning at
all At the same time when we designate certain objects as phenomena or
sensuous existences thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from
their own nature as things in themselves it is evident that by this
very distinction we as it were place the latter considered in this
their own nature although we do not so intuite them in opposition to
the former or on the other hand we do so place other possible
things which are not objects of our senses but are cogitated by the
understanding alone and call them intelligible existences noumena
Now the question arises whether the pure conceptions of our
understanding do possess significance in respect of these latter and
may possibly be a mode of cognizing them
But we are met at the very commencement with an ambiguity which may
easily occasion great misapprehension The understanding when it terms
an object in a certain relation phenomenon at the same time forms out
of this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself and
hence believes that it can form also conceptions of such objects Now as
the understanding possesses no other fundamental conceptions besides the
categories it takes for granted that an object considered as a thing
in itself must be capable of being thought by means of these pure
conceptions and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined
conception of an intelligible existence a something out of the sphere
of our sensibility for a determinate conception of an existence which
we can cognize in some way or other by means of the understanding
If by the term noumenon we understand a thing so far as it is not an
object of our sensuous intuition thus making abstraction of our mode of
intuiting it this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word But
if we understand by it an object of a nonsensuous intuition we in this
case assume a peculiar mode of intuition an intellectual intuition to
wit which does not however belong to us of the very possibility of
which we have no notionand this is a noumenon in the positive sense
The doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the
negative sense that is of things which the understanding is obliged to
cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition consequently
not as mere phenomena but as things in themselves But the
understanding at the same time comprehends that it cannot employ its
categories for the consideration of things in themselves because these
possess significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in
space and time and that they are competent to determine this unity by
means of general a priori connecting conceptions only on account of the
pure ideality of space and time Where this unity of time is not to be
met with as is the case with noumena the whole use indeed the whole
meaning of the categories is entirely lost for even the possibility of
things to correspond to the categories is in this case incomprehensible
On this point I need only refer the reader to what I have said at the
commencement of the General Remark appended to the foregoing chapter
Now the possibility of a thing can never be proved from the fact that
the conception of it is not selfcontradictory but only by means of
an intuition corresponding to the conception If therefore we wish to
apply the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as phenomena
we must have an intuition different from the sensuous and in this case
the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word Now
as such an intuition that is an intellectual intuition is no part of
our faculty of cognition it is absolutely impossible for the categories
to possess any application beyond the limits of experience It may be
true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of
sensuous intuition has no relation and cannot be applied but our
conceptions of the understanding as mere forms of thought for our
sensuous intuition do not extend to these What therefore we call
noumenon must be understood by us as such in a negative sense
If I take away from an empirical intuition all thought by means of the
categories there remains no cognition of any object for by means of
mere intuition nothing is cogitated and from the existence of such
or such an affection of sensibility in me it does not follow that this
affection or representation has any relation to an object without
me But if I take away all intuition there still remains the form of
thought that is the mode of determining an object for the manifold
of a possible intuition Thus the categories do in some measure really
extend further than sensuous intuition inasmuch as they think objects
in general without regard to the mode of sensibility in which
these objects are given But they do not for this reason apply to and
determine a wider sphere of objects because we cannot assume that such
can be given without presupposing the possibility of another than
the sensuous mode of intuition a supposition we are not justified in
making
I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no
contradiction and which is connected with other cognitions as a
limitation of given conceptions but whose objective reality cannot
be cognized in any manner The conception of a noumenon that is of a
thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense but as a
thing in itself solely through the pure understanding is not
selfcontradictory for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility
is the only possible mode of intuition Nay further this conception is
necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena
and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition for
things in themselves which lie beyond its province are called noumena
for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend
its application to all that the understanding thinks But after all
the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible and beyond
the sphere of phenomena all is for us a mere void that is to say
we possess an understanding whose province does problematically extend
beyond this sphere but we do not possess an intuition indeed not even
the conception of a possible intuition by means of which objects beyond
the region of sensibility could be given us and in reference to which
the understanding might be employed assertorically The conception of a
noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception and therefore only
of negative use But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion but
is connected with the limitation of sensibility without however being
capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere
The division of objects into phenomena and noumena and of the
world into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis is therefore quite
inadmissible in a positive sense although conceptions do certainly
admit of such a division for the class of noumena have no determinate
object corresponding to them and cannot therefore possess objective
validity If we abandon the senses how can it be made conceivable
that the categories which are the only conceptions that could serve as
conceptions for noumena have any sense or meaning at all inasmuch
as something more than the mere unity of thought namely a possible
intuition is requisite for their application to an object The
conception of a noumenon considered as merely problematical is
however not only admissible but as a limitative conception of
sensibility absolutely necessary But in this case a noumenon is not
a particular intelligible object for our understanding on the contrary
the kind of understanding to which it could belong is itself a problem
for we cannot form the most distant conception of the possibility of an
understanding which should cognize an object not discursively by
means of categories but intuitively in a nonsensuous intuition Our
understanding attains in this way a sort of negative extension That is
to say it is not limited by but rather limits sensibility by giving
the name of noumena to things not considered as phenomena but as
things in themselves But it at the same time prescribes limits to
itself for it confesses itself unable to cognize these by means of the
categories and hence is compelled to cogitate them merely as an unknown
something
I find however in the writings of modern authors an entirely
different use of the expressions mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis
which quite departs from the meaning of the ancientsan acceptation in
which indeed there is to be found no difficulty but which at the same
time depends on mere verbal quibbling According to this meaning
some have chosen to call the complex of phenomena in so far as it is
intuited mundus sensibilis but in so far as the connection thereof is
cogitated according to general laws of thought mundus intelligibilis
Astronomy in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of the
starry heaven may represent the former a system of astronomy such as
the Copernican or Newtonian the latter But such twisting of words is a
mere sophistical subterfuge to avoid a difficult question by modifying
its meaning to suit our own convenience To be sure understanding and
reason are employed in the cognition of phenomena but the question is
whether these can be applied when the object is not a phenomenon and in
this sense we regard it if it is cogitated as given to the understanding
alone and not to the senses The question therefore is whether over
and above the empirical use of the understanding a transcendental use
is possible which applies to the noumenon as an object This question
we have answered in the negative
When therefore we say the senses represent objects as they appear the
understanding as they are the latter statement must not be understood
in a transcendental but only in an empirical signification that is
as they must be represented in the complete connection of phenomena and
not according to what they may be apart from their relation to possible
experience consequently not as objects of the pure understanding For
this must ever remain unknown to us Nay it is also quite unknown to us
whether any such transcendental or extraordinary cognition is possible
under any circumstances at least whether it is possible by means of
our categories Understanding and sensibility with us can determine
objects only in conjunction If we separate them we have intuitions
without conceptions or conceptions without intuitions in both cases
representations which we cannot apply to any determinate object
If after all our inquiries and explanations any one still hesitates to
abandon the mere transcendental use of the categories let him attempt
to construct with them a synthetical proposition It would of course
be unnecessary for this purpose to construct an analytical proposition
for that does not extend the sphere of the understanding but being
concerned only about what is cogitated in the conception itself it
leaves it quite undecided whether the conception has any relation to
objects or merely indicates the unity of thoughtcomplete abstraction
being made of the modi in which an object may be given in such a
proposition it is sufficient for the understanding to know what lies
in the conceptionto what it applies is to it indifferent The attempt
must therefore be made with a synthetical and socalled transcendental
principle for example Everything that exists exists as substance
or Everything that is contingent exists as an effect of some other
thing viz of its cause Now I ask whence can the understanding draw
these synthetical propositions when the conceptions contained therein
do not relate to possible experience but to things in themselves
noumena Where is to be found the third term which is always
requisite PURE site in a synthetical proposition which may connect
in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical analytical
connection with each other The proposition never will be demonstrated
nay more the possibility of any such pure assertion never can
be shown without making reference to the empirical use of the
understanding and thus ipso facto completely renouncing pure
and nonsensuous judgement Thus the conception of pure and merely
intelligible objects is completely void of all principles of its
application because we cannot imagine any mode in which they might be
given and the problematical thought which leaves a place open for
them serves only like a void space to limit the use of empirical
principles without containing at the same time any other object of
cognition beyond their sphere
Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection
from the Confusion of the Transcendental with the Empirical use of the
Understanding
Reflection reflexio is not occupied about objects themselves for the
purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them but is that state of
the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions
under which we obtain conceptions It is the consciousness of the
relation of given representations to the different sources or faculties
of cognition by which alone their relation to each other can be
rightly determined The first question which occurs in considering our
representations is to what faculty of cognition do they belong To the
understanding or to the senses Many judgements are admitted to be true
from mere habit or inclination but because reflection neither precedes
nor follows it is held to be a judgement that has its origin in the
understanding All judgements do not require examination that is
investigation into the grounds of their truth For when they are
immediately certain for example Between two points there can be only
one straight line no better or less mediate test of their truth can
be found than that which they themselves contain and express But
all judgement nay all comparisons require reflection that is a
distinction of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions
belong The act whereby I compare my representations with the faculty of
cognition which originates them and whereby I distinguish whether they
are compared with each other as belonging to the pure understanding
or to sensuous intuition I term transcendental reflection Now the
relations in which conceptions can stand to each other are those of
identity and difference agreement and opposition of the internal and
external finally of the determinable and the determining matter
and form The proper determination of these relations rests on the
question to what faculty of cognition they subjectively belong whether
to sensibility or understanding For on the manner in which we solve
this question depends the manner in which we must cogitate these
relations
Before constructing any objective judgement we compare the conceptions
that are to be placed in the judgement and observe whether there exists
identity of many representations in one conception if a general
judgement is to be constructed or difference if a particular whether
there is agreement when affirmative and opposition when negative
judgements are to be constructed and so on For this reason we ought
to call these conceptions conceptions of comparison conceptus
comparationis But as when the question is not as to the logical form
but as to the content of conceptions that is to say whether the things
themselves are identical or different in agreement or opposition
and so on the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty
of cognition to wit a relation either to sensibility or to the
understanding and as on this relation depends their relation to
each other transcendental reflection that is the relation of given
representations to one or the other faculty of cognition can alone
determine this latter relation Thus we shall not be able to discover
whether the things are identical or different in agreement or
opposition etc from the mere conception of the things by means
of comparison comparatio but only by distinguishing the mode
of cognition to which they belong in other words by means of
transcendental reflection We may therefore with justice say that
logical reflection is mere comparison for in it no account is taken of
the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong and
they are consequently as far as regards their origin to be treated
as homogeneous while transcendental reflection which applies to the
objects themselves contains the ground of the possibility of objective
comparison of representations with each other and is therefore very
different from the former because the faculties of cognition to which
they belong are not even the same Transcendental reflection is a duty
which no one can neglect who wishes to establish an a priori judgement
upon things We shall now proceed to fulfil this duty and thereby throw
not a little light on the question as to the determination of the proper
business of the understanding
Identity and Difference When an object is presented to us several
times but always with the same internal determinations qualitas et
quantitas it if an object of pure understanding is always the same
not several things but only one thing numerica identitas but if a
phenomenon we do not concern ourselves with comparing the conception of
the thing with the conception of some other but although they may be
in this respect perfectly the same the difference of place at the same
time is a sufficient ground for asserting the numerical difference of
these objects of sense Thus in the case of two drops of water we
may make complete abstraction of all internal difference quality and
quantity and the fact that they are intuited at the same time in
different places is sufficient to justify us in holding them to
be numerically different Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in
themselves consequently as intelligibilia that is objects of pure
understanding although on account of the confused nature of their
representations he gave them the name of phenomena and in this
case his principle of the indiscernible principium identatis
indiscernibilium is not to be impugned But as phenomena are objects
of sensibility and as the understanding in respect of them must be
employed empirically and not purely or transcendentally plurality
and numerical difference are given by space itself as the condition of
external phenomena For one part of space although it may be perfectly
similar and equal to another part is still without it and for this
reason alone is different from the latter which is added to it in order
to make up a greater space It follows that this must hold good of
all things that are in the different parts of space at the same time
however similar and equal one may be to another
Agreement and Opposition When reality is represented by the pure
understanding realitas noumenon opposition between realities is
incogitablesuch a relation that is that when these realities are
connected in one subject they annihilate the effects of each other and
may be represented in the formula 3 3 0 On the other hand the
real in a phenomenon realitas phaenomenon may very well be in mutual
opposition and when united in the same subject the one may completely
or in part annihilate the effect or consequence of the other as in the
case of two moving forces in the same straight line drawing or
impelling a point in opposite directions or in the case of a pleasure
counterbalancing a certain amount of pain
The Internal and External In an object of the pure understanding
only that is internal which has no relation as regards its existence
to anything different from itself On the other hand the internal
determinations of a substantia phaenomenon in space are nothing
but relations and it is itself nothing more than a complex of mere
relations Substance in space we are cognizant of only through forces
operative in it either drawing others towards itself attraction
or preventing others from forcing into itself repulsion and
impenetrability We know no other properties that make up the
conception of substance phenomenal in space and which we term matter
On the other hand as an object of the pure understanding every
substance must have internal determination and forces But what other
internal attributes of such an object can I think than those which my
internal sense presents to me That to wit which in either itself
thought or something analogous to it Hence Leibnitz who looked upon
things as noumena after denying them everything like external relation
and therefore also composition or combination declared that all
substances even the component parts of matter were simple substances
with powers of representation in one word monads
Matter and Form These two conceptions lie at the foundation of all
other reflection so inseparably are they connected with every mode of
exercising the understanding The former denotes the determinable in
general the second its determination both in a transcendental sense
abstraction being made of every difference in that which is given and
of the mode in which it is determined Logicians formerly termed the
universal matter the specific difference of this or that part of
the universal form In a judgement one may call the given conceptions
logical matter for the judgement the relation of these to each other
by means of the copula the form of the judgement In an object the
composite parts thereof essentialia are the matter the mode in which
they are connected in the object the form In respect to things
in general unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all
possibility the limitation thereof negation as the form by which
one thing is distinguished from another according to transcendental
conceptions The understanding demands that something be given at least
in the conception in order to be able to determine it in a certain
manner Hence in a conception of the pure understanding the matter
precedes the form and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed the
existence of things monads and of an internal power of representation
in them in order to found upon this their external relation and the
community their state that is of their representations Hence with
him space and time were possiblethe former through the relation of
substances the latter through the connection of their determinations
with each other as causes and effects And so would it really be
if the pure understanding were capable of an immediate application
to objects and if space and time were determinations of things in
themselves But being merely sensuous intuitions in which we determine
all objects solely as phenomena the form of intuition as a subjective
property of sensibility must antecede all matter sensations
consequently space and time must antecede all phenomena and all data
of experience and rather make experience itself possible But the
intellectual philosopher could not endure that the form should precede
the things themselves and determine their possibility an objection
perfectly correct if we assume that we intuite things as they are
although with confused representation But as sensuous intuition is a
peculiar subjective condition which is a priori at the foundation of
all perception and the form of which is primitive the form must be
given per se and so far from matter or the things themselves which
appear lying at the foundation of experience as we must conclude
if we judge by mere conceptions the very possibility of itself
presupposes on the contrary a given formal intuition space and time
Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to a
conception either in the sensibility or in the pure understanding the
transcendental place In this manner the appointment of the position
which must be taken by each conception according to the difference
in its use and the directions for determining this place to all
conceptions according to rules would be a transcendental topic a
doctrine which would thoroughly shield us from the surreptitious devices
of the pure understanding and the delusions which thence arise as it
would always distinguish to what faculty of cognition each conception
properly belonged Every conception every title under which many
cognitions rank together may be called a logical place Upon this is
based the logical topic of Aristotle of which teachers and rhetoricians
could avail themselves in order under certain titles of thought to
observe what would best suit the matter they had to treat and thus
enable themselves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of
profundity
Transcendental topic on the contrary contains nothing more than the
abovementioned four titles of all comparison and distinction which
differ from categories in this respect that they do not represent the
object according to that which constitutes its conception quantity
reality but set forth merely the comparison of representations which
precedes our conceptions of things But this comparison requires a
previous reflection that is a determination of the place to which the
representations of the things which are compared belong whether
to wit they are cogitated by the pure understanding or given by
sensibility
Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring
to what faculty their objects belong whether as noumena to the
understanding or as phenomena to sensibility If however we wish to
employ these conceptions in respect of objects previous transcendental
reflection is necessary Without this reflection I should make a very
unsafe use of these conceptions and construct pretended synthetical
propositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge and which
are based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly that is upon a
substitution of an object of pure understanding for a phenomenon
For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic and consequently
deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection the
celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual system of the world
or rather believed himself competent to cognize the internal nature of
things by comparing all objects merely with the understanding and the
abstract formal conceptions of thought Our table of the conceptions of
reflection gives us the unexpected advantage of being able to exhibit
the distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its parts and at the
same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this peculiar mode of
thought which rested upon naught but a misconception He compared all
things with each other merely by means of conceptions and naturally
found no other differences than those by which the understanding
distinguishes its pure conceptions one from another The conditions
of sensuous intuition which contain in themselves their own means of
distinction he did not look upon as primitive because sensibility
was to him but a confused mode of representation and not any particular
source of representations A phenomenon was for him the representation
of the thing in itself although distinguished from cognition by the
understanding only in respect of the logical formthe former with its
usual want of analysis containing according to him a certain mixture
of collateral representations in its conception of a thing which it is
the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish In one word
Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena just as Locke in his system
of noogony if I may be allowed to make use of such expressions
sensualized the conceptions of the understanding that is to say
declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract conceptions
of reflection Instead of seeking in the understanding and sensibility
two different sources of representations which however can present us
with objective judgements of things only in conjunction each of
these great men recognized but one of these faculties which in their
opinion applied immediately to things in themselves the other having
no duty but that of confusing or arranging the representations of the
former
Accordingly the objects of sense were compared by Leibnitz as things in
general merely in the understanding
1st He compares them in regard to their identity or differenceas
judged by the understanding As therefore he considered merely the
conceptions of objects and not their position in intuition in
which alone objects can be given and left quite out of sight the
transcendental locale of these conceptionswhether that is their
object ought to be classed among phenomena or among things in
themselves it was to be expected that he should extend the application
of the principle of indiscernibles which is valid solely of conceptions
of things in general to objects of sense mundus phaenomenon and that
he should believe that he had thereby contributed in no small degree to
extend our knowledge of nature In truth if I cognize in all its inner
determinations a drop of water as a thing in itself I cannot look upon
one drop as different from another if the conception of the one is
completely identical with that of the other But if it is a phenomenon
in space it has a place not merely in the understanding among
conceptions but also in sensuous external intuition in space and in
this case the physical locale is a matter of indifference in regard to
the internal determinations of things and one place B may contain
a thing which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place A
just as well as if the two things were in every respect different from
each other Difference of place without any other conditions makes the
plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena not only possible in
itself but even necessary Consequently the above socalled law is not
a law of nature It is merely an analytical rule for the comparison of
things by means of mere conceptions
2nd The principle Realities as simple affirmations never logically
contradict each other is a proposition perfectly true respecting the
relation of conceptions but whether as regards nature or things in
themselves of which we have not the slightest conception is without
any the least meaning For real opposition in which A B is 0
exists everywhere an opposition that is in which one reality united
with another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the othera
fact which is constantly brought before our eyes by the different
antagonistic actions and operations in nature which nevertheless as
depending on real forces must be called realitates phaenomena General
mechanics can even present us with the empirical condition of this
opposition in an a priori rule as it directs its attention to the
opposition in the direction of forcesa condition of which the
transcendental conception of reality can tell us nothing Although M
Leibnitz did not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of
a new principle he yet employed it for the establishment of
new propositions and his followers introduced it into their
LeibnitzioWolfian system of philosophy According to this principle
for example all evils are but consequences of the limited nature of
created beings that is negations because these are the only opposite
of reality In the mere conception of a thing in general this is really
the case but not in things as phenomena In like manner the upholders
of this system deem it not only possible but natural also to connect
and unite all reality in one being because they acknowledge no other
sort of opposition than that of contradiction by which the conception
itself of a thing is annihilated and find themselves unable to
conceive an opposition of reciprocal destruction so to speak in which
one real cause destroys the effect of another and the conditions of
whose representation we meet with only in sensibility
3rd The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than on
this philosophers mode of falsely representing the difference of
the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding
Substances in general must have something inward which is therefore
free from external relations consequently from that of composition
also The simplethat which can be represented by a unitis therefore
the foundation of that which is internal in things in themselves The
internal state of substances cannot therefore consist in place shape
contact or motion determinations which are all external relations
and we can ascribe to them no other than that whereby we internally
determine our faculty of sense itself that is to say the state of
representation Thus then were constructed the monads which were to
form the elements of the universe the active force of which consists in
representation the effects of this force being thus entirely confined
to themselves
For the same reason his view of the possible community of substances
could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony and by no means
as a physical influence For inasmuch as everything is occupied only
internally that is with its own representations the state of the
representations of one substance could not stand in active and living
connection with that of another but some third cause operating on all
without exception was necessary to make the different states correspond
with one another And this did not happen by means of assistance applied
in each particular case systema assistentiae but through the unity of
the idea of a cause occupied and connected with all substances in which
they necessarily receive according to the Leibnitzian school their
existence and permanence consequently also reciprocal correspondence
according to universal laws
4th This philosophers celebrated doctrine of space and time in which
he intellectualized these forms of sensibility originated in the same
delusion of transcendental reflection If I attempt to represent by the
mere understanding the external relations of things I can do so only
by employing the conception of their reciprocal action and if I wish
to connect one state of the same thing with another state I must avail
myself of the notion of the order of cause and effect And thus Leibnitz
regarded space as a certain order in the community of substances and
time as the dynamical sequence of their states That which space and
time possess proper to themselves and independent of things he ascribed
to a necessary confusion in our conceptions of them whereby that which
is a mere form of dynamical relations is held to be a selfexistent
intuition antecedent even to things themselves Thus space and time
were the intelligible form of the connection of things substances and
their states in themselves But things were intelligible substances
substantiae noumena At the same time he made these conceptions valid
of phenomena because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode of
intuition but sought all even the empirical representation of objects
in the understanding and left to sense naught but the despicable task
of confusing and disarranging the representations of the former
But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition concerning things
in themselves by means of the pure understanding which is impossible
it could not apply to phenomena which do not represent things in
themselves In such a case I should be obliged in transcendental
reflection to compare my conceptions only under the conditions of
sensibility and so space and time would not be determinations of things
in themselves but of phenomena What things may be in themselves I
know not and need not know because a thing is never presented to me
otherwise than as a phenomenon
I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions
of reflection Matter is substantia phaenomenon That in it which is
internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies and
in all the functions and operations it performs and which are indeed
never anything but phenomena of the external sense I cannot therefore
find anything that is absolutely but only what is comparatively
internal and which itself consists of external relations The
absolutely internal in matter and as it should be according to the pure
understanding is a mere chimera for matter is not an object for
the pure understanding But the transcendental object which is the
foundation of the phenomenon which we call matter is a mere nescio
quid the nature of which we could not understand even though someone
were found able to tell us For we can understand nothing that does not
bring with it something in intuition corresponding to the expressions
employed If by the complaint of being unable to perceive the internal
nature of things it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure
understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves
it is a silly and unreasonable complaint for those who talk thus really
desire that we should be able to cognize consequently to intuite
things without senses and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty
of cognition perfectly different from the human faculty not merely in
degree but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof so that thus
we should not be men but belong to a class of beings the possibility
of whose existence much less their nature and constitution we have
no means of cognizing By observation and analysis of phenomena we
penetrate into the interior of nature and no one can say what progress
this knowledge may make in time But those transcendental questions
which pass beyond the limits of nature we could never answer even
although all nature were laid open to us because we have not the power
of observing our own mind with any other intuition than that of our
internal sense For herein lies the mystery of the origin and source
of our faculty of sensibility Its application to an object and the
transcendental ground of this unity of subjective and objective lie too
deeply concealed for us who cognize ourselves only through the
internal sense consequently as phenomena to be able to discover in our
existence anything but phenomena the nonsensuous cause of which we at
the same time earnestly desire to penetrate to
The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by the
processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration of the
nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are compared
with each other in the understanding alone while it at the same time
confirms what we particularly insisted on namely that although
phenomena are not included as things in themselves among the objects of
the pure understanding they are nevertheless the only things by which
our cognition can possess objective reality that is to say which give
us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions
When we reflect in a purely logical manner we do nothing more than
compare conceptions in our understanding to discover whether both have
the same content whether they are selfcontradictory or not whether
anything is contained in either conception which of the two is given
and which is merely a mode of thinking that given But if I apply these
conceptions to an object in general in the transcendental sense
without first determining whether it is an object of sensuous or
intellectual intuition certain limitations present themselves which
forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions and render all empirical use
of them impossible And thus these limitations prove that the
representation of an object as a thing in general is not only
insufficient but without sensuous determination and independently of
empirical conditions selfcontradictory that we must therefore make
abstraction of all objects as in logic or admitting them must think
them under conditions of sensuous intuition that consequently the
intelligible requires an altogether peculiar intuition which we do not
possess and in the absence of which it is for us nothing while on the
other hand phenomena cannot be objects in themselves For when I merely
think things in general the difference in their external relations
cannot constitute a difference in the things themselves on the
contrary the former presupposes the latter and if the conception of
one of two things is not internally different from that of the other
I am merely thinking the same thing in different relations Further
by the addition of one affirmation reality to the other the positive
therein is really augmented and nothing is abstracted or withdrawn
from it hence the real in things cannot be in contradiction with or
opposition to itselfand so on
The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employment of the
understanding has as we have shown been so misconceived by Leibnitz
one of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or modern times
that he has been misled into the construction of a baseless system of
intellectual cognition which professes to determine its objects without
the intervention of the senses For this reason the exposition of the
cause of the amphiboly of these conceptions as the origin of these
false principles is of great utility in determining with certainty the
proper limits of the understanding
It is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of a
conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it dictum de omni
et nullo but it would be absurd so to alter this logical proposition
as to say whatever is not contained in a general conception is likewise
not contained in the particular conceptions which rank under it for
the latter are particular conceptions for the very reason that
their content is greater than that which is cogitated in the general
conception And yet the whole intellectual system of Leibnitz is based
upon this false principle and with it must necessarily fall to the
ground together with all the ambiguous principles in reference to the
employment of the understanding which have thence originated
Leibnitzs principle of the identity of indiscernibles or
indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition that if in the
conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found it is
also not to be met with in things themselves that consequently
all things are completely identical numero eadem which are not
distinguishable from each other as to quality or quantity in our
conceptions of them But as in the mere conception of anything
abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition
that of which abstraction has been made is rashly held to be
nonexistent and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is
contained in its conception
The conception of a cubic foot of space however I may think it is
in itself completely identical But two cubic feet in space are
nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their being
in different places they are numero diversa and these places are
conditions of intuition wherein the object of this conception is
given and which do not belong to the conception but to the faculty of
sensibility In like manner there is in the conception of a thing no
contradiction when a negative is not connected with an affirmative
and merely affirmative conceptions cannot in conjunction produce any
negation But in sensuous intuition wherein reality take for example
motion is given we find conditions opposite directionsof which
abstraction has been made in the conception of motion in generalwhich
render possible a contradiction or opposition not indeed of a logical
kindand which from pure positives produce zero 0 We are therefore
not justified in saying that all reality is in perfect agreement
and harmony because no contradiction is discoverable among its
conceptions According to mere conceptions that which is internal
is the substratum of all relations or external determinations When
therefore I abstract all conditions of intuition and confine myself
solely to the conception of a thing in general I can make abstraction
of all external relations and there must nevertheless remain a
conception of that which indicates no relation but merely internal
determinations Now it seems to follow that in everything substance
there is something which is absolutely internal and which antecedes all
external determinations inasmuch as it renders them possible and
that therefore this substratum is something which does not contain any
external relations and is consequently simple for corporeal things are
never anything but relations at least of their parts external to
each other and inasmuch as we know of no other absolutely internal
determinations than those of the internal sense this substratum is not
only simple but also analogously with our internal sense determined
through representations that is to say all things are properly monads
or simple beings endowed with the power of representation Now all this
would be perfectly correct if the conception of a thing were the
only necessary condition of the presentation of objects of external
intuition It is on the contrary manifest that a permanent phenomenon
in space impenetrable extension can contain mere relations and
nothing that is absolutely internal and yet be the primary substratum
of all external perception By mere conceptions I cannot think anything
external without at the same time thinking something internal for
the reason that conceptions of relations presuppose given things and
without these are impossible But as an intuition there is something
that is space which with all it contains consists of purely formal
or indeed real relations which is not found in the mere conception of
a thing in general and this presents to us the substratum which could
not be cognized through conceptions alone I cannot say because a thing
cannot be represented by mere conceptions without something absolutely
internal there is also in the things themselves which are contained
under these conceptions and in their intuition nothing external to
which something absolutely internal does not serve as the foundation
For when we have made abstraction of all the conditions of intuition
there certainly remains in the mere conception nothing but the internal
in general through which alone the external is possible But this
necessity which is grounded upon abstraction alone does not obtain in
the case of things themselves in so far as they are given in intuition
with such determinations as express mere relations without having
anything internal as their foundation for they are not things of a
thing of which we can neither for they are not things in themselves but
only phenomena What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations what
we call its internal determinations are but comparatively internal But
there are some selfsubsistent and permanent through which a determined
object is given That I when abstraction is made of these relations
have nothing more to think does not destroy the conception of a thing
as phenomenon nor the conception of an object in abstracto but it does
away with the possibility of an object that is determinable according to
mere conceptions that is of a noumenon It is certainly startling to
hear that a thing consists solely of relations but this thing is simply
a phenomenon and cannot be cogitated by means of the mere categories
it does itself consist in the mere relation of something in general to
the senses In the same way we cannot cogitate relations of things in
abstracto if we commence with conceptions alone in any other manner
than that one is the cause of determinations in the other for that is
itself the conception of the understanding or category of relation But
as in this case we make abstraction of all intuition we lose altogether
the mode in which the manifold determines to each of its parts its
place that is the form of sensibility space and yet this mode
antecedes all empirical causality
If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought
by means of the pure categories without the need of the schemata of
sensibility such objects are impossible For the condition of the
objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of
our sensuous intuition whereby objects are given and if we make
abstraction of the latter the former can have no relation to an object
And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition from our
own still our functions of thought would have no use or signification
in respect thereof But if we understand by the term objects of a
nonsensuous intuition in respect of which our categories are not
valid and of which we can accordingly have no knowledge neither
intuition nor conception in this merely negative sense noumena must be
admitted For this is no more than saying that our mode of intuition is
not applicable to all things but only to objects of our senses
that consequently its objective validity is limited and that room is
therefore left for another kind of intuition and thus also for things
that may be objects of it But in this sense the conception of a
noumenon is problematical that is to say it is the notion of that it
that it is possible nor that it is impossible inasmuch as we do not
know of any mode of intuition besides the sensuous or of any other sort
of conceptions than the categoriesa mode of intuition and a kind of
conception neither of which is applicable to a nonsensuous object We
are on this account incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects
of thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility and to assume the
existence of objects of pure thought that is of noumena inasmuch as
these have no true positive signification For it must be confessed
of the categories that they are not of themselves sufficient for the
cognition of things in themselves and without the data of sensibility
are mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding Thought is
certainly not a product of the senses and in so far is not limited by
them but it does not therefore follow that it may be employed purely
and without the intervention of sensibility for it would then be
without reference to an object And we cannot call a noumenon an object
of pure thought for the representation thereof is but the problematical
conception of an object for a perfectly different intuition and
a perfectly different understanding from ours both of which are
consequently themselves problematical The conception of a noumenon is
therefore not the conception of an object but merely a problematical
conception inseparably connected with the limitation of our sensibility
That is to say this conception contains the answer to the question
Are there objects quite unconnected with and independent of our
intuitiona question to which only an indeterminate answer can be
given That answer is Inasmuch as sensuous intuition does not apply
to all things without distinction there remains room for other and
different objects The existence of these problematical objects
is therefore not absolutely denied in the absence of a determinate
conception of them but as no category is valid in respect of them
neither must they be admitted as objects for our understanding
Understanding accordingly limits sensibility without at the same time
enlarging its own field While moreover it forbids sensibility to
apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and restricts it
to the sphere of phenomena it cogitates an object in itself only
however as a transcendental object which is the cause of a phenomenon
consequently not itself a phenomenon and which cannot be thought
either as a quantity or as reality or as substance because these
conceptions always require sensuous forms in which to determine an
objectan object therefore of which we are quite unable to say
whether it can be met with in ourselves or out of us whether it would
be annihilated together with sensibility or if this were taken away
would continue to exist If we wish to call this object a noumenon
because the representation of it is nonsensuous we are at liberty
to do so But as we can apply to it none of the conceptions of our
understanding the representation is for us quite void and is available
only for the indication of the limits of our sensuous intuition thereby
leaving at the same time an empty space which we are competent to
fill by the aid neither of possible experience nor of the pure
understanding
The critique of the pure understanding accordingly does not permit us
to create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which are
presented to us as phenomena and to stray into intelligible worlds
nay it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much as a
conception of them The specious error which leads to thisand which is
a perfectly excusable onelies in the fact that the employment of the
understanding contrary to its proper purpose and destination is made
transcendental and objects that is possible intuitions are made to
regulate themselves according to conceptions instead of the conceptions
arranging themselves according to the intuitions on which alone their
own objective validity rests Now the reason of this again is that
apperception and with it thought antecedes all possible determinate
arrangement of representations Accordingly we think something in
general and determine it on the one hand sensuously but on the other
distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from this
particular mode of intuiting it In this case there remains a mode of
determining the object by mere thought which is really but a logical
form without content which however seems to us to be a mode of
the existence of the object in itself noumenon without regard to
intuition which is limited to our senses
Before ending this transcendental analytic we must make an addition
which although in itself of no particular importance seems to be
necessary to the completeness of the system The highest conception
with which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins is the division
into possible and impossible But as all division presupposes a divided
conception a still higher one must exist and this is the conception of
an object in generalproblematically understood and without its being
decided whether it is something or nothing As the categories are the
only conceptions which apply to objects in general the distinguishing
of an object whether it is something or nothing must proceed according
to the order and direction of the categories
To the categories of quantity that is the conceptions of all many
and one the conception which annihilates all that is the conception
of none is opposed And thus the object of a conception to which no
intuition can be found to correspond is nothing That is it is a
conception without an object ens rationis like noumena which cannot
be considered possible in the sphere of reality though they must not
therefore be held to be impossibleor like certain new fundamental
forces in matter the existence of which is cogitable without
contradiction though as examples from experience are not forthcoming
they must not be regarded as possible
Reality is something negation is nothing that is a conception of
the absence of an object as cold a shadow nihil privativum
The mere form of intuition without substance is in itself no
object but the merely formal condition of an object as phenomenon
as pure space and pure time These are certainly something as forms
of intuition but are not themselves objects which are intuited ens
imaginarium
The object of a conception which is selfcontradictory is nothing
because the conception is nothingis impossible as a figure composed
of two straight lines nihil negativum
The table of this division of the conception of nothing the
corresponding division of the conception of something does not require
special description must therefore be arranged as follows
NOTHING
AS
1
As Empty Conception
without object
ens rationis
2 3
Empty object of Empty intuition
a conception without object
nihil privativum ens imaginarium
4
Empty object
without conception
nihil negativum
We see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil negativum
or pure nothing by the consideration that the former must not be
reckoned among possibilities because it is a mere fictionthough
not selfcontradictory while the latter is completely opposed to
all possibility inasmuch as the conception annihilates itself Both
however are empty conceptions On the other hand the nihil privativum
and ens imaginarium are empty data for conceptions If light be not
given to the senses we cannot represent to ourselves darkness and if
extended objects are not perceived we cannot represent space Neither
the negation nor the mere form of intuition can without something
real be an object
We termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance This does not
signify a doctrine of probability for probability is truth only
cognized upon insufficient grounds and though the information it gives
us is imperfect it is not therefore deceitful Hence it must not be
separated from the analytical part of logic Still less must phenomenon
and appearance be held to be identical For truth or illusory appearance
does not reside in the object in so far as it is intuited but in the
judgement upon the object in so far as it is thought It is therefore
quite correct to say that the senses do not err not because they always
judge correctly but because they do not judge at all Hence truth and
error consequently also illusory appearance as the cause of error are
only to be found in a judgement that is in the relation of an object
to our understanding In a cognition which completely harmonizes with
the laws of the understanding no error can exist In a representation
of the sensesas not containing any judgementthere is also no error
But no power of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws Hence
neither the understanding per se without the influence of another
cause nor the senses per se would fall into error the former could
not because if it acts only according to its own laws the effect the
judgement must necessarily accord with these laws But in accordance
with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all
truth In the senses there is no judgementneither a true nor a false
one But as we have no source of cognition besides these two it
follows that error is caused solely by the unobserved influence of
the sensibility upon the understanding And thus it happens that the
subjective grounds of a judgement and are confounded with the objective
and cause them to deviate from their proper determination just as a
body in motion would always of itself proceed in a straight line but
if another impetus gives to it a different direction it will then
start off into a curvilinear line of motion To distinguish the peculiar
action of the understanding from the power which mingles with it it is
necessary to consider an erroneous judgement as the diagonal between two
forces that determine the judgement in two different directions which
as it were form an angle and to resolve this composite operation into
the simple ones of the understanding and the sensibility In pure
a priori judgements this must be done by means of transcendental
reflection whereby as has been already shown each representation
has its place appointed in the corresponding faculty of cognition and
consequently the influence of the one faculty upon the other is made
apparent
It is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory
appearance for example optical illusion which occurs in the
empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding
and in which the judgement is misled by the influence of imagination
Our purpose is to speak of transcendental illusory appearance which
influences principlesthat are not even applied to experience for in
this case we should possess a sure test of their correctnessbut which
leads us in disregard of all the warnings of criticism completely
beyond the empirical employment of the categories and deludes us with
the chimera of an extension of the sphere of the pure understanding
We shall term those principles the application of which is confined
entirely within the limits of possible experience immanent those
on the other hand which transgress these limits we shall call
transcendent principles But by these latter I do not understand
principles of the transcendental use or misuse of the categories which
is in reality a mere fault of the judgement when not under due restraint
from criticism and therefore not paying sufficient attention to the
limits of the sphere in which the pure understanding is allowed to
exercise its functions but real principles which exhort us to break
down all those barriers and to lay claim to a perfectly new field of
cognition which recognizes no line of demarcation Thus transcendental
and transcendent are not identical terms The principles of the
pure understanding which we have already propounded ought to be
of empirical and not of transcendental use that is they are not
applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience A principle
which removes these limits nay which authorizes us to overstep them
is called transcendent If our criticism can succeed in exposing the
illusion in these pretended principles those which are limited in their
employment to the sphere of experience may be called in opposition to
the others immanent principles of the pure understanding
Logical illusion which consists merely in the imitation of the form of
reason the illusion in sophistical syllogisms arises entirely from
a want of due attention to logical rules So soon as the attention
is awakened to the case before us this illusion totally disappears
Transcendental illusion on the contrary does not cease to exist even
after it has been exposed and its nothingness clearly perceived by
means of transcendental criticism Take for example the illusion in
the proposition The world must have a beginning in time The cause of
this is as follows In our reason subjectively considered as a faculty
of human cognition there exist fundamental rules and maxims of its
exercise which have completely the appearance of objective principles
Now from this cause it happens that the subjective necessity of a
certain connection of our conceptions is regarded as an objective
necessity of the determination of things in themselves This illusion it
is impossible to avoid just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea
appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore because we
see the former by means of higher rays than the latter or which is a
still stronger case as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from
seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time afterwards although
he is not deceived by this illusion
Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing
the illusory appearance in transcendental judgements and guarding us
against it but to make it as in the case of logical illusion entirely
disappear and cease to be illusion is utterly beyond its power For we
have here to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion which rests
upon subjective principles and imposes these upon us as objective while
logical dialectic in the detection of sophisms has to do merely with
an error in the logical consequence of the propositions or with an
artificially constructed illusion in imitation of the natural error
There is therefore a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure
reasonnot that in which the bungler from want of the requisite
knowledge involves himself nor that which the sophist devises for the
purpose of misleading but that which is an inseparable adjunct of human
reason and which even after its illusions have been exposed does not
cease to deceive and continually to lead reason into momentary errors
which it becomes necessary continually to remove
All our knowledge begins with sense proceeds thence to understanding
and ends with reason beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in
the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it
to the highest unity of thought At this stage of our inquiry it is my
duty to give an explanation of this the highest faculty of cognition
and I confess I find myself here in some difficulty Of reason as of
the understanding there is a merely formal that is logical use in
which it makes abstraction of all content of cognition but there is
also a real use inasmuch as it contains in itself the source of certain
conceptions and principles which it does not borrow either from the
senses or the understanding The former faculty has been long defined by
logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to
immediate conclusions consequentiae immediatae but the nature of the
latter which itself generates conceptions is not to be understood
from this definition Now as a division of reason into a logical and
a transcendental faculty presents itself here it becomes necessary to
seek for a higher conception of this source of cognition which shall
comprehend both conceptions In this we may expect according to the
analogy of the conceptions of the understanding that the logical
conception will give us the key to the transcendental and that the
table of the functions of the former will present us with the clue to
the conceptions of reason
In the former part of our transcendental logic we defined the
understanding to be the faculty of rules reason may be distinguished
from understanding as the faculty of principles
The term principle is ambiguous and commonly signifies merely a
cognition that may be employed as a principle although it is not in
itself and as regards its proper origin entitled to the distinction
Every general proposition even if derived from experience by the
process of induction may serve as the major in a syllogism but it is
not for that reason a principle Mathematical axioms for example there
can be only one straight line between two points are general a priori
cognitions and are therefore rightly denominated principles relatively
to the cases which can be subsumed under them But I cannot for
this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line from
principlesI cognize it only in pure intuition
Cognition from principles then is that cognition in which I cognize
the particular in the general by means of conceptions Thus every
syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a principle
For the major always gives a conception through which everything that
is subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized according to a
principle Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a
syllogism and the understanding presents us with such general a
priori propositions they may be termed principles in respect of their
possible use
But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in
relation to their origin we shall find them to be anything rather
than cognitions from conceptions For they would not even be possible
a priori if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition in
mathematics or on that of the conditions of a possible experience
That everything that happens has a cause cannot be concluded from the
general conception of that which happens on the contrary the principle
of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which
happens a determinate empirical conception
Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot supply
and they alone are entitled to be called principles At the same time
all general propositions may be termed comparative principles
It has been a longcherished wishthat who knows how late may one
day be happily accomplishedthat the principles of the endless variety
of civil laws should be investigated and exposed for in this way alone
can we find the secret of simplifying legislation But in this case
laws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon conditions
under which it subsists in perfect harmony with itself they
consequently have for their object that which is completely our own
work and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these
conceptions But how objects as things in themselveshow the nature of
things is subordinated to principles and is to be determined according
to conceptions is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to
answer Be this however as it mayfor on this point our investigation
is yet to be madeit is at least manifest from what we have said that
cognition from principles is something very different from cognition by
means of the understanding which may indeed precede other cognitions
in the form of a principle but in itselfin so far as it is
syntheticalis neither based upon mere thought nor contains a general
proposition drawn from conceptions alone
The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of
phenomena by virtue of rules the reason is a faculty for the production
of unity of rules of the understanding under principles Reason
therefore never applies directly to experience or to any sensuous
object its object is on the contrary the understanding to the
manifold cognition of which it gives a unity a priori by means of
conceptionsa unity which may be called rational unity and which is
of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the
understanding
The above is the general conception of the faculty of reason in so
far as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the absence of
examples These will be given in the sequel
A distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately
cognized and that which is inferred or concluded That in a figure
which is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles is an
immediate cognition but that these angles are together equal to two
right angles is an inference or conclusion Now as we are constantly
employing this mode of thought and have thus become quite accustomed to
it we no longer remark the above distinction and as in the case of
the socalled deceptions of sense consider as immediately perceived
what has really been inferred In every reasoning or syllogism there
is a fundamental proposition afterwards a second drawn from it and
finally the conclusion which connects the truth in the first with the
truth in the secondand that infallibly If the judgement concluded
is so contained in the first proposition that it can be deduced from
it without the meditation of a third notion the conclusion is called
immediate consequentia immediata I prefer the term conclusion of
the understanding But if in addition to the fundamental cognition a
second judgement is necessary for the production of the conclusion it
is called a conclusion of the reason In the proposition All men are
mortal are contained the propositions Some men are mortal Nothing
that is not mortal is a man and these are therefore immediate
conclusions from the first On the other hand the proposition all the
learned are mortal is not contained in the main proposition for the
conception of a learned man does not occur in it and it can be deduced
from the main proposition only by means of a mediating judgement
In every syllogism I first cogitate a rule the major by means of
the understanding In the next place I subsume a cognition under the
condition of the rule and this is the minor by means of the judgement
And finally I determine my cognition by means of the predicate of the
rule this is the conclusio consequently I determine it a priori
by means of the reason The relations therefore which the major
proposition as the rule represents between a cognition and its
condition constitute the different kinds of syllogisms These are just
threefoldanalogously with all judgements in so far as they differ
in the mode of expressing the relation of a cognition in the
understandingnamely categorical hypothetical and disjunctive
When as often happens the conclusion is a judgement which may follow
from other given judgements through which a perfectly different object
is cogitated I endeavour to discover in the understanding whether the
assertion in this conclusion does not stand under certain conditions
according to a general rule If I find such a condition and if the
object mentioned in the conclusion can be subsumed under the given
condition then this conclusion follows from a rule which is also valid
for other objects of cognition From this we see that reason endeavours
to subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to
the smallest possible number of principles general conditions and
thus to produce in it the highest unity
Can we isolate reason and if so is it in this case a peculiar source
of conceptions and judgements which spring from it alone and through
which it can be applied to objects or is it merely a subordinate
faculty whose duty it is to give a certain form to given cognitionsa
form which is called logical and through which the cognitions of the
understanding are subordinated to each other and lower rules to higher
those to wit whose condition comprises in its sphere the condition
of the others in so far as this can be done by comparison This is the
question which we have at present to answer Manifold variety of rules
and unity of principles is a requirement of reason for the purpose of
bringing the understanding into complete accordance with itself just as
understanding subjects the manifold content of intuition to conceptions
and thereby introduces connection into it But this principle prescribes
no law to objects and does not contain any ground of the possibility of
cognizing or of determining them as such but is merely a subjective
law for the proper arrangement of the content of the understanding
The purpose of this law is by a comparison of the conceptions of the
understanding to reduce them to the smallest possible number although
at the same time it does not justify us in demanding from objects
themselves such a uniformity as might contribute to the convenience and
the enlargement of the sphere of the understanding or in expecting that
it will itself thus receive from them objective validity In one word
the question is does reason in itself that is does pure reason
contain a priori synthetical principles and rules and what are those
principles
The formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives
us sufficient information in regard to the ground on which the
transcendental principle of reason in its pure synthetical cognition
will rest
Reason as observed in the syllogistic process is not applicable to
intuitions for the purpose of subjecting them to rulesfor this is the
province of the understanding with its categoriesbut to conceptions
and judgements If pure reason does apply to objects and the intuition
of them it does so not immediately but mediatelythrough the
understanding and its judgements which have a direct relation to
the senses and their intuition for the purpose of determining their
objects The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible
experience but is essentially different from this unity which is that
of the understanding That everything which happens has a cause is not
a principle cognized and prescribed by reason This principle makes the
unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason which
without a reference to possible experience could never have produced by
means of mere conceptions any such synthetical unity
Reason in its logical use endeavours to discover the general
condition of its judgement the conclusion and a syllogism is itself
nothing but a judgement by means of the subsumption of its condition
under a general rule the major Now as this rule may itself be
subjected to the same process of reason and thus the condition of the
condition be sought by means of a prosyllogism as long as the process
can be continued it is very manifest that the peculiar principle of
reason in its logical use is to find for the conditioned cognition of
the understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity of the former is
completed
But this logical maxim cannot be a principle of pure reason unless we
admit that if the conditioned is given the whole series of conditions
subordinated to one anothera series which is consequently itself
unconditionedis also given that is contained in the object and its
connection
But this principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical for
analytically the conditioned certainly relates to some condition but
not to the unconditioned From this principle also there must originate
different synthetical propositions of which the pure understanding is
perfectly ignorant for it has to do only with objects of a possible
experience the cognition and synthesis of which is always conditioned
The unconditioned if it does really exist must be especially
considered in regard to the determinations which distinguish it from
whatever is conditioned and will thus afford us material for many a
priori synthetical propositions
The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason
will however be transcendent in relation to phenomena that is to
say it will be impossible to make any adequate empirical use of this
principle It is therefore completely different from all principles of
the understanding the use made of which is entirely immanent their
object and purpose being merely the possibility of experience Now our
duty in the transcendental dialectic is as follows To discover whether
the principle that the series of conditions in the synthesis of
phenomena or of thought in general extends to the unconditioned is
objectively true or not what consequences result therefrom affecting
the empirical use of the understanding or rather whether there exists
any such objectively valid proposition of reason and whether it is not
on the contrary a merely logical precept which directs us to ascend
perpetually to still higher conditions to approach completeness in the
series of them and thus to introduce into our cognition the highest
possible unity of reason We must ascertain I say whether this
requirement of reason has not been regarded by a misunderstanding as
a transcendental principle of pure reason which postulates a thorough
completeness in the series of conditions in objects themselves We
must show moreover the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into
syllogisms the major proposition of which pure reason has supplieda
proposition which has perhaps more of the character of a petitio than
of a postulatumand that proceed from experience upwards to its
conditions The solution of these problems is our task in transcendental
dialectic which we are about to expose even at its source that lies
deep in human reason We shall divide it into two parts the first of
which will treat of the transcendent conceptions of pure reason the
second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms
The conceptions of pure reasonwe do not here speak of the possibility
of themare not obtained by reflection but by inference or
conclusion The conceptions of understanding are also cogitated a priori
antecedently to experience and render it possible but they contain
nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena in so far as these
must necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness Through
them alone are cognition and the determination of an object possible It
is from them accordingly that we receive material for reasoning and
antecedently to them we possess no a priori conceptions of objects from
which they might be deduced On the other hand the sole basis of
their objective reality consists in the necessity imposed on them as
containing the intellectual form of all experience of restricting their
application and influence to the sphere of experience
But the term conception of reason or rational conception itself
indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of
experience because its objectmatter is a cognition of which every
empirical cognition is but a partnay the whole of possible experience
may be itself but a part of ita cognition to which no actual
experience ever fully attains although it does always pertain to it
The aim of rational conceptions is the comprehension as that of the
conceptions of understanding is the understanding of perceptions
If they contain the unconditioned they relate to that to which all
experience is subordinate but which is never itself an object of
experiencethat towards which reason tends in all its conclusions from
experience and by the standard of which it estimates the degree
of their empirical use but which is never itself an element in an
empirical synthesis If notwithstanding such conceptions possess
objective validity they may be called conceptus ratiocinati
conceptions legitimately concluded in cases where they do not
they have been admitted on account of having the appearance of
being correctly concluded and may be called conceptus ratiocinantes
sophistical conceptions But as this can only be sufficiently
demonstrated in that part of our treatise which relates to the
dialectical conclusions of reason we shall omit any consideration of
it in this place As we called the pure conceptions of the understanding
categories we shall also distinguish those of pure reason by a new name
and call them transcendental ideas These terms however we must in the
first place explain and justify
Despite the great wealth of words which European languages possess the
thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited
to his conception for want of which he is unable to make himself
intelligible either to others or to himself To coin new words is a
pretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful and
before recourse is taken to so desperate an expedient it is advisable
to examine the dead and learned languages with the hope and the
probability that we may there meet with some adequate expression of the
notion we have in our minds In this case even if the original meaning
of the word has become somewhat uncertain from carelessness or want of
caution on the part of the authors of it it is always better to adhere
to and confirm its proper meaningeven although it may be doubtful
whether it was formerly used in exactly this sensethan to make our
labour vain by want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible
For this reason when it happens that there exists only a single word to
express a certain conception and this word in its usual acceptation
is thoroughly adequate to the conception the accurate distinction of
which from related conceptions is of great importance we ought not to
employ the expression improvidently or for the sake of variety and
elegance of style use it as a synonym for other cognate words It
is our duty on the contrary carefully to preserve its peculiar
signification as otherwise it easily happens that when the attention of
the reader is no longer particularly attracted to the expression and it
is lost amid the multitude of other words of very different import the
thought which it conveyed and which it alone conveyed is lost with it
Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he meant
by it something which is never derived from the senses but which
far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding with which
Aristotle occupied himself inasmuch as in experience nothing perfectly
corresponding to them could be found Ideas are according to him
archetypes of things themselves and not merely keys to possible
experiences like the categories In his view they flow from the
highest reason by which they have been imparted to human reason which
however exists no longer in its original state but is obliged with
great labour to recall by reminiscencewhich is called philosophythe
old but now sadly obscured ideas I will not here enter upon any
literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher
attached to this expression I shall content myself with remarking that
it is nothing unusual in common conversation as well as in written
works by comparing the thoughts which an author has delivered upon a
subject to understand him better than he understood himself inasmuch
as he may not have sufficiently determined his conception and thus have
sometimes spoken nay even thought in opposition to his own opinions
Plato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the
feeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely spelling out
phenomena according to synthetical unity for the purpose of being able
to read them as experience and that our reason naturally raises itself
to cognitions far too elevated to admit of the possibility of an
object given by experience corresponding to themcognitions which are
nevertheless real and are not mere phantoms of the brain
This philosopher found his ideas especially in all that is practical
that is which rests upon freedom which in its turn ranks under
cognitions that are the peculiar product of reason He who would derive
from experience the conceptions of virtue who would make as many
have really done that which at best can but serve as an imperfectly
illustrative example a model for or the formation of a perfectly
adequate idea on the subject would in fact transform virtue into a
nonentity changeable according to time and circumstance and utterly
incapable of being employed as a rule On the contrary everyone is
conscious that when any one is held up to him as a model of virtue he
compares this socalled model with the true original which he possesses
in his own mind and values him according to this standard But this
standard is the idea of virtue in relation to which all possible
objects of experience are indeed serviceable as examplesproofs of
the practicability in a certain degree of that which the conception of
virtue demandsbut certainly not as archetypes That the actions of
man will never be in perfect accordance with all the requirements of the
pure ideas of reason does not prove the thought to be chimerical For
only through this idea are all judgements as to moral merit or demerit
possible it consequently lies at the foundation of every approach to
moral perfection however far removed from it the obstacles in human
natureindeterminable as to degreemay keep us
The Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an exampleand a
striking oneof imaginary perfection such as can exist only in the
brain of the idle thinker and Brucker ridicules the philosopher
for maintaining that a prince can never govern well unless he is
participant in the ideas But we should do better to follow up this
thought and where this admirable thinker leaves us without assistance
employ new efforts to place it in clearer light rather than carelessly
fling it aside as useless under the very miserable and pernicious
pretext of impracticability A constitution of the greatest possible
human freedom according to laws by which the liberty of every
individual can consist with the liberty of every other not of the
greatest possible happiness for this follows necessarily from the
former is to say the least a necessary idea which must be placed
at the foundation not only of the first plan of the constitution of a
state but of all its laws And in this it not necessary at the outset
to take account of the obstacles which lie in our wayobstacles which
perhaps do not necessarily arise from the character of human nature but
rather from the previous neglect of true ideas in legislation For there
is nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of a philosopher than the
vulgar appeal to a socalled adverse experience which indeed would not
have existed if those institutions had been established at the proper
time and in accordance with ideas while instead of this conceptions
crude for the very reason that they have been drawn from experience
have marred and frustrated all our better views and intentions The more
legislation and government are in harmony with this idea the more rare
do punishments become and thus it is quite reasonable to maintain
as Plato did that in a perfect state no punishments at all would be
necessary Now although a perfect state may never exist the idea is
not on that account the less just which holds up this maximum as the
archetype or standard of a constitution in order to bring legislative
government always nearer and nearer to the greatest possible perfection
For at what precise degree human nature must stop in its progress and
how wide must be the chasm which must necessarily exist between the
idea and its realization are problems which no one can or ought to
determineand for this reason that it is the destination of freedom to
overstep all assigned limits between itself and the idea
But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and
where ideas are operative causes of actions and their objects that is
to say in the region of ethics but also in regard to nature herself
Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas A plant and animal
the regular order of natureprobably also the disposition of the whole
universegive manifest evidence that they are possible only by means
of and according to ideas that indeed no one creature under the
individual conditions of its existence perfectly harmonizes with the
idea of the most perfect of its kindjust as little as man with
the idea of humanity which nevertheless he bears in his soul as the
archetypal standard of his actions that notwithstanding these ideas
are in the highest sense individually unchangeably and completely
determined and are the original causes of things and that the totality
of connected objects in the universe is alone fully adequate to that
idea Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the writings of
this philosopher the mental power exhibited in this ascent from the
ectypal mode of regarding the physical world to the architectonic
connection thereof according to ends that is ideas is an effort which
deserves imitation and claims respect But as regards the principles of
ethics of legislation and of religion spheres in which ideas
alone render experience possible although they never attain to full
expression therein he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar
merit which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very
empirical rules the validity of which as principles is destroyed by
ideas For as regards nature experience presents us with rules and is
the source of truth but in relation to ethical laws experience is the
parent of illusion and it is in the highest degree reprehensible to
limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do from what
is done
We must however omit the consideration of these important subjects
the development of which is in reality the peculiar duty and dignity of
philosophy and confine ourselves for the present to the more humble but
not less useful task of preparing a firm foundation for those majestic
edifices of moral science For this foundation has been hitherto
insecure from the many subterranean passages which reason in its
confident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions
Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly acquainted with the
transcendental use made of pure reason its principles and ideas that
we may be able properly to determine and value its influence and real
worth But before bringing these introductory remarks to a close I
beg those who really have philosophy at heartand their number is but
smallif they shall find themselves convinced by the considerations
following as well as by those above to exert themselves to preserve to
the expression idea its original signification and to take care that
it be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of
representations are loosely designatedthat the interests of science
may not thereby suffer We are in no want of words to denominate
adequately every mode of representation without the necessity of
encroaching upon terms which are proper to others The following is
a graduated list of them The genus is representation in general
representatio Under it stands representation with consciousness
perceptio A perception which relates solely to the subject as a
modification of its state is a sensation sensatio an objective
perception is a cognition cognitio A cognition is either an intuition
or a conception intuitus vel conceptus The former has an immediate
relation to the object and is singular and individual the latter has
but a mediate relation by means of a characteristic mark which may be
common to several things A conception is either empirical or pure A
pure conception in so far as it has its origin in the understanding
alone and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image is
called notio A conception formed from notions which transcends the
possibility of experience is an idea or a conception of reason To
one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions it must be quite
intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red called an idea
It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of understanding
Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of
our cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions a priori
conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience or
rather indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an
empirical cognition of objects The form of judgementsconverted into a
conception of the synthesis of intuitionsproduced the categories
which direct the employment of the understanding in experience This
consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms when
applied to synthetical unity of intuitions following the rule of the
categories will contain the origin of particular a priori conceptions
which we may call pure conceptions of reason or transcendental ideas
and which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality of
experience according to principles
The function of reason in arguments consists in the universality of
a cognition according to conceptions and the syllogism itself is
a judgement which is determined a priori in the whole extent of its
condition The proposition Caius is mortal is one which may be
obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone but my
wish is to find a conception which contains the condition under which
the predicate of this judgement is givenin this case the conception
of manand after subsuming under this condition taken in its whole
extent all men are mortal I determine according to it the cognition
of the object thought and say Caius is mortal
Hence in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a
certain object after having thought it in the major in its whole extent
under a certain condition This complete quantity of the extent in
relation to such a condition is called universality universalitas To
this corresponds totality universitas of conditions in the synthesis
of intuitions The transcendental conception of reason is therefore
nothing else than the conception of the totality of the conditions of
a given conditioned Now as the unconditioned alone renders possible
totality of conditions and conversely the totality of conditions is
itself always unconditioned a pure rational conception in general
can be defined and explained by means of the conception of the
unconditioned in so far as it contains a basis for the synthesis of the
conditioned
To the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates by
means of the categories the number of pure rational conceptions will
correspond We must therefore seek for first an unconditioned of
the categorical synthesis in a subject secondly of the hypothetical
synthesis of the members of a series thirdly of the disjunctive
synthesis of parts in a system
There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms each of which
proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditionedone to the subject
which cannot be employed as predicate another to the presupposition
which supposes nothing higher than itself and the third to an aggregate
of the members of the complete division of a conception Hence the pure
rational conceptions of totality in the synthesis of conditions have a
necessary foundation in the nature of human reasonat least as modes of
elevating the unity of the understanding to the unconditioned They
may have no valid application corresponding to their transcendental
employment in concreto and be thus of no greater utility than
to direct the understanding how while extending them as widely
as possible to maintain its exercise and application in perfect
consistence and harmony
But while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the
unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason we again
light upon an expression which we find it impossible to dispense with
and which nevertheless owing to the ambiguity attaching to it from long
abuse we cannot employ with safety The word absolute is one of the few
words which in its original signification was perfectly adequate to
the conception it was intended to conveya conception which no other
word in the same language exactly suits and the lossor which is
the same thing the incautious and loose employmentof which must
be followed by the loss of the conception itself And as it is a
conception which occupies much of the attention of reason its loss
would be greatly to the detriment of all transcendental philosophy The
word absolute is at present frequently used to denote that something can
be predicated of a thing considered in itself and intrinsically In this
sense absolutely possible would signify that which is possible in itself
internewhich is in fact the least that one can predicate of an
object On the other hand it is sometimes employed to indicate that
a thing is valid in all respectsfor example absolute sovereignty
Absolutely possible would in this sense signify that which is possible
in all relations and in every respect and this is the most that can be
predicated of the possibility of a thing Now these significations do
in truth frequently coincide Thus for example that which is
intrinsically impossible is also impossible in all relations that is
absolutely impossible But in most cases they differ from each other
toto caelo and I can by no means conclude that because a thing is in
itself possible it is also possible in all relations and therefore
absolutely Nay more I shall in the sequel show that absolute
necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity and
that therefore it must not be considered as synonymous with it Of an
opposite which is intrinsically impossible we may affirm that it is in
all respects impossible and that consequently the thing itself of
which this is the opposite is absolutely necessary but I cannot reason
conversely and say the opposite of that which is absolutely necessary
is intrinsically impossible that is that the absolute necessity of
things is an internal necessity For this internal necessity is in
certain cases a mere empty word with which the least conception cannot
be connected while the conception of the necessity of a thing in all
relations possesses very peculiar determinations Now as the loss of a
conception of great utility in speculative science cannot be a matter of
indifference to the philosopher I trust that the proper determination
and careful preservation of the expression on which the conception
depends will likewise be not indifferent to him
In this enlarged signification then shall I employ the word absolute
in opposition to that which is valid only in some particular respect
for the latter is restricted by conditions the former is valid without
any restriction whatever
Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object nothing
else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions and does not
rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely that is in all
respects and relations unconditioned For pure reason leaves to the
understanding everything that immediately relates to the object of
intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination The former
restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment of
the conceptions of the understanding and aims at carrying out the
synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category even to the
unconditioned This unity may hence be called the rational unity of
phenomena as the other which the category expresses may be termed the
unity of the understanding Reason therefore has an immediate relation
to the use of the understanding not indeed in so far as the latter
contains the ground of possible experience for the conception of the
absolute totality of conditions is not a conception that can be employed
in experience because no experience is unconditioned but solely
for the purpose of directing it to a certain unity of which the
understanding has no conception and the aim of which is to collect into
an absolute whole all acts of the understanding Hence the objective
employment of the pure conceptions of reason is always transcendent
while that of the pure conceptions of the understanding must according
to their nature be always immanent inasmuch as they are limited to
possible experience
I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason to which
no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense
Accordingly the pure conceptions of reason at present under
consideration are transcendental ideas They are conceptions of pure
reason for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means
of an absolute totality of conditions They are not mere fictions but
natural and necessary products of reason and have hence a necessary
relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understanding
And finally they are transcendent and overstep the limits of all
experiences in which consequently no object can ever be presented
that would be perfectly adequate to a transcendental idea When we use
the word idea we say as regards its object an object of the pure
understanding a great deal but as regards its subject that is in
respect of its reality under conditions of experience exceedingly
little because the idea as the conception of a maximum can never be
completely and adequately presented in concreto Now as in the merely
speculative employment of reason the latter is properly the sole aim
and as in this case the approximation to a conception which is never
attained in practice is the same thing as if the conception were
nonexistentit is commonly said of the conception of this kind it is
only an idea So we might very well say the absolute totality of all
phenomena is only an idea for as we never can present an adequate
representation of it it remains for us a problem incapable of solution
On the other hand as in the practical use of the understanding we have
only to do with action and practice according to rules an idea of pure
reason can always be given really in concreto although only partially
nay it is the indispensable condition of all practical employment of
reason The practice or execution of the idea is always limited
and defective but nevertheless within indeterminable boundaries
consequently always under the influence of the conception of an absolute
perfection And thus the practical idea is always in the highest degree
fruitful and in relation to real actions indispensably necessary
In the idea pure reason possesses even causality and the power of
producing that which its conception contains Hence we cannot say of
wisdom in a disparaging way it is only an idea For for the very
reason that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible aims
it must be for all practical exertions and endeavours the primitive
condition and rulea rule which if not constitutive is at least
limitative
Now although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of reason
they are only ideas we must not on this account look upon them as
superfluous and nugatory For although no object can be determined by
them they can be of great utility unobserved and at the basis of
the edifice of the understanding as the canon for its extended and
selfconsistent exercisea canon which indeed does not enable it to
cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its own
conceptions but which guides it more securely in its cognition Not
to mention that they perhaps render possible a transition from our
conceptions of nature and the nonego to the practical conceptions and
thus produce for even ethical ideas keeping so to speak and connection
with the speculative cognitions of reason The explication of all this
must be looked for in the sequel
But setting aside in conformity with our original purpose the
consideration of the practical ideas we proceed to contemplate reason
in its speculative use alone nay in a still more restricted sphere to
wit in the transcendental use and here must strike into the same path
which we followed in our deduction of the categories That is to say we
shall consider the logical form of the cognition of reason that we
may see whether reason may not be thereby a source of conceptions which
enables us to regard objects in themselves as determined synthetically a
priori in relation to one or other of the functions of reason
Reason considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of
cognition is the faculty of conclusion that is of mediate
judgementby means of the subsumption of the condition of a possible
judgement under the condition of a given judgement The given judgement
is the general rule major The subsumption of the condition of another
possible judgement under the condition of the rule is the minor The
actual judgement which enounces the assertion of the rule in the
subsumed case is the conclusion conclusio The rule predicates
something generally under a certain condition The condition of the rule
is satisfied in some particular case It follows that what was valid
in general under that condition must also be considered as valid in the
particular case which satisfies this condition It is very plain that
reason attains to a cognition by means of acts of the understanding
which constitute a series of conditions When I arrive at the
proposition All bodies are changeable by beginning with the more
remote cognition in which the conception of body does not appear but
which nevertheless contains the condition of that conception All
compound is changeable by proceeding from this to a less remote
cognition which stands under the condition of the former Bodies are
compound and hence to a third which at length connects for me the
remote cognition changeable with the one before me Consequently
bodies are changeableI have arrived at a cognition conclusion
through a series of conditions premises Now every series whose
exponent of the categorical or hypothetical judgement is given can be
continued consequently the same procedure of reason conducts us to the
ratiocinatio polysyllogistica which is a series of syllogisms that can
be continued either on the side of the conditions per prosyllogismos
or of the conditioned per episyllogismos to an indefinite extent
But we very soon perceive that the chain or series of prosyllogisms
that is of deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or conditions
of a given cognition in other words the ascending series of syllogisms
must have a very different relation to the faculty of reason from that
of the descending series that is the progressive procedure of reason
on the side of the conditioned by means of episyllogisms For as in
the former case the cognition conclusio is given only as conditioned
reason can attain to this cognition only under the presupposition that
all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are
given totality in the series of premises because only under this
supposition is the judgement we may be considering possible a priori
while on the side of the conditioned or the inferences only an
incomplete and becoming and not a presupposed or given series
consequently only a potential progression is cogitated Hence when
a cognition is contemplated as conditioned reason is compelled to
consider the series of conditions in an ascending line as completed and
given in their totality But if the very same condition is considered
at the same time as the condition of other cognitions which together
constitute a series of inferences or consequences in a descending
line reason may preserve a perfect indifference as to how far this
progression may extend a parte posteriori and whether the totality of
this series is possible because it stands in no need of such a series
for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion before it inasmuch as
this conclusion is sufficiently guaranteed and determined on grounds a
parte priori It may be the case that upon the side of the conditions
the series of premises has a first or highest condition or it may
not possess this and so be a parte priori unlimited but it must
nevertheless contain totality of conditions even admitting that we
never could succeed in completely apprehending it and the whole series
must be unconditionally true if the conditioned which is considered
as an inference resulting from it is to be held as true This is a
requirement of reason which announces its cognition as determined a
priori and as necessary either in itselfand in this case it needs no
grounds to rest uponor if it is deduced as a member of a series of
grounds which is itself unconditionally true
We are not at present engaged with a logical dialectic which makes
complete abstraction of the content of cognition and aims only at
unveiling the illusory appearance in the form of syllogisms Our subject
is transcendental dialectic which must contain completely a priori
the origin of certain cognitions drawn from pure reason and the origin
of certain deduced conceptions the object of which cannot be given
empirically and which therefore lie beyond the sphere of the faculty
of understanding We have observed from the natural relation which
the transcendental use of our cognition in syllogisms as well as in
judgements must have to the logical that there are three kinds of
dialectical arguments corresponding to the three modes of conclusion
by which reason attains to cognitions on principles and that in all
it is the business of reason to ascend from the conditioned synthesis
beyond which the understanding never proceeds to the unconditioned
which the understanding never can reach
Now the most general relations which can exist in our representations
are 1st the relation to the subject 2nd the relation to objects
either as phenomena or as objects of thought in general If we connect
this subdivision with the main division all the relations of our
representations of which we can form either a conception or an idea
are threefold 1 The relation to the subject 2 The relation to the
manifold of the object as a phenomenon 3 The relation to all things in
general
Now all pure conceptions have to do in general with the synthetical
unity of representations conceptions of pure reason transcendental
ideas on the other hand with the unconditional synthetical unity
of all conditions It follows that all transcendental ideas arrange
themselves in three classes the first of which contains the absolute
unconditioned unity of the thinking subject the second the absolute
unity of the series of the conditions of a phenomenon the third the
absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general
The thinking subject is the objectmatter of Psychology the sum total
of all phenomena the world is the objectmatter of Cosmology and the
thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all
that is cogitable the being of all beings is the objectmatter of all
Theology Thus pure reason presents us with the idea of a transcendental
doctrine of the soul psychologia rationalis of a transcendental
science of the world cosmologia rationalis and finally of
a transcendental doctrine of God theologia transcendentalis
Understanding cannot originate even the outline of any of these
sciences even when connected with the highest logical use of reason
that is all cogitable syllogismsfor the purpose of proceeding from
one object phenomenon to all others even to the utmost limits of
the empirical synthesis They are on the contrary pure and genuine
products or problems of pure reason
What modi of the pure conceptions of reason these transcendental ideas
are will be fully exposed in the following chapter They follow
the guiding thread of the categories For pure reason never relates
immediately to objects but to the conceptions of these contained in the
understanding In like manner it will be made manifest in the detailed
explanation of these ideashow reason merely through the synthetical
use of the same function which it employs in a categorical syllogism
necessarily attains to the conception of the absolute unity of the
thinking subjecthow the logical procedure in hypothetical ideas
necessarily produces the idea of the absolutely unconditioned in a
series of given conditions and finallyhow the mere form of the
disjunctive syllogism involves the highest conception of a being of
all beings a thought which at first sight seems in the highest degree
paradoxical
An objective deduction such as we were able to present in the case of
the categories is impossible as regards these transcendental ideas For
they have in truth no relation to any object in experience for the
very reason that they are only ideas But a subjective deduction of them
from the nature of our reason is possible and has been given in the
present chapter
It is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason is the absolute
totality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions and that it
does not concern itself with the absolute completeness on the Part of
the conditioned For of the former alone does she stand in need in
order to preposit the whole series of conditions and thus present them
to the understanding a priori But if we once have a completely and
unconditionally given condition there is no further necessity
in proceeding with the series for a conception of reason for the
understanding takes of itself every step downward from the condition
to the conditioned Thus the transcendental ideas are available only for
ascending in the series of conditions till we reach the unconditioned
that is principles As regards descending to the conditioned on the
other hand we find that there is a widely extensive logical use which
reason makes of the laws of the understanding but that a transcendental
use thereof is impossible and that when we form an idea of the absolute
totality of such a synthesis for example of the whole series of
all future changes in the world this idea is a mere ens rationis an
arbitrary fiction of thought and not a necessary presupposition of
reason For the possibility of the conditioned presupposes the totality
of its conditions but not of its consequences Consequently this
conception is not a transcendental ideaand it is with these alone that
we are at present occupied
Finally it is obvious that there exists among the transcendental ideas
a certain connection and unity and that pure reason by means of them
collects all its cognitions into one system From the cognition of self
to the cognition of the world and through these to the supreme being
the progression is so natural that it seems to resemble the logical
march of reason from the premises to the conclusion Now whether there
lies unobserved at the foundation of these ideas an analogy of the
same kind as exists between the logical and transcendental procedure of
reason is another of those questions the answer to which we must not
expect till we arrive at a more advanced stage in our inquiries In this
cursory and preliminary view we have meanwhile reached our aim For
we have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcendental
conceptions of reason from their being commonly mixed up with
other conceptions in the systems of philosophers and not properly
distinguished from the conceptions of the understanding we have exposed
their origin and thereby at the same time their determinate number
and presented them in a systematic connection and have thus marked out
and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason
It may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is
something of which we have no conception although the idea may be a
necessary product of reason according to its original laws For in
fact a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given
by reason is impossible For such an object must be capable of being
presented and intuited in a Possible experience But we should express
our meaning better and with less risk of being misunderstood if
we said that we can have no knowledge of an object which perfectly
corresponds to an idea although we may possess a problematical
conception thereof
Now the transcendental subjective reality at least of the pure
conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas
by a necessary procedure of reason There must therefore be syllogisms
which contain no empirical premises and by means of which we conclude
from something that we do know to something of which we do not even
possess a conception to which we nevertheless by an unavoidable
illusion ascribe objective reality Such arguments are as regards
their result rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms although
indeed as regards their origin they are very well entitled to the
latter name inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of
reason but are necessitated by its very nature They are sophisms not
of men but of pure reason herself from which the Wisest cannot free
himself After long labour he may be able to guard against the error
but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually
mocks and misleads him
Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds corresponding to
the number of the ideas which their conclusions present In the argument
or syllogism of the first class I conclude from the transcendental
conception of the subject contains no manifold the absolute unity
of the subject itself of which I cannot in this manner attain to a
conception This dialectical argument I shall call the transcendental
paralogism The second class of sophistical arguments is occupied with
the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of
conditions for a given phenomenon and I conclude from the fact that
I have always a selfcontradictory conception of the unconditioned
synthetical unity of the series upon one side the truth of the opposite
unity of which I have nevertheless no conception The condition of
reason in these dialectical arguments I shall term the antinomy of pure
reason Finally according to the third kind of sophistical argument
I conclude from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in
general in so far as they can be given the absolute synthetical unity
of all conditions of the possibility of things in general that is from
things which I do not know in their mere transcendental conception I
conclude a being of all beings which I know still less by means of a
transcendental conception and of whose unconditioned necessity I can
form no conception whatever This dialectical argument I shall call the
ideal of pure reason
The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect
of its form be the content what it may But a transcendental paralogism
has a transcendental foundation and concludes falsely while the form
is correct and unexceptionable In this manner the paralogism has
its foundation in the nature of human reason and is the parent of an
unavoidable though not insoluble mental illusion
We now come to a conception which was not inserted in the general list
of transcendental conceptions and yet must be reckoned with them
but at the same time without in the least altering or indicating a
deficiency in that table This is the conception or if the term is
preferred the judgement I think But it is readily perceived that
this thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general
and consequently of transcendental conceptions also and that it is
therefore regarded as a transcendental conception although it can
have no peculiar claim to be so ranked inasmuch as its only use is to
indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness At the same
time pure as this conception is from empirical content impressions
of the senses it enables us to distinguish two different kinds of
objects I as thinking am an object of the internal sense and am
called soul That which is an object of the external senses is called
body Thus the expression I as a thinking being designates the
objectmatter of psychology which may be called the rational doctrine
of the soul inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of
the soul but what independently of all experience which determines me
in concreto may be concluded from this conception I in so far as it
appears in all thought
Now the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of
this kind For if the smallest empirical element of thought if any
particular perception of my internal state were to be introduced among
the grounds of cognition of this science it would not be a rational
but an empirical doctrine of the soul We have thus before us a
pretended science raised upon the single proposition I think whose
foundation or want of foundation we may very properly and agreeably
with the nature of a transcendental philosophy here examine It
ought not to be objected that in this proposition which expresses the
perception of ones self an internal experience is asserted and that
consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon it
is not pure but partly founded upon an empirical principle For this
internal perception is nothing more than the mere apperception I
think which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible
in which we say I think substance cause etc For internal
experience in general and its possibility or perception in general and
its relation to other perceptions unless some particular distinction
or determination thereof is empirically given cannot be regarded as
empirical cognition but as cognition of the empirical and belongs
to the investigation of the possibility of every experience which
is certainly transcendental The smallest object of experience for
example only pleasure or pain that should be included in the general
representation of selfconsciousness would immediately change the
rational into an empirical psychology
I think is therefore the only text of rational psychology from which
it must develop its whole system It is manifest that this thought when
applied to an object myself can contain nothing but transcendental
predicates thereof because the least empirical predicate would destroy
the purity of the science and its independence of all experience
But we shall have to follow here the guidance of the categoriesonly
as in the present case a thing I as thinking being is at first
given we shallnot indeed change the order of the categories as it
stands in the tablebut begin at the category of substance by which at
the a thing in itself is represented and proceeds backwards through
the series The topic of the rational doctrine of the soul from which
everything else it may contain must be deduced is accordingly as
follows
1 2
The Soul is SUBSTANCE As regards its quality
it is SIMPLE
3
As regards the different
times in which it exists
it is numerically identical
that is UNITY not Plurality
4
It is in relation to possible objects in space
From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology
by combination alone without the aid of any other principle This
substance merely as an object of the internal sense gives
the conception of Immateriality as simple substance that of
Incorruptibility its identity as intellectual substance gives the
conception of Personality all these three together Spirituality
Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection
commercium with bodies Thus it represents thinking substance as the
principle of life in matter that is as a soul anima and as the
ground of Animality and this limited and determined by the conception
of spirituality gives us that of Immortality
Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental
psychology which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason
touching the nature of our thinking being We can however lay at
the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself
perfectly contentless representation I which cannot even be called
a conception but merely a consciousness which accompanies all
conceptions By this I or He or It who or which thinks nothing
more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought x which
is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates and
of which apart from these we cannot form the least conception Hence
in a perpetual circle inasmuch as we must always employ it in order
to frame any judgement respecting it And this inconvenience we find it
impossible to rid ourselves of because consciousness in itself is not
so much a representation distinguishing a particular object as a form
of representation in general in so far as it may be termed cognition
for in and by cognition alone do I think anything
It must however appear extraordinary at first sight that the condition
under which I think and which is consequently a property of my subject
should be held to be likewise valid for every existence which thinks
and that we can presume to base upon a seemingly empirical proposition
a judgement which is apodictic and universal to wit that everything
which thinks is constituted as the voice of my consciousness declares it
to be that is as a selfconscious being The cause of this belief is
to be found in the fact that we necessarily attribute to things a priori
all the properties which constitute conditions under which alone we
can cogitate them Now I cannot obtain the least representation of
a thinking being by means of external experience but solely through
selfconsciousness Such objects are consequently nothing more than the
transference of this consciousness of mine to other things which can
only thus be represented as thinking beings The proposition I think
is in the present case understood in a problematical sense not in
so far as it contains a perception of an existence like the Cartesian
Cogito ergo sum but in regard
to its mere possibilityfor the purpose of discovering what properties
may be inferred from so simple a proposition and predicated of the
subject of it
If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of thinking beings
there lay more than the mere Cogitoif we could likewise call in aid
observations on the play of our thoughts and the thence derived natural
laws of the thinking self there would arise an empirical psychology
which would be a kind of physiology of the internal sense and might
possibly be capable of explaining the phenomena of that sense But it
could never be available for discovering those properties which do not
belong to possible experience such as the quality of simplicity
nor could it make any apodictic enunciation on the nature of thinking
beings it would therefore not be a rational psychology
Now as the proposition I think in the problematical sense contains
the form of every judgement in general and is the constant accompaniment
of all the categories it is manifest that conclusions are drawn from
it only by a transcendental employment of the understanding This use of
the understanding excludes all empirical elements and we cannot as
has been shown above have any favourable conception beforehand of
its procedure We shall therefore follow with a critical eye this
proposition through all the predicaments of pure psychology but we
shall for brevitys sake allow this examination to proceed in an
uninterrupted connection
Before entering on this task however the following general remark may
help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument It is not
merely through my thinking that I cognize an object but only through my
determining a given intuition in relation to the unity of consciousness
in which all thinking consists It follows that I cognize myself not
through my being conscious of myself as thinking but only when I am
conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in relation to the
function of thought All the modi of selfconsciousness in thought
are hence not conceptions of objects conceptions of the
understandingcategories they are mere logical functions which do
not present to thought an object to be cognized and cannot therefore
present my Self as an object Not the consciousness of the determining
but only that of the determinable self that is of my internal
intuition in so far as the manifold contained in it can be connected
conformably with the general condition of the unity of apperception in
thought is the object
In all judgements I am the determining subject of that relation which
constitutes a judgement But that the I which thinks must be considered
as in thought always a subject and as a thing which cannot be a
predicate to thought is an apodictic and identical proposition But
this proposition does not signify that I as an object am for
myself a selfsubsistent being or substance This latter
statementan ambitious onerequires to be supported by data which are
not to be discovered in thought and are perhaps in so far as I
consider the thinking self merely as such not to be discovered in the
thinking self at all
That the I or Ego of apperception and consequently in all thought
is singular or simple and cannot be resolved into a plurality of
subjects and therefore indicates a logically simple subjectthis is
selfevident from the very conception of an Ego and is consequently an
analytical proposition But this is not tantamount to declaring that
the thinking Ego is a simple substancefor this would be a synthetical
proposition The conception of substance always relates to intuitions
which with me cannot be other than sensuous and which consequently lie
completely out of the sphere of the understanding and its thought
but to this sphere belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple
in thought It would indeed be surprising if the conception of
substance which in other cases requires so much labour to distinguish
from the other elements presented by intuitionso much trouble too
to discover whether it can be simple as in the case of the parts of
mattershould be presented immediately to me as if by revelation in
the poorest mental representation of all
The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold
representations of which I am conscious is likewise a proposition lying
in the conceptions themselves and is consequently analytical But
this identity of the subject of which I am conscious in all its
representations does not relate to or concern the intuition of the
subject by which it is given as an object This proposition cannot
therefore enounce the identity of the person by which is understood the
consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being
in all change and variation of circumstances To prove this we
should require not a mere analysis of the proposition but synthetical
judgements based upon a given intuition
I distinguish my own existence as that of a thinking being from
that of other things external to meamong which my body also is
reckoned This is also an analytical proposition for other things are
exactly those which I think as different or distinguished from myself
But whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things
external to me and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking
being without being mancannot be known or inferred from this
proposition
Thus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition of myself as
object by the analysis of the consciousness of my Self in thought The
logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a metaphysical
determination of the object
Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous if there
existed a possibility of proving a priori that all thinking beings
are in themselves simple substances as such therefore possess
the inseparable attribute of personality and are conscious of their
existence apart from and unconnected with matter For we should thus
have taken a step beyond the world of sense and have penetrated into
the sphere of noumena and in this case the right could not be denied
us of extending our knowledge in this sphere of establishing ourselves
and under a favouring star appropriating to ourselves possessions
in it For the proposition Every thinking being as such is simple
substance is an a priori synthetical proposition because in the first
place it goes beyond the conception which is the subject of it and adds
to the mere notion of a thinking being the mode of its existence and in
the second place annexes a predicate that of simplicity to the latter
conceptiona predicate which it could not have discovered in the sphere
of experience It would follow that a priori synthetical propositions
are possible and legitimate not only as we have maintained in
relation to objects of possible experience and as principles of the
possibility of this experience itself but are applicable to things
in themselvesan inference which makes an end of the whole of this
Critique and obliges us to fall back on the old mode of metaphysical
procedure But indeed the danger is not so great if we look a little
closer into the question
There lurks in the procedure of rational Psychology a paralogism which
is represented in the following syllogism
That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject does not exist
otherwise than as subject and is therefore substance
A thinking being considered merely as such cannot be cogitated
otherwise than as subject
Therefore it exists also as such that is as substance
In the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated generally and in
every relation consequently as it may be given in intuition But in the
minor we speak of the same being only in so far as it regards itself as
subject relatively to thought and the unity of consciousness but
not in relation to intuition by which it is presented as an object to
thought Thus the conclusion is here arrived at by a Sophisma figurae
dictionis
That this famous argument is a mere paralogism will be plain to any one
who will consider the general remark which precedes our exposition of
the principles of the pure understanding and the section on noumena
For it was there proved that the conception of a thing which can
exist per seonly as a subject and never as a predicate possesses
no objective reality that is to say we can never know whether there
exists any object to correspond to the conception consequently the
conception is nothing more than a conception and from it we derive
no proper knowledge If this conception is to indicate by the term
substance an object that can be given if it is to become a cognition
we must have at the foundation of the cognition a permanent intuition
as the indispensable condition of its objective reality For through
intuition alone can an object be given But in internal intuition
there is nothing permanent for the Ego is but the consciousness of my
thought If then we appeal merely to thought we cannot discover
the necessary condition of the application of the conception of
substancethat is of a subject existing per seto the subject as
a thinking being And thus the conception of the simple nature of
substance which is connected with the objective reality of this
conception is shown to be also invalid and to be in fact nothing
more than the logical qualitative unity of selfconsciousness in
thought whilst we remain perfectly ignorant whether the subject is
composite or not
Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Substantiality or
Permanence of the Soul
This acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the common
argument which attempts to prove that the soulit being granted that it
is a simple beingcannot perish by dissolution or decomposition he
saw it is not impossible for it to cease to be by extinction or
disappearance He endeavoured to prove in his Phaedo that the soul
cannot be annihilated by showing that a simple being cannot cease to
exist Inasmuch as he said a simple existence cannot diminish nor
gradually lose portions of its being and thus be by degrees reduced
to nothing for it possesses no parts and therefore no multiplicity
between the moment in which it is and the moment in which it is not
no time can be discoveredwhich is impossible But this philosopher
did not consider that granting the soul to possess this simple nature
which contains no parts external to each other and consequently no
extensive quantity we cannot refuse to it any less than to any other
being intensive quantity that is a degree of reality in regard to
all its faculties nay to all that constitutes its existence But this
degree of reality can become less and less through an infinite series
of smaller degrees It follows therefore that this supposed
substancethis thing the permanence of which is not assured in any
other way may if not by decomposition by gradual loss remissio
of its powers consequently by elanguescence if I may employ this
expression be changed into nothing For consciousness itself has
always a degree which may be lessened Consequently the faculty of
being conscious may be diminished and so with all other faculties The
permanence of the soul therefore as an object of the internal sense
remains undemonstrated nay even indemonstrable Its permanence in
life is evident per se inasmuch as the thinking being as man is to
itself at the same time an object of the external senses But this
does not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm from mere
conceptions its permanence beyond life2
If now we take the above propositionsas they must be accepted as
valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychologyin
synthetical connection and proceed from the category of relation
with the proposition All thinking beings are as such substances
backwards through the series till the circle is completed we come
at last to their existence of which in this system of rational
psychology substances are held to be conscious independently of
external things nay it is asserted that in relation to the permanence
which is a necessary characteristic of substance they can of
themselves determine external things It follows that idealismat least
problematical idealism is perfectly unavoidable in this rationalistic
system And if the existence of outward things is not held to be
requisite to the determination of the existence of a substance in time
the existence of these outward things at all is a gratuitous assumption
which remains without the possibility of a proof
But if we proceed analyticallythe I think as a proposition
containing in itself an existence as given consequently modality being
the principleand dissect this proposition in order to ascertain its
content and discover whether and how this Ego determines its existence
in time and space without the aid of anything external the propositions
of rationalistic psychology would not begin with the conception of a
thinking being but with a reality and the properties of a thinking
being in general would be deduced from the mode in which this reality is
cogitated after everything empirical had been abstracted as is shown
in the following table
1
I think
2 3
as Subject as simple Subject
4
as identical Subject
in every state of my thought
Now inasmuch as it is not determined in this second proposition
whether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject and not also as a
predicate of another being the conception of a subject is here taken in
a merely logical sense and it remains undetermined whether substance
is to be cogitated under the conception or not But in the third
proposition the absolute unity of apperceptionthe simple Ego in the
representation to which all connection and separation which constitute
thought relate is of itself important even although it presents
us with no information about the constitution or subsistence of the
subject Apperception is something real and the simplicity of its
nature is given in the very fact of its possibility Now in space there
is nothing real that is at the same time simple for points which are
the only simple things in space are merely limits but not constituent
parts of space From this follows the impossibility of a definition
on the basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as a merely
thinking subject But because my existence is considered in the first
proposition as given for it does not mean Every thinking being
exists for this would be predicating of them absolute necessity
but only I exist thinking the proposition is quite empirical and
contains the determinability of my existence merely in relation to my
representations in time But as I require for this purpose something
that is permanent such as is not given in internal intuition the
mode of my existence whether as substance or as accident cannot
be determined by means of this simple selfconsciousness Thus
if materialism is inadequate to explain the mode in which I exist
spiritualism is likewise as insufficient and the conclusion is that we
are utterly unable to attain to any knowledge of the constitution of
the soul in so far as relates to the possibility of its existence apart
from external objects
And indeed how should it be possible merely by the aid of the unity
of consciousnesswhich we cognize only for the reason that it is
indispensable to the possibility of experienceto pass the bounds of
experience our existence in this life and to extend our cognition
to the nature of all thinking beings by means of the empiricalbut
in relation to every sort of intuition perfectly undeterminedproposition
I think
There does not then exist any rational psychology as a doctrine
furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves It is nothing
more than a discipline which sets impassable limits to speculative
reason in this region of thought to prevent it on the one hand from
throwing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism and on the
other from losing itself in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism
It teaches us to consider this refusal of our reason to give any
satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this
our human life as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation and to
direct to a practical use our knowledge of ourselveswhich although
applicable only to objects of experience receives its principles from a
higher source and regulates its procedure as if our destiny reached far
beyond the boundaries of experience and life
From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in
a mere misunderstanding The unity of consciousness which lies at the
basis of the categories is considered to be an intuition of the subject
as an object and the category of substance is applied to the intuition
But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought by which no
object is given to which therefore the category of substancewhich
always presupposes a given intuitioncannot be applied Consequently
the subject cannot be cognized The subject of the categories cannot
therefore for the very reason that it cogitates these frame any
conception of itself as an object of the categories for to
cogitate these it must lay at the foundation its own pure
selfconsciousnessthe very thing that it wishes to explain and
describe In like manner the subject in which the representation of
time has its basis cannot determine for this very reason its own
existence in time Now if the latter is impossible the former as an
attempt to determine itself by means of the categories as a thinking
being in general is no less so
Thus then appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a cognition
which is to extend its rule beyond the limits of experiencea cognition
which is one of the highest interests of humanity and thus is proved
the futility of the attempt of speculative philosophy in this region of
thought But in this interest of thought the severity of criticism has
rendered to reason a not unimportant service by the demonstration of
the impossibility of making any dogmatical affirmation concerning an
object of experience beyond the boundaries of experience She has thus
fortified reason against all affirmations of the contrary Now this can
be accomplished in only two ways Either our proposition must be
proved apodeictically or if this is unsuccessful the sources of this
inability must be sought for and if these are discovered to exist in
the natural and necessary limitation of our reason our opponents must
submit to the same law of renunciation and refrain from advancing claims
to dogmatic assertion
But the right say rather the necessity to admit a future life upon
principles of the practical conjoined with the speculative use
of reason has lost nothing by this renunciation for the merely
speculative proof has never had any influence upon the common reason of
men It stands upon the point of a hair so that even the schools have
been able to preserve it from falling only by incessantly discussing
it and spinning it like a top and even in their eyes it has never been
able to present any safe foundation for the erection of a theory
The proofs which have been current among men preserve their value
undiminished nay rather gain in clearness and unsophisticated power
by the rejection of the dogmatical assumptions of speculative reason
For reason is thus confined within her own peculiar provincethe
arrangement of ends or aims which is at the same time the arrangement
of nature and as a practical faculty without limiting itself to the
latter it is justified in extending the former and with it our own
existence beyond the boundaries of experience and life If we turn our
attention to the analogy of the nature of living beings in this world
in the consideration of which reason is obliged to accept as a principle
that no organ no faculty no appetite is useless and that nothing is
superfluous nothing disproportionate to its use nothing unsuited to
its end but that on the contrary everything is perfectly conformed to
its destination in lifewe shall find that man who alone is the final
end and aim of this order is still the only animal that seems to be
excepted from it For his natural giftsnot merely as regards the
talents and motives that may incite him to employ them but especially
the moral law in himstretch so far beyond all mere earthly utility and
advantage that he feels himself bound to prize the mere consciousness
of probity apart from all advantageous consequenceseven the shadowy
gift of posthumous fameabove everything and he is conscious of an
inward call to constitute himself by his conduct in this worldwithout
regard to mere sublunary intereststhe citizen of a better This
mighty irresistible proofaccompanied by an everincreasing knowledge
of the conformability to a purpose in everything we see around us
by the conviction of the boundless immensity of creation by the
consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the possible extension
of our knowledge and by a desire commensurate therewithremains to
humanity even after the theoretical cognition of ourselves has failed
to establish the necessity of an existence after death
The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our
confounding an idea of reason of a pure intelligence with the
conceptionin every respect undeterminedof a thinking being in
general I cogitate myself in behalf of a possible experience at
the same time making abstraction of all actual experience and infer
therefrom that I can be conscious of myself apart from experience
and its empirical conditions I consequently confound the possible
abstraction of my empirically determined existence with the supposed
consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self
and I believe that I cognize what is substantial in myself as a
transcendental subject when I have nothing more in thought than the
unity of consciousness which lies at the basis of all determination of
cognition
The task of explaining the community of the soul with the body does not
properly belong to the psychology of which we are here speaking
because it proposes to prove the personality of the soul apart from this
communion after death and is therefore transcendent in the proper
sense of the word although occupying itself with an object of
experienceonly in so far however as it ceases to be an object of
experience But a sufficient answer may be found to the question in
our system The difficulty which lies in the execution of this task
consists as is well known in the presupposed heterogeneity of the
object of the internal sense the soul and the objects of the external
senses inasmuch as the formal condition of the intuition of the one is
time and of that of the other space also But if we consider that both
kinds of objects do not differ internally but only in so far as the
one appears externally to the otherconsequently that what lies at the
basis of phenomena as a thing in itself may not be heterogeneous this
difficulty disappears There then remains no other difficulty than is to
be found in the questionhow a community of substances is possible
a question which lies out of the region of psychology and which the
reader after what in our analytic has been said of primitive forces
and faculties will easily judge to be also beyond the region of human
cognition
The proposition I think or I exist thinking is an empirical
proposition But such a proposition must be based on empirical
intuition and the object cogitated as a phenomenon and thus our
theory appears to maintain that the soul even in thought is merely
a phenomenon and in this way our consciousness itself in fact abuts
upon nothing
Thought per se is merely the purely spontaneous logical function which
operates to connect the manifold of a possible intuition and it does
not represent the subject of consciousness as a phenomenonfor this
reason alone that it pays no attention to the question whether the
mode of intuiting it is sensuous or intellectual I therefore do not
represent myself in thought either as I am or as I appear to myself I
merely cogitate myself as an object in general of the mode of intuiting
which I make abstraction When I represent myself as the subject of
thought or as the ground of thought these modes of representation are
not related to the categories of substance or of cause for these are
functions of thought applicable only to our sensuous intuition The
application of these categories to the Ego would however be necessary
if I wished to make myself an object of knowledge But I wish to be
conscious of myself only as thinking in what mode my Self is given
in intuition I do not consider and it may be that I who think am a
phenomenonalthough not in so far as I am a thinking being but in
the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am a being though this
consciousness does not present to me any property of this being as
material for thought
But the proposition I think in so far as it declares I exist
thinking is not the mere representation of a logical function
It determines the subject which is in this case an object also in
relation to existence and it cannot be given without the aid of the
internal sense whose intuition presents to us an object not as a thing
in itself but always as a phenomenon In this proposition there is
therefore something more to be found than the mere spontaneity of
thought there is also the receptivity of intuition that is my thought
of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself Now in this
intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions of the employment
of its logical functions as categories of substance cause and so
forth not merely for the purpose of distinguishing itself as an object
in itself by means of the representation I but also for the purpose
of determining the mode of its existence that is of cognizing
itself as noumenon But this is impossible for the internal empirical
intuition is sensuous and presents us with nothing but phenomenal data
which do not assist the object of pure consciousness in its attempt
to cognize itself as a separate existence but are useful only as
contributions to experience
But let it be granted that we could discover not in experience but in
certain firmlyestablished a priori laws of the use of pure reasonlaws
relating to our existence authority to consider ourselves as
legislating a priori in relation to our own existence and as determining
this existence we should on this supposition find ourselves possessed
of a spontaneity by which our actual existence would be determinable
without the aid of the conditions of empirical intuition We should also
become aware that in the consciousness of our existence there was an
a priori content which would serve to determine our own existencean
existence only sensuously determinablerelatively however to a
certain internal faculty in relation to an intelligible world
But this would not give the least help to the attempts of rational
psychology For this wonderful faculty which the consciousness of
the moral law in me reveals would present me with a principle of the
determination of my own existence which is purely intellectualbut by
what predicates By none other than those which are given in sensuous
intuition Thus I should find myself in the same position in rational
psychology which I formerly occupied that is to say I should
find myself still in need of sensuous intuitions in order to give
significance to my conceptions of substance and cause by means of which
alone I can possess a knowledge of myself but these intuitions can
never raise me above the sphere of experience I should be justified
however in applying these conceptions in regard to their practical
use which is always directed to objects of experiencein conformity
with their analogical significance when employed theoreticallyto
freedom and its subject At the same time I should understand by them
merely the logical functions of subject and predicate of principle and
consequence in conformity with which all actions are so determined
that they are capable of being explained along with the laws of nature
conformably to the categories of substance and cause although
they originate from a very different principle We have made these
observations for the purpose of guarding against misunderstanding to
which the doctrine of our intuition of self as a phenomenon is exposed
We shall have occasion to perceive their utility in the sequel
We showed in the introduction to this part of our work that all
transcendental illusion of pure reason arose from dialectical arguments
the schema of which logic gives us in its three formal species of
syllogismsjust as the categories find their logical schema in the
four functions of all judgements The first kind of these sophistical
arguments related to the unconditioned unity of the subjective
conditions of all representations in general of the subject or soul
in correspondence with the categorical syllogisms the major of which
as the principle enounces the relation of a predicate to a subject
The second kind of dialectical argument will therefore be concerned
following the analogy with hypothetical syllogisms with the
unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the phenomenon
and in this way the theme of the third kind to be treated of in the
following chapter will be the unconditioned unity of the objective
conditions of the possibility of objects in general
But it is worthy of remark that the transcendental paralogism produced
in the mind only a onethird illusion in regard to the idea of the
subject of our thought and the conceptions of reason gave no ground to
maintain the contrary proposition The advantage is completely on the
side of Pneumatism although this theory itself passes into naught in
the crucible of pure reason
Very different is the case when we apply reason to the objective
synthesis of phenomena Here certainly reason establishes with much
plausibility its principle of unconditioned unity but it very soon
falls into such contradictions that it is compelled in relation to
cosmology to renounce its pretensions
For here a new phenomenon of human reason meets usa perfectly natural
antithetic which does not require to be sought for by subtle sophistry
but into which reason of itself unavoidably falls It is thereby
preserved to be sure from the slumber of a fancied convictionwhich
a merely onesided illusion produces but it is at the same time
compelled either on the one hand to abandon itself to a despairing
scepticism or on the other to assume a dogmatical confidence and
obstinate persistence in certain assertions without granting a fair
hearing to the other side of the question Either is the death of a
sound philosophy although the former might perhaps deserve the title of
the euthanasia of pure reason
Before entering this region of discord and confusion which the conflict
of the laws of pure reason antinomy produces we shall present the
reader with some considerations in explanation and justification of the
method we intend to follow in our treatment of this subject I term all
transcendental ideas in so far as they relate to the absolute totality
in the synthesis of phenomena cosmical conceptions partly on
account of this unconditioned totality on which the conception of the
worldwhole is baseda conception which is itself an ideapartly
because they relate solely to the synthesis of phenomenathe empirical
synthesis while on the other hand the absolute totality in the
synthesis of the conditions of all possible things gives rise to
an ideal of pure reason which is quite distinct from the cosmical
conception although it stands in relation with it Hence as the
paralogisms of pure reason laid the foundation for a dialectical
psychology the antinomy of pure reason will present us with the
transcendental principles of a pretended pure rational cosmologynot
however to declare it valid and to appropriate it butas the very
term of a conflict of reason sufficiently indicates to present it as an
idea which cannot be reconciled with phenomena and experience
That We may be able to enumerate with systematic precision these ideas
according to a principle we must remark in the first place that it
is from the understanding alone that pure and transcendental conceptions
take their origin that the reason does not properly give birth to any
conception but only frees the conception of the understanding from the
unavoidable limitation of a possible experience and thus endeavours to
raise it above the empirical though it must still be in connection with
it This happens from the fact that for a given conditioned reason
demands absolute totality on the side of the conditions to which the
understanding submits all phenomena and thus makes of the category a
transcendental idea This it does that it may be able to give absolute
completeness to the empirical synthesis by continuing it to the
unconditioned which is not to be found in experience but only in
the idea Reason requires this according to the principle If the
conditioned is given the whole of the conditions and consequently the
absolutely unconditioned is also given whereby alone the former was
possible First then the transcendental ideas are properly nothing but
categories elevated to the unconditioned and they may be arranged in
a table according to the titles of the latter But secondly all the
categories are not available for this purpose but only those in which
the synthesis constitutes a seriesof conditions subordinated to not
coordinated with each other Absolute totality is required of reason
only in so far as concerns the ascending series of the conditions of
a conditioned not consequently when the question relates to
the descending series of consequences or to the aggregate of the
coordinated conditions of these consequences For in relation to a
given conditioned conditions are presupposed and considered to be given
along with it On the other hand as the consequences do not render
possible their conditions but rather presuppose themin the
consideration of the procession of consequences or in the descent from
the given condition to the conditioned we may be quite unconcerned
whether the series ceases or not and their totality is not a necessary
demand of reason
Thus we cogitateand necessarilya given time completely elapsed up
to a given moment although that time is not determinable by us But
as regards time future which is not the condition of arriving at the
present in order to conceive it it is quite indifferent whether we
consider future time as ceasing at some point or as prolonging itself
to infinity Take for example the series m n o in which n is given
as conditioned in relation to m but at the same time as the condition
of o and let the series proceed upwards from the conditioned n to m l
k i etc and also downwards from the condition n to the conditioned
o p q r etcI must presuppose the former series to be able
to consider n as given and n is according to reason the totality of
conditions possible only by means of that series But its possibility
does not rest on the following series o p q r which for this
reason cannot be regarded as given but only as capable of being given
dabilis
I shall term the synthesis of the series on the side of the
conditionsfrom that nearest to the given phenomenon up to the more
remoteregressive that which proceeds on the side of the conditioned
from the immediate consequence to the more remote I shall call the
progressive synthesis The former proceeds in antecedentia the latter
in consequentia The cosmological ideas are therefore occupied with the
totality of the regressive synthesis and proceed in antecedentia not
in consequentia When the latter takes place it is an arbitrary and
not a necessary problem of pure reason for we require for the complete
understanding of what is given in a phenomenon not the consequences
which succeed but the grounds or principles which precede
In order to construct the table of ideas in correspondence with the
table of categories we take first the two primitive quanta of all our
intuitions time and space Time is in itself a series and the formal
condition of all series and hence in relation to a given present
we must distinguish a priori in it the antecedentia as conditions
time past from the consequentia time future Consequently the
transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of the
conditions of a given conditioned relates merely to all past time
According to the idea of reason the whole past time as the condition
of the given moment is necessarily cogitated as given But as
regards space there exists in it no distinction between progressus and
regressus for it is an aggregate and not a seriesits parts existing
together at the same time I can consider a given point of time in
relation to past time only as conditioned because this given moment
comes into existence only through the past time rather through the
passing of the preceding time But as the parts of space are not
subordinated but coordinated to each other one part cannot be the
condition of the possibility of the other and space is not in itself
like time a series But the synthesis of the manifold parts of
spacethe syntheses whereby we apprehend spaceis nevertheless
successive it takes place therefore in time and contains a series
And as in this series of aggregated spaces for example the feet in a
rood beginning with a given portion of space those which continue
to be annexed form the condition of the limits of the formerthe
measurement of a space must also be regarded as a synthesis of the
series of the conditions of a given conditioned It differs however in
this respect from that of time that the side of the conditioned is
not in itself distinguishable from the side of the condition and
consequently regressus and progressus in space seem to be identical
But inasmuch as one part of space is not given but only limited
by and through another we must also consider every limited space
as conditioned in so far as it presupposes some other space as
the condition of its limitation and so on As regards limitation
therefore our procedure in space is also a regressus and the
transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in a
series of conditions applies to space also and I am entitled to demand
the absolute totality of the phenomenal synthesis in space as well as in
time Whether my demand can be satisfied is a question to be answered in
the sequel
Secondly the real in spacethat is matteris conditioned Its
internal conditions are its parts and the parts of parts its remote
conditions so that in this case we find a regressive synthesis the
absolute totality of which is a demand of reason But this cannot be
obtained otherwise than by a complete division of parts whereby the
real in matter becomes either nothing or that which is not matter
that is to say the simple Consequently we find here also a series of
conditions and a progress to the unconditioned
Thirdly as regards the categories of a real relation between phenomena
the category of substance and its accidents is not suitable for the
formation of a transcendental idea that is to say reason has no
ground in regard to it to proceed regressively with conditions For
accidents in so far as they inhere in a substance are coordinated
with each other and do not constitute a series And in relation to
substance they are not properly subordinated to it but are the mode
of existence of the substance itself The conception of the substantial
might nevertheless seem to be an idea of the transcendental reason
But as this signifies nothing more than the conception of an object
in general which subsists in so far as we cogitate in it merely a
transcendental subject without any predicates and as the question here
is of an unconditioned in the series of phenomenait is clear that
the substantial can form no member thereof The same holds good of
substances in community which are mere aggregates and do not form a
series For they are not subordinated to each other as conditions of the
possibility of each other which however may be affirmed of spaces
the limits of which are never determined in themselves but always by
some other space It is therefore only in the category of causality
that we can find a series of causes to a given effect and in which
we ascend from the latter as the conditioned to the former as the
conditions and thus answer the question of reason
Fourthly the conceptions of the possible the actual and the necessary
do not conduct us to any seriesexcepting only in so far as the
contingent in existence must always be regarded as conditioned and as
indicating according to a law of the understanding a condition under
which it is necessary to rise to a higher till in the totality of the
series reason arrives at unconditioned necessity
There are accordingly only four cosmological ideas corresponding
with the four titles of the categories For we can select only such as
necessarily furnish us with a series in the synthesis of the manifold
1
The absolute Completeness
of the
COMPOSITION
of the given totality of all phenomena
2
The absolute Completeness
of the
DIVISION
of given totality in a phenomenon
3
The absolute Completeness
of the
ORIGINATION
of a phenomenon
4
The absolute Completeness
of the DEPENDENCE of the EXISTENCE
of what is changeable in a phenomenon
We must here remark in the first place that the idea of absolute
totality relates to nothing but the exposition of phenomena and
therefore not to the pure conception of a totality of things Phenomena
are here therefore regarded as given and reason requires the absolute
completeness of the conditions of their possibility in so far as these
conditions constitute a seriesconsequently an absolutely that is in
every respect complete synthesis whereby a phenomenon can be explained
according to the laws of the understanding
Secondly it is properly the unconditioned alone that reason seeks in
this serially and regressively conducted synthesis of conditions It
wishes to speak in another way to attain to completeness in the series
of premises so as to render it unnecessary to presuppose others
This unconditioned is always contained in the absolute totality of the
series when we endeavour to form a representation of it in thought
But this absolutely complete synthesis is itself but an idea for it is
impossible at least beforehand to know whether any such synthesis is
possible in the case of phenomena When we represent all existence in
thought by means of pure conceptions of the understanding without any
conditions of sensuous intuition we may say with justice that for a
given conditioned the whole series of conditions subordinated to each
other is also given for the former is only given through the latter
But we find in the case of phenomena a particular limitation of the mode
in which conditions are given that is through the successive synthesis
of the manifold of intuition which must be complete in the regress Now
whether this completeness is sensuously possible is a problem But the
idea of it lies in the reasonbe it possible or impossible to connect
with the idea adequate empirical conceptions Therefore as in the
absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of the manifold in a
phenomenon following the guidance of the categories which represent it
as a series of conditions to a given conditioned the unconditioned is
necessarily containedit being still left unascertained whether and
how this totality exists reason sets out from the idea of totality
although its proper and final aim is the unconditionedof the whole
series or of a part thereof
This unconditioned may be cogitatedeither as existing only in the
entire series all the members of which therefore would be
without exception conditioned and only the totality absolutely
unconditionedand in this case the regressus is called infinite or
the absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series to which the
other members are subordinated but which Is not itself submitted to
any other condition In the former case the series is a parte priori
unlimited without beginning that is infinite and nevertheless
completely given But the regress in it is never completed and can only
be called potentially infinite In the second case there exists a first
in the series This first is called in relation to past time the
beginning of the world in relation to space the limit of the world in
relation to the parts of a given limited whole the simple in relation
to causes absolute spontaneity liberty and in relation to the
existence of changeable things absolute physical necessity
We possess two expressions world and nature which are generally
interchanged The first denotes the mathematical total of all phenomena
and the totality of their synthesisin its progress by means of
composition as well as by division And the world is termed nature
when it is regarded as a dynamical wholewhen our attention is not
directed to the aggregation in space and time for the purpose of
cogitating it as a quantity but to the unity in the existence of
phenomena In this case the condition of that which happens is called
a cause the unconditioned causality of the cause in a phenomenon is
termed liberty the conditioned cause is called in a more limited sense
a natural cause The conditioned in existence is termed contingent and
the unconditioned necessary The unconditioned necessity of phenomena
may be called natural necessity
The ideas which we are at present engaged in discussing I have called
cosmological ideas partly because by the term world is understood the
entire content of all phenomena and our ideas are directed solely to
the unconditioned among phenomena partly also because world in the
transcendental sense signifies the absolute totality of the content
of existing things and we are directing our attention only to the
completeness of the synthesisalthough properly only in regression
In regard to the fact that these ideas are all transcendent and
although they do not transcend phenomena as regards their mode but
are concerned solely with the world of sense and not with noumena
nevertheless carry their synthesis to a degree far above all possible
experienceit still seems to me that we can with perfect propriety
designate them cosmical conceptions As regards the distinction between
the mathematically and the dynamically unconditioned which is the aim of
the regression of the synthesis I should call the two former in a
more limited signification cosmical conceptions the remaining two
transcendent physical conceptions This distinction does not at present
seem to be of particular importance but we shall afterwards find it to
be of some value
Thetic is the term applied to every collection of dogmatical
propositions By antithetic I do not understand dogmatical assertions
of the opposite but the selfcontradiction of seemingly dogmatical
cognitions thesis cum antithesis in none of which we can discover
any decided superiority Antithetic is not therefore occupied with
onesided statements but is engaged in considering the contradictory
nature of the general cognitions of reason and its causes
Transcendental antithetic is an investigation into the antinomy of pure
reason its causes and result If we employ our reason not merely in
the application of the principles of the understanding to objects of
experience but venture with it beyond these boundaries there arise
certain sophistical propositions or theorems These assertions have
the following peculiarities They can find neither confirmation
nor confutation in experience and each is in itself not only
selfconsistent but possesses conditions of its necessity in the very
nature of reasononly that unluckily there exist just as valid and
necessary grounds for maintaining the contrary proposition
The questions which naturally arise in the consideration of this
dialectic of pure reason are therefore 1st In what propositions is
pure reason unavoidably subject to an antinomy 2nd What are the causes
of this antinomy 3rd Whether and in what way can reason free itself
from this selfcontradiction
A dialectical proposition or theorem of pure reason must according
to what has been said be distinguishable from all sophistical
propositions by the fact that it is not an answer to an arbitrary
question which may be raised at the mere pleasure of any person but
to one which human reason must necessarily encounter in its progress In
the second place a dialectical proposition with its opposite does not
carry the appearance of a merely artificial illusion which disappears
as soon as it is investigated but a natural and unavoidable illusion
which even when we are no longer deceived by it continues to mock us
and although rendered harmless can never be completely removed
This dialectical doctrine will not relate to the unity of understanding
in empirical conceptions but to the unity of reason in pure ideas The
conditions of this doctrine areinasmuch as it must as a synthesis
according to rules be conformable to the understanding and at the same
time as the absolute unity of the synthesis to the reasonthat if
it is adequate to the unity of reason it is too great for the
understanding if according with the understanding it is too small for
the reason Hence arises a mutual opposition which cannot be avoided
do what we will
These sophistical assertions of dialectic open as it were a
battlefield where that side obtains the victory which has been
permitted to make the attack and he is compelled to yield who has been
unfortunately obliged to stand on the defensive And hence champions of
ability whether on the right or on the wrong side are certain to carry
away the crown of victory if they only take care to have the right to
make the last attack and are not obliged to sustain another onset from
their opponent We can easily believe that this arena has been often
trampled by the feet of combatants that many victories have been
obtained on both sides but that the last victory decisive of the
affair between the contending parties was won by him who fought for the
right only if his adversary was forbidden to continue the tourney As
impartial umpires we must lay aside entirely the consideration whether
the combatants are fighting for the right or for the wrong side for
the true or for the false and allow the combat to be first decided
Perhaps after they have wearied more than injured each other they
will discover the nothingness of their cause of quarrel and part good
friends
This method of watching or rather of originating a conflict of
assertions not for the purpose of finally deciding in favour of either
side but to discover whether the object of the struggle is not a mere
illusion which each strives in vain to reach but which would be
no gain even when reachedthis procedure I say may be termed the
sceptical method It is thoroughly distinct from scepticismthe
principle of a technical and scientific ignorance which undermines
the foundations of all knowledge in order if possible to destroy
our belief and confidence therein For the sceptical method aims at
certainty by endeavouring to discover in a conflict of this kind
conducted honestly and intelligently on both sides the point
of misunderstanding just as wise legislators derive from the
embarrassment of judges in lawsuits information in regard to the
defective and illdefined parts of their statutes The antinomy which
reveals itself in the application of laws is for our limited wisdom
the best criterion of legislation For the attention of reason which in
abstract speculation does not easily become conscious of its errors is
thus roused to the momenta in the determination of its principles
But this sceptical method is essentially peculiar to transcendental
philosophy and can perhaps be dispensed with in every other field of
investigation In mathematics its use would be absurd because in it no
false assertions can long remain hidden inasmuch as its demonstrations
must always proceed under the guidance of pure intuition and by means
of an always evident synthesis In experimental philosophy doubt and
delay may be very useful but no misunderstanding is possible which
cannot be easily removed and in experience means of solving the
difficulty and putting an end to the dissension must at last be found
whether sooner or later Moral philosophy can always exhibit its
principles with their practical consequences in concretoat least in
possible experiences and thus escape the mistakes and ambiguities of
abstraction But transcendental propositions which lay claim to insight
beyond the region of possible experience cannot on the one hand
exhibit their abstract synthesis in any a priori intuition nor on the
other expose a lurking error by the help of experience Transcendental
reason therefore presents us with no other criterion than that of an
attempt to reconcile such assertions and for this purpose to permit a
free and unrestrained conflict between them And this we now proceed to
arrange
The world has a beginning in time and is also limited in regard to
space
Granted that the world has no beginning in time up to every given
moment of time an eternity must have elapsed and therewith passed away
an infinite series of successive conditions or states of things in the
world Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it never
can be completed by means of a successive synthesis It follows that an
infinite series already elapsed is impossible and that consequently
a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence And
this was the first thing to be proved
As regards the second let us take the opposite for granted In this
case the world must be an infinite given total of coexistent things
Now we cannot cogitate the dimensions of a quantity which is not given
within certain limits of an intuition in any other way than by means
of the synthesis of its parts and the total of such a quantity only
by means of a completed synthesis or the repeated addition of unity to
itself Accordingly to cogitate the world which fills all spaces as
a whole the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world must
be looked upon as completed that is to say an infinite time must be
regarded as having elapsed in the enumeration of all coexisting things
which is impossible For this reason an infinite aggregate of actual
things cannot be considered as a given whole consequently not as a
contemporaneously given whole The world is consequently as regards
extension in space not infinite but enclosed in limits And this was
the second thing to be proved
The world has no beginning and no limits in space but is in relation
both to time and space infinite
For let it be granted that it has a beginning A beginning is an
existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing does not exist
On the above supposition it follows that there must have been a time in
which the world did not exist that is a void time But in a void time
the origination of a thing is impossible because no part of any such
time contains a distinctive condition of being in preference to that of
nonbeing whether the supposed thing originate of itself or by means
of some other cause Consequently many series of things may have a
beginning in the world but the world itself cannot have a beginning
and is therefore in relation to past time infinite
As regards the second statement let us first take the opposite for
grantedthat the world is finite and limited in space it follows that
it must exist in a void space which is not limited We should therefore
meet not only with a relation of things in space but also a relation
of things to space Now as the world is an absolute whole out of and
beyond which no object of intuition and consequently no correlate to
which can be discovered this relation of the world to a void space is
merely a relation to no object But such a relation and consequently
the limitation of the world by void space is nothing Consequently
the world as regards space is not limited that is it is infinite in
regard to extension
In bringing forward these conflicting arguments I have not been on
the search for sophisms for the purpose of availing myself of special
pleading which takes advantage of the carelessness of the opposite
party appeals to a misunderstood statute and erects its unrighteous
claims upon an unfair interpretation Both proofs originate fairly from
the nature of the case and the advantage presented by the mistakes of
the dogmatists of both parties has been completely set aside
The thesis might also have been unfairly demonstrated by the
introduction of an erroneous conception of the infinity of a given
quantity A quantity is infinite if a greater than itself cannot
possibly exist The quantity is measured by the number of given
unitswhich are taken as a standardcontained in it Now no number can
be the greatest because one or more units can always be added It follows
that an infinite given quantity consequently an infinite world both as
regards time and extension is impossible It is therefore limited in
both respects In this manner I might have conducted my proof but the
conception given in it does not agree with the true conception of an
infinite whole In this there is no representation of its quantity
it is not said how large it is consequently its conception is not the
conception of a maximum We cogitate in it merely its relation to an
arbitrarily assumed unit in relation to which it is greater than any
number Now just as the unit which is taken is greater or smaller the
infinite will be greater or smaller but the infinity which consists
merely in the relation to this given unit must remain always the same
although the absolute quantity of the whole is not thereby cognized
The true transcendental conception of infinity is that the successive
synthesis of unity in the measurement of a given quantum can never be
completed Hence it follows without possibility of mistake that an
eternity of actual successive states up to a given the present moment
cannot have elapsed and that the world must therefore have a beginning
In regard to the second part of the thesis the difficulty as to an
infinite and yet elapsed series disappears for the manifold of a world
infinite in extension is contemporaneously given But in order to
cogitate the total of this manifold as we cannot have the aid of limits
constituting by themselves this total in intuition we are obliged to
give some account of our conception which in this case cannot proceed
from the whole to the determined quantity of the parts but must
demonstrate the possibility of a whole by means of a successive
synthesis of the parts But as this synthesis must constitute a series
that cannot be completed it is impossible for us to cogitate prior to
it and consequently not by means of it a totality For the conception
of totality itself is in the present case the representation of a
completed synthesis of the parts and this completion and consequently
its conception is impossible
The proof in favour of the infinity of the cosmical succession and the
cosmical content is based upon the consideration that in the opposite
case a void time and a void space must constitute the limits of the
world Now I am not unaware that there are some ways of escaping this
conclusion It may for example be alleged that a limit to the world
as regards both space and time is quite possible without at the same
time holding the existence of an absolute time before the beginning of
the world or an absolute space extending beyond the actual worldwhich
is impossible I am quite well satisfied with the latter part of this
opinion of the philosophers of the Leibnitzian school Space is merely
the form of external intuition but not a real object which can itself
be externally intuited it is not a correlate of phenomena it is
the form of phenomena itself Space therefore cannot be regarded as
absolutely and in itself something determinative of the existence
of things because it is not itself an object but only the form of
possible objects Consequently things as phenomena determine space
that is to say they render it possible that of all the possible
predicates of space size and relation certain may belong to
reality But we cannot affirm the converse that space as something
selfsubsistent can determine real things in regard to size or shape
for it is in itself not a real thing Space filled or void may
therefore be limited by phenomena but phenomena cannot be limited by
an empty space without them This is true of time also All this being
granted it is nevertheless indisputable that we must assume these two
nonentities void space without and void time before the world if we
assume the existence of cosmical limits relatively to space or time
For as regards the subterfuge adopted by those who endeavour to evade
the consequencethat if the world is limited as to space and time the
infinite void must determine the existence of actual things in regard
to their dimensionsit arises solely from the fact that instead of a
sensuous world an intelligible worldof which nothing is knownis
cogitated instead of a real beginning an existence which is preceded
by a period in which nothing exists an existence which presupposes no
other condition than that of time and instead of limits of extension
boundaries of the universe But the question relates to the mundus
phaenomenon and its quantity and in this case we cannot make
abstraction of the conditions of sensibility without doing away with
the essential reality of this world itself The world of sense if it is
limited must necessarily lie in the infinite void If this and with it
space as the a priori condition of the possibility of phenomena is left
out of view the whole world of sense disappears In our problem is this
alone considered as given The mundus intelligibilis is nothing but the
general conception of a world in which abstraction has been made of
all conditions of intuition and in relation to which no synthetical
propositioneither affirmative or negativeis possible
Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts and
there exists nothing that is not either itself simple or composed of
simple parts
For grant that composite substances do not consist of simple parts
in this case if all combination or composition were annihilated in
thought no composite part and as by the supposition there do
not exist simple parts no simple part would exist Consequently
no substance consequently nothing would exist Either then it
is impossible to annihilate composition in thought or after such
annihilation there must remain something that subsists without
composition that is something that is simple But in the former case
the composite could not itself consist of substances because with
substances composition is merely a contingent relation apart from
which they must still exist as selfsubsistent beings Now as this case
contradicts the supposition the second must contain the truththat the
substantial composite in the world consists of simple parts
It follows as an immediate inference that the things in the world are
all without exception simple beingsthat composition is merely an
external condition pertaining to themand that although we never
can separate and isolate the elementary substances from the state of
composition reason must cogitate these as the primary subjects of
all composition and consequently as prior theretoand as simple
substances
No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts and there does
not exist in the world any simple substance
Let it be supposed that a composite thing as substance consists
of simple parts Inasmuch as all external relation consequently
all composition of substances is possible only in space the space
occupied by that which is composite must consist of the same number of
parts as is contained in the composite But space does not consist of
simple parts but of spaces Therefore every part of the composite must
occupy a space But the absolutely primary parts of what is composite
are simple It follows that what is simple occupies a space Now as
everything real that occupies a space contains a manifold the parts of
which are external to each other and is consequently compositeand
a real composite not of accidents for these cannot exist external to
each other apart from substance but of substancesit follows that the
simple must be a substantial composite which is selfcontradictory
The second proposition of the antithesisthat there exists in the
world nothing that is simpleis here equivalent to the following
The existence of the absolutely simple cannot be demonstrated from any
experience or perception either external or internal and the absolutely
simple is a mere idea the objective reality of which cannot be
demonstrated in any possible experience it is consequently in the
exposition of phenomena without application and object For let us
take for granted that an object may be found in experience for this
transcendental idea the empirical intuition of such an object must then
be recognized to contain absolutely no manifold with its parts external
to each other and connected into unity Now as we cannot reason from
the nonconsciousness of such a manifold to the impossibility of its
existence in the intuition of an object and as the proof of this
impossibility is necessary for the establishment and proof of absolute
simplicity it follows that this simplicity cannot be inferred from any
perception whatever As therefore an absolutely simple object cannot
be given in any experience and the world of sense must be considered as
the sum total of all possible experiences nothing simple exists in the
world
This second proposition in the antithesis has a more extended aim than
the first The first merely banishes the simple from the intuition of
the composite while the second drives it entirely out of nature Hence
we were unable to demonstrate it from the conception of a given object
of external intuition of the composite but we were obliged to prove
it from the relation of a given object to a possible experience in
general
When I speak of a whole which necessarily consists of simple parts I
understand thereby only a substantial whole as the true composite that
is to say I understand that contingent unity of the manifold which is
given as perfectly isolated at least in thought placed in reciprocal
connection and thus constituted a unity Space ought not to be called a
compositum but a totum for its parts are possible in the whole and not
the whole by means of the parts It might perhaps be called a compositum
ideale but not a compositum reale But this is of no importance As
space is not a composite of substances and not even of real accidents
if I abstract all composition thereinnothing not even a
point remains for a point is possible only as the limit of a
spaceconsequently of a composite Space and time therefore do not
consist of simple parts That which belongs only to the condition or
state of a substance even although it possesses a quantity motion or
change for example likewise does not consist of simple parts That is
to say a certain degree of change does not originate from the addition
of many simple changes Our inference of the simple from the composite
is valid only of selfsubsisting things But the accidents of a state
are not selfsubsistent The proof then for the necessity of the
simple as the component part of all that is substantial and composite
may prove a failure and the whole case of this thesis be lost if we
carry the proposition too far and wish to make it valid of everything
that is composite without distinctionas indeed has really now and then
happened Besides I am here speaking only of the simple in so far as
it is necessarily given in the compositethe latter being capable
of solution into the former as its component parts The proper
signification of the word monas as employed by Leibnitz ought to
relate to the simple given immediately as simple substance for
example in consciousness and not as an element of the composite As
an clement the term atomus would be more appropriate And as I wish to
prove the existence of simple substances only in relation to and
as the elements of the composite I might term the antithesis of the
second Antinomy transcendental Atomistic But as this word has long
been employed to designate a particular theory of corporeal phenomena
moleculae and thus presupposes a basis of empirical conceptions I
prefer calling it the dialectical principle of Monadology
Against the assertion of the infinite subdivisibility of matter whose
ground of proof is purely mathematical objections have been alleged by
the Monadists These objections lay themselves open at first sight
to suspicion from the fact that they do not recognize the clearest
mathematical proofs as propositions relating to the constitution of
space in so far as it is really the formal condition of the possibility
of all matter but regard them merely as inferences from abstract but
arbitrary conceptions which cannot have any application to real things
Just as if it were possible to imagine another mode of intuition than
that given in the primitive intuition of space and just as if itÂ’s a
priori determinations did not apply to everything the existence of
which is possible from the fact alone of its filling space If we
listen to them we shall find ourselves required to cogitate in
addition to the mathematical point which is simplenot however
a part but a mere limit of spacephysical points which are indeed
likewise simple but possess the peculiar property as parts of space
of filling it merely by their aggregation I shall not repeat here the
common and clear refutations of this absurdity which are to be
found everywhere in numbers everyone knows that it is impossible to
undermine the evidence of mathematics by mere discursive conceptions I
shall only remark that if in this case philosophy endeavours to gain
an advantage over mathematics by sophistical artifices it is because
it forgets that the discussion relates solely to Phenomena and their
conditions It is not sufficient to find the conception of the simple
for the pure conception of the composite but we must discover for the
intuition of the composite matter the intuition of the simple Now
this according to the laws of sensibility and consequently in the
case of objects of sense is utterly impossible In the case of a
whole composed of substances which is cogitated solely by the pure
understanding it may be necessary to be in possession of the simple
before composition is possible But this does not hold good of the Totum
substantiale phaenomenon which as an empirical intuition in space
possesses the necessary property of containing no simple part for the
very reason that no part of space is simple Meanwhile the Monadists
have been subtle enough to escape from this difficulty by presupposing
intuition and the dynamical relation of substances as the condition of
the possibility of space instead of regarding space as the condition
of the possibility of the objects of external intuition that is of
bodies Now we have a conception of bodies only as phenomena and as
such they necessarily presuppose space as the condition of all external
phenomena The evasion is therefore in vain as indeed we have
sufficiently shown in our Aesthetic If bodies were things in
themselves the proof of the Monadists would be unexceptionable
The second dialectical assertion possesses the peculiarity of
having opposed to it a dogmatical proposition which among all such
sophistical statements is the only one that undertakes to prove in the
case of an object of experience that which is properly a transcendental
ideathe absolute simplicity of substance The proposition is that the
object of the internal sense the thinking Ego is an absolute simple
substance Without at present entering upon this subjectas it has been
considered at length in a former chapterI shall merely remark that if
something is cogitated merely as an object without the addition of any
synthetical determination of its intuitionas happens in the case
of the bare representation Iit is certain that no manifold and no
composition can be perceived in such a representation As moreover the
predicates whereby I cogitate this object are merely intuitions of the
internal sense there cannot be discovered in them anything to prove
the existence of a manifold whose parts are external to each other
and consequently nothing to prove the existence of real composition
Consciousness therefore is so constituted that inasmuch as the
thinking subject is at the same time its own object it cannot divide
itselfalthough it can divide its inhering determinations For every
object in relation to itself is absolute unity Nevertheless if the
subject is regarded externally as an object of intuition it must in
its character of phenomenon possess the property of composition And it
must always be regarded in this manner if we wish to know whether there
is or is not contained in it a manifold whose parts are external to each
other
Causality according to the laws of nature is not the only causality
operating to originate the phenomena of the world A causality of
freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena
Let it be supposed that there is no other kind of causality than that
according to the laws of nature Consequently everything that happens
presupposes a previous condition which it follows with absolute
certainty in conformity with a rule But this previous condition must
itself be something that has happened that has arisen in time as it
did not exist before for if it has always been in existence its
consequence or effect would not thus originate for the first time
but would likewise have always existed The causality therefore of a
cause whereby something happens is itself a thing that has happened
Now this again presupposes in conformity with the law of nature a
previous condition and its causality and this another anterior to the
former and so on If then everything happens solely in accordance
with the laws of nature there cannot be any real first beginning of
things but only a subaltern or comparative beginning There cannot
therefore be a completeness of series on the side of the causes which
originate the one from the other But the law of nature is that
nothing can happen without a sufficient a priori determined cause The
proposition thereforeif all causality is possible only in accordance
with the laws of natureis when stated in this unlimited and general
manner selfcontradictory It follows that this cannot be the only kind
of causality
From what has been said it follows that a causality must be admitted
by means of which something happens without its cause being determined
according to necessary laws by some other cause preceding That is to
say there must exist an absolute spontaneity of cause which of itself
originates a series of phenomena which proceeds according to natural
lawsconsequently transcendental freedom without which even in the
course of nature the succession of phenomena on the side of causes is
never complete
There is no such thing as freedom but everything in the world happens
solely according to the laws of nature
Granted that there does exist freedom in the transcendental sense as a
peculiar kind of causality operating to produce events in the worlda
faculty that is to say of originating a state and consequently a
series of consequences from that state In this case not only the
series originated by this spontaneity but the determination of this
spontaneity itself to the production of the series that is to say the
causality itself must have an absolute commencement such that nothing
can precede to determine this action according to unvarying laws But
every beginning of action presupposes in the acting cause a state of
inaction and a dynamically primal beginning of action presupposes a
state which has no connectionas regards causalitywith the preceding
state of the causewhich does not that is in any wise result from it
Transcendental freedom is therefore opposed to the natural law of cause
and effect and such a conjunction of successive states in effective
causes is destructive of the possibility of unity in experience and
for that reason not to be found in experienceis consequently a mere
fiction of thought
We have therefore nothing but nature to which we must look for
connection and order in cosmical events Freedomindependence of the
laws of natureis certainly a deliverance from restraint but it is
also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule For it cannot
be alleged that instead of the laws of nature laws of freedom may be
introduced into the causality of the course of nature For if freedom
were determined according to laws it would be no longer freedom
but merely nature Nature therefore and transcendental freedom are
distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness The former imposes
upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the origin of events ever
higher and higher in the series of causes inasmuch as causality is
always conditioned thereby while it compensates this labour by the
guarantee of a unity complete and in conformity with law The latter on
the contrary holds out to the understanding the promise of a point
of rest in the chain of causes by conducting it to an unconditioned
causality which professes to have the power of spontaneous origination
but which in its own utter blindness deprives it of the guidance of
rules by which alone a completely connected experience is possible
The transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the entire
content of the psychological conception so termed which is for the most
part empirical It merely presents us with the conception of spontaneity
of action as the proper ground for imputing freedom to the cause of a
certain class of objects It is however the true stumblingstone to
philosophy which meets with unconquerable difficulties in the way of
its admitting this kind of unconditioned causality That element in the
question of the freedom of the will which has for so long a time placed
speculative reason in such perplexity is properly only transcendental
and concerns the question whether there must be held to exist a faculty
of spontaneous origination of a series of successive things or states
How such a faculty is possible is not a necessary inquiry for in the
case of natural causality itself we are obliged to content ourselves
with the a priori knowledge that such a causality must be presupposed
although we are quite incapable of comprehending how the being of
one thing is possible through the being of another but must for this
information look entirely to experience Now we have demonstrated this
necessity of a free first beginning of a series of phenomena only in so
far as it is required for the comprehension of an origin of the world
all following states being regarded as a succession according to laws
of nature alone But as there has thus been proved the existence of a
faculty which can of itself originate a series in timealthough we
are unable to explain how it can existwe feel ourselves authorized to
admit even in the midst of the natural course of events a beginning
as regards causality of different successions of phenomena and at the
same time to attribute to all substances a faculty of free action
But we ought in this case not to allow ourselves to fall into a common
misunderstanding and to suppose that because a successive series in
the world can only have a comparatively first beginninganother state
or condition of things always precedingan absolutely first beginning
of a series in the course of nature is impossible For we are not
speaking here of an absolutely first beginning in relation to time but
as regards causality alone When for example I completely of my own
free will and independently of the necessarily determinative influence
of natural causes rise from my chair there commences with this event
including its material consequences in infinitum an absolutely
new series although in relation to time this event is merely the
continuation of a preceding series For this resolution and act of mine
do not form part of the succession of effects in nature and are not
mere continuations of it on the contrary the determining causes of
nature cease to operate in reference to this event which certainly
succeeds the acts of nature but does not proceed from them For
these reasons the action of a free agent must be termed in regard to
causality if not in relation to time an absolutely primal beginning of
a series of phenomena
The justification of this need of reason to rest upon a free act as
the first beginning of the series of natural causes is evident from
the fact that all philosophers of antiquity with the exception of the
Epicurean school felt themselves obliged when constructing a theory of
the motions of the universe to accept a prime mover that is a freely
acting cause which spontaneously and prior to all other causes evolved
this series of states They always felt the need of going beyond mere
nature for the purpose of making a first beginning comprehensible
The assertor of the allsufficiency of nature in regard to causality
transcendental Physiocracy in opposition to the doctrine of freedom
would defend his view of the question somewhat in the following manner
He would say in answer to the sophistical arguments of the opposite
party If you do not accept a mathematical first in relation to time
you have no need to seek a dynamical first in regard to causality Who
compelled you to imagine an absolutely primal condition of the world
and therewith an absolute beginning of the gradually progressing
successions of phenomenaand as some foundation for this fancy of
yours to set bounds to unlimited nature Inasmuch as the substances in
the world have always existedat least the unity of experience renders
such a supposition quite necessarythere is no difficulty in believing
also that the changes in the conditions of these substances have always
existed and consequently that a first beginning mathematical or
dynamical is by no means required The possibility of such an infinite
derivation without any initial member from which all the others result
is certainly quite incomprehensible But if you are rash enough to
deny the enigmatical secrets of nature for this reason you will find
yourselves obliged to deny also the existence of many fundamental
properties of natural objects such as fundamental forces which you
can just as little comprehend and even the possibility of so simple
a conception as that of change must present to you insuperable
difficulties For if experience did not teach you that it was real you
never could conceive a priori the possibility of this ceaseless sequence
of being and nonbeing
But if the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is
granteda faculty of originating changes in the worldthis faculty
must at least exist out of and apart from the world although it is
certainly a bold assumption that over and above the complete content
of all possible intuitions there still exists an object which cannot be
presented in any possible perception But to attribute to substances
in the world itself such a faculty is quite inadmissible for in
this case the connection of phenomena reciprocally determining and
determined according to general laws which is termed nature and along
with it the criteria of empirical truth which enable us to distinguish
experience from mere visionary dreaming would almost entirely
disappear In proximity with such a lawless faculty of freedom a system
of nature is hardly cogitable for the laws of the latter would be
continually subject to the intrusive influences of the former and
the course of phenomena which would otherwise proceed regularly and
uniformly would become thereby confused and disconnected
There exists either in or in connection with the worldeither as a
part of it or as the cause of itan absolutely necessary being
The world of sense as the sum total of all phenomena contains a series
of changes For without such a series the mental representation of
the series of time itself as the condition of the possibility of the
sensuous world could not be presented to us But every change stands
under its condition which precedes it in time and renders it necessary
Now the existence of a given condition presupposes a complete series of
conditions up to the absolutely unconditioned which alone is absolutely
necessary It follows that something that is absolutely necessary must
exist if change exists as its consequence But this necessary thing
itself belongs to the sensuous world For suppose it to exist out of and
apart from it the series of cosmical changes would receive from it a
beginning and yet this necessary cause would not itself belong to
the world of sense But this is impossible For as the beginning of a
series in time is determined only by that which precedes it in time the
supreme condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist
in the time in which this series itself did not exist for a beginning
supposes a time preceding in which the thing that begins to be was
not in existence The causality of the necessary cause of changes
and consequently the cause itself must for these reasons belong
to timeand to phenomena time being possible only as the form of
phenomena Consequently it cannot be cogitated as separated from the
world of sensethe sum total of all phenomena There is therefore
contained in the world something that is absolutely necessarywhether
it be the whole cosmical series itself or only a part of it
An absolutely necessary being does not exist either in the world or
out of itas its cause
Grant that either the world itself is necessary or that there is
contained in it a necessary existence Two cases are possible First
there must either be in the series of cosmical changes a beginning
which is unconditionally necessary and therefore uncausedwhich is at
variance with the dynamical law of the determination of all phenomena
in time or secondly the series itself is without beginning and
although contingent and conditioned in all its parts is nevertheless
absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a wholewhich is
selfcontradictory For the existence of an aggregate cannot be
necessary if no single part of it possesses necessary existence
Grant on the other band that an absolutely necessary cause exists out
of and apart from the world This cause as the highest member in the
series of the causes of cosmical changes must originate or begin the
existence of the latter and their series In this case it must also
begin to act and its causality would therefore belong to time and
consequently to the sum total of phenomena that is to the world
It follows that the cause cannot be out of the world which is
contradictory to the hypothesis Therefore neither in the world nor
out of it but in causal connection with it does there exist any
absolutely necessary being
To demonstrate the existence of a necessary being I cannot be permitted
in this place to employ any other than the cosmological argument
which ascends from the conditioned in phenomena to the unconditioned in
conceptionthe unconditioned being considered the necessary condition
of the absolute totality of the series The proof from the mere idea
of a supreme being belongs to another principle of reason and requires
separate discussion
The pure cosmological proof demonstrates the existence of a necessary
being but at the same time leaves it quite unsettled whether this
being is the world itself or quite distinct from it To establish
the truth of the latter view principles are requisite which are not
cosmological and do not proceed in the series of phenomena We
should require to introduce into our proof conceptions of contingent
beingsregarded merely as objects of the understanding and also
a principle which enables us to connect these by means of mere
conceptions with a necessary being But the proper place for all such
arguments is a transcendent philosophy which has unhappily not yet been
established
But if we begin our proof cosmologically by laying at the foundation
of it the series of phenomena and the regress in it according to
empirical laws of causality we are not at liberty to break off from
this mode of demonstration and to pass over to something which is not
itself a member of the series The condition must be taken in exactly
the same signification as the relation of the conditioned to its
condition in the series has been taken for the series must conduct us
in an unbroken regress to this supreme condition But if this relation
is sensuous and belongs to the possible empirical employment of
understanding the supreme condition or cause must close the regressive
series according to the laws of sensibility and consequently must
belong to the series of time It follows that this necessary existence
must be regarded as the highest member of the cosmical series
Certain philosophers have nevertheless allowed themselves the liberty
of making such a saltus metabasis eis allo gonos From the changes
in the world they have concluded their empirical contingency that
is their dependence on empiricallydetermined causes and they thus
admitted an ascending series of empirical conditions and in this they
are quite right But as they could not find in this series any primal
beginning or any highest member they passed suddenly from the empirical
conception of contingency to the pure category which presents us with
a seriesnot sensuous but intellectualwhose completeness does
certainly rest upon the existence of an absolutely necessary cause Nay
more this intellectual series is not tied to any sensuous conditions
and is therefore free from the condition of time which requires it
spontaneously to begin its causality in time But such a procedure is
perfectly inadmissible as will be made plain from what follows
In the pure sense of the categories that is contingent the
contradictory opposite of which is possible Now we cannot reason from
empirical contingency to intellectual The opposite of that which is
changedthe opposite of its stateis actual at another time and is
therefore possible Consequently it is not the contradictory opposite
of the former state To be that it is necessary that in the same time
in which the preceding state existed its opposite could have existed in
its place but such a cognition is not given us in the mere phenomenon
of change A body that was in motion A comes into a state of rest
nonA Now it cannot be concluded from the fact that a state opposite
to the state A follows it that the contradictory opposite of A is
possible and that A is therefore contingent To prove this we should
require to know that the state of rest could have existed in the very
same time in which the motion took place Now we know nothing more than
that the state of rest was actual in the time that followed the state of
motion consequently that it was also possible But motion at one time
and rest at another time are not contradictorily opposed to each other
It follows from what has been said that the succession of opposite
determinations that is change does not demonstrate the fact of
contingency as represented in the conceptions of the pure understanding
and that it cannot therefore conduct us to the fact of the existence
of a necessary being Change proves merely empirical contingency that
is to say that the new state could not have existed without a cause
which belongs to the preceding time This causeeven although it is
regarded as absolutely necessarymust be presented to us in time and
must belong to the series of phenomena
The difficulties which meet us in our attempt to rise through the
series of phenomena to the existence of an absolutely necessary supreme
cause must not originate from our inability to establish the truth of
our mere conceptions of the necessary existence of a thing That is to
say our objections not be ontological but must be directed against
the causal connection with a series of phenomena of a condition which is
itself unconditioned In one word they must be cosmological and relate
to empirical laws We must show that the regress in the series of
causes in the world of sense cannot conclude with an empirically
unconditioned condition and that the cosmological argument from the
contingency of the cosmical statea contingency alleged to arise from
changedoes not justify us in accepting a first cause that is a prime
originator of the cosmical series
The reader will observe in this antinomy a very remarkable contrast The
very same grounds of proof which established in the thesis the existence
of a supreme being demonstrated in the antithesisand with equal
strictnessthe nonexistence of such a being We found first that a
necessary being exists because the whole time past contains the series
of all conditions and with it therefore the unconditioned the
necessary secondly that there does not exist any necessary being
for the same reason that the whole time past contains the series of
all conditionswhich are themselves therefore in the aggregate
conditioned The cause of this seeming incongruity is as follows We
attend in the first argument solely to the absolute totality of the
series of conditions the one of which determines the other in time and
thus arrive at a necessary unconditioned In the second we consider
on the contrary the contingency of everything that is determined in
the series of timefor every event is preceded by a time in which the
condition itself must be determined as conditionedand thus everything
that is unconditioned or absolutely necessary disappears In both the
mode of proof is quite in accordance with the common procedure of human
reason which often falls into discord with itself from considering an
object from two different points of view Herr von Mairan regarded
the controversy between two celebrated astronomers which arose from
a similar difficulty as to the choice of a proper standpoint as a
phenomenon of sufficient importance to warrant a separate treatise
on the subject The one concluded the moon revolves on its own axis
because it constantly presents the same side to the earth the other
declared that the moon does not revolve on its own axis for the same
reason Both conclusions were perfectly correct according to the point
of view from which the motions of the moon were considered
We have thus completely before us the dialectical procedure of the
cosmological ideas No possible experience can present us with an object
adequate to them in extent Nay more reason itself cannot cogitate
them as according with the general laws of experience And yet they
are not arbitrary fictions of thought On the contrary reason in
its uninterrupted progress in the empirical synthesis is necessarily
conducted to them when it endeavours to free from all conditions and
to comprehend in its unconditioned totality that which can only be
determined conditionally in accordance with the laws of experience
These dialectical propositions are so many attempts to solve four
natural and unavoidable problems of reason There are neither more nor
can there be less than this number because there are no other series
of synthetical hypotheses limiting a priori the empirical synthesis
The brilliant claims of reason striving to extend its dominion beyond
the limits of experience have been represented above only in dry
formulae which contain merely the grounds of its pretensions They
have besides in conformity with the character of a transcendental
philosophy been freed from every empirical element although the full
splendour of the promises they hold out and the anticipations they
excite manifests itself only when in connection with empirical
cognitions In the application of them however and in the advancing
enlargement of the employment of reason while struggling to rise from
the region of experience and to soar to those sublime ideas philosophy
discovers a value and a dignity which if it could but make good its
assertions would raise it far above all other departments of human
knowledgeprofessing as it does to present a sure foundation for our
highest hopes and the ultimate aims of all the exertions of reason
The questions whether the world has a beginning and a limit to its
extension in space whether there exists anywhere or perhaps in my
own thinking Self an indivisible and indestructible unityor whether
nothing but what is divisible and transitory exists whether I am a free
agent or like other beings am bound in the chains of nature and fate
whether finally there is a supreme cause of the world or all our
thought and speculation must end with nature and the order of external
thingsare questions for the solution of which the mathematician would
willingly exchange his whole science for in it there is no satisfaction
for the highest aspirations and most ardent desires of humanity Nay it
may even be said that the true value of mathematicsthat pride of human
reasonconsists in this that she guides reason to the knowledge of
naturein her greater as well as in her less manifestationsin her
beautiful order and regularityguides her moreover to an insight into
the wonderful unity of the moving forces in the operations of nature
far beyond the expectations of a philosophy building only on experience
and that she thus encourages philosophy to extend the province of reason
beyond all experience and at the same time provides it with the most
excellent materials for supporting its investigations in so far as
their nature admits by adequate and accordant intuitions
Unfortunately for speculationbut perhaps fortunately for the
practical interests of humanityreason in the midst of her highest
anticipations finds herself hemmed in by a press of opposite and
contradictory conclusions from which neither her honour nor her safety
will permit her to draw back Nor can she regard these conflicting
trains of reasoning with indifference as mere passages at arms still
less can she command peace for in the subject of the conflict she has a
deep interest There is no other course left open to her than to reflect
with herself upon the origin of this disunion in reasonwhether it may
not arise from a mere misunderstanding After such an inquiry arrogant
claims would have to be given up on both sides but the sovereignty
of reason over understanding and sense would be based upon a sure
foundation
We shall at present defer this radical inquiry and in the meantime
consider for a little what side in the controversy we should most
willingly take if we were obliged to become partisans at all As in
this case we leave out of sight altogether the logical criterion of
truth and merely consult our own interest in reference to the question
these considerations although inadequate to settle the question of
right in either party will enable us to comprehend how those who have
taken part in the struggle adopt the one view rather than the otherno
special insight into the subject however having influenced their
choice They will at the same time explain to us many other things
by the wayfor example the fiery zeal on the one side and the cold
maintenance of their cause on the other why the one party has met with
the warmest approbations and the other has always been repulsed by
irreconcilable prejudices
There is one thing however that determines the proper point of view
from which alone this preliminary inquiry can be instituted and carried
on with the proper completenessand that is the comparison of the
principles from which both sides thesis and antithesis proceed My
readers would remark in the propositions of the antithesis a complete
uniformity in the mode of thought and a perfect unity of principle Its
principle was that of pure empiricism not only in the explication
of the phenomena in the world but also in the solution of the
transcendental ideas even of that of the universe itself The
affirmations of the thesis on the contrary were based in addition to
the empirical mode of explanation employed in the series of phenomena
on intellectual propositions and its principles were in so far
not simple I shall term the thesis in view of its essential
characteristic the dogmatism of pure reason
On the side of Dogmatism or of the thesis therefore in the
determination of the cosmological ideas we find
A practical interest which must be very dear to every rightthinking
man That the word has a beginningthat the nature of my thinking self
is simple and therefore indestructiblethat I am a free agent and
raised above the compulsion of nature and her lawsand finally that
the entire order of things which form the world is dependent upon a
Supreme Being from whom the whole receives unity and connectionthese
are so many foundationstones of morality and religion The antithesis
deprives us of all these supportsor at least seems so to deprive us
A speculative interest of reason manifests itself on this side For
if we take the transcendental ideas and employ them in the manner which
the thesis directs we can exhibit completely a priori the entire
chain of conditions and understand the derivation of the
conditionedbeginning from the unconditioned This the antithesis does
not do and for this reason does not meet with so welcome a reception
For it can give no answer to our question respecting the conditions of
its synthesisexcept such as must be supplemented by another question
and so on to infinity According to it we must rise from a given
beginning to one still higher every part conducts us to a still smaller
one every event is preceded by another event which is its cause and
the conditions of existence rest always upon other and still higher
conditions and find neither end nor basis in some selfsubsistent thing
as the primal being
This side has also the advantage of popularity and this constitutes
no small part of its claim to favour The common understanding does not
find the least difficulty in the idea of the unconditioned beginning of
all synthesisaccustomed as it is rather to follow our consequences
than to seek for a proper basis for cognition In the conception of an
absolute first moreoverthe possibility of which it does not inquire
intoit is highly gratified to find a firmlyestablished point
of departure for its attempts at theory while in the restless and
continuous ascent from the conditioned to the condition always with one
foot in the air it can find no satisfaction
On the side of the antithesis or Empiricism in the determination of
the cosmological ideas
We cannot discover any such practical interest arising from pure
principles of reason as morality and religion present On the contrary
pure empiricism seems to empty them of all their power and influence
If there does not exist a Supreme Being distinct from the worldif the
world is without beginning consequently without a Creatorif our wills
are not free and the soul is divisible and subject to corruption just
like matterthe ideas and principles of morality lose all validity and
fall with the transcendental ideas which constituted their theoretical
support
But empiricism in compensation holds out to reason in its
speculative interests certain important advantages far exceeding any
that the dogmatist can promise us For when employed by the empiricist
understanding is always upon its proper ground of investigationthe
field of possible experience the laws of which it can explore and thus
extend its cognition securely and with clear intelligence without being
stopped by limits in any direction Here can it and ought it to find and
present to intuition its proper objectnot only in itself but in all
its relations or if it employ conceptions upon this ground it can
always present the corresponding images in clear and unmistakable
intuitions It is quite unnecessary for it to renounce the guidance of
nature to attach itself to ideas the objects of which it cannot know
because as mere intellectual entities they cannot be presented in
any intuition On the contrary it is not even permitted to abandon
its proper occupation under the pretence that it has been brought to
a conclusion for it never can be and to pass into the region of
idealizing reason and transcendent conceptions which it is not required
to observe and explore the laws of nature but merely to think and to
imaginesecure from being contradicted by facts because they have not
been called as witnesses but passed by or perhaps subordinated to the
socalled higher interests and considerations of pure reason
Hence the empiricist will never allow himself to accept any epoch of
nature for the firstthe absolutely primal state he will not believe
that there can be limits to his outlook into her wide domains nor pass
from the objects of nature which he can satisfactorily explain by
means of observation and mathematical thoughtwhich he can determine
synthetically in intuition to those which neither sense nor imagination
can ever present in concreto he will not concede the existence of a
faculty in nature operating independently of the laws of naturea
concession which would introduce uncertainty into the procedure of the
understanding which is guided by necessary laws to the observation of
phenomena nor finally will he permit himself to seek a cause beyond
nature inasmuch as we know nothing but it and from it alone receive an
objective basis for all our conceptions and instruction in the unvarying
laws of things
In truth if the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in the
establishment of his antithesis than to check the presumption of a
reason which mistakes its true destination which boasts of its insight
and its knowledge just where all insight and knowledge cease to
exist and regards that which is valid only in relation to a practical
interest as an advancement of the speculative interests of the mind
in order when it is convenient for itself to break the thread of our
physical investigations and under pretence of extending our cognition
connect them with transcendental ideas by means of which we really know
only that we know nothingif I say the empiricist rested satisfied
with this benefit the principle advanced by him would be a maxim
recommending moderation in the pretensions of reason and modesty in its
affirmations and at the same time would direct us to the right mode
of extending the province of the understanding by the help of the only
true teacher experience In obedience to this advice intellectual
hypotheses and faith would not be called in aid of our practical
interests nor should we introduce them under the pompous titles of
science and insight For speculative cognition cannot find an objective
basis any other where than in experience and when we overstep its
limits our synthesis which requires ever new cognitions independent of
experience has no substratum of intuition upon which to build
But ifas often happensempiricism in relation to ideas becomes
itself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the sphere of its
phenomenal cognition it falls itself into the error of intemperancean
error which is here all the more reprehensible as thereby the practical
interest of reason receives an irreparable injury
And this constitutes the opposition between Epicureanism and Platonism
Both Epicurus and Plato assert more in their systems than they know The
former encourages and advances sciencealthough to the prejudice of
the practical the latter presents us with excellent principles for the
investigation of the practical but in relation to everything regarding
which we can attain to speculative cognition permits reason to append
idealistic explanations of natural phenomena to the great injury of
physical investigation
In regard to the third motive for the preliminary choice of a party
in this war of assertions it seems very extraordinary that empiricism
should be utterly unpopular We should be inclined to believe that the
common understanding would receive it with pleasurepromising as it
does to satisfy it without passing the bounds of experience and its
connected order while transcendental dogmatism obliges it to rise to
conceptions which far surpass the intelligence and ability of the most
practised thinkers But in this in truth is to be found its real
motive For the common understanding thus finds itself in a situation
where not even the most learned can have the advantage of it If it
understands little or nothing about these transcendental conceptions no
one can boast of understanding any more and although it may not express
itself in so scholastically correct a manner as others it can busy
itself with reasoning and arguments without end wandering among mere
ideas about which one can always be very eloquent because we know
nothing about them while in the observation and investigation of
nature it would be forced to remain dumb and to confess its utter
ignorance Thus indolence and vanity form of themselves strong
recommendations of these principles Besides although it is a hard
thing for a philosopher to assume a principle of which he can give to
himself no reasonable account and still more to employ conceptions the
objective reality of which cannot be established nothing is more usual
with the common understanding It wants something which will allow it
to go to work with confidence The difficulty of even comprehending
a supposition does not disquiet it becausenot knowing what
comprehending meansit never even thinks of the supposition it may be
adopting as a principle and regards as known that with which it
has become familiar from constant use And at last all speculative
interests disappear before the practical interests which it holds dear
and it fancies that it understands and knows what its necessities
and hopes incite it to assume or to believe Thus the empiricism of
transcendentally idealizing reason is robbed of all popularity and
however prejudicial it may be to the highest practical principles there
is no fear that it will ever pass the limits of the schools or acquire
any favour or influence in society or with the multitude
Human reason is by nature architectonic That is to say it regards all
cognitions as parts of a possible system and hence accepts only such
principles as at least do not incapacitate a cognition to which we may
have attained from being placed along with others in a general system
But the propositions of the antithesis are of a character which renders
the completion of an edifice of cognitions impossible According to
these beyond one state or epoch of the world there is always to be
found one more ancient in every part always other parts themselves
divisible preceding every event another the origin of which
must itself be sought still higher and everything in existence is
conditioned and still not dependent on an unconditioned and primal
existence As therefore the antithesis will not concede the existence
of a first beginning which might be available as a foundation a
complete edifice of cognition in the presence of such hypothesis is
utterly impossible Thus the architectonic interest of reason which
requires a unitynot empirical but a priori and rationalforms a
natural recommendation for the assertions of the thesis in our antinomy
But if any one could free himself entirely from all considerations
of interest and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason
attending only to their content irrespective of the consequences which
follow from them such a person on the supposition that he knew no
other way out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or
other of the conflicting doctrines would live in a state of continual
hesitation Today he would feel convinced that the human will is free
tomorrow considering the indissoluble chain of nature he would look
on freedom as a mere illusion and declare nature to be allinall But
if he were called to action the play of the merely speculative reason
would disappear like the shapes of a dream and practical interest would
dictate his choice of principles But as it well befits a reflective
and inquiring being to devote certain periods of time to the examination
of its own reasonto divest itself of all partiality and frankly to
communicate its observations for the judgement and opinion of others so
no one can be blamed for much less prevented from placing both
parties on their trial with permission to end themselves free
from intimidation before intimidation before a sworn jury of equal
condition with themselvesthe condition of weak and fallible men
To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions
would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of extravagant
boasting and selfconceit and at once to destroy the confidence that
might otherwise have been reposed in him There are however sciences
so constituted that every question arising within their sphere must
necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from the knowledge already
possessed for the answer must be received from the same sources whence
the question arose In such sciences it is not allowable to excuse
ourselves on the plea of necessary and unavoidable ignorance a solution
is absolutely requisite The rule of right and wrong must help us to the
knowledge of what is right or wrong in all possible cases otherwise
the idea of obligation or duty would be utterly null for we cannot have
any obligation to that which we cannot know On the other hand in our
investigations of the phenomena of nature much must remain uncertain
and many questions continue insoluble because what we know of nature
is far from being sufficient to explain all the phenomena that are
presented to our observation Now the question is Whether there is in
transcendental philosophy any question relating to an object presented
to pure reason which is unanswerable by this reason and whether we
must regard the subject of the question as quite uncertain so far as
our knowledge extends and must give it a place among those subjects of
which we have just so much conception as is sufficient to enable us
to raise a questionfaculty or materials failing us however when we
attempt an answer
Now I maintain that among all speculative cognition the peculiarity of
transcendental philosophy is that there is no question relating to an
object presented to pure reason which is insoluble by this reason and
that the profession of unavoidable ignorancethe problem being alleged
to be beyond the reach of our facultiescannot free us from the
obligation to present a complete and satisfactory answer For the very
conception which enables us to raise the question must give us the power
of answering it inasmuch as the object as in the case of right and
wrong is not to be discovered out of the conception
But in transcendental philosophy it is only the cosmological questions
to which we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation to the
constitution of their object and the philosopher is not permitted to
avail himself of the pretext of necessary ignorance and impenetrable
obscurity These questions relate solely to the cosmological ideas For
the object must be given in experience and the question relates to the
adequateness of the object to an idea If the object is transcendental
and therefore itself unknown if the question for example is whether
the objectthe something the phenomenon of which internalin
ourselves is thoughtthat is to say the soul is in itself a simple
being or whether there is a cause of all things which is absolutely
necessaryin such cases we are seeking for our idea an object of which
we may confess that it is unknown to us though we must not on that
account assert that it is impossible The cosmological ideas alone
possess the peculiarity that we can presuppose the object of them and the
empirical synthesis requisite for the conception of that object to be
given and the question which arises from these ideas relates merely
to the progress of this synthesis in so far as it must contain absolute
totalitywhich however is not empirical as it cannot be given in any
experience Now as the question here is solely in regard to a thing as
the object of a possible experience and not as a thing in itself the
answer to the transcendental cosmological question need not be sought
out of the idea for the question does not regard an object in itself
The question in relation to a possible experience is not What can be
given in an experience in concreto but what is contained in the idea
to which the empirical synthesis must approximate The question must
therefore be capable of solution from the idea alone For the idea is
a creation of reason itself which therefore cannot disclaim the
obligation to answer or refer us to the unknown object
It is not so extraordinary as it at first sight appears that a science
should demand and expect satisfactory answers to all the questions that
may arise within its own sphere questiones domesticae although up to
a certain time these answers may not have been discovered There are
in addition to transcendental philosophy only two pure sciences
of reason the one with a speculative the other with a practical
contentpure mathematics and pure ethics Has anyone ever heard
it alleged that from our complete and necessary ignorance of the
conditions it is uncertain what exact relation the diameter of a circle
bears to the circle in rational or irrational numbers By the former
the sum cannot be given exactly by the latter only approximately and
therefore we decide that the impossibility of a solution of the question
is evident Lambert presented us with a demonstration of this In the
general principles of morals there can be nothing uncertain for the
propositions are either utterly without meaning or must originate
solely in our rational conceptions On the other hand there must be
in physical science an infinite number of conjectures which can never
become certainties because the phenomena of nature are not given as
objects dependent on our conceptions The key to the solution of such
questions cannot therefore be found in our conceptions or in pure
thought but must lie without us and for that reason is in many cases
not to be discovered and consequently a satisfactory explanation cannot
be expected The questions of transcendental analytic which relate to
the deduction of our pure cognition are not to be regarded as of the
same kind as those mentioned above for we are not at present treating
of the certainty of judgements in relation to the origin of our
conceptions but only of that certainty in relation to objects
We cannot therefore escape the responsibility of at least a critical
solution of the questions of reason by complaints of the limited nature
of our faculties and the seemingly humble confession that it is beyond
the power of our reason to decide whether the world has existed from
all eternity or had a beginningwhether it is infinitely extended or
enclosed within certain limitswhether anything in the world is simple
or whether everything must be capable of infinite divisibilitywhether
freedom can originate phenomena or whether everything is absolutely
dependent on the laws and order of natureand finally whether there
exists a being that is completely unconditioned and necessary or
whether the existence of everything is conditioned and consequently
dependent on something external to itself and therefore in its own
nature contingent For all these questions relate to an object which
can be given nowhere else than in thought This object is the absolutely
unconditioned totality of the synthesis of phenomena If the conceptions
in our minds do not assist us to some certain result in regard to these
problems we must not defend ourselves on the plea that the object
itself remains hidden from and unknown to us For no such thing or
object can be givenit is not to be found out of the idea in our minds
We must seek the cause of our failure in our idea itself which is an
insoluble problem and in regard to which we obstinately assume that
there exists a real object corresponding and adequate to it A clear
explanation of the dialectic which lies in our conception will very
soon enable us to come to a satisfactory decision in regard to such a
question
The pretext that we are unable to arrive at certainty in regard to these
problems may be met with this question which requires at least a plain
answer From what source do the ideas originate the solution of which
involves you in such difficulties Are you seeking for an explanation
of certain phenomena and do you expect these ideas to give you the
principles or the rules of this explanation Let it be granted that
all nature was laid open before you that nothing was hid from your
senses and your consciousness Still you could not cognize in concreto
the object of your ideas in any experience For what is demanded is not
only this full and complete intuition but also a complete synthesis and
the consciousness of its absolute totality and this is not possible by
means of any empirical cognition It follows that your questionyour
ideais by no means necessary for the explanation of any phenomenon
and the idea cannot have been in any sense given by the object itself
For such an object can never be presented to us because it cannot be
given by any possible experience Whatever perceptions you may attain
to you are still surrounded by conditionsin space or in timeand
you cannot discover anything unconditioned nor can you decide whether
this unconditioned is to be placed in an absolute beginning of the
synthesis or in an absolute totality of the series without beginning
A whole in the empirical signification of the term is always merely
comparative The absolute whole of quantity the universe of division
of derivation of the condition of existence with the questionwhether
it is to be produced by finite or infinite synthesis no possible
experience can instruct us concerning You will not for example be
able to explain the phenomena of a body in the least degree better
whether you believe it to consist of simple or of composite parts
for a simple phenomenonand just as little an infinite series of
compositioncan never be presented to your perception Phenomena
require and admit of explanation only in so far as the conditions of
that explanation are given in perception but the sum total of that
which is given in phenomena considered as an absolute whole is itself
a perceptionand we cannot therefore seek for explanations of this
whole beyond itself in other perceptions The explanation of this whole
is the proper object of the transcendental problems of pure reason
Although therefore the solution of these problems is unattainable
through experience we must not permit ourselves to say that it is
uncertain how the object of our inquiries is constituted For the object
is in our own mind and cannot be discovered in experience and we have
only to take care that our thoughts are consistent with each other
and to avoid falling into the amphiboly of regarding our idea as a
representation of an object empirically given and therefore to be
cognized according to the laws of experience A dogmatical solution is
therefore not only unsatisfactory but impossible The critical solution
which may be a perfectly certain one does not consider the question
objectively but proceeds by inquiring into the basis of the cognition
upon which the question rests
We should be quite willing to desist from the demand of a dogmatical
answer to our questions if we understood beforehand that be the answer
what it may it would only serve to increase our ignorance to throw
us from one incomprehensibility into another from one obscurity
into another still greater and perhaps lead us into irreconcilable
contradictions If a dogmatical affirmative or negative answer is
demanded is it at all prudent to set aside the probable grounds of
a solution which lie before us and to take into consideration what
advantage we shall gain if the answer is to favour the one side or the
other If it happens that in both cases the answer is mere nonsense
we have in this an irresistible summons to institute a critical
investigation of the question for the purpose of discovering whether
it is based on a groundless presupposition and relates to an idea the
falsity of which would be more easily exposed in its application and
consequences than in the mere representation of its content This is the
great utility of the sceptical mode of treating the questions addressed
by pure reason to itself By this method we easily rid ourselves of
the confusions of dogmatism and establish in its place a temperate
criticism which as a genuine cathartic will successfully remove
the presumptuous notions of philosophy and their consequencethe vain
pretension to universal science
If then I could understand the nature of a cosmological idea and
perceive before I entered on the discussion of the subject at all
that whatever side of the question regarding the unconditioned of the
regressive synthesis of phenomena it favouredit must either be too
great or too small for every conception of the understandingI would
be able to comprehend how the idea which relates to an object of
experiencean experience which must be adequate to and in accordance
with a possible conception of the understandingmust be completely void
and without significance inasmuch as its object is inadequate consider
it as we may And this is actually the case with all cosmological
conceptions which for the reason above mentioned involve reason so
long as it remains attached to them in an unavoidable antinomy For
suppose
First that the world has no beginningin this case it is too large
for our conception for this conception which consists in a successive
regress cannot overtake the whole eternity that has elapsed Grant
that it has a beginning it is then too small for the conception of
the understanding For as a beginning presupposes a time preceding it
cannot be unconditioned and the law of the empirical employment of the
understanding imposes the necessity of looking for a higher condition of
time and the world is therefore evidently too small for this law
The same is the case with the double answer to the question regarding
the extent in space of the world For if it is infinite and
unlimited it must be too large for every possible empirical conception
If it is finite and limited we have a right to ask What determines
these limits Void space is not a selfsubsistent correlate of things
and cannot be a final conditionand still less an empirical condition
forming a part of a possible experience For how can we have any
experience or perception of an absolute void But the absolute totality
of the empirical synthesis requires that the unconditioned be an
empirical conception Consequently a finite world is too small for our
conception
Secondly if every phenomenon matter in space consists of an infinite
number of parts the regress of the division is always too great for our
conception and if the division of space must cease with some member
of the division the simple it is too small for the idea of the
unconditioned For the member at which we have discontinued our division
still admits a regress to many more parts contained in the object
Thirdly suppose that every event in the world happens in accordance
with the laws of nature the causality of a cause must itself be
an event and necessitates a regress to a still higher cause and
consequently the unceasing prolongation of the series of conditions
a parte priori Operative nature is therefore too large for every
conception we can form in the synthesis of cosmical events
If we admit the existence of spontaneously produced events that is of
free agency we are driven in our search for sufficient reasons on an
unavoidable law of nature and are compelled to appeal to the empirical
law of causality and we find that any such totality of connection in
our synthesis is too small for our necessary empirical conception
Fourthly if we assume the existence of an absolutely necessary
beingwhether it be the world or something in the world or the cause
of the worldwe must place it in a time at an infinite distance from
any given moment for otherwise it must be dependent on some other and
higher existence Such an existence is in this case too large for our
empirical conception and unattainable by the continued regress of any
synthesis
But if we believe that everything in the worldbe it condition or
conditionedis contingent every given existence is too small for our
conception For in this case we are compelled to seek for some other
existence upon which the former depends
We have said that in all these cases the cosmological idea is either
too great or too small for the empirical regress in a synthesis and
consequently for every possible conception of the understanding Why did
we not express ourselves in a manner exactly the reverse of this and
instead of accusing the cosmological idea of over stepping or of falling
short of its true aim possible experience say that in the first case
the empirical conception is always too small for the idea and in the
second too great and thus attach the blame of these contradictions to
the empirical regress The reason is this Possible experience can alone
give reality to our conceptions without it a conception is merely an
idea without truth or relation to an object Hence a possible empirical
conception must be the standard by which we are to judge whether an
idea is anything more than an idea and fiction of thought or whether it
relates to an object in the world If we say of a thing that in
relation to some other thing it is too large or too small the former is
considered as existing for the sake of the latter and requiring to
be adapted to it Among the trivial subjects of discussion in the old
schools of dialectics was this question If a ball cannot pass through
a hole shall we say that the ball is too large or the hole too small
In this case it is indifferent what expression we employ for we do
not know which exists for the sake of the other On the other hand we
cannot say The man is too long for his coat but The coat is too
short for the man
We are thus led to the wellfounded suspicion that the cosmological
ideas and all the conflicting sophistical assertions connected with
them are based upon a false and fictitious conception of the mode in
which the object of these ideas is presented to us and this suspicion
will probably direct us how to expose the illusion that has so long led
us astray from the truth
In the transcendental aesthetic we proved that everything intuited in
space and time all objects of a possible experience are nothing but
phenomena that is mere representations and that these as
presented to usas extended bodies or as series of changeshave no
selfsubsistent existence apart from human thought This doctrine I
call Transcendental Idealism The realist in the transcendental
sense regards these modifications of our sensibility these mere
representations as things subsisting in themselves
It would be unjust to accuse us of holding the longdecried theory of
empirical idealism which while admitting the reality of space denies
or at least doubts the existence of bodies extended in it and thus
leaves us without a sufficient criterion of reality and illusion The
supporters of this theory find no difficulty in admitting the reality of
the phenomena of the internal sense in time nay they go the length
of maintaining that this internal experience is of itself a sufficient
proof of the real existence of its object as a thing in itself
Transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external
intuitionas intuited in space and all changes in timeas represented
by the internal sense are real For as space is the form of that
intuition which we call external and without objects in space no
empirical representation could be given us we can and ought to regard
extended bodies in it as real The case is the same with representations
in time But time and space with all phenomena therein are not in
themselves things They are nothing but representations and cannot exist
out of and apart from the mind Nay the sensuous internal intuition of
the mind as the object of consciousness the determination of which
is represented by the succession of different states in time is not
the real proper self as it exists in itselfnot the transcendental
subjectbut only a phenomenon which is presented to the sensibility of
this to us unknown being This internal phenomenon cannot be admitted
to be a selfsubsisting thing for its condition is time and time
cannot be the condition of a thing in itself But the empirical truth
of phenomena in space and time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of
doubt and sufficiently distinguished from the illusion of dreams
or fancyalthough both have a proper and thorough connection in an
experience according to empirical laws The objects of experience then
are not things in themselves but are given only in experience and have
no existence apart from and independently of experience That there may
be inhabitants in the moon although no one has ever observed them must
certainly be admitted but this assertion means only that we may in the
possible progress of experience discover them at some future time For
that which stands in connection with a perception according to the
laws of the progress of experience is real They are therefore really
existent if they stand in empirical connection with my actual or real
consciousness although they are not in themselves real that is apart
from the progress of experience
There is nothing actually givenwe can be conscious of nothing as
real except a perception and the empirical progression from it to other
possible perceptions For phenomena as mere representations are real
only in perception and perception is in fact nothing but the reality
of an empirical representation that is a phenomenon To call a
phenomenon a real thing prior to perception means either that we must
meet with this phenomenon in the progress of experience or it means
nothing at all For I can say only of a thing in itself that it exists
without relation to the senses and experience But we are speaking here
merely of phenomena in space and time both of which are determinations
of sensibility and not of things in themselves It follows that
phenomena are not things in themselves but are mere representations
which if not given in usin perceptionare nonexistent
The faculty of sensuous intuition is properly a receptivitya capacity
of being affected in a certain manner by representations the relation
of which to each other is a pure intuition of space and timethe pure
forms of sensibility These representations in so far as they are
connected and determinable in this relation in space and time
according to laws of the unity of experience are called objects The
nonsensuous cause of these representations is completely unknown to us
and hence cannot be intuited as an object For such an object could not
be represented either in space or in time and without these conditions
intuition or representation is impossible We may at the same time
term the nonsensuous cause of phenomena the transcendental objectbut
merely as a mental correlate to sensibility considered as a
receptivity To this transcendental object we may attribute the whole
connection and extent of our possible perceptions and say that it is
given and exists in itself prior to all experience But the phenomena
corresponding to it are not given as things in themselves but in
experience alone For they are mere representations receiving from
perceptions alone significance and relation to a real object under
the condition that this or that perceptionindicating an objectis in
complete connection with all others in accordance with the rules of the
unity of experience Thus we can say The things that really existed
in past time are given in the transcendental object of experience But
these are to me real objects only in so far as I can represent to my
own mind that a regressive series of possible perceptionsfollowing
the indications of history or the footsteps of cause and effectin
accordance with empirical lawsthat in one word the course of the
world conducts us to an elapsed series of time as the condition of the
present time This series in past time is represented as real not in
itself but only in connection with a possible experience Thus when
I say that certain events occurred in past time I merely assert the
possibility of prolonging the chain of experience from the present
perception upwards to the conditions that determine it according to
time
If I represent to myself all objects existing in all space and time I
do not thereby place these in space and time prior to all experience on
the contrary such a representation is nothing more than the notion of
a possible experience in its absolute completeness In experience alone
are those objects which are nothing but representations given But
when I say they existed prior to my experience this means only that
I must begin with the perception present to me and follow the track
indicated until I discover them in some part or region of experience
The cause of the empirical condition of this progressionand
consequently at what member therein I must stop and at what point
in the regress I am to find this memberis transcendental and hence
necessarily incognizable But with this we have not to do our concern
is only with the law of progression in experience in which objects
that is phenomena are given It is a matter of indifference whether
I say I may in the progress of experience discover stars at a hundred
times greater distance than the most distant of those now visible or
Stars at this distance may be met in space although no one has
or ever will discover them For if they are given as things in
themselves without any relation to possible experience they are for me
nonexistent consequently are not objects for they are not contained
in the regressive series of experience But if these phenomena must be
employed in the construction or support of the cosmological idea of an
absolute whole and when we are discussing a question that oversteps the
limits of possible experience the proper distinction of the different
theories of the reality of sensuous objects is of great importance
in order to avoid the illusion which must necessarily arise from the
misinterpretation of our empirical conceptions
The antinomy of pure reason is based upon the following dialectical
argument If that which is conditioned is given the whole series
of its conditions is also given but sensuous objects are given as
conditioned consequently This syllogism the major of which seems
so natural and evident introduces as many cosmological ideas as there
are different kinds of conditions in the synthesis of phenomena in
so far as these conditions constitute a series These ideas require
absolute totality in the series and thus place reason in inextricable
embarrassment Before proceeding to expose the fallacy in this
dialectical argument it will be necessary to have a correct
understanding of certain conceptions that appear in it
In the first place the following proposition is evident and
indubitably certain If the conditioned is given a regress in the
series of all its conditions is thereby imperatively required For the
very conception of a conditioned is a conception of something related
to a condition and if this condition is itself conditioned to
another conditionand so on through all the members of the series
This proposition is therefore analytical and has nothing to fear
from transcendental criticism It is a logical postulate of reason
to pursue as far as possible the connection of a conception with its
conditions
If in the second place both the conditioned and the condition are
things in themselves and if the former is given not only is the
regress to the latter requisite but the latter is really given with
the former Now as this is true of all the members of the series the
entire series of conditions and with them the unconditioned is at the
same time given in the very fact of the conditioned the existence of
which is possible only in and through that series being given In
this case the synthesis of the conditioned with its condition is a
synthesis of the understanding merely which represents things as they
are without regarding whether and how we can cognize them But if
I have to do with phenomena which in their character of mere
representations are not given if I do not attain to a cognition of
them in other words to themselves for they are nothing more than
empirical cognitions I am not entitled to say If the conditioned
is given all its conditions as phenomena are also given I cannot
therefore from the fact of a conditioned being given infer the
absolute totality of the series of its conditions For phenomena are
nothing but an empirical synthesis in apprehension or perception and
are therefore given only in it Now in speaking of phenomena it does
not follow that if the conditioned is given the synthesis which
constitutes its empirical condition is also thereby given and
presupposed such a synthesis can be established only by an actual
regress in the series of conditions But we are entitled to say in this
case that a regress to the conditions of a conditioned in other
words that a continuous empirical synthesis is enjoined that if the
conditions are not given they are at least required and that we are
certain to discover the conditions in this regress
We can now see that the major in the above cosmological syllogism
takes the conditioned in the transcendental signification which it has
in the pure category while the minor speaks of it in the empirical
signification which it has in the category as applied to phenomena
There is therefore a dialectical fallacy in the syllogisma sophisma
figurae dictionis But this fallacy is not a consciously devised one
but a perfectly natural illusion of the common reason of man For
when a thing is given as conditioned we presuppose in the major its
conditions and their series unperceived as it were and unseen
because this is nothing more than the logical requirement of complete
and satisfactory premises for a given conclusion In this case time
is altogether left out in the connection of the conditioned with
the condition they are supposed to be given in themselves and
contemporaneously It is moreover just as natural to regard phenomena
in the minor as things in themselves and as objects presented to the
pure understanding as in the major in which complete abstraction was
made of all conditions of intuition But it is under these conditions
alone that objects are given Now we overlooked a remarkable distinction
between the conceptions The synthesis of the conditioned with its
condition and the complete series of the latter in the major are not
limited by time and do not contain the conception of succession On the
contrary the empirical synthesis and the series of conditions in the
phenomenal worldsubsumed in the minorare necessarily successive and
given in time alone It follows that I cannot presuppose in the minor
as I did in the major the absolute totality of the synthesis and of
the series therein represented for in the major all the members of the
series are given as things in themselveswithout any limitations or
conditions of time while in the minor they are possible only in and
through a successive regress which cannot exist except it be actually
carried into execution in the world of phenomena
After this proof of the viciousness of the argument commonly employed
in maintaining cosmological assertions both parties may now be justly
dismissed as advancing claims without grounds or title But the process
has not been ended by convincing them that one or both were in the
wrong and had maintained an assertion which was without valid grounds
of proof Nothing seems to be clearer than that if one maintains The
world has a beginning and another The world has no beginning one
of the two must be right But it is likewise clear that if the evidence
on both sides is equal it is impossible to discover on what side the
truth lies and the controversy continues although the parties have
been recommended to peace before the tribunal of reason There remains
then no other means of settling the question than to convince the
parties who refute each other with such conclusiveness and ability
that they are disputing about nothing and that a transcendental
illusion has been mocking them with visions of reality where there is
none The mode of adjusting a dispute which cannot be decided upon its
own merits we shall now proceed to lay before our readers
Zeno of Elea a subtle dialectician was severely reprimanded by Plato
as a sophist who merely from the base motive of exhibiting his
skill in discussion maintained and subverted the same proposition by
arguments as powerful and convincing on the one side as on the other He
maintained for example that God who was probably nothing more in his
view than the world is neither finite nor infinite neither in motion
nor in rest neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing It
seemed to those philosophers who criticized his mode of discussion
that his purpose was to deny completely both of two selfcontradictory
propositionswhich is absurd But I cannot believe that there is any
justice in this accusation The first of these propositions I shall
presently consider in a more detailed manner With regard to the others
if by the word of God he understood merely the Universe his meaning
must have beenthat it cannot be permanently present in one placethat
is at restnor be capable of changing its placethat is of
movingbecause all places are in the universe and the universe itself
is therefore in no place Again if the universe contains in itself
everything that exists it cannot be similar or dissimilar to any other
thing because there is in fact no other thing with which it can be
compared If two opposite judgements presuppose a contingent impossible
or arbitrary condition bothin spite of their opposition which is
however not properly or really a contradictionfall away because the
condition which ensured the validity of both has itself disappeared
If we say Everybody has either a good or a bad smell we have omitted
a third possible judgementit has no smell at all and thus both
conflicting statements may be false If we say It is either
goodsmelling or not goodsmelling vel suaveolens vel nonsuaveolens
both judgements are contradictorily opposed and the contradictory
opposite of the former judgementsome bodies are not
goodsmellingembraces also those bodies which have no smell at all In
the preceding pair of opposed judgements per disparata the contingent
condition of the conception of body smell attached to both conflicting
statements instead of having been omitted in the latter which is
consequently not the contradictory opposite of the former
If accordingly we say The world is either infinite in extension or
it is not infinite non est infinitus and if the former proposition
is false its contradictory oppositethe world is not infinitemust
be true And thus I should deny the existence of an infinite without
however affirming the existence of a finite world But if we construct
our proposition thus The world is either infinite or finite
noninfinite both statements may be false For in this case we
consider the world as per se determined in regard to quantity and
while in the one judgement we deny its infinite and consequently
perhaps its independent existence in the other we append to the
world regarded as a thing in itself a certain determinationthat
of finitude and the latter may be false as well as the former if the
world is not given as a thing in itself and thus neither as finite nor
as infinite in quantity This kind of opposition I may be allowed to
term dialectical that of contradictories may be called analytical
opposition Thus then of two dialectically opposed judgements both may
be false from the fact that the one is not a mere contradictory of
the other but actually enounces more than is requisite for a full and
complete contradiction
When we regard the two propositionsThe world is infinite in
quantity and The world is finite in quantity as contradictory
opposites we are assuming that the worldthe complete series of
phenomenais a thing in itself For it remains as a permanent quantity
whether I deny the infinite or the finite regress in the series of
its phenomena But if we dismiss this assumptionthis transcendental
illusionand deny that it is a thing in itself the contradictory
opposition is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical one and the
world as not existing in itselfindependently of the regressive series
of my representationsexists in like manner neither as a whole which is
infinite nor as a whole which is finite in itself The universe exists
for me only in the empirical regress of the series of phenomena and not
per se If then it is always conditioned it is never completely or as
a whole and it is therefore not an unconditioned whole and does not
exist as such either with an infinite or with a finite quantity
What we have here said of the first cosmological ideathat of the
absolute totality of quantity in phenomenaapplies also to the
others The series of conditions is discoverable only in the regressive
synthesis itself and not in the phenomenon considered as a thing in
itselfgiven prior to all regress Hence I am compelled to say The
aggregate of parts in a given phenomenon is in itself neither finite nor
infinite and these parts are given only in the regressive synthesis
of decompositiona synthesis which is never given in absolute
completeness either as finite or as infinite The same is the case
with the series of subordinated causes or of the conditioned up to the
unconditioned and necessary existence which can never be regarded as in
itself ind in its totality either as finite or as infinite because
as a series of subordinate representations it subsists only in the
dynamical regress and cannot be regarded as existing previously to this
regress or as a selfsubsistent series of things
Thus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas disappears
For the above demonstration has established the fact that it is merely
the product of a dialectical and illusory opposition which arises from
the application of the idea of absolute totalityadmissible only as a
condition of things in themselvesto phenomena which exist only in
our representations andwhen constituting a seriesin a successive
regress This antinomy of reason may however be really profitable to
our speculative interests not in the way of contributing any dogmatical
addition but as presenting to us another material support in our
critical investigations For it furnishes us with an indirect proof
of the transcendental ideality of phenomena if our minds were
not completely satisfied with the direct proof set forth in the
Transcendental Aesthetic The proof would proceed in the following
dilemma If the world is a whole existing in itself it must be either
finite or infinite But it is neither finite nor infiniteas has been
shown on the one side by the thesis on the other by the antithesis
Therefore the worldthe content of all phenomenais not a whole
existing in itself It follows that phenomena are nothing apart
from our representations And this is what we mean by transcendental
ideality
This remark is of some importance It enables us to see that the proofs
of the fourfold antinomy are not mere sophistriesare not fallacious
but grounded on the nature of reason and validunder the supposition
that phenomena are things in themselves The opposition of the
judgements which follow makes it evident that a fallacy lay in the
initial supposition and thus helps us to discover the true constitution
of objects of sense This transcendental dialectic does not favour
scepticism although it presents us with a triumphant demonstration of
the advantages of the sceptical method the great utility of which is
apparent in the antinomy where the arguments of reason were allowed to
confront each other in undiminished force And although the result of
these conflicts of reason is not what we expectedalthough we have
obtained no positive dogmatical addition to metaphysical sciencewe
have still reaped a great advantage in the correction of our judgements
on these subjects of thought
The cosmological principle of totality could not give us any certain
knowledge in regard to the maximum in the series of conditions in the
world of sense considered as a thing in itself The actual regress in
the series is the only means of approaching this maximum This principle
of pure reason therefore may still be considered as validnot as an
axiom enabling us to cogitate totality in the object as actual but as
a problem for the understanding which requires it to institute and
to continue in conformity with the idea of totality in the mind the
regress in the series of the conditions of a given conditioned For in
the world of sense that is in space and time every condition which
we discover in our investigation of phenomena is itself conditioned
because sensuous objects are not things in themselves in which case an
absolutely unconditioned might be reached in the progress of cognition
but are merely empirical representations the conditions of which must
always be found in intuition The principle of reason is therefore
properly a mere ruleprescribing a regress in the series of conditions
for given phenomena and prohibiting any pause or rest on an absolutely
unconditioned It is therefore not a principle of the possibility
of experience or of the empirical cognition of sensuous
objectsconsequently not a principle of the understanding for every
experience is confined within certain proper limits determined by the
given intuition Still less is it a constitutive principle of reason
authorizing us to extend our conception of the sensuous world beyond all
possible experience It is merely a principle for the enlargement and
extension of experience as far as is possible for human faculties It
forbids us to consider any empirical limits as absolute It is hence a
principle of reason which as a rule dictates how we ought to proceed
in our empirical regress but is unable to anticipate or indicate prior
to the empirical regress what is given in the object itself I have
termed it for this reason a regulative principle of reason while the
principle of the absolute totality of the series of conditions
as existing in itself and given in the object is a constitutive
cosmological principle This distinction will at once demonstrate the
falsehood of the constitutive principle and prevent us from attributing
by a transcendental subreptio objective reality to an idea which is
valid only as a rule
In order to understand the proper meaning of this rule of pure reason
we must notice first that it cannot tell us what the object is but only
how the empirical regress is to be proceeded with in order to attain to
the complete conception of the object If it gave us any information in
respect to the former statement it would be a constitutive principlea
principle impossible from the nature of pure reason It will not
therefore enable us to establish any such conclusions as The series
of conditions for a given conditioned is in itself finite or It is
infinite For in this case we should be cogitating in the mere idea
of absolute totality an object which is not and cannot be given in
experience inasmuch as we should be attributing a reality objective and
independent of the empirical synthesis to a series of phenomena This
idea of reason cannot then be regarded as validexcept as a rule for
the regressive synthesis in the series of conditions according to
which we must proceed from the conditioned through all intermediate and
subordinate conditions up to the unconditioned although this goal is
unattained and unattainable For the absolutely unconditioned cannot be
discovered in the sphere of experience
We now proceed to determine clearly our notion of a synthesis which
can never be complete There are two terms commonly employed for this
purpose These terms are regarded as expressions of different and
distinguishable notions although the ground of the distinction has
never been clearly exposed The term employed by the mathematicians
is progressus in infinitum The philosophers prefer the expression
progressus in indefinitum Without detaining the reader with an
examination of the reasons for such a distinction or with remarks
on the right or wrong use of the terms I shall endeavour clearly to
determine these conceptions so far as is necessary for the purpose in
this Critique
We may with propriety say of a straight line that it may be produced
to infinity In this case the distinction between a progressus in
infinitum and a progressus in indefinitum is a mere piece of subtlety
For although when we say Produce a straight line it is more correct
to say in indefinitum than in infinitum because the former means
Produce it as far as you please the second You must not cease to
produce it the expression in infinitum is when we are speaking of the
power to do it perfectly correct for we can always make it longer if
we pleaseon to infinity And this remark holds good in all cases when
we speak of a progressus that is an advancement from the condition to
the conditioned this possible advancement always proceeds to infinity
We may proceed from a given pair in the descending line of generation
from father to son and cogitate a neverending line of descendants from
it For in such a case reason does not demand absolute totality in the
series because it does not presuppose it as a condition and as given
datum but merely as conditioned and as capable of being given
dabile
Very different is the case with the problem How far the regress which
ascends from the given conditioned to the conditions must extend
whether I can say It is a regress in infinitum or only in
indefinitum and whether for example setting out from the human
beings at present alive in the world I may ascend in the series of
their ancestors in infinitummr whether all that can be said is that
so far as I have proceeded I have discovered no empirical ground for
considering the series limited so that I am justified and indeed
compelled to search for ancestors still further back although I am not
obliged by the idea of reason to presuppose them
My answer to this question is If the series is given in empirical
intuition as a whole the regress in the series of its internal
conditions proceeds in infinitum but if only one member of the series
is given from which the regress is to proceed to absolute totality the
regress is possible only in indefinitum For example the division of
a portion of matter given within certain limitsof a body that
isproceeds in infinitum For as the condition of this whole is its
part and the condition of the part a part of the part and so on and
as in this regress of decomposition an unconditioned indivisible member
of the series of conditions is not to be found there are no reasons
or grounds in experience for stopping in the division but on the
contrary the more remote members of the division are actually and
empirically given prior to this division That is to say the division
proceeds to infinity On the other hand the series of ancestors of
any given human being is not given in its absolute totality in any
experience and yet the regress proceeds from every genealogical member
of this series to one still higher and does not meet with any empirical
limit presenting an absolutely unconditioned member of the series
But as the members of such a series are not contained in the empirical
intuition of the whole prior to the regress this regress does not
proceed to infinity but only in indefinitum that is we are called
upon to discover other and higher members which are themselves always
conditioned
In neither casethe regressus in infinitum nor the regressus in
indefinitum is the series of conditions to be considered as actually
infinite in the object itself This might be true of things in
themselves but it cannot be asserted of phenomena which as conditions
of each other are only given in the empirical regress itself Hence
the question no longer is What is the quantity of this series of
conditions in itselfis it finite or infinite for it is nothing in
itself but How is the empirical regress to be commenced and how
far ought we to proceed with it And here a signal distinction in
the application of this rule becomes apparent If the whole is given
empirically it is possible to recede in the series of its internal
conditions to infinity But if the whole is not given and can only
be given by and through the empirical regress I can only say It
is possible to infinity to proceed to still higher conditions in
the series In the first case I am justified in asserting that more
members are empirically given in the object than I attain to in the
regress of decomposition In the second case I am justified only in
saying that I can always proceed further in the regress because no
member of the series is given as absolutely conditioned and thus
a higher member is possible and an inquiry with regard to it is
necessary In the one case it is necessary to find other members of the
series in the other it is necessary to inquire for others inasmuch as
experience presents no absolute limitation of the regress For either
you do not possess a perception which absolutely limits your empirical
regress and in this case the regress cannot be regarded as complete
or you do possess such a limitative perception in which case it is not
a part of your series for that which limits must be distinct from
that which is limited by it and it is incumbent you to continue your
regress up to this condition and so on
These remarks will be placed in their proper light by their application
in the following section
We have shown that no transcendental use can be made either of the
conceptions of reason or of understanding We have shown likewise that
the demand of absolute totality in the series of conditions in the world
of sense arises from a transcendental employment of reason resting on
the opinion that phenomena are to be regarded as things in themselves
It follows that we are not required to answer the question respecting
the absolute quantity of a serieswhether it is in itself limited or
unlimited We are only called upon to determine how far we must proceed
in the empirical regress from condition to condition in order to
discover in conformity with the rule of reason a full and correct
answer to the questions proposed by reason itself
This principle of reason is hence valid only as a rule for the extension
of a possible experienceits invalidity as a principle constitutive of
phenomena in themselves having been sufficiently demonstrated And thus
too the antinomial conflict of reason with itself is completely put an
end to inasmuch as we have not only presented a critical solution of
the fallacy lurking in the opposite statements of reason but have shown
the true meaning of the ideas which gave rise to these statements The
dialectical principle of reason has therefore been changed into a
doctrinal principle But in fact if this principle in the subjective
signification which we have shown to be its only true sense may be
guaranteed as a principle of the unceasing extension of the employment
of our understanding its influence and value are just as great as if
it were an axiom for the a priori determination of objects For such
an axiom could not exert a stronger influence on the extension and
rectification of our knowledge otherwise than by procuring for the
principles of the understanding the most widely expanded employment in
the field of experience
Here as well as in the case of the other cosmological problems the
ground of the regulative principle of reason is the proposition that
in our empirical regress no experience of an absolute limit and
consequently no experience of a condition which is itself absolutely
unconditioned is discoverable And the truth of this proposition itself
rests upon the consideration that such an experience must represent
to us phenomena as limited by nothing or the mere void on which our
continued regress by means of perception must abutwhich is impossible
Now this proposition which declares that every condition attained in
the empirical regress must itself be considered empirically conditioned
contains the rule in terminis which requires me to whatever extent
I may have proceeded in the ascending series always to look for some
higher member in the serieswhether this member is to become known to
me through experience or not
Nothing further is necessary then for the solution of the first
cosmological problem than to decide whether in the regress to the
unconditioned quantity of the universe as regards space and time
this never limited ascent ought to be called a regressus in infinitum or
indefinitum
The general representation which we form in our minds of the series of
all past states or conditions of the world or of all the things which
at present exist in it is itself nothing more than a possible empirical
regress which is cogitatedalthough in an undetermined mannerin the
mind and which gives rise to the conception of a series of conditions
for a given object Now I have a conception of the universe but not
an intuitionthat is not an intuition of it as a whole Thus I cannot
infer the magnitude of the regress from the quantity or magnitude of the
world and determine the former by means of the latter on the contrary
I must first of all form a conception of the quantity or magnitude
of the world from the magnitude of the empirical regress But of this
regress I know nothing more than that I ought to proceed from every
given member of the series of conditions to one still higher But the
quantity of the universe is not thereby determined and we cannot affirm
that this regress proceeds in infinitum Such an affirmation would
anticipate the members of the series which have not yet been reached
and represent the number of them as beyond the grasp of any empirical
synthesis it would consequently determine the cosmical quantity
prior to the regress although only in a negative mannerwhich is
impossible For the world is not given in its totality in any intuition
consequently its quantity cannot be given prior to the regress It
follows that we are unable to make any declaration respecting the
cosmical quantity in itselfnot even that the regress in it is a
regress in infinitum we must only endeavour to attain to a conception
of the quantity of the universe in conformity with the rule which
determines the empirical regress in it But this rule merely requires
us never to admit an absolute limit to our serieshow far soever we may
have proceeded in it but always on the contrary to subordinate every
phenomenon to some other as its condition and consequently to proceed
to this higher phenomenon Such a regress is therefore the regressus
in indefinitum which as not determining a quantity in the object is
clearly distinguishable from the regressus in infinitum
It follows from what we have said that we are not justified in declaring
the world to be infinite in space or as regards past time For this
conception of an infinite given quantity is empirical but we cannot
apply the conception of an infinite quantity to the world as an object
of the senses I cannot say The regress from a given perception to
everything limited either in space or time proceeds in infinitum for
this presupposes an infinite cosmical quantity neither can I say It
is finite for an absolute limit is likewise impossible in experience
It follows that I am not entitled to make any assertion at all
respecting the whole object of experiencethe world of sense I must
limit my declarations to the rule according to which experience or
empirical knowledge is to be attained
To the question therefore respecting the cosmical quantity the first
and negative answer is The world has no beginning in time and no
absolute limit in space
For in the contrary case it would be limited by a void time on the
one hand and by a void space on the other Now since the world as a
phenomenon cannot be thus limited in itself for a phenomenon is not a
thing in itself it must be possible for us to have a perception of this
limitation by a void time and a void space But such a perceptionsuch
an experience is impossible because it has no content Consequently
an absolute cosmical limit is empirically and therefore absolutely
impossible
From this follows the affirmative answer The regress in the series
of phenomenaas a determination of the cosmical quantity proceeds in
indefinitum This is equivalent to saying The world of sense has no
absolute quantity but the empirical regress through which alone the
world of sense is presented to us on the side of its conditions rests
upon a rule which requires it to proceed from every member of the
series as conditioned to one still more remote whether through
personal experience or by means of history or the chain of cause and
effect and not to cease at any point in this extension of the possible
empirical employment of the understanding And this is the proper and
only use which reason can make of its principles
The above rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one kind of
phenomena It does not for example forbid us in our ascent from an
individual human being through the line of his ancestors to expect that
we shall discover at some point of the regress a primeval pair or to
admit in the series of heavenly bodies a sun at the farthest possible
distance from some centre All that it demands is a perpetual progress
from phenomena to phenomena even although an actual perception is not
presented by them as in the case of our perceptions being so weak
as that we are unable to become conscious of them since they
nevertheless belong to possible experience
Every beginning is in time and all limits to extension are in space
But space and time are in the world of sense Consequently phenomena
in the world are conditionally limited but the world itself is not
limited either conditionally or unconditionally
For this reason and because neither the world nor the cosmical series
of conditions to a given conditioned can be completely given our
conception of the cosmical quantity is given only in and through the
regress and not prior to itin a collective intuition But the regress
itself is really nothing more than the determining of the cosmical
quantity and cannot therefore give us any determined conception of
itstill less a conception of a quantity which is in relation to a
certain standard infinite The regress does not therefore proceed to
infinity an infinity given but only to an indefinite extent for or
the of presenting to us a quantityrealized only in and through the
regress itself
When I divide a whole which is given in intuition I proceed from a
conditioned to its conditions The division of the parts of the whole
subdivisio or decompositio is a regress in the series of these
conditions The absolute totality of this series would be actually
attained and given to the mind if the regress could arrive at simple
parts But if all the parts in a continuous decomposition are themselves
divisible the division that is to say the regress proceeds from the
conditioned to its conditions in infinitum because the conditions the
parts are themselves contained in the conditioned and as the latter
is given in a limited intuition the former are all given along with it
This regress cannot therefore be called a regressus in indefinitum as
happened in the case of the preceding cosmological idea the regress
in which proceeded from the conditioned to the conditions not given
contemporaneously and along with it but discoverable only through the
empirical regress We are not however entitled to affirm of a whole
of this kind which is divisible in infinitum that it consists of an
infinite number of parts For although all the parts are contained in
the intuition of the whole the whole division is not contained therein
The division is contained only in the progressing decompositionin the
regress itself which is the condition of the possibility and actuality
of the series Now as this regress is infinite all the members
parts to which it attains must be contained in the given whole as an
aggregate But the complete series of division is not contained therein
For this series being infinite in succession and always incomplete
cannot represent an infinite number of members and still less a
composition of these members into a whole
To apply this remark to space Every limited part of space presented to
intuition is a whole the parts of which are always spacesto whatever
extent subdivided Every limited space is hence divisible to infinity
Let us again apply the remark to an external phenomenon enclosed in
limits that is a body The divisibility of a body rests upon the
divisibility of space which is the condition of the possibility of the
body as an extended whole A body is consequently divisible to infinity
though it does not for that reason consist of an infinite number of
parts
It certainly seems that as a body must be cogitated as substance
in space the law of divisibility would not be applicable to it as
substance For we may and ought to grant in the case of space that
division or decomposition to any extent never can utterly annihilate
composition that is to say the smallest part of space must still
consist of spaces otherwise space would entirely cease to
existwhich is impossible But the assertion on the other band that
when all composition in matter is annihilated in thought nothing
remains does not seem to harmonize with the conception of substance
which must be properly the subject of all composition and must remain
even after the conjunction of its attributes in spacewhich constituted
a bodyis annihilated in thought But this is not the case with
substance in the phenomenal world which is not a thing in itself
cogitated by the pure category Phenomenal substance is not an absolute
subject it is merely a permanent sensuous image and nothing more than
an intuition in which the unconditioned is not to be found
But although this rule of progress to infinity is legitimate and
applicable to the subdivision of a phenomenon as a mere occupation or
filling of space it is not applicable to a whole consisting of a number
of distinct parts and constituting a quantum discretumthat is to say
an organized body It cannot be admitted that every part in an organized
whole is itself organized and that in analysing it to infinity we
must always meet with organized parts although we may allow that the
parts of the matter which we decompose in infinitum may be organized
For the infinity of the division of a phenomenon in space rests
altogether on the fact that the divisibility of a phenomenon is given
only in and through this infinity that is an undetermined number of
parts is given while the parts themselves are given and determined only
in and through the subdivision in a word the infinity of the division
necessarily presupposes that the whole is not already divided in se
Hence our division determines a number of parts in the wholea number
which extends just as far as the actual regress in the division while
on the other hand the very notion of a body organized to infinity
represents the whole as already and in itself divided We expect
therefore to find in it a determinate but at the same time infinite
number of partswhich is selfcontradictory For we should thus have a
whole containing a series of members which could not be completed in
any regresswhich is infinite and at the same time complete in an
organized composite Infinite divisibility is applicable only to a
quantum continuum and is based entirely on the infinite divisibility
of space But in a quantum discretum the multitude of parts or units is
always determined and hence always equal to some number To what extent
a body may be organized experience alone can inform us and although
so far as our experience of this or that body has extended we may not
have discovered any inorganic part such parts must exist in possible
experience But how far the transcendental division of a phenomenon
must extend we cannot know from experienceit is a question which
experience cannot answer it is answered only by the principle of reason
which forbids us to consider the empirical regress in the analysis of
extended body as ever absolutely complete
Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcendental Mathematical
Ideasand Introductory to the Solution of the Dynamical Ideas
We presented the antinomy of pure reason in a tabular form and we
endeavoured to show the ground of this selfcontradiction on the part
of reason and the only means of bringing it to a conclusionnamely by
declaring both contradictory statements to be false We represented
in these antinomies the conditions of phenomena as belonging to the
conditioned according to relations of space and timewhich is the
usual supposition of the common understanding In this respect all
dialectical representations of totality in the series of conditions
to a given conditioned were perfectly homogeneous The condition was
always a member of the series along with the conditioned and thus the
homogeneity of the whole series was assured In this case the regress
could never be cogitated as complete or if this was the case a member
really conditioned was falsely regarded as a primal member consequently
as unconditioned In such an antinomy therefore we did not consider
the object that is the conditioned but the series of conditions
belonging to the object and the magnitude of that series And thus
arose the difficultya difficulty not to be settled by any decision
regarding the claims of the two parties but simply by cutting the
knotby declaring the series proposed by reason to be either too long
or too short for the understanding which could in neither case make its
conceptions adequate with the ideas
But we have overlooked up to this point an essential difference
existing between the conceptions of the understanding which reason
endeavours to raise to the rank of ideastwo of these indicating a
mathematical and two a dynamical synthesis of phenomena Hitherto it
was necessary to signalize this distinction for just as in our general
representation of all transcendental ideas we considered them under
phenomenal conditions so in the two mathematical ideas our discussion
is concerned solely with an object in the world of phenomena But as
we are now about to proceed to the consideration of the dynamical
conceptions of the understanding and their adequateness with ideas we
must not lose sight of this distinction We shall find that it opens up
to us an entirely new view of the conflict in which reason is involved
For while in the first two antinomies both parties were dismissed on
the ground of having advanced statements based upon false hypothesis in
the present case the hope appears of discovering a hypothesis which may
be consistent with the demands of reason and the judge completing the
statement of the grounds of claim which both parties had left in an
unsatisfactory state the question may be settled on its own merits
not by dismissing the claimants but by a comparison of the arguments on
both sides If we consider merely their extension and whether they are
adequate with ideas the series of conditions may be regarded as all
homogeneous But the conception of the understanding which lies at the
basis of these ideas contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous
presupposed in every quantityin its composition as well as in its
division or of the heterogeneous which is the case in the dynamical
synthesis of cause and effect as well as of the necessary and the
contingent
Thus it happens that in the mathematical series of phenomena no other
than a sensuous condition is admissiblea condition which is itself a
member of the series while the dynamical series of sensuous conditions
admits a heterogeneous condition which is not a member of the series
but as purely intelligible lies out of and beyond it And thus reason
is satisfied and an unconditioned placed at the head of the series
of phenomena without introducing confusion into or discontinuing it
contrary to the principles of the understanding
Now from the fact that the dynamical ideas admit a condition of
phenomena which does not form a part of the series of phenomena arises
a result which we should not have expected from an antinomy In former
cases the result was that both contradictory dialectical statements
were declared to be false In the present case we find the conditioned
in the dynamical series connected with an empirically unconditioned
but nonsensuous condition and thus satisfaction is done to the
understanding on the one hand and to the reason on the other While
moreover the dialectical arguments for unconditioned totality in mere
phenomena fall to the ground both propositions of reason may be shown
to be true in their proper signification This could not happen in
the case of the cosmological ideas which demanded a mathematically
unconditioned unity for no condition could be placed at the head of
the series of phenomena except one which was itself a phenomenon and
consequently a member of the series
There are only two modes of causality cogitablethe causality of nature
or of freedom The first is the conjunction of a particular state with
another preceding it in the world of sense the former following the
latter by virtue of a law Now as the causality of phenomena is
subject to conditions of time and the preceding state if it had always
existed could not have produced an effect which would make its first
appearance at a particular time the causality of a cause must itself be
an effectmust itself have begun to be and therefore according to the
principle of the understanding itself requires a cause
We must understand on the contrary by the term freedom in the
cosmological sense a faculty of the spontaneous origination of a state
the causality of which therefore is not subordinated to another cause
determining it in time Freedom is in this sense a pure transcendental
idea which in the first place contains no empirical element the
object of which in the second place cannot be given or determined in
any experience because it is a universal law of the very possibility
of experience that everything which happens must have a cause that
consequently the causality of a cause being itself something that has
happened must also have a cause In this view of the case the whole
field of experience how far soever it may extend contains nothing that
is not subject to the laws of nature But as we cannot by this means
attain to an absolute totality of conditions in reference to the series
of causes and effects reason creates the idea of a spontaneity which
can begin to act of itself and without any external cause determining
it to action according to the natural law of causality
It is especially remarkable that the practical conception of freedom
is based upon the transcendental idea and that the question of
the possibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the
consideration of the truth of the latter Freedom in the practical
sense is the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous impulses
A will is sensuous in so far as it is pathologically affected by
sensuous impulses it is termed animal arbitrium brutum when it is
pathologically necessitated The human will is certainly an arbitrium
sensitivum not brutum but liberum because sensuousness does not
necessitate its action a faculty existing in man of selfdetermination
independently of all sensuous coercion
It is plain that if all causality in the world of sense were
naturaland natural onlyevery event would be determined by another
according to necessary laws and that consequently phenomena in
so far as they determine the will must necessitate every action as a
natural effect from themselves and thus all practical freedom would
fall to the ground with the transcendental idea For the latter
presupposes that although a certain thing has not happened it ought to
have happened and that consequently its phenomenal cause was not so
powerful and determinative as to exclude the causality of our willa
causality capable of producing effects independently of and even in
opposition to the power of natural causes and capable consequently of
spontaneously originating a series of events
Here too we find it to be the case as we generally found in the
selfcontradictions and perplexities of a reason which strives to pass
the bounds of possible experience that the problem is properly not
physiological but transcendental The question of the possibility
of freedom does indeed concern psychology but as it rests upon
dialectical arguments of pure reason its solution must engage the
attention of transcendental philosophy Before attempting this solution
a task which transcendental philosophy cannot decline it will
be advisable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in the
settlement of the question
If phenomena were things in themselves and time and space forms of the
existence of things condition and conditioned would always be members
of the same series and thus would arise in the present case the
antinomy common to all transcendental ideasthat their series is either
too great or too small for the understanding The dynamical ideas which
we are about to discuss in this and the following section possess the
peculiarity of relating to an object not considered as a quantity but
as an existence and thus in the discussion of the present question
we may make abstraction of the quantity of the series of conditions
and consider merely the dynamical relation of the condition to the
conditioned The question then suggests itself whether freedom is
possible and if it is whether it can consist with the universality
of the natural law of causality and consequently whether we enounce a
proper disjunctive proposition when we say Every effect must have its
origin either in nature or in freedom or whether both cannot exist
together in the same event in different relations The principle of
an unbroken connection between all events in the phenomenal world in
accordance with the unchangeable laws of nature is a wellestablished
principle of transcendental analytic which admits of no exception The
question therefore is Whether an effect determined according to
the laws of nature can at the same time be produced by a free agent or
whether freedom and nature mutually exclude each other And here the
common but fallacious hypothesis of the absolute reality of phenomena
manifests its injurious influence in embarrassing the procedure
of reason For if phenomena are things in themselves freedom is
impossible In this case nature is the complete and allsufficient
cause of every event and condition and conditioned cause and effect
are contained in the same series and necessitated by the same law If
on the contrary phenomena are held to be as they are in fact nothing
more than mere representations connected with each other in accordance
with empirical laws they must have a ground which is not phenomenal
But the causality of such an intelligible cause is not determined or
determinable by phenomena although its effects as phenomena must be
determined by other phenomenal existences This cause and its causality
exist therefore out of and apart from the series of phenomena while
its effects do exist and are discoverable in the series of empirical
conditions Such an effect may therefore be considered to be free in
relation to its intelligible cause and necessary in relation to the
phenomena from which it is a necessary consequencea distinction which
stated in this perfectly general and abstract manner must appear in
the highest degree subtle and obscure The sequel will explain It is
sufficient at present to remark that as the complete and unbroken
connection of phenomena is an unalterable law of nature freedom is
impossibleon the supposition that phenomena are absolutely real Hence
those philosophers who adhere to the common opinion on this subject can
never succeed in reconciling the ideas of nature and freedom
That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous I may be
allowed to term intelligible If accordingly an object which must be
regarded as a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty which is not an
object of sensuous intuition but by means of which it is capable of
being the cause of phenomena the causality of an object or existence of
this kind may be regarded from two different points of view It may be
considered to be intelligible as regards its actionthe action of
a thing which is a thing in itself and sensuous as regards its
effectsthe effects of a phenomenon belonging to the sensuous world We
should accordingly have to form both an empirical and an intellectual
conception of the causality of such a faculty or powerboth however
having reference to the same effect This twofold manner of cogitating
a power residing in a sensuous object does not run counter to any of
the conceptions which we ought to form of the world of phenomena or of
a possible experience Phenomenanot being things in themselvesmust
have a transcendental object as a foundation which determines them as
mere representations and there seems to be no reason why we should not
ascribe to this transcendental object in addition to the property of
selfphenomenization a causality whose effects are to be met with in
the world of phenomena although it is not itself a phenomenon But
every effective cause must possess a character that is to say a law of
its causality without which it would cease to be a cause In the above
case then every sensuous object would possess an empirical character
which guaranteed that its actions as phenomena stand in complete and
harmonious connection conformably to unvarying natural laws with all
other phenomena and can be deduced from these as conditions and that
they do thus in connection with these constitute a series in the order
of nature This sensuous object must in the second place possess an
intelligible character which guarantees it to be the cause of those
actions as phenomena although it is not itself a phenomenon nor
subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense The former may
be termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon the latter the
character of the thing as a thing in itself
Now this active subject would in its character of intelligible subject
be subordinate to no conditions of time for time is only a condition
of phenomena and not of things in themselves No action would begin or
cease to be in this subject it would consequently be free from the law
of all determination of timethe law of change namely that everything
which happens must have a cause in the phenomena of a preceding
state In one word the causality of the subject in so far as it is
intelligible would not form part of the series of empirical conditions
which determine and necessitate an event in the world of sense Again
this intelligible character of a thing cannot be immediately cognized
because we can perceive nothing but phenomena but it must be capable of
being cogitated in harmony with the empirical character for we always
find ourselves compelled to place in thought a transcendental object
at the basis of phenomena although we can never know what this object is
in itself
In virtue of its empirical character this subject would at the same
time be subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality and as a
phenomenon and member of the sensuous world its effects would have
to be accounted for by a reference to preceding phenomena Eternal
phenomena must be capable of influencing it and its actions in
accordance with natural laws must explain to us how its empirical
character that is the law of its causality is to be cognized in and
by means of experience In a word all requisites for a complete and
necessary determination of these actions must be presented to us by
experience
In virtue of its intelligible character on the other hand although we
possess only a general conception of this character the subject
must be regarded as free from all sensuous influences and from
all phenomenal determination Moreover as nothing happens in this
subjectfor it is a noumenon and there does not consequently exist in
it any change demanding the dynamical determination of time and for
the same reason no connection with phenomena as causesthis active
existence must in its actions be free from and independent of natural
necessity for or necessity exists only in the world of phenomena It
would be quite correct to say that it originates or begins its effects
in the world of sense from itself although the action productive of
these effects does not begin in itself We should not be in this case
affirming that these sensuous effects began to exist of themselves
because they are always determined by prior empirical conditionsby
virtue of the empirical character which is the phenomenon of the
intelligible characterand are possible only as constituting a
continuation of the series of natural causes And thus nature and
freedom each in the complete and absolute signification of these terms
can exist without contradiction or disagreement in the same action
I have thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first merely
a sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem in order to
enable him to form with greater ease a clear conception of the course
which reason must adopt in the solution I shall now proceed to exhibit
the several momenta of this solution and to consider them in their
order
The natural law that everything which happens must have a cause that
the causality of this cause that is the action of the cause which
cannot always have existed but must be itself an event for it precedes
in time some effect which it has originated must have itself a
phenomenal cause by which it is determined and and consequently all
events are empirically determined in an order of naturethis law I
say which lies at the foundation of the possibility of experience
and of a connected system of phenomena or nature is a law of the
understanding from which no departure and to which no exception can
be admitted For to except even a single phenomenon from its operation
is to exclude it from the sphere of possible experience and thus to
admit it to be a mere fiction of thought or phantom of the brain
Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes
in which however absolute totality cannot be found But we need
not detain ourselves with this question for it has already been
sufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into which
reason falls when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the series
of phenomena If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the illusion of
transcendental idealism we shall find that neither nature nor freedom
exists Now the question is Whether admitting the existence of
natural necessity in the world of phenomena it is possible to consider
an effect as at the same time an effect of nature and an effect of
freedomor whether these two modes of causality are contradictory and
incompatible
No phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series Every
action in so far as it is productive of an event is itself an event or
occurrence and presupposes another preceding state in which its cause
existed Thus everything that happens is but a continuation of a series
and an absolute beginning is impossible in the sensuous world The
actions of natural causes are accordingly themselves effects and
presuppose causes preceding them in time A primal action which forms an
absolute beginning is beyond the causal power of phenomena
Now is it absolutely necessary that granting that all effects are
phenomena the causality of the cause of these effects must also be a
phenomenon and belong to the empirical world Is it not rather possible
that although every effect in the phenomenal world must be connected
with an empirical cause according to the universal law of nature this
empirical causality may be itself the effect of a nonempirical and
intelligible causalityits connection with natural causes remaining
nevertheless intact Such a causality would be considered in reference
to phenomena as the primal action of a cause which is in so far
therefore not phenomenal but by reason of this faculty or power
intelligible although it must at the same time as a link in the chain
of nature be regarded as belonging to the sensuous world
A belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is necessary if
we are required to look for and to present the natural conditions of
natural events that is to say their causes This being admitted as
unexceptionably valid the requirements of the understanding which
recognizes nothing but nature in the region of phenomena are satisfied
and our physical explanations of physical phenomena may proceed in their
regular course without hindrance and without opposition But it is no
stumblingblock in the way even assuming the idea to be a pure fiction
to admit that there are some natural causes in the possession of a
faculty which is not empirical but intelligible inasmuch as it is not
determined to action by empirical conditions but purely and solely upon
grounds brought forward by the understandingthis action being still
when the cause is phenomenized in perfect accordance with the laws of
empirical causality Thus the acting subject as a causal phenomenon
would continue to preserve a complete connection with nature and
natural conditions and the phenomenon only of the subject with all
its phenomenal causality would contain certain conditions which if we
ascend from the empirical to the transcendental object must necessarily
be regarded as intelligible For if we attend in our inquiries with
regard to causes in the world of phenomena to the directions of nature
alone we need not trouble ourselves about the relation in which the
transcendental subject which is completely unknown to us stands to
these phenomena and their connection in nature The intelligible ground
of phenomena in this subject does not concern empirical questions It
has to do only with pure thought and although the effects of this
thought and action of the pure understanding are discoverable in
phenomena these phenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and
complete explanation upon purely physical grounds and in accordance
with natural laws And in this case we attend solely to their empirical
and omit all consideration of their intelligible character which is the
transcendental cause of the former as completely unknown except in so
far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol Now let us
apply this to experience Man is a phenomenon of the sensuous world and
at the same time therefore a natural cause the causality of which
must be regulated by empirical laws As such he must possess an
empirical character like all other natural phenomena We remark this
empirical character in his actions which reveal the presence of certain
powers and faculties If we consider inanimate or merely animal nature
we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves any other than a
faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous manner But man to
whom nature reveals herself only through sense cognizes himself not
only by his senses but also through pure apperception and this in
actions and internal determinations which he cannot regard as sensuous
impressions He is thus to himself on the one hand a phenomenon
but on the other hand in respect of certain faculties a purely
intelligible objectintelligible because its action cannot be ascribed
to sensuous receptivity These faculties are understanding and reason
The latter especially is in a peculiar manner distinct from all
empiricallyconditioned faculties for it employs ideas alone in the
consideration of its objects and by means of these determines the
understanding which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its
own conceptions which like the ideas of reason are pure and
nonempirical
That reason possesses the faculty of causality or that at least we are
compelled so to represent it is evident from the imperatives which in
the sphere of the practical we impose on many of our executive powers
The words I ought express a species of necessity and imply a connection
with grounds which nature does not and cannot present to the mind of
man Understanding knows nothing in nature but that which is or has
been or will be It would be absurd to say that anything in nature
ought to be other than it is in the relations of time in which it
stands indeed the ought when we consider merely the course of nature
has neither application nor meaning The question What ought to happen
in the sphere of nature is just as absurd as the question What ought
to be the properties of a circle All that we are entitled to ask is
What takes place in nature or in the latter case What are the
properties of a circle
But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action the
ground of which is a pure conception while the ground of a merely
natural action is on the contrary always a phenomenon This action
must certainly be possible under physical conditions if it is
prescribed by the moral imperative ought but these physical or natural
conditions do not concern the determination of the will itself they
relate to its effects alone and the consequences of the effect in the
world of phenomena Whatever number of motives nature may present to
my will whatever sensuous impulsesthe moral ought it is beyond their
power to produce They may produce a volition which so far from
being necessary is always conditioneda volition to which the ought
enunciated by reason sets an aim and a standard gives permission or
prohibition Be the object what it may purely sensuousas pleasure
or presented by pure reasonas good reason will not yield to grounds
which have an empirical origin Reason will not follow the order
of things presented by experience but with perfect spontaneity
rearranges them according to ideas with which it compels empirical
conditions to agree It declares in the name of these ideas certain
actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place and
which perhaps never will take place and yet presupposes that it
possesses the faculty of causality in relation to these actions For
in the absence of this supposition it could not expect its ideas to
produce certain effects in the world of experience
Now let us stop here and admit it to be at least possible that reason
does stand in a really causal relation to phenomena In this case it
mustpure reason as it isexhibit an empirical character For every
cause supposes a rule according to which certain phenomena follow as
effects from the cause and every rule requires uniformity in these
effects and this is the proper ground of the conception of a causeas
a faculty or power Now this conception of a cause may be termed the
empirical character of reason and this character is a permanent one
while the effects produced appear in conformity with the various
conditions which accompany and partly limit them in various forms
Thus the volition of every man has an empirical character which is
nothing more than the causality of his reason in so far as its effects
in the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule according to
which we are enabled to examine in their several kinds and degrees the
actions of this causality and the rational grounds for these actions
and in this way to decide upon the subjective principles of the
volition Now we learn what this empirical character is only from
phenomenal effects and from the rule of these which is presented by
experience and for this reason all the actions of man in the world
of phenomena are determined by his empirical character and the
cooperative causes of nature If then we could investigate all the
phenomena of human volition to their lowest foundation in the mind
there would be no action which we could not anticipate with certainty
and recognize to be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions
So far as relates to this empirical character therefore there can be
no freedom and it is only in the light of this character that we can
consider the human will when we confine ourselves to simple observation
and as is the case in anthropology institute a physiological
investigation of the motive causes of human actions
But when we consider the same actions in relation to reasonnot for the
purpose of explaining their origin that is in relation to speculative
reason but to practical reason as the producing cause of these
actionswe shall discover a rule and an order very different from those
of nature and experience For the declaration of this mental faculty may
be that what has and could not but take place in the course of nature
ought not to have taken place Sometimes too we discover or believe
that we discover that the ideas of reason did actually stand in a
causal relation to certain actions of man and that these actions have
taken place because they were determined not by empirical causes but
by the act of the will upon grounds of reason
Now granting that reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena can
an action of reason be called free when we know that sensuously in
its empirical character it is completely determined and absolutely
necessary But this empirical character is itself determined by the
intelligible character The latter we cannot cognize we can only
indicate it by means of phenomena which enable us to have an immediate
cognition only of the empirical character An action then in so far
as it is to be ascribed to an intelligible cause does not result from
it in accordance with empirical laws That is to say not the conditions
of pure reason but only their effects in the internal sense precede
the act Pure reason as a purely intelligible faculty is not subject
to the conditions of time The causality of reason in its intelligible
character does not begin to be it does not make its appearance at a
certain time for the purpose of producing an effect If this were not
the case the causality of reason would be subservient to the natural
law of phenomena which determines them according to time and as a
series of causes and effects in time it would consequently cease to
be freedom and become a part of nature We are therefore justified in
saying If reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena it is a
faculty which originates the sensuous condition of an empirical
series of effects For the condition which resides in the reason is
nonsensuous and therefore cannot be originated or begin to be And
thus we findwhat we could not discover in any empirical seriesa
condition of a successive series of events itself empirically
unconditioned For in the present case the condition stands out of and
beyond the series of phenomenait is intelligible and it
consequently cannot be subjected to any sensuous condition or to any
timedetermination by a preceding cause
But in another respect the same cause belongs also to the series
of phenomena Man is himself a phenomenon His will has an empirical
character which is the empirical cause of all his actions There is
no conditiondetermining man and his volition in conformity with this
characterwhich does not itself form part of the series of effects
in nature and is subject to their lawthe law according to which an
empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist
For this reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous
origination all actions being phenomena and belonging to the world of
experience But it cannot be said of reason that the state in which it
determines the will is always preceded by some other state determining
it For reason is not a phenomenon and therefore not subject to
sensuous conditions and consequently even in relation to its
causality the sequence or conditions of time do not influence reason
nor can the dynamical law of nature which determines the sequence of
time according to certain rules be applied to it
Reason is consequently the permanent condition of all actions of the
human will Each of these is determined in the empirical character of
the man even before it has taken place The intelligible character of
which the former is but the sensuous schema knows no before or after
and every action irrespective of the timerelation in which it stands
with other phenomena is the immediate effect of the intelligible
character of pure reason which consequently enjoys freedom of
action and is not dynamically determined either by internal or external
preceding conditions This freedom must not be described in a merely
negative manner as independence of empirical conditions for in this
case the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of phenomena but
it must be regarded positively as a faculty which can spontaneously
originate a series of events At the same time it must not be supposed
that any beginning can take place in reason on the contrary reason
as the unconditioned condition of all action of the will admits of no
timeconditions although its effect does really begin in a series of
phenomenaa beginning which is not however absolutely primal
I shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an example
from its employment in the world of experience proved it cannot be by
any amount of experience or by any number of facts for such arguments
cannot establish the truth of transcendental propositions Let us take a
voluntary actionfor example a falsehoodby means of which a man
has introduced a certain degree of confusion into the social life
of humanity which is judged according to the motives from which it
originated and the blame of which and of the evil consequences arising
from it is imputed to the offender We at first proceed to examine the
empirical character of the offence and for this purpose we endeavour
to penetrate to the sources of that character such as a defective
education bad company a shameless and wicked disposition frivolity
and want of reflectionnot forgetting also the occasioning causes which
prevailed at the moment of the transgression In this the procedure is
exactly the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of
causes which determine a given physical effect Now although we believe
the action to have been determined by all these circumstances we do
not the less blame the offender We do not blame him for his unhappy
disposition nor for the circumstances which influenced him nay not
even for his former course of life for we presuppose that all these
considerations may be set aside that the series of preceding conditions
may be regarded as having never existed and that the action may
be considered as completely unconditioned in relation to any state
preceding just as if the agent commenced with it an entirely new series
of effects Our blame of the offender is grounded upon a law of reason
which requires us to regard this faculty as a cause which could have
and ought to have otherwise determined the behaviour of the culprit
independently of all empirical conditions This causality of reason we
do not regard as a cooperating agency but as complete in itself It
matters not whether the sensuous impulses favoured or opposed the
action of this causality the offence is estimated according to its
intelligible characterthe offender is decidedly worthy of blame the
moment he utters a falsehood It follows that we regard reason in
spite of the empirical conditions of the act as completely free and
therefore therefore as in the present case culpable
The above judgement is complete evidence that we are accustomed to think
that reason is not affected by sensuous conditions that in it no change
takes placealthough its phenomena in other words the mode in
which it appears in its effects are subject to changethat in it no
preceding state determines the following and consequently that
it does not form a member of the series of sensuous conditions which
necessitate phenomena according to natural laws Reason is present and
the same in all human actions and at all times but it does not itself
exist in time and therefore does not enter upon any state in which it
did not formerly exist It is relatively to new states or conditions
determining but not determinable Hence we cannot ask Why did not
reason determine itself in a different manner The question ought to
be thus stated Why did not reason employ its power of causality
to determine certain phenomena in a different manner But this is
a question which admits of no answer For a different intelligible
character would have exhibited a different empirical character and
when we say that in spite of the course which his whole former life has
taken the offender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood
this means merely that the act was subject to the power and
authoritypermissive or prohibitiveof reason Now reason is not
subject in its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time and
a difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of
phenomena to each otherfor these are not things and therefore not
causes in themselvesbut it cannot produce any difference in the
relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason
Thus then in our investigation into free actions and the causal power
which produced them we arrive at an intelligible cause beyond which
however we cannot go although we can recognize that it is free that
is independent of all sensuous conditions and that in this way it
may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of phenomena But for what
reason the intelligible character generates such and such phenomena
and exhibits such and such an empirical character under certain
circumstances it is beyond the power of our reason to decide The
question is as much above the power and the sphere of reason as the
following would be Why does the transcendental object of our external
sensuous intuition allow of no other form than that of intuition in
space But the problem which we were called upon to solve does not
require us to entertain any such questions The problem was merely
thiswhether freedom and natural necessity can exist without opposition
in the same action To this question we have given a sufficient
answer for we have shown that as the former stands in a relation to a
different kind of condition from those of the latter the law of the one
does not affect the law of the other and that consequently both can
exist together in independence of and without interference with each
other
The reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the above
remarks has not been to prove the actual existence of freedom as a
faculty in which resides the cause of certain sensuous phenomena For
not to mention that such an argument would not have a transcendental
character nor have been limited to the discussion of pure
conceptionsall attempts at inferring from experience what cannot be
cogitated in accordance with its laws must ever be unsuccessful Nay
more I have not even aimed at demonstrating the possibility of freedom
for this too would have been a vain endeavour inasmuch as it is beyond
the power of the mind to cognize the possibility of a reality or of a
causal power by the aid of mere a priori conceptions Freedom has been
considered in the foregoing remarks only as a transcendental idea by
means of which reason aims at originating a series of conditions in
the world of phenomena with the help of that which is sensuously
unconditioned involving itself however in an antinomy with the laws
which itself prescribes for the conduct of the understanding That this
antinomy is based upon a mere illusion and that nature and freedom are
at least not opposedthis was the only thing in our power to prove and
the question which it was our task to solve
In the preceding remarks we considered the changes in the world of
sense as constituting a dynamical series in which each member is
subordinated to anotheras its cause Our present purpose is to avail
ourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to
an existence which may be the highest condition of all changeable
phenomena that is to a necessary being Our endeavour to reach
not the unconditioned causality but the unconditioned existence of
substance The series before us is therefore a series of conceptions
and not of intuitions in which the one intuition is the condition of
the other
But it is evident that as all phenomena are subject to change and
conditioned in their existence the series of dependent existences
cannot embrace an unconditioned member the existence of which would
be absolutely necessary It follows that if phenomena were things
in themselves andas an immediate consequence from this
suppositioncondition and conditioned belonged to the same series of
phenomena the existence of a necessary being as the condition of the
existence of sensuous phenomena would be perfectly impossible
An important distinction however exists between the dynamical and the
mathematical regress The latter is engaged solely with the combination
of parts into a whole or with the division of a whole into its parts
and therefore are the conditions of its series parts of the series
and to be consequently regarded as homogeneous and for this reason as
consisting without exception of phenomena If the former regress on
the contrary the aim of which is not to establish the possibility of
an unconditioned whole consisting of given parts or of an unconditioned
part of a given whole but to demonstrate the possibility of the
deduction of a certain state from its cause or of the contingent
existence of substance from that which exists necessarily it is not
requisite that the condition should form part of an empirical series
along with the conditioned
In the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present
dealing there exists a way of escape from the difficulty for it is
not impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true
in different relations All sensuous phenomena may be contingent and
consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence and yet
there may also exist a nonempirical condition of the whole series
or in other words a necessary being For this necessary being as an
intelligible condition would not form a membernot even the highest
memberof the series the whole world of sense would be left in its
empirically determined existence uninterfered with and uninfluenced
This would also form a ground of distinction between the modes of
solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies For while in the
consideration of freedom in the former antinomy the thing itselfthe
cause substantia phaenomenonwas regarded as belonging to the series
of conditions and only its causality to the intelligible worldwe are
obliged in the present case to cogitate this necessary being as purely
intelligible and as existing entirely apart from the world of sense
as an ens extramundanum for otherwise it would be subject to the
phenomenal law of contingency and dependence
In relation to the present problem therefore the regulative principle
of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses an
empirically conditioned existencethat no property of the sensuous
world possesses unconditioned necessitythat we are bound to expect
and so far as is possible to seek for the empirical condition of every
member in the series of conditionsand that there is no sufficient
reason to justify us in deducing any existence from a condition which
lies out of and beyond the empirical series or in regarding any
existence as independent and selfsubsistent although this should not
prevent us from recognizing the possibility of the whole series being
based upon a being which is intelligible and for this reason free from
all empirical conditions
But it has been far from my intention in these remarks to prove the
existence of this unconditioned and necessary being or even to evidence
the possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the existence or
all sensuous phenomena As bounds were set to reason to prevent it from
leaving the guiding thread of empirical conditions and losing itself in
transcendent theories which are incapable of concrete presentation so
it was my purpose on the other band to set bounds to the law of the
purely empirical understanding and to protest against any attempts
on its part at deciding on the possibility of things or declaring the
existence of the intelligible to be impossible merely on the ground
that it is not available for the explanation and exposition of
phenomena It has been shown at the same time that the contingency
of all the phenomena of nature and their empirical conditions is quite
consistent with the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary although purely
intelligible condition that no real contradiction exists between them
and that consequently both may be true The existence of such an
absolutely necessary being may be impossible but this can never be
demonstrated from the universal contingency and dependence of sensuous
phenomena nor from the principle which forbids us to discontinue the
series at some member of it or to seek for its cause in some sphere
of existence beyond the world of nature Reason goes its way in the
empirical world and follows too its peculiar path in the sphere of
the transcendental
The sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena which are mere
representations and always sensuously conditioned things in themselves
are not and cannot be objects to us It is not to be wondered at
therefore that we are not justified in leaping from some member of
an empirical series beyond the world of sense as if empirical
representations were things in themselves existing apart from their
transcendental ground in the human mind and the cause of whose
existence may be sought out of the empirical series This would
certainly be the case with contingent things but it cannot be with mere
representations of things the contingency of which is itself merely a
phenomenon and can relate to no other regress than that which determines
phenomena that is the empirical But to cogitate an intelligible
ground of phenomena as free moreover from the contingency of the
latter conflicts neither with the unlimited nature of the empirical
regress nor with the complete contingency of phenomena And the
demonstration of this was the only thing necessary for the solution of
this apparent antinomy For if the condition of every conditionedas
regards its existenceis sensuous and for this reason a part of
the same series it must be itself conditioned as was shown in the
antithesis of the fourth antinomy The embarrassments into which a
reason which postulates the unconditioned necessarily falls must
therefore continue to exist or the unconditioned must be placed in the
sphere of the intelligible In this way its necessity does not require
nor does it even permit the presence of an empirical condition and it
is consequently unconditionally necessary
The empirical employment of reason is not affected by the assumption
of a purely intelligible being it continues its operations on the
principle of the contingency of all phenomena proceeding from empirical
conditions to still higher and higher conditions themselves empirical
Just as little does this regulative principle exclude the assumption
of an intelligible cause when the question regards merely the pure
employment of reasonin relation to ends or aims For in this case an
intelligible cause signifies merely the transcendental and to us unknown
ground of the possibility of sensuous phenomena and its existence
necessary and independent of all sensuous conditions is not
inconsistent with the contingency of phenomena or with the unlimited
possibility of regress which exists in the series of empirical
conditions
So long as the object of our rational conceptions is the
totality of conditions in the world of phenomena and the
satisfaction from this source of the requirements of reason
so long are our ideas transcendental and cosmological
But when we set the unconditionedwhich is the aim of
all our inquiriesin a sphere which lies out of the
world of sense and possible experience our ideas become transcendent
They are then not merely serviceable towards the completion of the
exercise of reason which remains an idea never executed but always
to be pursued they detach themselves completely from experience and
construct for themselves objects the material of which has not been
presented by experience and the objective reality of which is not based
upon the completion of the empirical series but upon pure a priori
conceptions The intelligible object of these transcendent ideas may
be conceded as a transcendental object But we cannot cogitate it as
a thing determinable by certain distinct predicates relating to its
internal nature for it has no connection with empirical conceptions
nor are we justified in affirming the existence of any such object
It is consequently a mere product of the mind alone Of all the
cosmological ideas however it is that occasioning the fourth antinomy
which compels us to venture upon this step For the existence of
phenomena always conditioned and never selfsubsistent requires us
to look for an object different from phenomenaan intelligible object
with which all contingency must cease But as we have allowed ourselves
to assume the existence of a selfsubsistent reality out of the field
of experience and are therefore obliged to regard phenomena as merely a
contingent mode of representing intelligible objects employed by beings
which are themselves intelligencesno other course remains for us than
to follow analogy and employ the same mode in forming some conception
of intelligible things of which we have not the least knowledge which
nature taught us to use in the formation of empirical conceptions
Experience made us acquainted with the contingent But we are at present
engaged in the discussion of things which are not objects of experience
and must therefore deduce our knowledge of them from that which is
necessary absolutely and in itself that is from pure conceptions
Hence the first step which we take out of the world of sense obliges
us to begin our system of new cognition with the investigation of
a necessary being and to deduce from our conceptions of it all our
conceptions of intelligible things This we propose to attempt in the
following chapter
We have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the mind
except under sensuous conditions because the conditions of objective
reality do not exist in these conceptions which contain in fact
nothing but the mere form of thought They may however when applied to
phenomena be presented in concreto for it is phenomena that present to
them the materials for the formation of empirical conceptions which
are nothing more than concrete forms of the conceptions of the
understanding But ideas are still further removed from objective
reality than categories for no phenomenon can ever present them to the
human mind in concreto They contain a certain perfection attainable
by no possible empirical cognition and they give to reason a systematic
unity to which the unity of experience attempts to approximate but can
never completely attain
But still further removed than the idea from objective reality is the
Ideal by which term I understand the idea not in concreto but in
individuoas an individual thing determinable or determined by the
idea alone The idea of humanity in its complete perfection supposes not
only the advancement of all the powers and faculties which constitute
our conception of human nature to a complete attainment of their
final aims but also everything which is requisite for the complete
determination of the idea for of all contradictory predicates only
one can conform with the idea of the perfect man What I have termed
an ideal was in Platos philosophy an idea of the divine mindan
individual object present to its pure intuition the most perfect of
every kind of possible beings and the archetype of all phenomenal
existences
Without rising to these speculative heights we are bound to confess
that human reason contains not only ideas but ideals which possess
not like those of Plato creative but certainly practical poweras
regulative principles and form the basis of the perfectibility of
certain actions Moral conceptions are not perfectly pure conceptions of
reason because an empirical elementof pleasure or painlies at the
foundation of them In relation however to the principle whereby
reason sets bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law and
consequently when we attend merely to their form they may be considered
as pure conceptions of reason Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity
are ideas But the wise man of the Stoics is an ideal that is to say a
human being existing only in thought and in complete conformity with the
idea of wisdom As the idea provides a rule so the ideal serves as an
archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy Thus
the conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of
action with which we may compare and judge ourselves which may help
us to reform ourselves although the perfection it demands can never be
attained by us Although we cannot concede objective reality to these
ideals they are not to be considered as chimeras on the contrary
they provide reason with a standard which enables it to estimate by
comparison the degree of incompleteness in the objects presented to
it But to aim at realizing the ideal in an example in the world of
experienceto describe for instance the character of the perfectly
wise man in a romanceis impracticable Nay more there is something
absurd in the attempt and the result must be little edifying as
the natural limitations which are continually breaking in upon the
perfection and completeness of the idea destroy the illusion in the
story and throw an air of suspicion even on what is good in the idea
which hence appears fictitious and unreal
Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason which is always based
upon determinate conceptions and serves as a rule and a model for
limitation or of criticism Very different is the nature of the ideals
of the imagination Of these it is impossible to present an intelligible
conception they are a kind of monogram drawn according to no
determinate rule and forming rather a vague picturethe production of
many diverse experiencesthan a determinate image Such are the ideals
which painters and physiognomists profess to have in their minds and
which can serve neither as a model for production nor as a standard for
appreciation They may be termed though improperly sensuous ideals as
they are declared to be models of certain possible empirical intuitions
They cannot however furnish rules or standards for explanation or
examination
In its ideals reason aims at complete and perfect determination
according to a priori rules and hence it cogitates an object which
must be completely determinable in conformity with principles although
all empirical conditions are absent and the conception of the object is
on this account transcendent
Every conception is in relation to that which is not contained in
it undetermined and subject to the principle of determinability This
principle is that of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only
one can belong to a conception It is a purely logical principle itself
based upon the principle of contradiction inasmuch as it makes complete
abstraction of the content and attends merely to the logical form of the
cognition
But again everything as regards its possibility is also subject to
the principle of complete determination according to which one of all
the possible contradictory predicates of things must belong to it
This principle is not based merely upon that of contradiction for
in addition to the relation between two contradictory predicates
it regards everything as standing in a relation to the sum of
possibilities as the sum total of all predicates of things and while
presupposing this sum as an a priori condition presents to the mind
everything as receiving the possibility of its individual existence from
the relation it bears to and the share it possesses in the aforesaid
sum of possibilities The principle of complete determination relates
the content and not to the logical form It is the principle of the
synthesis of all the predicates which are required to constitute the
complete conception of a thing and not a mere principle analytical
representation which enounces that one of two contradictory predicates
must belong to a conception It contains moreover a transcendental
presuppositionthat namely of the material for all possibility which
must contain a priori the data for this or that particular possibility
The proposition everything which exists is completely determined means
not only that one of every pair of given contradictory attributes but
that one of all possible attributes is always predicable of the thing
in it the predicates are not merely compared logically with each other
but the thing itself is transcendentally compared with the sumtotal of
all possible predicates The proposition is equivalent to saying To
attain to a complete knowledge of a thing it is necessary to possess a
knowledge of everything that is possible and to determine it thereby in
a positive or negative manner The conception of complete determination
is consequently a conception which cannot be presented in its totality
in concreto and is therefore based upon an idea which has its seat in
the reasonthe faculty which prescribes to the understanding the laws
of its harmonious and perfect exercise
Now although this idea of the sumtotal of all possibility in so far
as it forms the condition of the complete determination of everything
is itself undetermined in relation to the predicates which may
constitute this sumtotal and we cogitate in it merely the sumtotal of
all possible predicateswe nevertheless find upon closer examination
that this idea as a primitive conception of the mind excludes a
large number of predicatesthose deduced and those irreconcilable with
others and that it is evolved as a conception completely determined a
priori Thus it becomes the conception of an individual object which
is completely determined by and through the mere idea and must
consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason
When we consider all possible predicates not merely logically but
transcendentally that is to say with reference to the content which
may be cogitated as existing in them a priori we shall find that
some indicate a being others merely a nonbeing The logical negation
expressed in the word not does not properly belong to a conception but
only to the relation of one conception to another in a judgement and is
consequently quite insufficient to present to the mind the content of a
conception The expression not mortal does not indicate that a nonbeing
is cogitated in the object it does not concern the content at all A
transcendental negation on the contrary indicates nonbeing in itself
and is opposed to transcendental affirmation the conception of which
of itself expresses a being Hence this affirmation indicates a reality
because in and through it objects are considered to be somethingto be
things while the opposite negation on the other band indicates a
mere want or privation or absence and where such negations alone
are attached to a representation the nonexistence of anything
corresponding to the representation
Now a negation cannot be cogitated as determined without cogitating at
the same time the opposite affirmation The man born blind has not the
least notion of darkness because he has none of light the vagabond
knows nothing of poverty because he has never known what it is to be in
comfort the ignorant man has no conception of his ignorance because
he has no conception of knowledge All conceptions of negatives are
accordingly derived or deduced conceptions and realities contain the
data and so to speak the material or transcendental content of the
possibility and complete determination of all things
If therefore a transcendental substratum lies at the foundation of the
complete determination of thingsa substratum which is to form the fund
from which all possible predicates of things are to be supplied this
substratum cannot be anything else than the idea of a sumtotal of
reality omnitudo realitatis In this view negations are nothing but
limitationsa term which could not with propriety be applied to
them if the unlimited the all did not form the true basis of our
conception
This conception of a sumtotal of reality is the conception of a thing
in itself regarded as completely determined and the conception of an
ens realissimum is the conception of an individual being inasmuch as
it is determined by that predicate of all possible contradictory
predicates which indicates and belongs to being It is therefore a
transcendental ideal which forms the basis of the complete determination
of everything that exists and is the highest material condition of
its possibilitya condition on which must rest the cogitation of all
objects with respect to their content Nay more this ideal is the only
proper ideal of which the human mind is capable because in this case
alone a general conception of a thing is completely determined by and
through itself and cognized as the representation of an individuum
The logical determination of a conception is based upon a disjunctive
syllogism the major of which contains the logical division of the
extent of a general conception the minor limits this extent to a
certain part while the conclusion determines the conception by this
part The general conception of a reality cannot be divided a priori
because without the aid of experience we cannot know any determinate
kinds of reality standing under the former as the genus The
transcendental principle of the complete determination of all things is
therefore merely the representation of the sumtotal of all reality it
is not a conception which is the genus of all predicates under
itself but one which comprehends them all within itself The complete
determination of a thing is consequently based upon the limitation of
this total of reality so much being predicated of the thing while all
that remains over is excludeda procedure which is in exact agreement
with that of the disjunctive syllogism and the determination of the
objects in the conclusion by one of the members of the division
It follows that reason in laying the transcendental ideal at the
foundation of its determination of all possible things takes a course
in exact analogy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogismsa
proposition which formed the basis of the systematic division of all
transcendental ideas according to which they are produced in complete
parallelism with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed by
the human mind
It is selfevident that reason in cogitating the necessary complete
determination of things does not presuppose the existence of a being
corresponding to its ideal but merely the idea of the idealfor
the purpose of deducing from the unconditional totality of complete
determination The ideal is therefore the prototype of all things
which as defective copies ectypa receive from it the material of
their possibility and approximate to it more or less though it is
impossible that they can ever attain to its perfection
The possibility of things must therefore be regarded as derivedexcept
that of the thing which contains in itself all reality which must be
considered to be primitive and original For all negationsand they
are the only predicates by means of which all other things can be
distinguished from the ens realissimumare mere limitations of a
greater and a highernay the highest reality and they consequently
presuppose this reality and are as regards their content derived from
it The manifold nature of things is only an infinitely various mode of
limiting the conception of the highest reality which is their common
substratum just as all figures are possible only as different modes of
limiting infinite space The object of the ideal of reasonan object
existing only in reason itselfis also termed the primal being ens
originarium as having no existence superior to him the supreme being
ens summum and as being the condition of all other beings which rank
under it the being of all beings ens entium But none of these terms
indicate the objective relation of an actually existing object to
other things but merely that of an idea to conceptions and all our
investigations into this subject still leave us in perfect uncertainty
with regard to the existence of this being
A primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with an
existence which is derivative for the latter presuppose the former and
therefore cannot be constitutive parts of it It follows that the ideal
of the primal being must be cogitated as simple
The deduction of the possibility of all other things from this primal
being cannot strictly speaking be considered as a limitation or as a
kind of division of its reality for this would be regarding the primal
being as a mere aggregatewhich has been shown to be impossible
although it was so represented in our first rough sketch The highest
reality must be regarded rather as the ground than as the sumtotal
of the possibility of all things and the manifold nature of things be
based not upon the limitation of the primal being itself but upon the
complete series of effects which flow from it And thus all our powers
of sense as well as all phenomenal reality phenomenal reality may be
with propriety regarded as belonging to this series of effects
while they could not have formed parts of the idea considered as an
aggregate Pursuing this track and hypostatizing this idea we shall
find ourselves authorized to determine our notion of the Supreme Being
by means of the mere conception of a highest reality as one simple
allsufficient eternal and so onin one word to determine it in its
unconditioned completeness by the aid of every possible predicate
The conception of such a being is the conception of God in its
transcendental sense and thus the ideal of pure reason is the
objectmatter of a transcendental theology
But by such an employment of the transcendental idea we should be over
stepping the limits of its validity and purpose For reason placed
it as the conception of all reality at the basis of the complete
determination of things without requiring that this conception be
regarded as the conception of an objective existence Such an existence
would be purely fictitious and the hypostatizing of the content of
the idea into an ideal as an individual being is a step perfectly
unauthorized Nay more we are not even called upon to assume the
possibility of such an hypothesis as none of the deductions drawn
from such an ideal would affect the complete determination of things in
generalfor the sake of which alone is the idea necessary
It is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic
of reason we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this
dialectic that we may have it in our power to give a rational
explanation of this illusion as a phenomenon of the human mind For
the ideal of which we are at present speaking is based not upon an
arbitrary but upon a natural idea The question hence arises How
happens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as deduced
from a single possibility that to wit of the highest reality and
presupposes this as existing in an individual and primal being
The answer is ready it is at once presented by the procedure of
transcendental analytic The possibility of sensuous objects is a
relation of these objects to thought in which something the empirical
form may be cogitated a priori while that which constitutes the
matterthe reality of the phenomenon that element which corresponds to
sensationmust be given from without as otherwise it could not even
be cogitated by nor could its possibility be presentable to the mind
Now a sensuous object is completely determined when it has been
compared with all phenomenal predicates and represented by means of
these either positively or negatively But as that which constitutes
the thing itselfthe real in a phenomenon must be given and that in
which the real of all phenomena is given is experience one sole and
allembracingthe material of the possibility of all sensuous objects
must be presupposed as given in a whole and it is upon the limitation
of this whole that the possibility of all empirical objects their
distinction from each other and their complete determination are based
Now no other objects are presented to us besides sensuous objects and
these can be given only in connection with a possible experience it
follows that a thing is not an object to us unless it presupposes
the whole or sumtotal of empirical reality as the condition of
its possibility Now a natural illusion leads us to consider this
principle which is valid only of sensuous objects as valid with regard
to things in general And thus we are induced to hold the empirical
principle of our conceptions of the possibility of things as phenomena
by leaving out this limitative condition to be a transcendental
principle of the possibility of things in general
We proceed afterwards to hypostatize this idea of the sumtotal of all
reality by changing the distributive unity of the empirical exercise
of the understanding into the collective unity of an empirical wholea
dialectical illusion and by cogitating this whole or sum of experience
as an individual thing containing in itself all empirical reality
This individual thing or being is then by means of the abovementioned
transcendental subreption substituted for our notion of a thing which
stands at the head of the possibility of all things the real conditions
of whose complete determination it presents
Notwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels to form some
presupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper basis
for the complete determination of its conceptions the idealistic and
factitious nature of such a presupposition is too evident to allow
reason for a moment to persuade itself into a belief of the objective
existence of a mere creation of its own thought But there are other
considerations which compel reason to seek out some resting place in the
regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned which is not given
as an actual existence from the mere conception of it although it
alone can give completeness to the series of conditions And this is
the natural course of every human reason even of the most uneducated
although the path at first entered it does not always continue to
follow It does not begin from conceptions but from common experience
and requires a basis in actual existence But this basis is insecure
unless it rests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary And
this foundation is itself unworthy of trust if it leave under and above
it empty space if it do not fill all and leave no room for a why or a
wherefore if it be not in one word infinite in its reality
If we admit the existence of some one thing whatever it may be we must
also admit that there is something which exists necessarily For what is
contingent exists only under the condition of some other thing which
is its cause and from this we must go on to conclude the existence of a
cause which is not contingent and which consequently exists necessarily
and unconditionally Such is the argument by which reason justifies its
advances towards a primal being
Now reason looks round for the conception of a being that may be
admitted without inconsistency to be worthy of the attribute of
absolute necessity not for the purpose of inferring a priori from
the conception of such a being its objective existence for if reason
allowed itself to take this course it would not require a basis in
given and actual existence but merely the support of pure conceptions
but for the purpose of discovering among all our conceptions of
possible things that conception which possesses no element inconsistent
with the idea of absolute necessity For that there must be some
absolutely necessary existence it regards as a truth already
established Now if it can remove every existence incapable of
supporting the attribute of absolute necessity excepting onethis
must be the absolutely necessary being whether its necessity is
comprehensible by us that is deducible from the conception of it
alone or not
Now that the conception of which contains a therefore to every
wherefore which is not defective in any respect whatever which is
allsufficient as a condition seems to be the being of which we can
justly predicate absolute necessityfor this reason that possessing
the conditions of all that is possible it does not and cannot itself
require any condition And thus it satisfies in one respect at least
the requirements of the conception of absolute necessity In this
view it is superior to all other conceptions which as deficient and
incomplete do not possess the characteristic of independence of all
higher conditions It is true that we cannot infer from this that what
does not contain in itself the supreme and complete conditionthe
condition of all other thingsmust possess only a conditioned
existence but as little can we assert the contrary for this supposed
being does not possess the only characteristic which can enable reason
to cognize by means of an a priori conception the unconditioned and
necessary nature of its existence
The conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees with
the conception of an unconditioned and necessary being The former
conception does not satisfy all the requirements of the latter but
we have no choice we are obliged to adhere to it for we find that we
cannot do without the existence of a necessary being and even although
we admit it we find it out of our power to discover in the whole sphere
of possibility any being that can advance wellgrounded claims to such a
distinction
The following is therefore the natural course of human reason It
begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being In
this being it recognizes the characteristics of unconditioned existence
It then seeks the conception of that which is independent of all
conditions and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient
condition of all other thingsin other words in that which contains
all reality But the unlimited all is an absolute unity and is
conceived by the mind as a being one and supreme and thus reason
concludes that the Supreme Being as the primal basis of all things
possesses an existence which is absolutely necessary
This conception must be regarded as in some degree satisfactory if we
admit the existence of a necessary being and consider that there exists
a necessity for a definite and final answer to these questions In such
a case we cannot make a better choice or rather we have no choice at
all but feel ourselves obliged to declare in favour of the absolute
unity of complete reality as the highest source of the possibility
of things But if there exists no motive for coming to a definite
conclusion and we may leave the question unanswered till we have fully
weighed both sidesin other words when we are merely called upon to
decide how much we happen to know about the question and how much we
merely flatter ourselves that we knowthe above conclusion does not
appear to be so great advantage but on the contrary seems defective
in the grounds upon which it is supported
For admitting the truth of all that has been said that namely the
inference from a given existence my own for example to the existence
of an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and unassailable
that in the second place we must consider a being which contains all
reality and consequently all the conditions of other things to
be absolutely unconditioned and admitting too that we have thus
discovered the conception of a thing to which may be attributed without
inconsistency absolute necessityit does not follow from all this that
the conception of a limited being in which the supreme reality does not
reside is therefore incompatible with the idea of absolute necessity
For although I do not discover the element of the unconditioned in the
conception of such a beingan element which is manifestly existent in
the sumtotal of all conditionsI am not entitled to conclude that its
existence is therefore conditioned just as I am not entitled to affirm
in a hypothetical syllogism that where a certain condition does not
exist in the present completeness as far as pure conceptions are
concerned the conditioned does not exist either On the contrary
we are free to consider all limited beings as likewise unconditionally
necessary although we are unable to infer this from the general
conception which we have of them Thus conducted this argument is
incapable of giving us the least notion of the properties of a necessary
being and must be in every respect without result
This argument continues however to possess a weight and an authority
which in spite of its objective insufficiency it has never been
divested of For granting that certain responsibilities lie upon us
which as based on the ideas of reason deserve to be respected and
submitted to although they are incapable of a real or practical
application to our nature or in other words would be responsibilities
without motives except upon the supposition of a Supreme Being to give
effect and influence to the practical laws in such a case we should be
bound to obey our conceptions which although objectively insufficient
do according to the standard of reason preponderate over and are
superior to any claims that may be advanced from any other quarter
The equilibrium of doubt would in this case be destroyed by a practical
addition indeed Reason would be compelled to condemn herself if she
refused to comply with the demands of the judgement no superior to
which we knowhowever defective her understanding of the grounds of
these demands might be
This argument although in fact transcendental inasmuch as it rests
upon the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent is so simple and
natural that the commonest understanding can appreciate its value
We see things around us change arise and pass away they or their
condition must therefore have a cause The same demand must again be
made of the cause itselfas a datum of experience Now it is natural
that we should place the highest causality just where we place supreme
causality in that being which contains the conditions of all possible
effects and the conception of which is so simple as that of an
allembracing reality This highest cause then we regard as absolutely
necessary because we find it absolutely necessary to rise to it and
do not discover any reason for proceeding beyond it Thus among all
nations through the darkest polytheism glimmer some faint sparks of
monotheism to which these idolaters have been led not from reflection
and profound thought but by the study and natural progress of the
common understanding
There are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity on the
grounds of speculative reason
All the paths conducting to this end begin either from determinate
experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense and
rise according to the laws of causality from it to the highest
cause existing apart from the worldor from a purely indeterminate
experience that is some empirical existenceor abstraction is made of
all experience and the existence of a supreme cause is concluded from a
priori conceptions alone The first is the physicotheological argument
the second the cosmological the third the ontological More there are
not and more there cannot be
I shall show it is as unsuccessful on the one paththe empiricalas on
the otherthe transcendental and that it stretches its wings in vain
to soar beyond the world of sense by the mere might of speculative
thought As regards the order in which we must discuss those arguments
it will be exactly the reverse of that in which reason in the progress
of its development attains to themthe order in which they are
placed above For it will be made manifest to the reader that although
experience presents the occasion and the startingpoint it is the
transcendental idea of reason which guides it in its pilgrimage and
is the goal of all its struggles I shall therefore begin with an
examination of the transcendental argument and afterwards inquire what
additional strength has accrued to this mode of proof from the addition
of the empirical element
It is evident from what has been said that the conception of an
absolutely necessary being is a mere idea the objective reality of
which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a
need of reason On the contrary this idea serves merely to indicate a
certain unattainable perfection and rather limits the operations
than by the presentation of new objects extends the sphere of the
understanding But a strange anomaly meets us at the very threshold
for the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely
necessary existence seems to be correct and unavoidable while the
conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any
conception of such a being
Philosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary being
and have nevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving
whetherand howa being of this nature is even cogitable not to
mention that its existence is actually demonstrable A verbal definition
of the conception is certainly easy enough it is something the
nonexistence of which is impossible But does this definition throw
any light upon the conditions which render it impossible to cogitate the
nonexistence of a thingconditions which we wish to ascertain that we
may discover whether we think anything in the conception of such a
being or not For the mere fact that I throw away by means of the word
unconditioned all the conditions which the understanding habitually
requires in order to regard anything as necessary is very far from
making clear whether by means of the conception of the unconditionally
necessary I think of something or really of nothing at all
Nay more this chanceconception now become so current many have
endeavoured to explain by examples which seemed to render any inquiries
regarding its intelligibility quite needless Every geometrical
propositiona triangle has three anglesit was said is absolutely
necessary and thus people talked of an object which lay out of the
sphere of our understanding as if it were perfectly plain what the
conception of such a being meant
All the examples adduced have been drawn without exception from
judgements and not from things But the unconditioned necessity of
a judgement does not form the absolute necessity of a thing On the
contrary the absolute necessity of a judgement is only a conditioned
necessity of a thing or of the predicate in a judgement The
proposition abovementioned does not enounce that three angles
necessarily exist but upon condition that a triangle exists three
angles must necessarily existin it And thus this logical necessity
has been the source of the greatest delusions Having formed an a
priori conception of a thing the content of which was made to embrace
existence we believed ourselves safe in concluding that because
existence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception that is
under the condition of my positing this thing as given the existence
of the thing is also posited necessarily and that it is therefore
absolutely necessarymerely because its existence has been cogitated in
the conception
If in an identical judgement I annihilate the predicate in thought
and retain the subject a contradiction is the result and hence I say
the former belongs necessarily to the latter But if I suppress both
subject and predicate in thought no contradiction arises for there is
nothing at all and therefore no means of forming a contradiction To
suppose the existence of a triangle and not that of its three angles
is selfcontradictory but to suppose the nonexistence of both triangle
and angles is perfectly admissible And so is it with the conception of
an absolutely necessary being Annihilate its existence in thought and
you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates how then can
there be any room for contradiction Externally there is nothing
to give rise to a contradiction for a thing cannot be necessary
externally nor internally for by the annihilation or suppression of
the thing itself its internal properties are also annihilated God is
omnipotentthat is a necessary judgement His omnipotence cannot be
denied if the existence of a Deity is positedthe existence that is
of an infinite being the two conceptions being identical But when you
say God does not exist neither omnipotence nor any other predicate
is affirmed they must all disappear with the subject and in this
judgement there cannot exist the least selfcontradiction
You have thus seen that when the predicate of a judgement is annihilated
in thought along with the subject no internal contradiction can arise
be the predicate what it may There is no possibility of evading the
conclusionyou find yourselves compelled to declare There are certain
subjects which cannot be annihilated in thought But this is
nothing more than saying There exist subjects which are absolutely
necessarythe very hypothesis which you are called upon to establish
For I find myself unable to form the slightest conception of a thing
which when annihilated in thought with all its predicates leaves
behind a contradiction and contradiction is the only criterion of
impossibility in the sphere of pure a priori conceptions
Against these general considerations the justice of which no one can
dispute one argument is adduced which is regarded as furnishing a
satisfactory demonstration from the fact It is affirmed that there is
one and only one conception in which the nonbeing or annihilation of
the object is selfcontradictory and this is the conception of an ens
realissimum It possesses you say all reality and you feel yourselves
justified in admitting the possibility of such a being This I am
willing to grant for the present although the existence of a conception
which is not selfcontradictory is far from being sufficient to prove
the possibility of an object Now the notion of all reality embraces
in it that of existence the notion of existence lies therefore in
the conception of this possible thing If this thing is annihilated
in thought the internal possibility of the thing is also annihilated
which is selfcontradictory
I answer It is absurd to introduceunder whatever term disguisedinto
the conception of a thing which is to be cogitated solely in reference
to its possibility the conception of its existence If this is
admitted you will have apparently gained the day but in reality have
enounced nothing but a mere tautology I ask is the proposition
this or that thing which I am admitting to be possible exists an
analytical or a synthetical proposition If the former there is no
addition made to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its
existence but then the conception in your minds is identical with
the thing itself or you have supposed the existence of a thing to
be possible and then inferred its existence from its internal
possibilitywhich is but a miserable tautology The word reality in the
conception of the thing and the word existence in the conception of the
predicate will not help you out of the difficulty For supposing you
were to term all positing of a thing reality you have thereby posited
the thing with all its predicates in the conception of the subject
and assumed its actual existence and this you merely repeat in the
predicate But if you confess as every reasonable person must that
every existential proposition is synthetical how can it be
maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied without
contradictiona property which is the characteristic of analytical
propositions alone
I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this
sophistical mode of argumentation by a strict definition of the
conception of existence did not my own experience teach me that the
illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate a
predicate which aids in the determination of a thing resists almost all
the endeavours of explanation and illustration A logical predicate may
be what you please even the subject may be predicated of itself
for logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement But the
determination of a conception is a predicate which adds to and enlarges
the conception It must not therefore be contained in the conception
Being is evidently not a real predicate that is a conception of
something which is added to the conception of some other thing It is
merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in it
Logically it is merely the copula of a judgement The proposition God
is omnipotent contains two conceptions which have a certain object or
content the word is is no additional predicateit merely indicates
the relation of the predicate to the subject Now if I take the subject
God with all its predicates omnipotence being one and say God is
or There is a God I add no new predicate to the conception of God
I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its
predicatesI posit the object in relation to my conception The content
of both is the same and there is no addition made to the conception
which expresses merely the possibility of the object by my cogitating
the objectin the expression it isas absolutely given or existing
Thus the real contains no more than the possible A hundred real dollars
contain no more than a hundred possible dollars For as the latter
indicate the conception and the former the object on the supposition
that the content of the former was greater than that of the latter my
conception would not be an expression of the whole object and would
consequently be an inadequate conception of it But in reckoning my
wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than in a
hundred possible dollarsthat is in the mere conception of them
For the real objectthe dollarsis not analytically contained in my
conception but forms a synthetical addition to my conception which
is merely a determination of my mental state although this objective
realitythis existenceapart from my conceptions does not in the
least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars
By whatever and by whatever number of predicateseven to the complete
determination of itI may cogitate a thing I do not in the least
augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement
This thing exists Otherwise not exactly the same but something more
than what was cogitated in my conception would exist and I could not
affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence If I
cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one the mode
of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the thing
by the affirmation that the thing exists on the contrary the thing
existsif it exist at allwith the same defect as that cogitated in
its conception otherwise not that which was cogitated but something
different exists Now if I cogitate a being as the highest reality
without defect or imperfection the question still remainswhether this
being exists or not For although no element is wanting in the possible
real content of my conception there is a defect in its relation to my
mental state that is I am ignorant whether the cognition of the object
indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori And here the cause
of the present difficulty becomes apparent If the question regarded an
object of sense merely it would be impossible for me to confound the
conception with the existence of a thing For the conception merely
enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general
conditions of experience while the existence of the object permits me
to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of actual experience At the
same time this connection with the world of experience does not in the
least augment the conception although a possible perception has been
added to the experience of the mind But if we cogitate existence by the
pure category alone it is not to be wondered at that we should find
ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it
from mere possibility
Whatever be the content of our conception of an object it is necessary
to go beyond it if we wish to predicate existence of the object In the
case of sensuous objects this is attained by their connection according
to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions but there is no means
of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought because it must
be cognized completely a priori But all our knowledge of existence be
it immediately by perception or by inferences connecting some object
with a perception belongs entirely to the sphere of experiencewhich
is in perfect unity with itself and although an existence out of
this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible it is a
hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining
The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful idea
but for the very reason that it is an idea it is incapable of enlarging
our cognition with regard to the existence of things It is not even
sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being which we
do not know to exist The analytical criterion of possibility which
consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions cannot
be denied it But the connection of real properties in a thing is a
synthesis of the possibility of which an a priori judgement cannot be
formed because these realities are not presented to us specifically
and even if this were to happen a judgement would still be impossible
because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must
be sought for in the world of experience to which the object of an idea
cannot belong And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in
his attempt to establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this
sublime ideal being
The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of
a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient and we may as well hope
to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas as the
merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash
account
It was by no means a natural course of proceeding but on the contrary
an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools to attempt
to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object
corresponding to it Such a course would never have been pursued
were it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the
existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress and
that as this necessity must be unconditioned and a priori reason is
bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy if possible this
requirement and enable us to attain to the a priori cognition of such
a being This conception was thought to be found in the idea of an ens
realissimum and thus this idea was employed for the attainment of a
better defined knowledge of a necessary being of the existence of
which we were convinced or persuaded on other grounds Thus reason was
seduced from her natural courage and instead of concluding with the
conception of an ens realissimum an attempt was made to begin with it
for the purpose of inferring from it that idea of a necessary existence
which it was in fact called in to complete Thus arose that unfortunate
ontological argument which neither satisfies the healthy common sense
of humanity nor sustains the scientific examination of the philosopher
The cosmological proof which we are about to examine retains the
connection between absolute necessity and the highest reality but
instead of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary existence
like the preceding argument it concludes from the given unconditioned
necessity of some being its unlimited reality The track it pursues
whether rational or sophistical is at least natural and not only goes
far to persuade the common understanding but shows itself deserving of
respect from the speculative intellect while it contains at the
same time the outlines of all the arguments employed in natural
theologyarguments which always have been and still will be in
use and authority These however adorned and hid under whatever
embellishments of rhetoric and sentiment are at bottom identical
with the arguments we are at present to discuss This proof termed by
Leibnitz the argumentum a contingentia mundi I shall now lay before the
reader and subject to a strict examination
It is framed in the following manner If something exists an
absolutely necessary being must likewise exist Now I at least exist
Consequently there exists an absolutely necessary being The minor
contains an experience the major reasons from a general experience to
the existence of a necessary being Thus this argument really begins at
experience and is not completely a priori or ontological The
object of all possible experience being the world it is called the
cosmological proof It contains no reference to any peculiar property
of sensuous objects by which this world of sense might be distinguished
from other possible worlds and in this respect it differs from the
physicotheological proof which is based upon the consideration of the
peculiar constitution of our sensuous world
The proof proceeds thus A necessary being can be determined only in one
way that is it can be determined by only one of all possible opposed
predicates consequently it must be completely determined in and by its
conception But there is only a single conception of a thing possible
which completely determines the thing a priori that is the conception
of the ens realissimum It follows that the conception of the ens
realissimum is the only conception by and in which we can cogitate a
necessary being Consequently a Supreme Being necessarily exists
In this cosmological argument are assembled so many sophistical
propositions that speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all
her dialectical skill to produce a transcendental illusion of the most
extreme character We shall postpone an investigation of this argument
for the present and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by
which it imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress and appeals
to the agreement of two witnesses the one with the credentials of pure
reason and the other with those of empiricism while in fact it is
only the former who has changed his dress and voice for the purpose
of passing himself off for an additional witness That it may possess
a secure foundation it bases its conclusions upon experience and thus
appears to be completely distinct from the ontological argument which
places its confidence entirely in pure a priori conceptions But this
experience merely aids reason in making one stepto the existence of a
necessary being What the properties of this being are cannot be learned
from experience and therefore reason abandons it altogether and
pursues its inquiries in the sphere of pure conception for the purpose
of discovering what the properties of an absolutely necessary being
ought to be that is what among all possible things contain the
conditions requisita of absolute necessity Reason believes that
it has discovered these requisites in the conception of an ens
realissimumand in it alone and hence concludes The ens realissimum
is an absolutely necessary being But it is evident that reason has
here presupposed that the conception of an ens realissimum is perfectly
adequate to the conception of a being of absolute necessity that is
that we may infer the existence of the latter from that of the formera
proposition which formed the basis of the ontological argument and
which is now employed in the support of the cosmological argument
contrary to the wish and professions of its inventors For the existence
of an absolutely necessary being is given in conceptions alone But if
I say The conception of the ens realissimum is a conception of this
kind and in fact the only conception which is adequate to our idea of a
necessary being I am obliged to admit that the latter may be inferred
from the former Thus it is properly the ontological argument which
figures in the cosmological and constitutes the whole strength of the
latter while the spurious basis of experience has been of no further
use than to conduct us to the conception of absolute necessity being
utterly insufficient to demonstrate the presence of this attribute in
any determinate existence or thing For when we propose to ourselves
an aim of this character we must abandon the sphere of experience and
rise to that of pure conceptions which we examine with the purpose of
discovering whether anyone contains the conditions of the possibility
of an absolutely necessary being But if the possibility of such a being
is thus demonstrated its existence is also proved for we may then
assert that of all possible beings there is one which possesses
the attribute of necessityin other words this being possesses an
absolutely necessary existence
All illusions in an argument are more easily detected when they are
presented in the formal manner employed by the schools which we now
proceed to do
If the proposition Every absolutely necessary being is likewise an ens
realissimum is correct and it is this which constitutes the nervus
probandi of the cosmological argument it must like all affirmative
judgements be capable of conversionthe conversio per accidens at
least It follows then that some entia realissima are absolutely
necessary beings But no ens realissimum is in any respect different
from another and what is valid of some is valid of all In this present
case therefore I may employ simple conversion and say Every ens
realissimum is a necessary being But as this proposition is determined
a priori by the conceptions contained in it the mere conception of
an ens realissimum must possess the additional attribute of absolute
necessity But this is exactly what was maintained in the ontological
argument and not recognized by the cosmological although it formed the
real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning
Thus the second mode employed by speculative reason of demonstrating the
existence of a Supreme Being is not only like the first illusory
and inadequate but possesses the additional blemish of an ignoratio
elenchiprofessing to conduct us by a new road to the desired goal but
bringing us back after a short circuit to the old path which we had
deserted at its call
I mentioned above that this cosmological argument contains a perfect
nest of dialectical assumptions which transcendental criticism does not
find it difficult to expose and to dissipate I shall merely enumerate
these leaving it to the reader who must by this time be well practised
in such matters to investigate the fallacies residing therein
The following fallacies for example are discoverable in this mode of
proof 1 The transcendental principle Everything that is contingent
must have a causea principle without significance except in the
sensuous world For the purely intellectual conception of the contingent
cannot produce any synthetical proposition like that of causality
which is itself without significance or distinguishing characteristic
except in the phenomenal world But in the present case it is employed
to help us beyond the limits of its sphere 2 From the impossibility
of an infinite ascending series of causes in the world of sense a first
cause is inferred a conclusion which the principles of the employment
of reason do not justify even in the sphere of experience and still
less when an attempt is made to pass the limits of this sphere 3
Reason allows itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds with
regard to the completion of this series It removes all conditions
without which however no conception of Necessity can take place
and as after this it is beyond our power to form any other conceptions
it accepts this as a completion of the conception it wishes to form of
the series 4 The logical possibility of a conception of the total
of reality the criterion of this possibility being the absence of
contradiction is confounded with the transcendental which requires a
principle of the practicability of such a synthesisa principle which
again refers us to the world of experience And so on
The aim of the cosmological argument is to avoid the necessity
of proving the existence of a necessary being priori from mere
conceptionsa proof which must be ontological and of which we feel
ourselves quite incapable With this purpose we reason from an
actual existencean experience in general to an absolutely necessary
condition of that existence It is in this case unnecessary to
demonstrate its possibility For after having proved that it exists the
question regarding its possibility is superfluous Now when we wish to
define more strictly the nature of this necessary being we do not look
out for some being the conception of which would enable us to comprehend
the necessity of its beingfor if we could do this an empirical
presupposition would be unnecessary no we try to discover merely the
negative condition conditio sine qua non without which a being would
not be absolutely necessary Now this would be perfectly admissible in
every sort of reasoning from a consequence to its principle but in
the present case it unfortunately happens that the condition of absolute
necessity can be discovered in but a single being the conception of
which must consequently contain all that is requisite for demonstrating
the presence of absolute necessity and thus entitle me to infer this
absolute necessity a priori That is it must be possible to reason
conversely and say The thing to which the conception of the highest
reality belongs is absolutely necessary But if I cannot reason
thusand I cannot unless I believe in the sufficiency of the
ontological argumentI find insurmountable obstacles in my new path
and am really no farther than the point from which I set out The
conception of a Supreme Being satisfies all questions a priori regarding
the internal determinations of a thing and is for this reason an ideal
without equal or parallel the general conception of it indicating it
as at the same time an ens individuum among all possible things But the
conception does not satisfy the question regarding its existencewhich
was the purpose of all our inquiries and although the existence of a
necessary being were admitted we should find it impossible to answer
the question What of all things in the world must be regarded as such
It is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an allsufficient
beinga cause of all possible effectsfor the purpose of enabling
reason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of explanation with
regard to phenomena But to assert that such a being necessarily exists
is no longer the modest enunciation of an admissible hypothesis but
the boldest declaration of an apodictic certainty for the cognition of
that which is absolutely necessary must itself possess that character
The aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is either to
discover a conception which shall harmonize with the idea of absolute
necessity or a conception which shall contain that idea If the one
is possible so is the other for reason recognizes that alone as
absolutely necessary which is necessary from its conception But both
attempts are equally beyond our powerwe find it impossible to satisfy
the understanding upon this point and as impossible to induce it to
remain at rest in relation to this incapacity
Unconditioned necessity which as the ultimate support and stay of
all existing things is an indispensable requirement of the mind is an
abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay Even the
idea of eternity terrible and sublime as it is as depicted by Haller
does not produce upon the mental vision such a feeling of awe and
terror for although it measures the duration of things it does not
support them We cannot bear nor can we rid ourselves of the
thought that a being which we regard as the greatest of all possible
existences should say to himself I am from eternity to eternity
beside me there is nothing except that which exists by my will whence
then am I Here all sinks away from under us and the greatest as the
smallest perfection hovers without stay or footing in presence of the
speculative reason which finds it as easy to part with the one as with
the other
Many physical powers which evidence their existence by their effects
are perfectly inscrutable in their nature they elude all our powers
of observation The transcendental object which forms the basis of
phenomena and in connection with it the reason why our sensibility
possesses this rather than that particular kind of conditions are and
must ever remain hidden from our mental vision the fact is there the
reason of the fact we cannot see But an ideal of pure reason cannot
be termed mysterious or inscrutable because the only credential of
its reality is the need of it felt by reason for the purpose of giving
completeness to the world of synthetical unity An ideal is not even
given as a cogitable object and therefore cannot be inscrutable on
the contrary it must as a mere idea be based on the constitution of
reason itself and on this account must be capable of explanation and
solution For the very essence of reason consists in its ability to
give an account of all our conceptions opinions and assertionsupon
objective or when they happen to be illusory and fallacious upon
subjective grounds
Both of the above arguments are transcendental in other words they do
not proceed upon empirical principles For although the cosmological
argument professed to lay a basis of experience for its edifice
of reasoning it did not ground its procedure upon the peculiar
constitution of experience but upon pure principles of reasonin
relation to an existence given by empirical consciousness utterly
abandoning its guidance however for the purpose of supporting its
assertions entirely upon pure conceptions Now what is the cause
in these transcendental arguments of the dialectical but natural
illusion which connects the conceptions of necessity and supreme
reality and hypostatizes that which cannot be anything but an idea
What is the cause of this unavoidable step on the part of reason of
admitting that some one among all existing things must be necessary
while it falls back from the assertion of the existence of such a being
as from an abyss And how does reason proceed to explain this anomaly
to itself and from the wavering condition of a timid and reluctant
approbationalways again withdrawnarrive at a calm and settled
insight into its cause
It is something very remarkable that on the supposition that something
exists I cannot avoid the inference that something exists necessarily
Upon this perfectly naturalbut not on that account reliableinference
does the cosmological argument rest But let me form any conception
whatever of a thing I find that I cannot cogitate the existence of
the thing as absolutely necessary and that nothing prevents mebe the
thing or being what it mayfrom cogitating its nonexistence I may
thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary
basis while I cannot cogitate any single or individual thing as
necessary In other words I can never complete the regress through the
conditions of existence without admitting the existence of a necessary
being but on the other hand I cannot make a commencement from this
being
If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the basis of
existing things and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual
thing as in itself necessary the inevitable inference is that necessity
and contingency are not properties of things themselvesotherwise an
internal contradiction would result that consequently neither of
these principles are objective but merely subjective principles
of reasonthe one requiring us to seek for a necessary ground
for everything that exists that is to be satisfied with no other
explanation than that which is complete a priori the other forbidding
us ever to hope for the attainment of this completeness that is to
regard no member of the empirical world as unconditioned In this
mode of viewing them both principles in their purely heuristic and
regulative character and as concerning merely the formal interest of
reason are quite consistent with each other The one says You must
philosophize upon nature as if there existed a necessary primal basis
of all existing things solely for the purpose of introducing systematic
unity into your knowledge by pursuing an idea of this charactera
foundation which is arbitrarily admitted to be ultimate while the
other warns you to consider no individual determination concerning
the existence of things as such an ultimate foundation that is
as absolutely necessary but to keep the way always open for further
progress in the deduction and to treat every determination as
determined by some other But if all that we perceive must be regarded
as conditionally necessary it is impossible that anything which is
empirically given should be absolutely necessary
It follows from this that you must accept the absolutely necessary
as out of and beyond the world inasmuch as it is useful only as a
principle of the highest possible unity in experience and you cannot
discover any such necessary existence in the world the second rule
requiring you to regard all empirical causes of unity as themselves
deduced
The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as
contingent while matter was considered by them in accordance with the
judgement of the common reason of mankind as primal and necessary
But if they had regarded matter not relativelyas the substratum of
phenomena but absolutely and in itselfas an independent existence
this idea of absolute necessity would have immediately disappeared For
there is nothing absolutely connecting reason with such an existence
on the contrary it can annihilate it in thought always and without
selfcontradiction But in thought alone lay the idea of absolute
necessity A regulative principle must therefore have been at
the foundation of this opinion In fact extension and
impenetrabilitywhich together constitute our conception of
matterform the supreme empirical principle of the unity of phenomena
and this principle in so far as it is empirically unconditioned
possesses the property of a regulative principle But as every
determination of matter which constitutes what is real in itand
consequently impenetrabilityis an effect which must have a cause and
is for this reason always derived the notion of matter cannot harmonize
with the idea of a necessary being in its character of the principle of
all derived unity For every one of its real properties being derived
must be only conditionally necessary and can therefore be annihilated
in thought and thus the whole existence of matter can be so annihilated
or suppressed If this were not the case we should have found in the
world of phenomena the highest ground or condition of unitywhich is
impossible according to the second regulative principle It follows
that matter and in general all that forms part of the world of sense
cannot be a necessary primal being nor even a principle of empirical
unity but that this being or principle must have its place assigned
without the world And in this way we can proceed in perfect
confidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and their existence from
other phenomena just as if there existed no necessary being and we
can at the same time strive without ceasing towards the attainment of
completeness for our deduction just as if such a beingthe supreme
condition of all existenceswere presupposed by the mind
These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal of
the Supreme Being far from being an enouncement of the existence of a
being in itself necessary is nothing more than a regulative principle
of reason requiring us to regard all connection existing between
phenomena as if it had its origin from an allsufficient necessary
cause and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary unity
in the explanation of phenomena We cannot at the same time avoid
regarding by a transcendental subreptio this formal principle as
constitutive and hypostatizing this unity Precisely similar is the
case with our notion of space Space is the primal condition of all
forms which are properly just so many different limitations of it and
thus although it is merely a principle of sensibility we cannot help
regarding it as an absolutely necessary and selfsubsistent thingas
an object given a priori in itself In the same way it is quite natural
that as the systematic unity of nature cannot be established as a
principle for the empirical employment of reason unless it is based
upon the idea of an ens realissimum as the supreme cause we should
regard this idea as a real object and this object in its character
of supreme condition as absolutely necessary and that in this way a
regulative should be transformed into a constitutive principle This
interchange becomes evident when I regard this supreme being which
relatively to the world was absolutely unconditionally necessary
as a thing per se In this case I find it impossible to represent this
necessity in or by any conception and it exists merely in my own mind
as the formal condition of thought but not as a material and hypostatic
condition of existence
If then neither a pure conception nor the general experience of an
existing being can provide a sufficient basis for the proof of the
existence of the Deity we can make the attempt by the only other
modethat of grounding our argument upon a determinate experience of
the phenomena of the present world their constitution and disposition
and discover whether we can thus attain to a sound conviction of
the existence of a Supreme Being This argument we shall term the
physicotheological argument If it is shown to be insufficient
speculative reason cannot present us with any satisfactory proof of the
existence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea
It is evident from the remarks that have been made in the preceding
sections that an answer to this question will be far from being
difficult or unconvincing For how can any experience be adequate
with an idea The very essence of an idea consists in the fact that no
experience can ever be discovered congruent or adequate with it The
transcendental idea of a necessary and allsufficient being is so
immeasurably great so high above all that is empirical which is always
conditioned that we hope in vain to find materials in the sphere of
experience sufficiently ample for our conception and in vain seek the
unconditioned among things that are conditioned while examples nay
even guidance is denied us by the laws of empirical synthesis
If the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical conditions
it must be a member of the empirical series and like the lower members
which it precedes have its origin in some higher member of the series
If on the other hand we disengage it from the chain and cogitate it
as an intelligible being apart from the series of natural causeshow
shall reason bridge the abyss that separates the latter from the former
All laws respecting the regress from effects to causes all synthetical
additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible experience and
the objects of the sensuous world and apart from them are without
significance
The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of
order variety beauty and conformity to ends that whether we pursue
our observations into the infinity of space in the one direction or
into its illimitable divisions in the other whether we regard the world
in its greatest or its least manifestationseven after we have attained
to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach we
find that language in the presence of wonders so inconceivable has lost
its force and number its power to reckon nay even thought fails to
conceive adequately and our conception of the whole dissolves into an
astonishment without power of expressionall the more eloquent that it
is dumb Everywhere around us we observe a chain of causes and effects
of means and ends of death and birth and as nothing has entered
of itself into the condition in which we find it we are constantly
referred to some other thing which itself suggests the same inquiry
regarding its cause and thus the universe must sink into the abyss
of nothingness unless we admit that besides this infinite chain
of contingencies there exists something that is primal and
selfsubsistentsomething which as the cause of this phenomenal world
secures its continuance and preservation
This highest causewhat magnitude shall we attribute to it Of the
content of the world we are ignorant still less can we estimate its
magnitude by comparison with the sphere of the possible But this
supreme cause being a necessity of the human mind what is there to
prevent us from attributing to it such a degree of perfection as to
place it above the sphere of all that is possible This we can easily
do although only by the aid of the faint outline of an abstract
conception by representing this being to ourselves as containing
in itself as an individual substance all possible perfectiona
conception which satisfies that requirement of reason which demands
parsimony in principles which is free from selfcontradiction which
even contributes to the extension of the employment of reason in
experience by means of the guidance afforded by this idea to order and
system and which in no respect conflicts with any law of experience
This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect It is the
oldest the clearest and that most in conformity with the common reason
of humanity It animates the study of nature as it itself derives its
existence and draws ever new strength from that source It introduces
aims and ends into a sphere in which our observation could not of itself
have discovered them and extends our knowledge of nature by directing
our attention to a unity the principle of which lies beyond nature
This knowledge of nature again reacts upon this ideaits cause and
thus our belief in a divine author of the universe rises to the power of
an irresistible conviction
For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this
argument of the authority it has always enjoyed The mind unceasingly
elevated by these considerations which although empirical are so
remarkably powerful and continually adding to their force will
not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by subtle
speculation it tears itself out of this state of uncertainty the
moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature and the majesty
of the universe and rises from height to height from condition to
condition till it has elevated itself to the supreme and unconditioned
author of all
But although we have nothing to object to the reasonableness and utility
of this procedure but have rather to commend and encourage it
we cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to
demonstrative certainty and to a reception upon its own merits apart
from favour or support by other arguments Nor can it injure the cause
of morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the arrogant sophist and
to teach him that modesty and moderation which are the properties of a
belief that brings calm and content into the mind without
prescribing to it an unworthy subjection I maintain then that the
physicotheological argument is insufficient of itself to prove
the existence of a Supreme Being that it must entrust this to the
ontological argumentto which it serves merely as an introduction and
that consequently this argument contains the only possible ground of
proof possessed by speculative reason for the existence of this being
The chief momenta in the physicotheological argument are as follow
We observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of
purpose executed with great wisdom and argument in whole of a
content indescribably various and of an extent without limits 2 This
arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things existing
in the worldit belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute
in other words the nature of different things could not of itself
whatever means were employed harmoniously tend towards certain
purposes were they not chosen and directed for these purposes by a
rational and disposing principle in accordance with certain fundamental
ideas 3 There exists therefore a sublime and wise cause or
several which is not merely a blind allpowerful nature producing
the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious fecundity but
a free and intelligent cause of the world 4 The unity of this cause
may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation existing
between the parts of the world as portions of an artistic edificean
inference which all our observation favours and all principles of
analogy support
In the above argument it is inferred from the analogy of certain
products of nature with those of human art when it compels Nature to
bend herself to its purposes as in the case of a house a ship or
a watch that the same kind of causalitynamely understanding
and willresides in nature It is also declared that the internal
possibility of this freelyacting nature which is the source of all
art and perhaps also of human reason is derivable from another and
superhuman arta conclusion which would perhaps be found incapable of
standing the test of subtle transcendental criticism But to neither of
these opinions shall we at present object We shall only remark that
it must be confessed that if we are to discuss the subject of cause
at all we cannot proceed more securely than with the guidance of the
analogy subsisting between nature and such products of designthese
being the only products whose causes and modes of organization are
completely known to us Reason would be unable to satisfy her own
requirements if she passed from a causality which she does know to
obscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation which she does not
know
According to the physicotheological argument the connection and
harmony existing in the world evidence the contingency of the form
merely but not of the matter that is of the substance of the world
To establish the truth of the latter opinion it would be necessary to
prove that all things would be in themselves incapable of this harmony
and order unless they were even as regards their substance the
product of a supreme wisdom But this would require very different
grounds of proof from those presented by the analogy with human art
This proof can at most therefore demonstrate the existence of an
architect of the world whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of
the material with which he works but not of a creator of the world to
whom all things are subject Thus this argument is utterly insufficient
for the task before usa demonstration of the existence of an
allsufficient being If we wish to prove the contingency of matter
we must have recourse to a transcendental argument which the
physicotheological was constructed expressly to avoid
We infer from the order and design visible in the universe as a
disposition of a thoroughly contingent character the existence of a
cause proportionate thereto The conception of this cause must contain
certain determinate qualities and it must therefore be regarded as the
conception of a being which possesses all power wisdom and so on in
one word all perfectionthe conception that is of an allsufficient
being For the predicates of very great astonishing or immeasurable
power and excellence give us no determinate conception of the thing
nor do they inform us what the thing may be in itself They merely
indicate the relation existing between the magnitude of the object and
the observer who compares it with himself and with his own power of
comprehension and are mere expressions of praise and reverence
by which the object is either magnified or the observing subject
depreciated in relation to the object Where we have to do with the
magnitude of the perfection of a thing we can discover no determinate
conception except that which comprehends all possible perfection or
completeness and it is only the total omnitudo of reality which is
completely determined in and through its conception alone
Now it cannot be expected that anyone will be bold enough to declare
that he has a perfect insight into the relation which the magnitude
of the world he contemplates bears in its extent as well as in its
content to omnipotence into that of the order and design in the
world to the highest wisdom and that of the unity of the world to
the absolute unity of a Supreme Being Physicotheology is therefore
incapable of presenting a determinate conception of a supreme cause of
the world and is therefore insufficient as a principle of theologya
theology which is itself to be the basis of religion
The attainment of absolute totality is completely impossible on the
path of empiricism And yet this is the path pursued in the
physicotheological argument What means shall we employ to bridge the
abyss
After elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the power
wisdom and other attributes of the author of the world and finding we
can advance no further we leave the argument on empirical grounds
and proceed to infer the contingency of the world from the order and
conformity to aims that are observable in it From this contingency we
infer by the help of transcendental conceptions alone the existence of
something absolutely necessary and still advancing proceed from
the conception of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the
completely determined or determining conception thereofthe conception
of an allembracing reality Thus the physicotheological failing
in its undertaking recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological
argument and as this is merely the ontological argument in disguise
it executes its design solely by the aid of pure reason although it at
first professed to have no connection with this faculty and to base its
entire procedure upon experience alone
The physicotheologians have therefore no reason to regard with such
contempt the transcendental mode of argument and to look down upon
it with the conceit of clearsighted observers of nature as the
braincobweb of obscure speculatists For if they reflect upon and
examine their own arguments they will find that after following for
some time the path of nature and experience and discovering themselves
no nearer their object they suddenly leave this path and pass into the
region of pure possibility where they hope to reach upon the wings of
ideas what had eluded all their empirical investigations Gaining as
they think a firm footing after this immense leap they extend their
determinate conceptioninto the possession of which they have come
they know not howover the whole sphere of creation and explain their
ideal which is entirely a product of pure reason by illustrations
drawn from experiencethough in a degree miserably unworthy of the
grandeur of the object while they refuse to acknowledge that they have
arrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very different road from
that of experience
Thus the physicotheological is based upon the cosmological and this
upon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being and as
besides these three there is no other path open to speculative reason
the ontological proof on the ground of pure conceptions of reason is
the only possible one if any proof of a proposition so far transcending
the empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at all
If by the term theology I understand the cognition of a primal being
that cognition is based either upon reason alone theologia rationalis
or upon revelation theologia revelata The former cogitates its
object either by means of pure transcendental conceptions as an ens
originarium realissimum ens entium and is termed transcendental
theology or by means of a conception derived from the nature of our
own mind as a supreme intelligence and must then be entitled natural
theology The person who believes in a transcendental theology alone
is termed a deist he who acknowledges the possibility of a natural
theology also a theist The former admits that we can cognize by pure
reason alone the existence of a Supreme Being but at the same time
maintains that our conception of this being is purely transcendental
and that all we can say of it is that it possesses all reality without
being able to define it more closely The second asserts that reason
is capable of presenting us from the analogy with nature with a more
definite conception of this being and that its operations as the cause
of all things are the results of intelligence and free will The former
regards the Supreme Being as the cause of the worldwhether by the
necessity of his nature or as a free agent is left undetermined the
latter considers this being as the author of the world
Transcendental theology aims either at inferring the existence of a
Supreme Being from a general experience without any closer reference
to the world to which this experience belongs and in this case it is
called cosmotheology or it endeavours to cognize the existence of such
a being through mere conceptions without the aid of experience and is
then termed ontotheology
Natural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an author of
the world from the constitution of the order and unity observable
in the world in which two modes of causality must be admitted to
existthose of nature and freedom Thus it rises from this world to a
supreme intelligence either as the principle of all natural or of
all moral order and perfection In the former case it is termed
physicotheology in the latter ethical or moraltheology
As we are wont to understand by the term God not merely an eternal
nature the operations of which are insensate and blind but a Supreme
Being who is the free and intelligent author of all things and as it
is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity we might
in strict rigour deny to the deist any belief in God at all and
regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal being or
thingthe supreme cause of all other things But as no one ought to be
blamed merely because he does not feel himself justified in maintaining
a certain opinion as if he altogether denied its truth and asserted
the opposite it is more correctas it is less harshto say the deist
believes in a God the theist in a living God summa intelligentia We
shall now proceed to investigate the sources of all these attempts of
reason to establish the existence of a Supreme Being
It may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical knowledge or
cognition as knowledge of that which is and practical knowledge as
knowledge of that which ought to be In this view the theoretical
employment of reason is that by which I cognize a priori as necessary
that something is while the practical is that by which I cognize a
priori what ought to happen Now if it is an indubitably certain
though at the same time an entirely conditioned truth that something
is or ought to happen either a certain determinate condition of this
truth is absolutely necessary or such a condition may be arbitrarily
presupposed In the former case the condition is postulated per
thesin in the latter supposed per hypothesin There are certain
practical lawsthose of moralitywhich are absolutely necessary Now
if these laws necessarily presuppose the existence of some being as the
condition of the possibility of their obligatory power this being must
be postulated because the conditioned from which we reason to this
determinate condition is itself cognized a priori as absolutely
necessary We shall at some future time show that the moral laws
not merely presuppose the existence of a Supreme Being but also as
themselves absolutely necessary in a different relation demand
or postulate italthough only from a practical point of view The
discussion of this argument we postpone for the present
When the question relates merely to that which is not to that which
ought to be the conditioned which is presented in experience is
always cogitated as contingent For this reason its condition cannot be
regarded as absolutely necessary but merely as relatively necessary
or rather as needful the condition is in itself and a priori a mere
arbitrary presupposition in aid of the cognition by reason of the
conditioned If then we are to possess a theoretical cognition of
the absolute necessity of a thing we cannot attain to this cognition
otherwise than a priori by means of conceptions while it is impossible
in this way to cognize the existence of a cause which bears any relation
to an existence given in experience
Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object
or certain conceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be
discovered by means of experience It is opposed to the cognition of
nature which concerns only those objects or predicates which can be
presented in a possible experience
The principle that everything which happens the empirically contingent
must have a cause is a principle of the cognition of nature but not of
speculative cognition For if we change it into an abstract principle
and deprive it of its reference to experience and the empirical we
shall find that it cannot with justice be regarded any longer as a
synthetical proposition and that it is impossible to discover any
mode of transition from that which exists to something entirely
differenttermed cause Nay more the conception of a cause likewise
that of the contingentloses in this speculative mode of employing
it all significance for its objective reality and meaning are
comprehensible from experience alone
When from the existence of the universe and the things in it the
existence of a cause of the universe is inferred reason is proceeding
not in the natural but in the speculative method For the principle of
the former enounces not that things themselves or substances but only
that which happens or their statesas empirically contingent have
a cause the assertion that the existence of substance itself is
contingent is not justified by experience it is the assertion of a
reason employing its principles in a speculative manner If again I
infer from the form of the universe from the way in which all things
are connected and act and react upon each other the existence of
a cause entirely distinct from the universethis would again be a
judgement of purely speculative reason because the object in this
casethe causecan never be an object of possible experience In both
these cases the principle of causality which is valid only in the field
of experienceuseless and even meaningless beyond this region would be
diverted from its proper destination
Now I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a theology
by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless that the principles of
reason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological truths
and consequently that a rational theology can have no existence
unless it is founded upon the laws of morality For all synthetical
principles of the understanding are valid only as immanent in
experience while the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates their
being employed transcendentally and of this the understanding is quite
incapable If the empirical law of causality is to conduct us to
a Supreme Being this being must belong to the chain of empirical
objectsin which case it would be like all phenomena itself
conditioned If the possibility of passing the limits of experience be
admitted by means of the dynamical law of the relation of an effect to
its cause what kind of conception shall we obtain by this procedure
Certainly not the conception of a Supreme Being because experience
never presents us with the greatest of all possible effects and it is
only an effect of this character that could witness to the existence
of a corresponding cause If for the purpose of fully satisfying the
requirements of Reason we recognize her right to assert the existence
of a perfect and absolutely necessary being this can be admitted
only from favour and cannot be regarded as the result or irresistible
demonstration The physicotheological proof may add weight to
othersif other proofs there areby connecting speculation with
experience but in itself it rather prepares the mind for theological
cognition and gives it a right and natural direction than establishes
a sure foundation for theology
It is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions admit only
of transcendental answersthose presented a priori by pure conceptions
without the least empirical admixture But the question in the present
case is evidently syntheticalit aims at the extension of our cognition
beyond the bounds of experienceit requires an assurance respecting the
existence of a being corresponding with the idea in our minds to which
no experience can ever be adequate Now it has been abundantly proved
that all a priori synthetical cognition is possible only as the
expression of the formal conditions of a possible experience and that
the validity of all principles depends upon their immanence in the field
of experience that is their relation to objects of empirical cognition
or phenomena Thus all transcendental procedure in reference to
speculative theology is without result
If anyone prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs of our
analytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old and
time honoured arguments he at least cannot decline answering the
questionhow he can pass the limits of all possible experience by the
help of mere ideas If he talks of new arguments or of improvements
upon old arguments I request him to spare me There is certainly no
great choice in this sphere of discussion as all speculative arguments
must at last look for support to the ontological and I have therefore
very little to fear from the argumentative fecundity of the dogmatical
defenders of a nonsensuous reason Without looking upon myself as a
remarkably combative person I shall not decline the challenge to detect
the fallacy and destroy the pretensions of every attempt of speculative
theology And yet the hope of better fortune never deserts those who
are accustomed to the dogmatical mode of procedure I shall therefore
restrict myself to the simple and equitable demand that such reasoners
will demonstrate from the nature of the human mind as well as from that
of the other sources of knowledge how we are to proceed to extend
our cognition completely a priori and to carry it to that point where
experience abandons us and no means exist of guaranteeing the objective
reality of our conceptions In whatever way the understanding may have
attained to a conception the existence of the object of the conception
cannot be discovered in it by analysis because the cognition of the
existence of the object depends upon the objects being posited and
given in itself apart from the conception But it is utterly impossible
to go beyond our conception without the aid of experiencewhich
presents to the mind nothing but phenomena or to attain by the help
of mere conceptions to a conviction of the existence of new kinds of
objects or supernatural beings
But although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to
demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being it is of the highest
utility in correcting our conception of this beingon the supposition
that we can attain to the cognition of it by some other meansin making
it consistent with itself and with all other conceptions of intelligible
objects clearing it from all that is incompatible with the conception
of an ens summun and eliminating from it all limitations or admixtures
of empirical elements
Transcendental theology is still therefore notwithstanding its
objective insufficiency of importance in a negative respect it is
useful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged with pure
ideas no other than a transcendental standard being in this case
admissible For if from a practical point of view the hypothesis of
a Supreme and Allsufficient Being is to maintain its validity without
opposition it must be of the highest importance to define this
conception in a correct and rigorous manneras the transcendental
conception of a necessary being to eliminate all phenomenal elements
anthropomorphism in its most extended signification and at the
same time to overflow all contradictory assertionsbe they atheistic
deistic or anthropomorphic This is of course very easy as the same
arguments which demonstrated the inability of human reason to affirm
the existence of a Supreme Being must be alike sufficient to prove the
invalidity of its denial For it is impossible to gain from the pure
speculation of reason demonstration that there exists no Supreme Being
as the ground of all that exists or that this being possesses none
of those properties which we regard as analogical with the dynamical
qualities of a thinking being or that as the anthropomorphists would
have us believe it is subject to all the limitations which sensibility
imposes upon those intelligences which exist in the world of experience
A Supreme Being is therefore for the speculative reason a mere ideal
though a faultless onea conception which perfects and crowns the
system of human cognition but the objective reality of which can
neither be proved nor disproved by pure reason If this defect is ever
supplied by a moral theology the problematic transcendental theology
which has preceded will have been at least serviceable as demonstrating
the mental necessity existing for the conception by the complete
determination of it which it has furnished and the ceaseless testing of
the conclusions of a reason often deceived by sense and not always in
harmony with its own ideas The attributes of necessity infinitude
unity existence apart from the world and not as a world soul
eternity free from conditions of time omnipresence free from
conditions of space omnipotence and others are pure transcendental
predicates and thus the accurate conception of a Supreme Being which
every theology requires is furnished by transcendental theology alone
The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only
confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our Transcendental
Analytic namely that all inferences which would lead us beyond the
limits of experience are fallacious and groundless but it at the same
time teaches us this important lesson that human reason has a natural
inclination to overstep these limits and that transcendental ideas
are as much the natural property of the reason as categories are of the
understanding There exists this difference however that while the
categories never mislead us outward objects being always in perfect
harmony therewith ideas are the parents of irresistible illusions the
severest and most subtle criticism being required to save us from the
fallacies which they induce
Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be in
harmony with the final purpose and proper employment of these powers
when once we have discovered their true direction and aim We are
entitled to suppose therefore that there exists a mode of employing
transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent although when we
mistake their meaning and regard them as conceptions of actual things
their mode of application is transcendent and delusive For it is not
the idea itself but only the employment of the idea in relation to
possible experience that is transcendent or immanent An idea is
employed transcendently when it is applied to an object falsely
believed to be adequate with and to correspond to it imminently when
it is applied solely to the employment of the understanding in the
sphere of experience Thus all errors of subreptioof misapplication
are to be ascribed to defects of judgement and not to understanding or
reason
Reason never has an immediate relation to an object it relates
immediately to the understanding alone It is only through the
understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience It
does not form conceptions of objects it merely arranges them and gives
to them that unity which they are capable of possessing when the sphere
of their application has been extended as widely as possible Reason
avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the sole
purpose of producing totality in the different series This totality the
understanding does not concern itself with its only occupation is the
connection of experiences by which series of conditions in accordance
with conceptions are established The object of reason is therefore
the understanding and its proper destination As the latter brings unity
into the diversity of objects by means of its conceptions so the former
brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas as
it sets the final aim of a collective unity to the operations of the
understanding which without this occupies itself with a distributive
unity alone
I accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas can never be employed
as constitutive ideas that they cannot be conceptions of objects and
that when thus considered they assume a fallacious and dialectical
character But on the other hand they are capable of an admirable and
indispensably necessary application to objectsas regulative ideas
directing the understanding to a certain aim the guiding lines towards
which all its laws follow and in which they all meet in one point This
pointthough a mere idea focus imaginarius that is not a point from
which the conceptions of the understanding do really proceed for it
lies beyond the sphere of possible experienceserves notwithstanding
to give to these conceptions the greatest possible unity combined with
the greatest possible extension Hence arises the natural illusion which
induces us to believe that these lines proceed from an object which lies
out of the sphere of empirical cognition just as objects reflected in
a mirror appear to be behind it But this illusionwhich we may hinder
from imposing upon usis necessary and unavoidable if we desire to
see not only those objects which lie before us but those which are at
a great distance behind us that is to say when in the present case
we direct the aims of the understanding beyond every given experience
towards an extension as great as can possibly be attained
If we review our cognitions in their entire extent we shall find that
the peculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system that
is to say to give them connection according to a principle This unity
presupposes an ideathe idea of the form of a whole of cognition
preceding the determinate cognition of the parts and containing the
conditions which determine a priori to every part its place and relation
to the other parts of the whole system This idea accordingly demands
complete unity in the cognition of the understandingnot the unity of
a contingent aggregate but that of a system connected according to
necessary laws It cannot be affirmed with propriety that this idea is a
conception of an object it is merely a conception of the complete unity
of the conceptions of objects in so far as this unity is available to
the understanding as a rule Such conceptions of reason are not derived
from nature on the contrary we employ them for the interrogation and
investigation of nature and regard our cognition as defective so long
as it is not adequate to them We admit that such a thing as pure earth
pure water or pure air is not to be discovered And yet we require
these conceptions which have their origin in the reason so far as
regards their absolute purity and completeness for the purpose of
determining the share which each of these natural causes has in every
phenomenon Thus the different kinds of matter are all referred to
earths as mere weight to salts and inflammable bodies as pure force
and finally to water and air as the vehicula of the former or the
machines employed by them in their operationsfor the purpose of
explaining the chemical action and reaction of bodies in accordance with
the idea of a mechanism For although not actually so expressed the
influence of such ideas of reason is very observable in the procedure of
natural philosophers
If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the general
and if the general be certain in se and given it is only necessary
that the judgement should subsume the particular under the general
the particular being thus necessarily determined I shall term this
the demonstrative or apodictic employment of reason If however
the general is admitted as problematical only and is a mere idea
the particular case is certain but the universality of the rule which
applies to this particular case remains a problem Several particular
cases the certainty of which is beyond doubt are then taken and
examined for the purpose of discovering whether the rule is applicable
to them and if it appears that all the particular cases which can be
collected follow from the rule its universality is inferred and at the
same time all the causes which have not or cannot be presented to our
observation are concluded to be of the same character with those which
we have observed This I shall term the hypothetical employment of the
reason
The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed as
problematical conceptions is properly not constitutive That is to say
if we consider the subject strictly the truth of the rule which has
been employed as an hypothesis does not follow from the use that is
made of it by reason For how can we know all the possible cases
that may arise some of which may however prove exceptions to
the universality of the rule This employment of reason is merely
regulative and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the
aggregate of our particular cognitions and thereby the approximating of
the rule to universality
The object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the
systematic unity of cognitions and this unity is the criterion of the
truth of a rule On the other hand this systematic unityas a mere
ideais in fact merely a unity projected not to be regarded as given
but only in the light of a problema problem which serves however as
a principle for the various and particular exercise of the understanding
in experience directs it with regard to those cases which are not
presented to our observation and introduces harmony and consistency
into all its operations
All that we can be certain of from the above considerations is that
this systematic unity is a logical principle whose aim is to assist the
understanding where it cannot of itself attain to rules by means of
ideas to bring all these various rules under one principle and thus
to ensure the most complete consistency and connection that can be
attained But the assertion that objects and the understanding by which
they are cognized are so constituted as to be determined to systematic
unity that this may be postulated a priori without any reference
to the interest of reason and that we are justified in declaring all
possible cognitionsempirical and othersto possess systematic unity
and to be subject to general principles from which notwithstanding
their various character they are all derivable such an assertion can
be founded only upon a transcendental principle of reason which would
render this systematic unity not subjectively and logicallyin its
character of a method but objectively necessary
We shall illustrate this by an example The conceptions of the
understanding make us acquainted among many other kinds of unity
with that of the causality of a substance which is termed power The
different phenomenal manifestations of the same substance appear at
first view to be so very dissimilar that we are inclined to assume
the existence of just as many different powers as there are different
effectsas in the case of the human mind we have feeling
consciousness imagination memory wit analysis pleasure desire
and so on Now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these
differences to as small a number as possible by comparing them and
discovering the hidden identity which exists We must inquire for
example whether or not imagination connected with consciousness
memory wit and analysis are not merely different forms of
understanding and reason The idea of a fundamental power the existence
of which no effort of logic can assure us of is the problem to be
solved for the systematic representation of the existing variety of
powers The logical principle of reason requires us to produce as great
a unity as is possible in the system of our cognitions and the more
the phenomena of this and the other power are found to be identical
the more probable does it become that they are nothing but different
manifestations of one and the same power which may be called
relatively speaking a fundamental power And so with other cases
These relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with
each other to discover if possible the one radical and absolutely
fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations But this
unity is purely hypothetical It is not maintained that this unity does
really exist but that we must in the interest of reason that is
for the establishment of principles for the various rules presented by
experience try to discover and introduce it so far as is practicable
into the sphere of our cognitions
But the transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us to
believe that this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical but
that it possesses objective reality and thus the systematic unity
of the various powers or forces in a substance is demanded by the
understanding and erected into an apodictic or necessary principle
For without having attempted to discover the unity of the various
powers existing in nature nay even after all our attempts have failed
we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist and may be sooner or
later discovered And this reason does not only as in the case
above adduced with regard to the unity of substance but where
many substances although all to a certain extent homogeneous are
discoverable as in the case of matter in general Here also does
reason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of various
powersinasmuch as particular laws of nature are subordinate to general
laws and parsimony in principles is not merely an economical principle
of reason but an essential law of nature
We cannot understand in fact how a logical principle of unity can of
right exist unless we presuppose a transcendental principle by which
such a systematic unitas a property of objects themselvesis regarded
as necessary a priori For with what right can reason in its logical
exercise require us to regard the variety of forces which nature
displays as in effect a disguised unity and to deduce them from one
fundamental force or power when she is free to admit that it is just
as possible that all forces should be different in kind and that a
systematic unity is not conformable to the design of nature In this
view of the case reason would be proceeding in direct opposition to her
own destination by setting as an aim an idea which entirely conflicts
with the procedure and arrangement of nature Neither can we assert that
reason has previously inferred this unity from the contingent nature
of phenomena For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this
unity is a necessary law inasmuch as without it we should not possess
a faculty of reason nor without reason a consistent and selfaccordant
mode of employing the understanding nor in the absence of this any
proper and sufficient criterion of empirical truth In relation to this
criterion therefore we must suppose the idea of the systematic unity
of nature to possess objective validity and necessity
We find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different forms in
the principles of philosophers although they have neither recognized
it nor confessed to themselves its presence That the diversities of
individual things do not exclude identity of species that the various
species must be considered as merely different determinations of a
few genera and these again as divisions of still higher races and
so onthat accordingly a certain systematic unity of all possible
empirical conceptions in so far as they can be deduced from higher and
more general conceptions must be sought for is a scholastic maxim or
logical principle without which reason could not be employed by us For
we can infer the particular from the general only in so far as general
properties of things constitute the foundation upon which the particular
rest
That the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by philosophers
in the wellknown scholastic maxim which forbids us unnecessarily to
augment the number of entities or principles entia praeter necessitatem
non esse multiplicanda This maxim asserts that nature herself assists
in the establishment of this unity of reason and that the seemingly
infinite diversity of phenomena should not deter us from the expectation
of discovering beneath this diversity a unity of fundamental properties
of which the aforesaid variety is but a more or less determined form
This unity although a mere idea thinkers have found it necessary
rather to moderate the desire than to encourage it It was considered
a great step when chemists were able to reduce all salts to two main
generaacids and alkalis and they regard this difference as itself a
mere variety or different manifestation of one and the same fundamental
material The different kinds of earths stones and even metals
chemists have endeavoured to reduce to three and afterwards to two but
still not content with this advance they cannot but think that behind
these diversities there lurks but one genusnay that even salts and
earths have a common principle It might be conjectured that this is
merely an economical plan of reason for the purpose of sparing itself
trouble and an attempt of a purely hypothetical character which
when successful gives an appearance of probability to the principle of
explanation employed by the reason But a selfish purpose of this kind
is easily to be distinguished from the idea according to which every
one presupposes that this unity is in accordance with the laws of
nature and that reason does not in this case request but requires
although we are quite unable to determine the proper limits of this
unity
If the diversity existing in phenomenaa diversity not of form for
in this they may be similar but of contentwere so great that the
subtlest human reason could never by comparison discover in them the
least similarity which is not impossible in this case the logical law
of genera would be without foundation the conception of a genus nay
all general conceptions would be impossible and the faculty of the
understanding the exercise of which is restricted to the world
of conceptions could not exist The logical principle of genera
accordingly if it is to be applied to nature by which I mean objects
presented to our senses presupposes a transcendental principle In
accordance with this principle homogeneity is necessarily presupposed
in the variety of phenomena although we are unable to determine a
priori the degree of this homogeneity because without it no empirical
conceptions and consequently no experience would be possible
The logical principle of genera which demands identity in phenomena is
balanced by another principlethat of species which requires variety
and diversity in things notwithstanding their accordance in the same
genus and directs the understanding to attend to the one no less than
to the other This principle of the faculty of distinction acts as a
check upon the reason and reason exhibits in this respect a double and
conflicting intereston the one hand the interest in the extent the
interest of generality in relation to genera on the other that of the
content the interest of individuality in relation to the variety of
species In the former case the understanding cogitates more under its
conceptions in the latter it cogitates more in them This distinction
manifests itself likewise in the habits of thought peculiar to natural
philosophers some of whomthe remarkably speculative headsmay be
said to be hostile to heterogeneity in phenomena and have their
eyes always fixed on the unity of genera while otherswith a strong
empirical tendencyaim unceasingly at the analysis of phenomena
and almost destroy in us the hope of ever being able to estimate the
character of these according to general principles
The latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical principle
the aim of which is the systematic completeness of all cognitions
This principle authorizes me beginning at the genus to descend to the
various and diverse contained under it and in this way extension as
in the former case unity is assured to the system For if we merely
examine the sphere of the conception which indicates a genus we cannot
discover how far it is possible to proceed in the division of that
sphere just as it is impossible from the consideration of the space
occupied by matter to determine how far we can proceed in the division
of it Hence every genus must contain different species and these again
different subspecies and as each of the latter must itself contain a
sphere must be of a certain extent as a conceptus communis reason
demands that no species or subspecies is to be considered as the lowest
possible For a species or subspecies being always a conception which
contains only what is common to a number of different things does not
completely determine any individual thing or relate immediately to
it and must consequently contain other conceptions that is other
subspecies under it This law of specification may be thus expressed
entium varietates non temere sunt minuendae
But it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be without
sense or application were it not based upon a transcendental law of
specification which certainly does not require that the differences
existing phenomena should be infinite in number for the logical
principle which merely maintains the indeterminateness of the logical
sphere of a conception in relation to its possible division does not
authorize this statement while it does impose upon the understanding
the duty of searching for subspecies to every species and minor
differences in every difference For were there no lower conceptions
neither could there be any higher Now the understanding cognizes only
by means of conceptions consequently how far soever it may proceed
in division never by mere intuition but always by lower and lower
conceptions The cognition of phenomena in their complete determination
which is possible only by means of the understanding requires an
unceasingly continued specification of conceptions and a progression
to ever smaller differences of which abstraction bad been made in the
conception of the species and still more in that of the genus
This law of specification cannot be deduced from experience it can
never present us with a principle of so universal an application
Empirical specification very soon stops in its distinction of
diversities and requires the guidance of the transcendental law as
a principle of the reasona law which imposes on us the necessity of
never ceasing in our search for differences even although these may not
present themselves to the senses That absorbent earths are of different
kinds could only be discovered by obeying the anticipatory law of
reason which imposes upon the understanding the task of discovering the
differences existing between these earths and supposes that nature is
richer in substances than our senses would indicate The faculty of the
understanding belongs to us just as much under the presupposition of
differences in the objects of nature as under the condition that these
objects are homogeneous because we could not possess conceptions nor
make any use of our understanding were not the phenomena included under
these conceptions in some respects dissimilar as well as similar in
their character
Reason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the operations
of this faculty By the principle of the homogeneity of the diverse
in higher genera By the principle of the variety of the homogeneous
in lower species and to complete the systematic unity it adds
A law of the affinity of all conceptions which prescribes a continuous
transition from one species to every other by the gradual increase of
diversity We may term these the principles of the homogeneity the
specification and the continuity of forms The latter results from the
union of the two former inasmuch as we regard the systematic connection
as complete in thought in the ascent to higher genera as well as in
the descent to lower species For all diversities must be related
to each other as they all spring from one highest genus descending
through the different gradations of a more and more extended
determination
We may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical
principles in the following manner Every conception may be regarded as
a point which as the standpoint of a spectator has a certain horizon
which may be said to enclose a number of things that may be viewed
so to speak from that centre Within this horizon there must be an
infinite number of other points each of which has its own horizon
smaller and more circumscribed in other words every species contains
subspecies according to the principle of specification and the
logical horizon consists of smaller horizons subspecies but not of
points individuals which possess no extent But different horizons
or genera which include under them so many conceptions may have one
common horizon from which as from a midpoint they may be surveyed
and we may proceed thus till we arrive at the highest genus or
universal and true horizon which is determined by the highest
conception and which contains under itself all differences and
varieties as genera species and subspecies
To this highest standpoint I am conducted by the law of homogeneity
as to all lower and more variouslydetermined conceptions by the law
of specification Now as in this way there exists no void in the whole
extent of all possible conceptions and as out of the sphere of these
the mind can discover nothing there arises from the presupposition of
the universal horizon above mentioned and its complete division the
principle Non datur vacuum formarum This principle asserts that there
are not different primitive and highest genera which stand isolated so
to speak from each other but all the various genera are mere divisions
and limitations of one highest and universal genus and hence follows
immediately the principle Datur continuum formarum This principle
indicates that all differences of species limit each other and do not
admit of transition from one to another by a saltus but only through
smaller degrees of the difference between the one species and the other
In one word there are no species or subspecies which in the view of
reason are the nearest possible to each other intermediate species or
subspecies being always possible the difference of which from each of
the former is always smaller than the difference existing between these
The first law therefore directs us to avoid the notion that there
exist different primal genera and enounces the fact of perfect
homogeneity the second imposes a check upon this tendency to unity and
prescribes the distinction of subspecies before proceeding to apply
our general conceptions to individuals The third unites both the
former by enouncing the fact of homogeneity as existing even in the
most various diversity by means of the gradual transition from one
species to another Thus it indicates a relationship between the
different branches or species in so far as they all spring from the
same stem
But this logical law of the continuum specierum formarum logicarum
presupposes a transcendental principle lex continui in natura without
which the understanding might be led into error by following the
guidance of the former and thus perhaps pursuing a path contrary to
that prescribed by nature This law must consequently be based upon
pure transcendental and not upon empirical considerations For in the
latter case it would come later than the system whereas it is really
itself the parent of all that is systematic in our cognition of nature
These principles are not mere hypotheses employed for the purpose
of experimenting upon nature although when any such connection is
discovered it forms a solid ground for regarding the hypothetical unity
as valid in the sphere of natureand thus they are in this respect not
without their use But we go farther and maintain that it is manifest
that these principles of parsimony in fundamental causes variety in
effects and affinity in phenomena are in accordance both with reason
and nature and that they are not mere methods or plans devised for the
purpose of assisting us in our observation of the external world
But it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea to which
no adequate object can be discovered in experience And this for two
reasons First because the species in nature are really divided and
hence form quanta discreta and if the gradual progression through
their affinity were continuous the intermediate members lying between
two given species must be infinite in number which is impossible
Secondly because we cannot make any determinate empirical use of this
law inasmuch as it does not present us with any criterion of affinity
which could aid us in determining how far we ought to pursue the
graduation of differences it merely contains a general indication that
it is our duty to seek for and if possible to discover them
When we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order
conformable to their employment in experience they will stand thus
Variety Affinity Unity each of them as ideas being taken in the
highest degree of their completeness Reason presupposes the existence
of cognitions of the understanding which have a direct relation to
experience and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitionsa unity
which far transcends all experience or empirical notions The affinity
of the diverse notwithstanding the differences existing between its
parts has a relation to things but a still closer one to the mere
properties and powers of things For example imperfect experience
may represent the orbits of the planets as circular But we discover
variations from this course and we proceed to suppose that the planets
revolve in a path which if not a circle is of a character very similar
to it That is to say the movements of those planets which do not form
a circle will approximate more or less to the properties of a circle
and probably form an ellipse The paths of comets exhibit still greater
variations for so far as our observation extends they do not return
upon their own course in a circle or ellipse But we proceed to the
conjecture that comets describe a parabola a figure which is closely
allied to the ellipse In fact a parabola is merely an ellipse with
its longer axis produced to an indefinite extent Thus these principles
conduct us to a unity in the genera of the forms of these orbits and
proceeding farther to a unity as regards the cause of the motions of
the heavenly bodiesthat is gravitation But we go on extending our
conquests over nature and endeavour to explain all seeming deviations
from these rules and even make additions to our system which no
experience can ever substantiatefor example the theory in affinity
with that of ellipses of hyperbolic paths of comets pursuing which
these bodies leave our solar system and passing from sun to sun unite
the most distant parts of the infinite universe which is held together
by the same moving power
The most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles is that
they seem to be transcendental and although only containing ideas
for the guidance of the empirical exercise of reason and although this
empirical employment stands to these ideas in an asymptotic relation
alone to use a mathematical term that is continually
approximate without ever being able to attain to them they possess
notwithstanding as a priori synthetical propositions objective
though undetermined validity and are available as rules for possible
experience In the elaboration of our experience they may also be
employed with great advantage as heuristic
principles A transcendental deduction of them cannot be
made such a deduction being always impossible in the case of ideas as
has been already shown
We distinguished in the Transcendental Analytic the dynamical
principles of the understanding which are regulative principles of
intuition from the mathematical which are constitutive principles of
intuition These dynamical laws are however constitutive in relation
to experience inasmuch as they render the conceptions without which
experience could not exist possible a priori But the principles of pure
reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical conceptions
because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be discovered and
they cannot therefore have an object in concreto Now if I grant that
they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience as constitutive
principles how shall I secure for them employment and objective
validity as regulative principles and in what way can they be so
employed
The understanding is the object of reason as sensibility is the object
of the understanding The production of systematic unity in all the
empirical operations of the understanding is the proper occupation of
reason just as it is the business of the understanding to connect the
various content of phenomena by means of conceptions and subject them
to empirical laws But the operations of the understanding are without
the schemata of sensibility undetermined and in the same manner
the unity of reason is perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions
under which and the extent to which the understanding ought to carry
the systematic connection of its conceptions But although it is
impossible to discover in intuition a schema for the complete systematic
unity of all the conceptions of the understanding there must be some
analogon of this schema This analogon is the idea of the maximum of the
division and the connection of our cognition in one principle For we
may have a determinate notion of a maximum and an absolutely perfect
all the restrictive conditions which are connected with an indeterminate
and various content having been abstracted Thus the idea of reason
is analogous with a sensuous schema with this difference that the
application of the categories to the schema of reason does not present
a cognition of any object as is the case with the application of the
categories to sensuous schemata but merely provides us with a rule or
principle for the systematic unity of the exercise of the understanding
Now as every principle which imposes upon the exercise of the
understanding a priori compliance with the rule of systematic unity
also relates although only in an indirect manner to an object of
experience the principles of pure reason will also possess objective
reality and validity in relation to experience But they will not aim at
determining our knowledge in regard to any empirical object they
will merely indicate the procedure following which the empirical and
determinate exercise of the understanding may be in complete harmony and
connection with itselfa result which is produced by its being brought
into harmony with the principle of systematic unity so far as that is
possible and deduced from it
I term all subjective principles which are not derived from observation
of the constitution of an object but from the interest which Reason
has in producing a certain completeness in her cognition of that object
maxims of reason Thus there are maxims of speculative reason which are
based solely upon its speculative interest although they appear to be
objective principles
When principles which are really regulative are regarded as
constitutive and employed as objective principles contradictions must
arise but if they are considered as mere maxims there is no room for
contradictions of any kind as they then merely indicate the different
interests of reason which occasion differences in the mode of thought
In effect Reason has only one single interest and the seeming
contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates a difference
in and a reciprocal limitation of the methods by which this interest
is satisfied
This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversityin accordance
with the principle of specification another the interest of unityin
accordance with the principle of aggregation Each believes that
his judgement rests upon a thorough insight into the subject he is
examining and yet it has been influenced solely by a greater or less
degree of adherence to some one of the two principles neither of which
are objective but originate solely from the interest of reason and on
this account to be termed maxims rather than principles When I observe
intelligent men disputing about the distinctive characteristics of men
animals or plants and even of minerals those on the one side assuming
the existence of certain national characteristics certain welldefined
and hereditary distinctions of family race and so on while the other
side maintain that nature has endowed all races of men with the same
faculties and dispositions and that all differences are but the result
of external and accidental circumstancesI have only to consider for
a moment the real nature of the subject of discussion to arrive at the
conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of and
that there is little probability of either party being able to speak
from a perfect insight into and understanding of the nature of the
subject itself Both have in reality been struggling for the twofold
interest of reason the one maintaining the one interest the other the
other But this difference between the maxims of diversity and unity
may easily be reconciled and adjusted although so long as they
are regarded as objective principles they must occasion not only
contradictions and polemic but place hindrances in the way of the
advancement of truth until some means is discovered of reconciling
these conflicting interests and bringing reason into union and harmony
with itself
The same is the case with the socalled law discovered by Leibnitz and
supported with remarkable ability by Bonnetthe law of the continuous
gradation of created beings which is nothing more than an inference
from the principle of affinity for observation and study of the order
of nature could never present it to the mind as an objective truth The
steps of this ladder as they appear in experience are too far apart
from each other and the socalled petty differences between different
kinds of animals are in nature commonly so wide separations that no
confidence can be placed in such views particularly when we reflect
on the great variety of things and the ease with which we can discover
resemblances and no faith in the laws which are said to express
the aims and purposes of nature On the other hand the method of
investigating the order of nature in the light of this principle
and the maxim which requires us to regard this orderit being still
undetermined how far it extendsas really existing in nature is beyond
doubt a legitimate and excellent principle of reasona principle which
extends farther than any experience or observation of ours and which
without giving us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of
experience guides us to the goal of systematic unity
The ideas of pure reason cannot be of themselves and in their own
nature dialectical it is from their misemployment alone that fallacies
and illusions arise For they originate in the nature of reason itself
and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for all the rights and
claims of speculation should be itself undeserving of confidence and
promotive of error It is to be expected therefore that these ideas
have a genuine and legitimate aim It is true the mob of sophists raise
against reason the cry of inconsistency and contradiction and affect to
despise the government of that faculty because they cannot understand
its constitution while it is to its beneficial influences alone
that they owe the position and the intelligence which enable them to
criticize and to blame its procedure
We cannot employ an a priori conception with certainty until we have
made a transcendental deduction therefore The ideas of pure reason do
not admit of the same kind of deduction as the categories But if they
are to possess the least objective validity and to represent anything
but mere creations of thought entia rationis ratiocinantis a
deduction of them must be possible This deduction will complete the
critical task imposed upon pure reason and it is to this part Of our
labours that we now proceed
There is a great difference between a things being presented to the
mind as an object in an absolute sense or merely as an ideal object In
the former case I employ my conceptions to determine the object in the
latter case nothing is present to the mind but a mere schema which does
not relate directly to an object not even in a hypothetical sense but
which is useful only for the purpose of representing other objects to
the mind in a mediate and indirect manner by means of their relation
to the idea in the intellect Thus I say the conception of a supreme
intelligence is a mere idea that is to say its objective reality does
not consist in the fact that it has an immediate relation to an object
for in this sense we have no means of establishing its objective
validity it is merely a schema constructed according to the necessary
conditions of the unity of reasonthe schema of a thing in general
which is useful towards the production of the highest degree of
systematic unity in the empirical exercise of reason in which we deduce
this or that object of experience from the imaginary object of this
idea as the ground or cause of the said object of experience In this
way the idea is properly a heuristic and not an ostensive conception
it does not give us any information respecting the constitution of an
object it merely indicates how under the guidance of the idea we
ought to investigate the constitution and the relations of objects in
the world of experience Now if it can be shown that the three kinds
of transcendental ideas psychological cosmological and theological
although not relating directly to any object nor determining it do
nevertheless on the supposition of the existence of an ideal object
produce systematic unity in the laws of the empirical employment of
the reason and extend our empirical cognition without ever being
inconsistent or in opposition with itit must be a necessary maxim
of reason to regulate its procedure according to these ideas And this
forms the transcendental deduction of all speculative ideas not as
constitutive principles of the extension of our cognition beyond the
limits of our experience but as regulative principles of the systematic
unity of empirical cognition which is by the aid of these ideas
arranged and emended within its own proper limits to an extent
unattainable by the operation of the principles of the understanding
alone
I shall make this plainer Guided by the principles involved in these
ideas we must in the first place so connect all the phenomena
actions and feelings of the mind as if it were a simple substance
which endowed with personal identity possesses a permanent existence
in this life at least while its states among which those of the
body are to be included as external conditions are in continual change
Secondly in cosmology we must investigate the conditions of all
natural phenomena internal as well as external as if they belonged to
a chain infinite and without any prime or supreme member while we do
not on this account deny the existence of intelligible grounds of
these phenomena although we never employ them to explain phenomena for
the simple reason that they are not objects of our cognition Thirdly
in the sphere of theology we must regard the whole system of
possible experience as forming an absolute but dependent and
sensuouslyconditioned unity and at the same time as based upon a
sole supreme and allsufficient ground existing apart from the world
itselfa ground which is a selfsubsistent primeval and creative
reason in relation to which we so employ our reason in the field of
experience as if all objects drew their origin from that archetype
of all reason In other words we ought not to deduce the internal
phenomena of the mind from a simple thinking substance but deduce them
from each other under the guidance of the regulative idea of a simple
being we ought not to deduce the phenomena order and unity of the
universe from a supreme intelligence but merely draw from this idea
of a supremely wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its
connection of causes and effects
Now there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas to possess
an objective and hyperbolic existence except the cosmological ideas
which lead reason into an antinomy the psychological and theological
ideas are not antinomial They contain no contradiction and how then
can anyone dispute their objective reality since he who denies it
knows as little about their possibility as we who affirm And yet
when we wish to admit the existence of a thing it is not sufficient to
convince ourselves that there is no positive obstacle in the way for
it cannot be allowable to regard mere creations of thought which
transcend though they do not contradict all our conceptions as real
and determinate objects solely upon the authority of a speculative
reason striving to compass its own aims They cannot therefore be
admitted to be real in themselves they can only possess a comparative
realitythat of a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic
unity of all cognition They are to be regarded not as actual things
but as in some measure analogous to them We abstract from the object
of the idea all the conditions which limit the exercise of our
understanding but which on the other hand are the sole conditions of
our possessing a determinate conception of any given thing And thus we
cogitate a something of the real nature of which we have not the
least conception but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a
relation to the whole system of phenomena analogous to that in which
phenomena stand to each other
By admitting these ideal beings we do not really extend our cognitions
beyond the objects of possible experience we extend merely the
empirical unity of our experience by the aid of systematic unity the
schema of which is furnished by the idea which is therefore validnot
as a constitutive but as a regulative principle For although we posit
a thing corresponding to the ideaa something an actual existencewe
do not on that account aim at the extension of our cognition by means
of transcendent conceptions This existence is purely ideal and not
objective it is the mere expression of the systematic unity which is to
be the guide of reason in the field of experience There are no attempts
made at deciding what the ground of this unity may be or what the real
nature of this imaginary being
Thus the transcendental and only determinate conception of God which
is presented to us by speculative reason is in the strictest sense
deistic In other words reason does not assure us of the objective
validity of the conception it merely gives us the idea of something on
which the supreme and necessary unity of all experience is based This
something we cannot following the analogy of a real substance cogitate
otherwise than as the cause of all things operating in accordance with
rational laws if we regard it as an individual object although we
should rest contented with the idea alone as a regulative principle
of reason and make no attempt at completing the sum of the conditions
imposed by thought This attempt is indeed inconsistent with the grand
aim of complete systematic unity in the sphere of cognitiona unity to
which no bounds are set by reason
Hence it happens that admitting a divine being I can have no
conception of the internal possibility of its perfection or of the
necessity of its existence The only advantage of this admission is that
it enables me to answer all other questions relating to the contingent
and to give reason the most complete satisfaction as regards the unity
which it aims at attaining in the world of experience But I cannot
satisfy reason with regard to this hypothesis itself and this proves
that it is not its intelligence and insight into the subject but its
speculative interest alone which induces it to proceed from a point
lying far beyond the sphere of our cognition for the purpose of being
able to consider all objects as parts of a systematic whole
Here a distinction presents itself in regard to the way in which we may
cogitate a presuppositiona distinction which is somewhat subtle but
of great importance in transcendental philosophy I may have sufficient
grounds to admit something or the existence of something in a
relative point of view suppositio relativa without being justified
in admitting it in an absolute sense suppositio absoluta This
distinction is undoubtedly requisite in the case of a regulative
principle the necessity of which we recognize though we are ignorant
of the source and cause of that necessity and which we assume to
be based upon some ultimate ground for the purpose of being able to
cogitate the universality of the principle in a more determinate way
For example I cogitate the existence of a being corresponding to a
pure transcendental idea But I cannot admit that this being exists
absolutely and in itself because all of the conceptions by which I can
cogitate an object in a determinate manner fall short of assuring me
of its existence nay the conditions of the objective validity of my
conceptions are excluded by the ideaby the very fact of its being an
idea The conceptions of reality substance causality nay even that
of necessity in existence have no significance out of the sphere of
empirical cognition and cannot beyond that sphere determine any
object They may accordingly be employed to explain the possibility of
things in the world of sense but they are utterly inadequate to explain
the possibility of the universe itself considered as a whole because
in this case the ground of explanation must lie out of and beyond the
world and cannot therefore be an object of possible experience
Now I may admit the existence of an incomprehensible being of this
naturethe object of a mere idea relatively to the world of sense
although I have no ground to admit its existence absolutely and in
itself For if an idea that of a systematic and complete unity of
which I shall presently speak more particularly lies at the foundation
of the most extended empirical employment of reason and if this
idea cannot be adequately represented in concreto although it is
indispensably necessary for the approximation of empirical unity to the
highest possible degreeI am not only authorized but compelled
to realize this idea that is to posit a real object corresponding
thereto But I cannot profess to know this object it is to me merely a
something to which as the ground of systematic unity in cognition I
attribute such properties as are analogous to the conceptions employed
by the understanding in the sphere of experience Following the analogy
of the notions of reality substance causality and necessity I
cogitate a being which possesses all these attributes in the highest
degree and as this idea is the offspring of my reason alone I
cogitate this being as selfsubsistent reason and as the cause of the
universe operating by means of ideas of the greatest possible harmony
and unity Thus I abstract all conditions that would limit my idea
solely for the purpose of rendering systematic unity possible in the
world of empirical diversity and thus securing the widest possible
extension for the exercise of reason in that sphere This I am enabled
to do by regarding all connections and relations in the world of sense
as if they were the dispositions of a supreme reason of which our
reason is but a faint image I then proceed to cogitate this Supreme
Being by conceptions which have properly no meaning or application
except in the world of sense But as I am authorized to employ the
transcendental hypothesis of such a being in a relative respect
alone that is as the substratum of the greatest possible unity in
experienceI may attribute to a being which I regard as distinct from
the world such properties as belong solely to the sphere of sense and
experience For I do not desire and am not justified in desiring to
cognize this object of my idea as it exists in itself for I possess
no conceptions sufficient for or task those of reality substance
causality nay even that of necessity in existence losing all
significance and becoming merely the signs of conceptions without
content and without applicability when I attempt to carry them beyond
the limits of the world of sense I cogitate merely the relation of a
perfectly unknown being to the greatest possible systematic unity of
experience solely for the purpose of employing it as the schema of the
regulative principle which directs reason in its empirical exercise
It is evident at the first view that we cannot presuppose the reality
of this transcendental object by means of the conceptions of reality
substance causality and so on because these conceptions cannot be
applied to anything that is distinct from the world of sense Thus
the supposition of a Supreme Being or cause is purely relative it is
cogitated only in behalf of the systematic unity of experience such a
being is but a something of whose existence in itself we have not the
least conception Thus too it becomes sufficiently manifest why we
required the idea of a necessary being in relation to objects given by
sense although we can never have the least conception of this being or
of its absolute necessity
And now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcendental
dialectic and the proper aim of the ideas of pure reasonwhich become
dialectical solely from misunderstanding and inconsiderateness Pure
reason is in fact occupied with itself and not with any object
Objects are not presented to it to be embraced in the unity of an
empirical conception it is only the cognitions of the understanding
that are presented to it for the purpose of receiving the unity of
a rational conception that is of being connected according to
a principle The unity of reason is the unity of system and this
systematic unity is not an objective principle extending its dominion
over objects but a subjective maxim extending its authority over the
empirical cognition of objects The systematic connection which reason
gives to the empirical employment of the understanding not only advances
the extension of that employment but ensures its correctness and thus
the principle of a systematic unity of this nature is also objective
although only in an indefinite respect principium vagum It is not
however a constitutive principle determining an object to which
it directly relates it is merely a regulative principle or maxim
advancing and strengthening the empirical exercise of reason by the
opening up of new paths of which the understanding is ignorant while
it never conflicts with the laws of its exercise in the sphere of
experience
But reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity without at the
same time cogitating an object of the ideaan object that cannot be
presented in any experience which contains no concrete example of a
complete systematic unity This being ens rationis ratiocinatae is
therefore a mere idea and is not assumed to be a thing which is
real absolutely and in itself On the contrary it forms merely the
problematical foundation of the connection which the mind introduces
among the phenomena of the sensuous world We look upon this connection
in the light of the abovementioned idea as if it drew its origin from
the supposed being which corresponds to the idea And yet all we aim at
is the possession of this idea as a secure foundation for the systematic
unity of experiencea unity indispensable to reason advantageous
to the understanding and promotive of the interests of empirical
cognition
We mistake the true meaning of this idea when we regard it as an
enouncement or even as a hypothetical declaration of the existence of
a real thing which we are to regard as the origin or ground of a
systematic constitution of the universe On the contrary it is left
completely undetermined what the nature or properties of this socalled
ground may be The idea is merely to be adopted as a point of view
from which this unity so essential to reason and so beneficial to
the understanding may be regarded as radiating In one word this
transcendental thing is merely the schema of a regulative principle by
means of which Reason so far as in her lies extends the dominion of
systematic unity over the whole sphere of experience
The first object of an idea of this kind is the ego considered merely
as a thinking nature or soul If I wish to investigate the properties of
a thinking being I must interrogate experience But I find that I
can apply none of the categories to this object the schema of these
categories which is the condition of their application being given
only in sensuous intuition But I cannot thus attain to the cognition of
a systematic unity of all the phenomena of the internal sense Instead
therefore of an empirical conception of what the soul really is reason
takes the conception of the empirical unity of all thought and by
cogitating this unity as unconditioned and primitive constructs the
rational conception or idea of a simple substance which is in itself
unchangeable possessing personal identity and in connection with other
real things external to it in one word it constructs the idea of a
simple selfsubsistent intelligence But the real aim of reason in this
procedure is the attainment of principles of systematic unity for the
explanation of the phenomena of the soul That is reason desires to
be able to represent all the determinations of the internal sense as
existing in one subject all powers as deduced from one fundamental
power all changes as mere varieties in the condition of a being which
is permanent and always the same and all phenomena in space as entirely
different in their nature from the procedure of thought Essential
simplicity with the other attributes predicated of the ego is regarded
as the mere schema of this regulative principle it is not assumed
that it is the actual ground of the properties of the soul For these
properties may rest upon quite different grounds of which we are
completely ignorant just as the above predicates could not give us any
knowledge of the soul as it is in itself even if we regarded them as
valid in respect of it inasmuch as they constitute a mere idea which
cannot be represented in concreto Nothing but good can result from
a psychological idea of this kind if we only take proper care not to
consider it as more than an idea that is if we regard it as valid
merely in relation to the employment of reason in the sphere of the
phenomena of the soul Under the guidance of this idea or principle
no empirical laws of corporeal phenomena are called in to explain that
which is a phenomenon of the internal sense alone no windy hypotheses
of the generation annihilation and palingenesis of souls are admitted
Thus the consideration of this object of the internal sense is kept
pure and unmixed with heterogeneous elements while the investigation
of reason aims at reducing all the grounds of explanation employed
in this sphere of knowledge to a single principle All this is best
effected nay cannot be effected otherwise than by means of such
a schema which requires us to regard this ideal thing as an actual
existence The psychological idea is therefore meaningless and
inapplicable except as the schema of a regulative conception For if
I ask whether the soul is not really of a spiritual natureit is
a question which has no meaning From such a conception has been
abstracted not merely all corporeal nature but all nature that is
all the predicates of a possible experience and consequently all the
conditions which enable us to cogitate an object to this conception have
disappeared But if these conditions are absent it is evident that the
conception is meaningless
The second regulative idea of speculative reason is the conception of
the universe For nature is properly the only object presented to us
in regard to which reason requires regulative principles Nature is
twofoldthinking and corporeal nature To cogitate the latter in regard
to its internal possibility that is to determine the application
of the categories to it no idea is requiredno representation which
transcends experience In this sphere therefore an idea is impossible
sensuous intuition being our only guide while in the sphere of
psychology we require the fundamental idea I which contains a priori
a certain form of thought namely the unity of the ego Pure reason has
therefore nothing left but nature in general and the completeness of
conditions in nature in accordance with some principle The absolute
totality of the series of these conditions is an idea which can never
be fully realized in the empirical exercise of reason while it is
serviceable as a rule for the procedure of reason in relation to that
totality It requires us in the explanation of given phenomena in
the regress or ascent in the series to proceed as if the series were
infinite in itself that is were prolonged in indefinitum while on
the other hand where reason is regarded as itself the determining cause
in the region of freedom we are required to proceed as if we had not
before us an object of sense but of the pure understanding In this
latter case the conditions do not exist in the series of phenomena but
may be placed quite out of and beyond it and the series of conditions
may be regarded as if it had an absolute beginning from an intelligible
cause All this proves that the cosmological ideas are nothing but
regulative principles and not constitutive and that their aim is not
to realize an actual totality in such series The full discussion of
this subject will be found in its proper place in the chapter on the
antinomy of pure reason
The third idea of pure reason containing the hypothesis of a being
which is valid merely as a relative hypothesis is that of the one and
allsufficient cause of all cosmological series in other words the
idea of God We have not the slightest ground absolutely to admit the
existence of an object corresponding to this idea for what can empower
or authorize us to affirm the existence of a being of the highest
perfectiona being whose existence is absolutely necessarymerely
because we possess the conception of such a being The answer is It is
the existence of the world which renders this hypothesis necessary But
this answer makes it perfectly evident that the idea of this being like
all other speculative ideas is essentially nothing more than a demand
upon reason that it shall regulate the connection which it and its
subordinate faculties introduce into the phenomena of the world by
principles of systematic unity and consequently that it shall regard
all phenomena as originating from one allembracing being as the
supreme and allsufficient cause From this it is plain that the only
aim of reason in this procedure is the establishment of its own formal
rule for the extension of its dominion in the world of experience that
it does not aim at an extension of its cognition beyond the limits
of experience and that consequently this idea does not contain any
constitutive principle
The highest formal unity which is based upon ideas alone is the unity
of all thingsa unity in accordance with an aim or purpose and the
speculative interest of reason renders it necessary to regard all order
in the world as if it originated from the intention and design of a
supreme reason This principle unfolds to the view of reason in the
sphere of experience new and enlarged prospects and invites it to
connect the phenomena of the world according to teleological laws
and in this way to attain to the highest possible degree of systematic
unity The hypothesis of a supreme intelligence as the sole cause of
the universean intelligence which has for us no more than an ideal
existenceis accordingly always of the greatest service to reason
Thus if we presuppose in relation to the figure of the earth which
is round but somewhat flattened at the poles or that of mountains or
seas wise designs on the part of an author of the universe we cannot
fail to make by the light of this supposition a great number of
interesting discoveries If we keep to this hypothesis as a principle
which is purely regulative even error cannot be very detrimental For
in this case error can have no more serious consequences than that
where we expected to discover a teleological connection nexus finalis
only a mechanical or physical connection appears In such a case we
merely fail to find the additional form of unity we expected but we do
not lose the rational unity which the mind requires in its procedure in
experience But even a miscarriage of this sort cannot affect the law in
its general and teleological relations For although we may convict an
anatomist of an error when he connects the limb of some animal with a
certain purpose it is quite impossible to prove in a single case that
any arrangement of nature be it what it may is entirely without aim or
design And thus medical physiology by the aid of a principle presented
to it by pure reason extends its very limited empirical knowledge of
the purposes of the different parts of an organized body so far that it
may be asserted with the utmost confidence and with the approbation of
all reflecting men that every organ or bodily part of an animal has its
use and answers a certain design Now this is a supposition which
if regarded as of a constitutive character goes much farther than any
experience or observation of ours can justify Hence it is evident that
it is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason which aims
at the highest degree of systematic unity by the aid of the idea of
a causality according to design in a supreme causea cause which it
regards as the highest intelligence
If however we neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely
regulative influence reason is betrayed into numerous errors For it
has then left the ground of experience in which alone are to be
found the criteria of truth and has ventured into the region of the
incomprehensible and unsearchable on the heights of which it loses
its power and collectedness because it has completely severed its
connection with experience
The first error which arises from our employing the idea of a Supreme
Being as a constitutive in repugnance to the very nature of an idea
and not as a regulative principle is the error of inactive reason
ignava ratio We may so term every principle which requires us to
regard our investigations of nature as absolutely complete and allows
reason to cease its inquiries as if it had fully executed its task
Thus the psychological idea of the ego when employed as a constitutive
principle for the explanation of the phenomena of the soul and for the
extension of our knowledge regarding this subject beyond the limits of
experienceeven to the condition of the soul after deathis convenient
enough for the purposes of pure reason but detrimental and even ruinous
to its interests in the sphere of nature and experience The dogmatizing
spiritualist explains the unchanging unity of our personality through
all changes of condition from the unity of a thinking substance the
interest which we take in things and events that can happen only after
our death from a consciousness of the immaterial nature of our thinking
subject and so on Thus he dispenses with all empirical investigations
into the cause of these internal phenomena and with all possible
explanations of them upon purely natural grounds while at the
dictation of a transcendent reason he passes by the immanent sources of
cognition in experience greatly to his own ease and convenience but
to the sacrifice of all genuine insight and intelligence These
prejudicial consequences become still more evident in the case of the
dogmatical treatment of our idea of a Supreme Intelligence and the
theological system of nature physicotheology which is falsely based
upon it For in this case the aims which we observe in nature and
often those which we merely fancy to exist make the investigation
of causes a very easy task by directing us to refer such and such
phenomena immediately to the unsearchable will and counsel of the
Supreme Wisdom while we ought to investigate their causes in the
general laws of the mechanism of matter We are thus recommended to
consider the labour of reason as ended when we have merely dispensed
with its employment which is guided surely and safely only by the order
of nature and the series of changes in the worldwhich are arranged
according to immanent and general laws This error may be avoided if we
do not merely consider from the viewpoint of final aims certain parts
of nature such as the division and structure of a continent the
constitution and direction of certain mountainchains or even the
organization existing in the vegetable and animal kingdoms but look
upon this systematic unity of nature in a perfectly general way in
relation to the idea of a Supreme Intelligence If we pursue this
advice we lay as a foundation for all investigation the conformity to
aims of all phenomena of nature in accordance with universal laws for
which no particular arrangement of nature is exempt but only cognized
by us with more or less difficulty and we possess a regulative
principle of the systematic unity of a teleological connection which we
do not attempt to anticipate or predetermine All that we do and ought
to do is to follow out the physicomechanical connection in nature
according to general laws with the hope of discovering sooner or
later the teleological connection also Thus and thus only can the
principle of final unity aid in the extension of the employment
of reason in the sphere of experience without being in any case
detrimental to its interests
The second error which arises from the misconception of the principle
of systematic unity is that of perverted reason perversa ratio usteron
roteron rationis The idea of systematic unity is available as a
regulative principle in the connection of phenomena according to general
natural laws and how far soever we have to travel upon the path of
experience to discover some fact or event this idea requires us to
believe that we have approached all the more nearly to the completion of
its use in the sphere of nature although that completion can never be
attained But this error reverses the procedure of reason We begin
by hypostatizing the principle of systematic unity and by giving
an anthropomorphic determination to the conception of a Supreme
Intelligence and then proceed forcibly to impose aims upon nature Thus
not only does teleology which ought to aid in the completion of unity
in accordance with general laws operate to the destruction of its
influence but it hinders reason from attaining its proper aim that
is the proof upon natural grounds of the existence of a supreme
intelligent cause For if we cannot presuppose supreme finality in
nature a priori that is as essentially belonging to nature how can
we be directed to endeavour to discover this unity and rising gradually
through its different degrees to approach the supreme perfection of an
author of alla perfection which is absolutely necessary and therefore
cognizable a priori The regulative principle directs us to presuppose
systematic unity absolutely and consequently as following from the
essential nature of thingsbut only as a unity of nature not merely
cognized empirically but presupposed a priori although only in
an indeterminate manner But if I insist on basing nature upon the
foundation of a supreme ordaining Being the unity of nature is in
effect lost For in this case it is quite foreign and unessential to
the nature of things and cannot be cognized from the general laws of
nature And thus arises a vicious circular argument what ought to have
been proved having been presupposed
To take the regulative principle of systematic unity in nature for a
constitutive principle and to hypostatize and make a cause out of that
which is properly the ideal ground of the consistent and harmonious
exercise of reason involves reason in inextricable embarrassments The
investigation of nature pursues its own path under the guidance of the
chain of natural causes in accordance with the general laws of nature
and ever follows the light of the idea of an author of the universenot
for the purpose of deducing the finality which it constantly pursues
from this Supreme Being but to attain to the cognition of his existence
from the finality which it seeks in the existence of the phenomena of
nature and if possible in that of all things to cognize this being
consequently as absolutely necessary Whether this latter purpose
succeed or not the idea is and must always be a true one and its
employment when merely regulative must always be accompanied by
truthful and beneficial results
Complete unity in conformity with aims constitutes absolute
perfection But if we do not find this unity in the nature of the things
which go to constitute the world of experience that is of objective
cognition consequently in the universal and necessary laws of nature
how can we infer from this unity the idea of the supreme and absolutely
necessary perfection of a primal being which is the origin of all
causality The greatest systematic unity and consequently teleological
unity constitutes the very foundation of the possibility of the most
extended employment of human reason The idea of unity is therefore
essentially and indissolubly connected with the nature of our reason
This idea is a legislative one and hence it is very natural that we
should assume the existence of a legislative reason corresponding to it
from which the systematic unity of naturethe object of the operations
of reasonmust be derived
In the course of our discussion of the antinomies we stated that it is
always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may raise
and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition which is
unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural phenomena
cannot in this case be admitted because the questions raised do not
relate to the nature of things but are necessarily originated by the
nature of reason itself and relate to its own internal constitution We
can now establish this assertion which at first sight appeared so rash
in relation to the two questions in which reason takes the greatest
interest and thus complete our discussion of the dialectic of pure
reason
If then the question is asked in relation to transcendental
theology first whether there is anything distinct from the world
which contains the ground of cosmical order and connection according
to general laws The answer is Certainly For the world is a sum of
phenomena there must therefore be some transcendental basis of these
phenomena that is a basis cogitable by the pure understanding alone
If secondly the question is asked whether this being is substance
whether it is of the greatest reality whether it is necessary and so
forth I answer that this question is utterly without meaning For all
the categories which aid me in forming a conception of an object cannot
be employed except in the world of sense and are without meaning when
not applied to objects of actual or possible experience Out of this
sphere they are not properly conceptions but the mere marks or indices
of conceptions which we may admit although they cannot without the
help of experience help us to understand any subject or thing If
thirdly the question is whether we may not cogitate this being which
is distinct from the world in analogy with the objects of experience
The answer is Undoubtedly but only as an ideal and not as a real
object That is we must cogitate it only as an unknown substratum of
the systematic unity order and finality of the worlda unity which
reason must employ as the regulative principle of its investigation of
nature Nay more we may admit into the idea certain anthropomorphic
elements which are promotive of the interests of this regulative
principle For it is no more than an idea which does not relate
directly to a being distinct from the world but to the regulative
principle of the systematic unity of the world by means however of a
schema of this unitythe schema of a Supreme Intelligence who is the
wiselydesigning author of the universe What this basis of cosmical
unity may be in itself we know notwe cannot discover from the
idea we merely know how we ought to employ the idea of this unity
in relation to the systematic operation of reason in the sphere of
experience
But it will be asked again can we on these grounds admit the
existence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world Without doubt
and not only so but we must assume the existence of such a being
But do we thus extend the limits of our knowledge beyond the field
of possible experience By no means For we have merely presupposed a
something of which we have no conception which we do not know as it
is in itself but in relation to the systematic disposition of the
universe which we must presuppose in all our observation of nature
we have cogitated this unknown being in analogy with an intelligent
existence an empirical conception that is to say we have endowed it
with those attributes which judging from the nature of our own
reason may contain the ground of such a systematic unity This idea is
therefore valid only relatively to the employment in experience of our
reason But if we attribute to it absolute and objective validity we
overlook the fact that it is merely an ideal being that we cogitate
and by setting out from a basis which is not determinable by
considerations drawn from experience we place ourselves in a position
which incapacitates us from applying this principle to the empirical
employment of reason
But it will be asked further can I make any use of this conception and
hypothesis in my investigations into the world and nature Yes for this
very purpose was the idea established by reason as a fundamental basis
But may I regard certain arrangements which seemed to have been made in
conformity with some fixed aim as the arrangements of design and look
upon them as proceeding from the divine will with the intervention
however of certain other particular arrangements disposed to that
end Yes you may do so but at the same time you must regard it as
indifferent whether it is asserted that divine wisdom has disposed all
things in conformity with his highest aims or that the idea of supreme
wisdom is a regulative principle in the investigation of nature and at
the same time a principle of the systematic unity of nature according to
general laws even in those cases where we are unable to discover that
unity In other words it must be perfectly indifferent to you whether
you say when you have discovered this unity God has wisely willed
it so or Nature has wisely arranged this For it was nothing but the
systematic unity which reason requires as a basis for the investigation
of nature that justified you in accepting the idea of a supreme
intelligence as a schema for a regulative principle and the farther
you advance in the discovery of design and finality the more certain
the validity of your idea But as the whole aim of this regulative
principle was the discovery of a necessary and systematic unity in
nature we have in so far as we attain this to attribute our success
to the idea of a Supreme Being while at the same time we cannot
without involving ourselves in contradictions overlook the general
laws of nature as it was in reference to them alone that this idea was
employed We cannot I say overlook the general laws of nature and
regard this conformity to aims observable in nature as contingent or
hyperphysical in its origin inasmuch as there is no ground which can
justify us in the admission of a being with such properties distinct
from and above nature All that we are authorized to assert is that
this idea may be employed as a principle and that the properties of
the being which is assumed to correspond to it may be regarded as
systematically connected in analogy with the causal determination of
phenomena
For the same reasons we are justified in introducing into the idea of
the supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements for without these we
could not predicate anything of it we may regard it as allowable
to cogitate this cause as a being with understanding the feelings of
pleasure and displeasure and faculties of desire and will corresponding
to these At the same time we may attribute to this being infinite
perfectiona perfection which necessarily transcends that which our
knowledge of the order and design in the world authorize us to predicate
of it For the regulative law of systematic unity requires us to study
nature on the supposition that systematic and final unity in infinitum
is everywhere discoverable even in the highest diversity For although
we may discover little of this cosmical perfection it belongs to the
legislative prerogative of reason to require us always to seek for
and to expect it while it must always be beneficial to institute all
inquiries into nature in accordance with this principle But it is
evident that by this idea of a supreme author of all which I place as
the foundation of all inquiries into nature I do not mean to assert
the existence of such a being or that I have any knowledge of its
existence and consequently I do not really deduce anything from the
existence of this being but merely from its idea that is to say from
the nature of things in this world in accordance with this idea A
certain dim consciousness of the true use of this idea seems to have
dictated to the philosophers of all times the moderate language used
by them regarding the cause of the world We find them employing
the expressions wisdom and care of nature and divine wisdom as
synonymousnay in purely speculative discussions preferring the
former because it does not carry the appearance of greater pretensions
than such as we are entitled to make and at the same time directs
reason to its proper field of actionnature and her phenomena
Thus pure reason which at first seemed to promise us nothing less
than the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of experience
is found when thoroughly examined to contain nothing but regulative
principles the virtue and function of which is to introduce into our
cognition a higher degree of unity than the understanding could of
itself These principles by placing the goal of all our struggles at
so great a distance realize for us the most thorough connection
between the different parts of our cognition and the highest degree of
systematic unity But on the other hand if misunderstood and employed
as constitutive principles of transcendent cognition they become the
parents of illusions and contradictions while pretending to introduce
us to new regions of knowledge
Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions proceeds from thence to
conceptions and ends with ideas Although it possesses in relation
to all three elements a priori sources of cognition which seemed
to transcend the limits of all experience a thoroughgoing criticism
demonstrates that speculative reason can never by the aid of these
elements pass the bounds of possible experience and that the proper
destination of this highest faculty of cognition is to employ all
methods and all the principles of these methods for the purpose of
penetrating into the innermost secrets of nature by the aid of the
principles of unity among all kinds of which teleological unity is
the highest while it ought not to attempt to soar above the sphere of
experience beyond which there lies nought for us but the void inane
The critical examination in our Transcendental Analytic of all the
propositions which professed to extend cognition beyond the sphere of
experience completely demonstrated that they can only conduct us to
a possible experience If we were not distrustful even of the clearest
abstract theorems if we were not allured by specious and inviting
prospects to escape from the constraining power of their evidence we
might spare ourselves the laborious examination of all the dialectical
arguments which a transcendent reason adduces in support of its
pretensions for we should know with the most complete certainty that
however honest such professions might be they are null and valueless
because they relate to a kind of knowledge to which no man can by any
possibility attain But as there is no end to discussion if we cannot
discover the true cause of the illusions by which even the wisest are
deceived and as the analysis of all our transcendent cognition into its
elements is of itself of no slight value as a psychological study while
it is a duty incumbent on every philosopherit was found necessary to
investigate the dialectical procedure of reason in its primary sources
And as the inferences of which this dialectic is the parent are not only
deceitful but naturally possess a profound interest for humanity it
was advisable at the same time to give a full account of the momenta of
this dialectical procedure and to deposit it in the archives of human
reason as a warning to all future metaphysicians to avoid these causes
of speculative error
If we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative reason as an
edifice the idea of which at least exists in the human mind it may
be said that we have in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements examined
the materials and determined to what edifice these belong and what
its height and stability We have found indeed that although we had
purposed to build for ourselves a tower which should reach to Heaven
the supply of materials sufficed merely for a habitation which was
spacious enough for all terrestrial purposes and high enough to
enable us to survey the level plain of experience but that the bold
undertaking designed necessarily failed for want of materialsnot to
mention the confusion of tongues which gave rise to endless disputes
among the labourers on the plan of the edifice and at last scattered
them over all the world each to erect a separate building for himself
according to his own plans and his own inclinations Our present task
relates not to the materials but to the plan of an edifice and as we
have had sufficient warning not to venture blindly upon a design which
may be found to transcend our natural powers while at the same time
we cannot give up the intention of erecting a secure abode for the mind
we must proportion our design to the material which is presented to us
and which is, at the same time, sufficient for all our wants
I understand then by the transcendental doctrine of method the
determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure
reason We shall accordingly have to treat of the discipline the canon
the architectonic and finally the history of pure reason This part
of our Critique will accomplish from the transcendental point of view
what has been usually attempted but miserably executed under the name
of practical logic It has been badly executed I say because general
logic not being limited to any particular kind of cognition not
even to the pure cognition of the understanding nor to any particular
objects it cannot without borrowing from other sciences do more than
present merely the titles or signs of possible methods and the technical
expressions which are employed in the systematic parts of all sciences
and thus the pupil is made acquainted with names the meaning and
application of which he is to learn only at some future time
Negative judgementsthose which are so not merely as regards their
logical form but in respect of their contentare not commonly held in
especial respect They are on the contrary regarded as jealous enemies
of our insatiable desire for knowledge and it almost requires an
apology to induce us to tolerate much less to prize and to respect
them
All propositions indeed may be logically expressed in a negative form
but in relation to the content of our cognition the peculiar province
of negative judgements is solely to prevent error For this reason too
negative propositions which are framed for the purpose of correcting
false cognitions where error is absolutely impossible are undoubtedly
true but inane and senseless that is they are in reality purposeless
and for this reason often very ridiculous Such is the proposition
of the schoolman that Alexander could not have subdued any countries
without an army
But where the limits of our possible cognition are very much contracted
the attraction to new fields of knowledge great the illusions to
which the mind is subject of the most deceptive character and the
evil consequences of error of no inconsiderable magnitudethe negative
element in knowledge which is useful only to guard us against error
is of far more importance than much of that positive instruction which
makes additions to the sum of our knowledge The restraint which is
employed to repress and finally to extirpate the constant inclination
to depart from certain rules is termed discipline It is distinguished
from culture which aims at the formation of a certain degree of skill
without attempting to repress or to destroy any other mental power
already existing In the cultivation of a talent which has given
evidence of an impulse towards selfdevelopment discipline takes a
negative culture and doctrine a positive part
That natural dispositions and talents such as imagination and wit
which ask a free and unlimited development require in many respects the
corrective influence of discipline everyone will readily grant But
it may well appear strange that reason whose proper duty it is to
prescribe rules of discipline to all the other powers of the mind
should itself require this corrective It has in fact hitherto
escaped this humiliation only because in presence of its magnificent
pretensions and high position no one could readily suspect it to be
capable of substituting fancies for conceptions and words for things
Reason when employed in the field of experience does not stand in need
of criticism because its principles are subjected to the continual test
of empirical observations Nor is criticism requisite in the sphere of
mathematics where the conceptions of reason must always be presented
in concreto in pure intuition and baseless or arbitrary assertions are
discovered without difficulty But where reason is not held in a plain
track by the influence of empirical or of pure intuition that is when
it is employed in the transcendental sphere of pure conceptions it
stands in great need of discipline to restrain its propensity to
overstep the limits of possible experience and to keep it from wandering
into error In fact the utility of the philosophy of pure reason is
entirely of this negative character Particular errors may be corrected
by particular animadversions and the causes of these errors may be
eradicated by criticism But where we find as in the case of pure
reason a complete system of illusions and fallacies closely connected
with each other and depending upon grand general principles there
seems to be required a peculiar and negative code of mental legislation
which under the denomination of a discipline and founded upon the
nature of reason and the objects of its exercise shall constitute a
system of thorough examination and testing which no fallacy will be
able to withstand or escape from under whatever disguise or concealment
it may lurk
But the reader must remark that in this the second division of our
transcendental Critique the discipline of pure reason is not directed
to the content but to the method of the cognition of pure reason The
former task has been completed in the doctrine of elements But there
is so much similarity in the mode of employing the faculty of reason
whatever be the object to which it is applied while at the same time
its employment in the transcendental sphere is so essentially different
in kind from every other that without the warning negative influence
of a discipline specially directed to that end the errors are
unavoidable which spring from the unskillful employment of the methods
which are originated by reason but which are out of place in this
sphere
The science of mathematics presents the most brilliant example of the
extension of the sphere of pure reason without the aid of experience
Examples are always contagious and they exert an especial influence on
the same faculty which naturally flatters itself that it will have
the same good fortune in other case as fell to its lot in one fortunate
instance Hence pure reason hopes to be able to extend its empire in the
transcendental sphere with equal success and security especially
when it applies the same method which was attended with such brilliant
results in the science of mathematics It is therefore of the
highest importance for us to know whether the method of arriving at
demonstrative certainty which is termed mathematical be identical with
that by which we endeavour to attain the same degree of certainty in
philosophy and which is termed in that science dogmatical
Philosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by means of
conceptions mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the
construction of conceptions The construction of a conception is
the presentation a priori of the intuition which corresponds to the
conception For this purpose a nonempirical intuition is requisite
which as an intuition is an individual object while as the
construction of a conception a general representation it must be seen
to be universally valid for all the possible intuitions which rank under
that conception Thus I construct a triangle by the presentation of the
object which corresponds to this conception either by mere imagination
in pure intuition or upon paper in empirical intuition in both cases
completely a priori without borrowing the type of that figure from any
experience The individual figure drawn upon paper is empirical but
it serves notwithstanding to indicate the conception even in its
universality because in this empirical intuition we keep our eye merely
on the act of the construction of the conception and pay no attention
to the various modes of determining it for example its size the
length of its sides the size of its angles these not in the least
affecting the essential character of the conception
Philosophical cognition accordingly regards the particular only in
the general mathematical the general in the particular nay in the
individual This is done however entirely a priori and by means of
pure reason so that as this individual figure is determined under
certain universal conditions of construction the object of the
conception to which this individual figure corresponds as its schema
must be cogitated as universally determined
The essential difference of these two modes of cognition consists
therefore in this formal quality it does not regard the difference of
the matter or objects of both Those thinkers who aim at distinguishing
philosophy from mathematics by asserting that the former has to do with
quality merely and the latter with quantity have mistaken the effect
for the cause The reason why mathematical cognition can relate only to
quantity is to be found in its form alone For it is the conception of
quantities only that is capable of being constructed that is presented
a priori in intuition while qualities cannot be given in any other than
an empirical intuition Hence the cognition of qualities by reason is
possible only through conceptions No one can find an intuition which
shall correspond to the conception of reality except in experience
it cannot be presented to the mind a priori and antecedently to the
empirical consciousness of a reality We can form an intuition by means
of the mere conception of it of a cone without the aid of experience
but the colour of the cone we cannot know except from experience I
cannot present an intuition of a cause except in an example which
experience offers to me Besides philosophy as well as mathematics
treats of quantities as for example of totality infinity and so
on Mathematics too treats of the difference of lines and surfacesas
spaces of different quality of the continuity of extensionas a
quality thereof But although in such cases they have a common object
the mode in which reason considers that object is very different in
philosophy from what it is in mathematics The former confines itself
to the general conceptions the latter can do nothing with a mere
conception it hastens to intuition In this intuition it regards the
conception in concreto not empirically but in an a priori intuition
which it has constructed and in which all the results which follow
from the general conditions of the construction of the conception are in
all cases valid for the object of the constructed conception
Suppose that the conception of a triangle is given to a philosopher
and that he is required to discover by the philosophical method what
relation the sum of its angles bears to a right angle He has nothing
before him but the conception of a figure enclosed within three right
lines and consequently with the same number of angles He may analyse
the conception of a right line of an angle or of the number three
as long as he pleases but he will not discover any properties not
contained in these conceptions But if this question is proposed to
a geometrician he at once begins by constructing a triangle He knows
that two right angles are equal to the sum of all the contiguous angles
which proceed from one point in a straight line and he goes on to
produce one side of his triangle thus forming two adjacent angles which
are together equal to two right angles He then divides the exterior of
these angles by drawing a line parallel with the opposite side of the
triangle and immediately perceives that he has thus got an exterior
adjacent angle which is equal to the interior Proceeding in this way
through a chain of inferences and always on the ground of intuition he
arrives at a clear and universally valid solution of the question
But mathematics does not confine itself to the construction of
quantities quanta as in the case of geometry it occupies itself
with pure quantity also quantitas as in the case of algebra where
complete abstraction is made of the properties of the object indicated
by the conception of quantity In algebra a certain method of
notation by signs is adopted and these indicate the different possible
constructions of quantities the extraction of roots and so on After
having thus denoted the general conception of quantities according to
their different relations the different operations by which quantity
or number is increased or diminished are presented in intuition in
accordance with general rules Thus when one quantity is to be divided
by another the signs which denote both are placed in the form peculiar
to the operation of division and thus algebra by means of a symbolical
construction of quantity just as geometry with its ostensive or
geometrical construction a construction of the objects themselves
arrives at results which discursive cognition cannot hope to reach by
the aid of mere conceptions
Now what is the cause of this difference in the fortune of the
philosopher and the mathematician the former of whom follows the path
of conceptions while the latter pursues that of intuitions which he
represents a priori in correspondence with his conceptions The cause
is evident from what has been already demonstrated in the introduction
to this Critique We do not in the present case want to discover
analytical propositions which may be produced merely by analysing our
conceptionsfor in this the philosopher would have the advantage over
his rival we aim at the discovery of synthetical propositionssuch
synthetical propositions moreover as can be cognized a priori I must
not confine myself to that which I actually cogitate in my conception
of a triangle for this is nothing more than the mere definition I
must try to go beyond that and to arrive at properties which are not
contained in although they belong to the conception Now this is
impossible unless I determine the object present to my mind according
to the conditions either of empirical or of pure intuition In the
former case I should have an empirical proposition arrived at by
actual measurement of the angles of the triangle which would possess
neither universality nor necessity but that would be of no value In
the latter I proceed by geometrical construction by means of which I
collect in a pure intuition just as I would in an empirical intuition
all the various properties which belong to the schema of a triangle
in general and consequently to its conception and thus construct
synthetical propositions which possess the attribute of universality
It would be vain to philosophize upon the triangle that is to reflect
on it discursively I should get no further than the definition with
which I had been obliged to set out There are certainly transcendental
synthetical propositions which are framed by means of pure conceptions
and which form the peculiar distinction of philosophy but these do not
relate to any particular thing but to a thing in general and enounce
the conditions under which the perception of it may become a part of
possible experience But the science of mathematics has nothing to do
with such questions nor with the question of existence in any fashion
it is concerned merely with the properties of objects in themselves
only in so far as these are connected with the conception of the
objects
In the above example we merely attempted to show the great difference
which exists between the discursive employment of reason in the sphere
of conceptions and its intuitive exercise by means of the construction
of conceptions The question naturally arises What is the cause which
necessitates this twofold exercise of reason and how are we to discover
whether it is the philosophical or the mathematical method which reason
is pursuing in an argument
All our knowledge relates finally to possible intuitions for it
is these alone that present objects to the mind An a priori or
nonempirical conception contains either a pure intuitionand in this
case it can be constructed or it contains nothing but the synthesis of
possible intuitions which are not given a priori In this latter case
it may help us to form synthetical a priori judgements but only in the
discursive method by conceptions not in the intuitive by means of the
construction of conceptions
The only a priori intuition is that of the pure form of phenomenaspace
and time A conception of space and time as quanta may be presented
a priori in intuition that is constructed either alone with their
quality figure or as pure quantity the mere synthesis of the
homogeneous by means of number But the matter of phenomena by which
things are given in space and time can be presented only in perception
a posteriori The only conception which represents a priori this
empirical content of phenomena is the conception of a thing in general
and the a priori synthetical cognition of this conception can give
us nothing more than the rule for the synthesis of that which may be
contained in the corresponding a posteriori perception it is utterly
inadequate to present an a priori intuition of the real object which
must necessarily be empirical
Synthetical propositions which relate to things in general an a priori
intuition of which is impossible are transcendental For this
reason transcendental propositions cannot be framed by means of the
construction of conceptions they are a priori and based entirely on
conceptions themselves They contain merely the rule by which we are to
seek in the world of perception or experience the synthetical unity
of that which cannot be intuited a priori But they are incompetent
to present any of the conceptions which appear in them in an a priori
intuition these can be given only a posteriori in experience which
however is itself possible only through these synthetical principles
If we are to form a synthetical judgement regarding a conception we
must go beyond it to the intuition in which it is given If we keep
to what is contained in the conception the judgement is merely
analyticalit is merely an explanation of what we have cogitated in the
conception But I can pass from the conception to the pure or empirical
intuition which corresponds to it I can proceed to examine my
conception in concreto and to cognize either a priori or a posterio
what I find in the object of the conception The formera priori
cognitionis rationalmathematical cognition by means of the
construction of the conception the lattera posteriori cognitionis
purely empirical cognition which does not possess the attributes of
necessity and universality Thus I may analyse the conception I have
of gold but I gain no new information from this analysis I merely
enumerate the different properties which I had connected with the notion
indicated by the word My knowledge has gained in logical clearness
and arrangement but no addition has been made to it But if I take the
matter which is indicated by this name and submit it to the examination
of my senses I am enabled to form several syntheticalalthough still
empiricalpropositions The mathematical conception of a triangle I
should construct that is present a priori in intuition and in
this way attain to rationalsynthetical cognition But when the
transcendental conception of reality or substance or power is
presented to my mind I find that it does not relate to or indicate
either an empirical or pure intuition but that it indicates merely the
synthesis of empirical intuitions which cannot of course be given
a priori The synthesis in such a conception cannot proceed a
prioriwithout the aid of experienceto the intuition which
corresponds to the conception and for this reason none of these
conceptions can produce a determinative synthetical proposition they
can never present more than a principle of the synthesis of possible
empirical intuitions A transcendental proposition is therefore a
synthetical cognition of reason by means of pure conceptions and the
discursive method and it renders possible all synthetical unity in
empirical cognition though it cannot present us with any intuition a
priori
There is thus a twofold exercise of reason Both modes have the
properties of universality and an a priori origin in common but are
in their procedure of widely different character The reason of this is
that in the world of phenomena in which alone objects are presented to
our minds there are two main elementsthe form of intuition space and
time which can be cognized and determined completely a priori and the
matter or contentthat which is presented in space and time and which
consequently contains a somethingan existence corresponding to our
powers of sensation As regards the latter which can never be given in
a determinate mode except by experience there are no a priori notions
which relate to it except the undetermined conceptions of the synthesis
of possible sensations in so far as these belong in a possible
experience to the unity of consciousness As regards the former we
can determine our conceptions a priori in intuition inasmuch as we are
ourselves the creators of the objects of the conceptions in space and
timethese objects being regarded simply as quanta In the one case
reason proceeds according to conceptions and can do nothing more than
subject phenomena to thesewhich can only be determined empirically
that is a posterioriin conformity however with those conceptions as
the rules of all empirical synthesis In the other case reason proceeds
by the construction of conceptions and as these conceptions relate
to an a priori intuition they may be given and determined in pure
intuition a priori and without the aid of empirical data The
examination and consideration of everything that exists in space
or timewhether it is a quantum or not in how far the particular
something which fills space or time is a primary substratum or a mere
determination of some other existence whether it relates to anything
elseeither as cause or effect whether its existence is isolated or in
reciprocal connection with and dependence upon others the possibility
of this existence its reality and necessity or oppositesall these
form part of the cognition of reason on the ground of conceptions and
this cognition is termed philosophical But to determine a priori an
intuition in space its figure to divide time into periods or merely
to cognize the quantity of an intuition in space and time and to
determine it by numberall this is an operation of reason by means of
the construction of conceptions and is called mathematical
The success which attends the efforts of reason in the sphere of
mathematics naturally fosters the expectation that the same good fortune
will be its lot if it applies the mathematical method in other regions
of mental endeavour besides that of quantities Its success is thus
great because it can support all its conceptions by a priori intuitions
and in this way make itself a master as it were over nature while
pure philosophy with its a priori discursive conceptions bungles
about in the world of nature and cannot accredit or show any a priori
evidence of the reality of these conceptions Masters in the science of
mathematics are confident of the success of this method indeed it is a
common persuasion that it is capable of being applied to any subject of
human thought They have hardly ever reflected or philosophized on
their favourite sciencea task of great difficulty and the specific
difference between the two modes of employing the faculty of reason
has never entered their thoughts Rules current in the field of common
experience and which common sense stamps everywhere with its approval
are regarded by them as axiomatic From what source the conceptions of
space and time with which as the only primitive quanta they have
to deal enter their minds is a question which they do not trouble
themselves to answer and they think it just as unnecessary to examine
into the origin of the pure conceptions of the understanding and the
extent of their validity All they have to do with them is to employ
them In all this they are perfectly right if they do not overstep the
limits of the sphere of nature But they pass unconsciously from the
world of sense to the insecure ground of pure transcendental conceptions
instabilis tellus innabilis unda where they can neither stand nor
swim and where the tracks of their footsteps are obliterated by time
while the march of mathematics is pursued on a broad and magnificent
highway which the latest posterity shall frequent without fear of
danger or impediment
As we have taken upon us the task of determining clearly and certainly
the limits of pure reason in the sphere of transcendentalism and as
the efforts of reason in this direction are persisted in even after the
plainest and most expressive warnings hope still beckoning us past the
limits of experience into the splendours of the intellectual worldit
becomes necessary to cut away the last anchor of this fallacious and
fantastic hope We shall accordingly show that the mathematical
method is unattended in the sphere of philosophy by the least
advantageexcept perhaps that it more plainly exhibits its own
inadequacythat geometry and philosophy are two quite different things
although they go hand in hand in hand in the field of natural science
and consequently that the procedure of the one can never be imitated
by the other
The evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions axioms and
demonstrations I shall be satisfied with showing that none of these
forms can be employed or imitated in philosophy in the sense in which
they are understood by mathematicians and that the geometrician if
he employs his method in philosophy will succeed only in building
cardcastles while the employment of the philosophical method in
mathematics can result in nothing but mere verbiage The essential
business of philosophy indeed is to mark out the limits of the
science and even the mathematician unless his talent is naturally
circumscribed and limited to this particular department of knowledge
cannot turn a deaf ear to the warnings of philosophy or set himself
above its direction
A definition is as the term itself indicates the
representation upon primary grounds of the complete conception of
a thing within its own limits Accordingly an empirical conception
cannot be defined it can only be explained For as there are in such
a conception only a certain number of marks or signs which denote a
certain class of sensuous objects we can never be sure that we do not
cogitate under the word which indicates the same object at one time
a greater at another a smaller number of signs Thus one person may
cogitate in his conception of gold in addition to its properties of
weight colour malleability that of resisting rust while another
person may be ignorant of this quality We employ certain signs only so
long as we require them for the sake of distinction new observations
abstract some and add new ones so that an empirical conception never
remains within permanent limits It is in fact useless to define a
conception of this kind If for example we are speaking of water and
its properties we do not stop at what we actually think by the word
water but proceed to observation and experiment and the word with
the few signs attached to it is more properly a designation than a
conception of the thing A definition in this case would evidently be
nothing more than a determination of the word In the second place no
a priori conception such as those of substance cause right fitness
and so on can be defined For I can never be sure that the clear
representation of a given conception which is given in a confused
state has been fully developed until I know that the representation
is adequate with its object But inasmuch as the conception as it is
presented to the mind may contain a number of obscure representations
which we do not observe in our analysis although we employ them in our
application of the conception I can never be sure that my analysis is
complete while examples may make this probable although they can never
demonstrate the fact Instead of the word definition I should rather
employ the term expositiona more modest expression which the critic
may accept without surrendering his doubts as to the completeness of the
analysis of any such conception As therefore neither empirical nor a
priori conceptions are capable of definition we have to see whether the
only other kind of conceptionsarbitrary conceptionscan be subjected
to this mental operation Such a conception can always be defined for
I must know thoroughly what I wished to cogitate in it as it was I who
created it and it was not given to my mind either by the nature of my
understanding or by experience At the same time I cannot say that by
such a definition I have defined a real object If the conception is
based upon empirical conditions if for example I have a conception of
a clock for a ship this arbitrary conception does not assure me of the
existence or even of the possibility of the object My definition of
such a conception would with more propriety be termed a declaration of
a project than a definition of an object There are no other conceptions
which can bear definition except those which contain an arbitrary
synthesis which can be constructed a priori Consequently the science
of mathematics alone possesses definitions For the object here thought
is presented a priori in intuition and thus it can never contain more
or less than the conception because the conception of the object has
been given by the definitionand primarily that is without deriving
the definition from any other source Philosophical definitions are
therefore merely expositions of given conceptions while mathematical
definitions are constructions of conceptions originally formed by the
mind itself the former are produced by analysis the completeness of
which is never demonstratively certain the latter by a synthesis In
a mathematical definition the conception is formed in a philosophical
definition it is only explained From this it follows
That we must not imitate in philosophy the mathematical usage of
commencing with definitionsexcept by way of hypothesis or experiment
For as all socalled philosophical definitions are merely analyses of
given conceptions these conceptions although only in a confused form
must precede the analysis and the incomplete exposition must precede
the complete so that we may be able to draw certain inferences from the
characteristics which an incomplete analysis has enabled us to discover
before we attain to the complete exposition or definition of the
conception In one word a full and clear definition ought in
philosophy rather to form the conclusion than the commencement of our
labours In mathematics on the contrary we cannot have a conception
prior to the definition it is the definition which gives us the
conception and it must for this reason form the commencement of every
chain of mathematical reasoning
Mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous For the conception is
given only in and through the definition and thus it contains only what
has been cogitated in the definition But although a definition cannot
be incorrect as regards its content an error may sometimes although
seldom creep into the form This error consists in a want of precision
Thus the common definition of a circlethat it is a curved line
every point in which is equally distant from another point called the
centreis faulty from the fact that the determination indicated by the
word curved is superfluous For there ought to be a particular theorem
which may be easily proved from the definition to the effect that every
line which has all its points at equal distances from another point
must be a curved linethat is that not even the smallest part of
it can be straight Analytical definitions on the other hand may be
erroneous in many respects either by the introduction of signs which do
not actually exist in the conception or by wanting in that completeness
which forms the essential of a definition In the latter case the
definition is necessarily defective because we can never be fully
certain of the completeness of our analysis For these reasons the
method of definition employed in mathematics cannot be imitated in
philosophy
These in so far as they are immediately certain are a
priori synthetical principles Now one conception cannot be connected
synthetically and yet immediately with another because if we wish to
proceed out of and beyond a conception a third mediating cognition is
necessary And as philosophy is a cognition of reason by the aid
of conceptions alone there is to be found in it no principle which
deserves to be called an axiom Mathematics on the other hand may
possess axioms because it can always connect the predicates of an
object a priori and without any mediating term by means of the
construction of conceptions in intuition Such is the case with the
proposition Three points can always lie in a plane On the other hand
no synthetical principle which is based upon conceptions can ever
be immediately certain for example the proposition Everything that
happens has a cause because I require a mediating term to connect
the two conceptions of event and causenamely the condition of
timedetermination in an experience and I cannot cognize any such
principle immediately and from conceptions alone Discursive principles
are accordingly very different from intuitive principles or axioms
The former always require deduction which in the case of the latter
may be altogether dispensed with Axioms are for this reason always
selfevident while philosophical principles whatever may be the degree
of certainty they possess cannot lay any claim to such a distinction
No synthetical proposition of pure transcendental reason can be so
evident as is often rashly enough declared as the statement twice two
are four It is true that in the Analytic I introduced into the list of
principles of the pure understanding certain axioms of intuition but
the principle there discussed was not itself an axiom but served merely
to present the principle of the possibility of axioms in general while
it was really nothing more than a principle based upon conceptions For
it is one part of the duty of transcendental philosophy to establish
the possibility of mathematics itself Philosophy possesses then no
axioms and has no right to impose its a priori principles upon thought
until it has established their authority and validity by a thoroughgoing
deduction
Only an apodictic proof based upon intuition
can be termed a demonstration Experience teaches us what is but it
cannot convince us that it might not have been otherwise Hence a proof
upon empirical grounds cannot be apodictic A priori conceptions in
discursive cognition can never produce intuitive certainty or evidence
however certain the judgement they present may be Mathematics alone
therefore contains demonstrations because it does not deduce its
cognition from conceptions but from the construction of conceptions
that is from intuition which can be given a priori in accordance with
conceptions The method of algebra in equations from which the
correct answer is deduced by reduction is a kind of constructionnot
geometrical but by symbolsin which all conceptions especially those
of the relations of quantities are represented in intuition by signs
and thus the conclusions in that science are secured from errors by the
fact that every proof is submitted to ocular evidence Philosophical
cognition does not possess this advantage it being required to consider
the general always in abstracto by means of conceptions while
mathematics can always consider it in concreto in an individual
intuition and at the same time by means of a priori representation
whereby all errors are rendered manifest to the senses The
formerdiscursive proofsought to be termed acroamatic proofs
rather than demonstrations as only words are employed in them while
demonstrations proper as the term itself indicates always require a
reference to the intuition of the object
It follows from all these considerations that it is not consonant with
the nature of philosophy especially in the sphere of pure reason to
employ the dogmatical method and to adorn itself with the titles and
insignia of mathematical science It does not belong to that order and
can only hope for a fraternal union with that science Its attempts at
mathematical evidence are vain pretensions which can only keep it back
from its true aim which is to detect the illusory procedure of reason
when transgressing its proper limits and by fully explaining and
analysing our conceptions to conduct us from the dim regions of
speculation to the clear region of modest selfknowledge Reason must
not therefore in its transcendental endeavours look forward with such
confidence as if the path it is pursuing led straight to its aim
nor reckon with such security upon its premises as to consider it
unnecessary to take a step back or to keep a strict watch for errors
which overlooked in the principles may be detected in the arguments
themselvesin which case it may be requisite either to determine these
principles with greater strictness or to change them entirely
I divide all apodictic propositions whether demonstrable or
immediately certain into dogmata and mathemata A direct synthetical
proposition based on conceptions is a dogma a proposition of the same
kind based on the construction of conceptions is a mathema Analytical
judgements do not teach us any more about an object than what was
contained in the conception we had of it because they do not extend our
cognition beyond our conception of an object they merely elucidate the
conception They cannot therefore be with propriety termed dogmas Of
the two kinds of a priori synthetical propositions above mentioned only
those which are employed in philosophy can according to the general
mode of speech bear this name those of arithmetic or geometry would
not be rightly so denominated Thus the customary mode of speaking
confirms the explanation given above and the conclusion arrived at
that only those judgements which are based upon conceptions not on the
construction of conceptions can be termed dogmatical
Thus pure reason in the sphere of speculation does not contain a
single direct synthetical judgement based upon conceptions By means
of ideas it is as we have shown incapable of producing synthetical
judgements which are objectively valid by means of the conceptions of
the understanding it establishes certain indubitable principles not
however directly on the basis of conceptions but only indirectly by
means of the relation of these conceptions to something of a purely
contingent nature namely possible experience When experience is
presupposed these principles are apodeictically certain but in
themselves and directly they cannot even be cognized a priori Thus
the given conceptions of cause and event will not be sufficient for
the demonstration of the proposition Every event has a cause For this
reason it is not a dogma although from another point of view that of
experience it is capable of being proved to demonstration The proper
term for such a proposition is principle and not theorem although
it does require to be proved because it possesses the remarkable
peculiarity of being the condition of the possibility of its own ground
of proof that is experience and of forming a necessary presupposition
in all empirical observation
If then in the speculative sphere of pure reason no dogmata are to
be found all dogmatical methods whether borrowed from mathematics
or invented by philosophical thinkers are alike inappropriate and
inefficient They only serve to conceal errors and fallacies and to
deceive philosophy whose duty it is to see that reason pursues a safe
and straight path A philosophical method may however be systematical
For our reason is subjectively considered itself a system and in
the sphere of mere conceptions a system of investigation according to
principles of unity the material being supplied by experience alone
But this is not the proper place for discussing the peculiar method
of transcendental philosophy as our present task is simply to examine
whether our faculties are capable of erecting an edifice on the basis
of pure reason and how far they may proceed with the materials at their
command
Reason must be subject in all its operations to criticism which
must always be permitted to exercise its functions without restraint
otherwise its interests are imperilled and its influence obnoxious to
suspicion There is nothing however useful however sacred it may be
that can claim exemption from the searching examination of this supreme
tribunal which has no respect of persons The very existence of reason
depends upon this freedom for the voice of reason is not that of
a dictatorial and despotic power it is rather like the vote of the
citizens of a free state every member of which must have the privilege
of giving free expression to his doubts and possess even the right of
veto
But while reason can never decline to submit itself to the tribunal of
criticism it has not always cause to dread the judgement of this court
Pure reason however when engaged in the sphere of dogmatism is not so
thoroughly conscious of a strict observance of its highest laws as to
appear before a higher judicial reason with perfect confidence On the
contrary it must renounce its magnificent dogmatical pretensions in
philosophy
Very different is the case when it has to defend itself not before a
judge but against an equal If dogmatical assertions are advanced on
the negative side in opposition to those made by reason on the positive
side its justification kat authrhopon is complete although the proof
of its propositions is kat aletheian unsatisfactory
By the polemic of pure reason I mean the defence of its propositions
made by reason in opposition to the dogmatical counterpropositions
advanced by other parties The question here is not whether its own
statements may not also be false it merely regards the fact that
reason proves that the opposite cannot be established with demonstrative
certainty nor even asserted with a higher degree of probability Reason
does not hold her possessions upon sufferance for although she cannot
show a perfectly satisfactory title to them no one can prove that she
is not the rightful possessor
It is a melancholy reflection that reason in its highest exercise
falls into an antithetic and that the supreme tribunal for the
settlement of differences should not be at union with itself It is true
that we had to discuss the question of an apparent antithetic but we
found that it was based upon a misconception In conformity with the
common prejudice phenomena were regarded as things in themselves and
thus an absolute completeness in their synthesis was required in the one
mode or in the other it was shown to be impossible in both a demand
entirely out of place in regard to phenomena There was then no
real selfcontradiction of reason in the propositions The series of
phenomena given in themselves has an absolutely first beginning and
This series is absolutely and in itself without beginning The two
propositions are perfectly consistent with each other because phenomena
as phenomena are in themselves nothing and consequently the hypothesis
that they are things in themselves must lead to selfcontradictory
inferences
But there are cases in which a similar misunderstanding cannot be
provided against and the dispute must remain unsettled Take for
example the theistic proposition There is a Supreme Being and on the
other hand the atheistic counterstatement There exists no Supreme
Being or in psychology Everything that thinks possesses the attribute
of absolute and permanent unity which is utterly different from the
transitory unity of material phenomena and the counterproposition The
soul is not an immaterial unity and its nature is transitory like that
of phenomena The objects of these questions contain no heterogeneous or
contradictory elements for they relate to things in themselves and not
to phenomena There would arise indeed a real contradiction if reason
came forward with a statement on the negative side of these questions
alone As regards the criticism to which the grounds of proof on the
affirmative side must be subjected it may be freely admitted without
necessitating the surrender of the affirmative propositions which have
at least the interest of reason in their favouran advantage which the
opposite party cannot lay claim to
I cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkersSulzer
among the restthat in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto
in use we may hope one day to see sufficient demonstrations of the
two cardinal propositions of pure reasonthe existence of a Supreme
Being and the immortality of the soul I am certain on the contrary
that this will never be the case For on what ground can reason base
such synthetical propositions which do not relate to the objects
of experience and their internal possibility But it is also
demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the
contrary with the least show of probability For as he can attempt such
a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason he is bound to prove
that a Supreme Being and a thinking subject in the character of a pure
intelligence are impossible But where will he find the knowledge which
can enable him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to things
which transcend the region of experience We may therefore rest
assured that the opposite never will be demonstrated We need not then
have recourse to scholastic arguments we may always admit the truth of
those propositions which are consistent with the speculative interests
of reason in the sphere of experience and form moreover the only
means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest Our
opponent who must not be considered here as a critic solely we can
be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert him
while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort as we have on our
side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of reason
and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with calm
indifference
From this point of view there is properly no antithetic of pure reason
For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field of
pure theology and psychology but on this ground there can appear no
combatant whom we need to fear Ridicule and boasting can be his
only weapons and these may be laughed at as mere childs play
This consideration restores to Reason her courage for what source
of confidence could be found if she whose vocation it is to destroy
error were at variance with herself and without any reasonable hope of
ever reaching a state of permanent repose
Everything in nature is good for some purpose Even poisons are
serviceable they destroy the evil effects of other poisons generated
in our system and must always find a place in every complete
pharmacopoeia The objections raised against the fallacies and
sophistries of speculative reason are objections given by the nature
of this reason itself and must therefore have a destination and
purpose which can only be for the good of humanity For what purpose has
Providence raised many objects in which we have the deepest interest
so far above us that we vainly try to cognize them with certainty and
our powers of mental vision are rather excited than satisfied by the
glimpses we may chance to seize It is very doubtful whether it is for
our benefit to advance bold affirmations regarding subjects involved
in such obscurity perhaps it would even be detrimental to our best
interests But it is undoubtedly always beneficial to leave the
investigating as well as the critical reason in perfect freedom and
permit it to take charge of its own interests which are advanced as
much by its limitation as by its extension of its views and which
always suffer by the interference of foreign powers forcing it against
its natural tendencies to bend to certain preconceived designs
Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable and combat him
only with the weapons of reason Have no anxiety for the practical
interests of humanitythese are never imperilled in a purely
speculative dispute Such a dispute serves merely to disclose the
antinomy of reason which as it has its source in the nature of
reason ought to be thoroughly investigated Reason is benefited by the
examination of a subject on both sides and its judgements are corrected
by being limited It is not the matter that may give occasion to
dispute but the manner For it is perfectly permissible to employ
in the presence of reason the language of a firmly rooted faith even
after we have been obliged to renounce all pretensions to knowledge
If we were to ask the dispassionate David Humea philosopher endowed
in a degree that few are with a wellbalanced judgement What motive
induced you to spend so much labour and thought in undermining the
consoling and beneficial persuasion that reason is capable of assuring
us of the existence and presenting us with a determinate conception
of a Supreme Beinghis answer would be Nothing but the desire of
teaching reason to know its own powers better and at the same time a
dislike of the procedure by which that faculty was compelled to support
foregone conclusions and prevented from confessing the internal
weaknesses which it cannot but feel when it enters upon a rigid
selfexamination If on the other hand we were to ask Priestleya
philosopher who had no taste for transcendental speculation but was
entirely devoted to the principles of empiricismwhat his motives were
for overturning those two main pillars of religionthe doctrines of
the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul in his view
the hope of a future life is but the expectation of the miracle of
resurrectionthis philosopher himself a zealous and pious teacher of
religion could give no other answer than this I acted in the interest
of reason which always suffers when certain objects are explained
and judged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material
naturethe only laws which we know in a determinate manner It would be
unfair to decry the latter philosopher who endeavoured to harmonize his
paradoxical opinions with the interests of religion and to undervalue
an honest and reflecting man because he finds himself at a loss the
moment he has left the field of natural science The same grace must be
accorded to Hume a man not less welldisposed and quite as blameless
in his moral character and who pushed his abstract speculations to an
extreme length because as he rightly believed the object of them lies
entirely beyond the bounds of natural science and within the sphere of
pure ideas
What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in the
present case to menace the best interests of humanity The course to be
pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain and natural
one Let each thinker pursue his own path if he shows talent if he
gives evidence of profound thought in one word if he shows that he
possesses the power of reasoningreason is always the gainer If you
have recourse to other means if you attempt to coerce reason if you
raise the cry of treason to humanity if you excite the feelings of
the crowd which can neither understand nor sympathize with such subtle
speculationsyou will only make yourselves ridiculous For the question
does not concern the advantage or disadvantage which we are expected
to reap from such inquiries the question is merely how far reason can
advance in the field of speculation apart from all kinds of interest
and whether we may depend upon the exertions of speculative reason or
must renounce all reliance on it Instead of joining the combatants
it is your part to be a tranquil spectator of the strugglea laborious
struggle for the parties engaged but attended in its progress as
well as in its result with the most advantageous consequences for
the interests of thought and knowledge It is absurd to expect to be
enlightened by Reason and at the same time to prescribe to her what
side of the question she must adopt Moreover reason is sufficiently
held in check by its own power the limits imposed on it by its own
nature are sufficient it is unnecessary for you to place over it
additional guards as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of
the intellectual state In the dialectic of reason there is no victory
gained which need in the least disturb your tranquillity
The strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason and we cannot but wish
that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect freedom which
ought to be its essential condition In this case we should have had at
an earlier period a matured and profound criticism which must have
put an end to all dialectical disputes by exposing the illusions and
prejudices in which they originated
There is in human nature an unworthy propensitya propensity which
like everything that springs from nature must in its final purpose be
conducive to the good of humanityto conceal our real sentiments and
to give expression only to certain received opinions which are regarded
as at once safe and promotive of the common good It is true this
tendency not only to conceal our real sentiments but to profess those
which may gain us favour in the eyes of society has not only civilized
but in a certain measure moralized us as no one can break through the
outward covering of respectability honour and morality and thus
the seeminglygood examples which we which we see around us form an
excellent school for moral improvement so long as our belief in
their genuineness remains unshaken But this disposition to represent
ourselves as better than we are and to utter opinions which are not
our own can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary arrangement
of nature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized state and to
teach us how to assume at least the appearance and manner of the good we
see But when true principles have been developed and have obtained a
sure foundation in our habit of thought this conventionalism must
be attacked with earnest vigour otherwise it corrupts the heart and
checks the growth of good dispositions with the mischievous weed of air
appearances
I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and
hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion where there is less
temptation to restrain the free expression of thought For what can be
more prejudicial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify our
real sentiments to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard to our
statements or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof which we
well know to be insufficient So long as mere personal vanity is the
source of these unworthy artificesand this is generally the case
in speculative discussions which are mostly destitute of practical
interest and are incapable of complete demonstrationthe vanity of
the opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side and thus the
result is the same although it is not brought about so soon as if the
dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright spirit But
where the mass entertains the notion that the aim of certain subtle
speculators is nothing less than to shake the very foundations of public
welfare and moralityit seems not only prudent but even praise worthy
to maintain the good cause by illusory arguments rather than to give to
our supposed opponents the advantage of lowering our declarations to the
moderate tone of a merely practical conviction and of compelling us to
confess our inability to attain to apodictic certainty in speculative
subjects But we ought to reflect that there is nothing in the
world more fatal to the maintenance of a good cause than deceit
misrepresentation and falsehood That the strictest laws of honesty
should be observed in the discussion of a purely speculative subject is
the least requirement that can be made If we could reckon with security
even upon so little the conflict of speculative reason regarding the
important questions of God immortality and freedom would have been
either decided long ago or would very soon be brought to a conclusion
But in general the uprightness of the defence stands in an inverse
ratio to the goodness of the cause and perhaps more honesty and
fairness are shown by those who deny than by those who uphold these
doctrines
I shall persuade myself then that I have readers who do not wish
to see a righteous cause defended by unfair arguments Such will now
recognize the fact that according to the principles of this Critique
if we consider not what is but what ought to be the case there can be
really no polemic of pure reason For how can two persons dispute about
a thing the reality of which neither can present in actual or even in
possible experience Each adopts the plan of meditating on his idea for
the purpose of drawing from the idea if he can what is more than the
idea that is the reality of the object which it indicates How shall
they settle the dispute since neither is able to make his assertions
directly comprehensible and certain but must restrict himself to
attacking and confuting those of his opponent All statements enounced
by pure reason transcend the conditions of possible experience beyond
the sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth while
they are at the same time framed in accordance with the laws of the
understanding which are applicable only to experience and thus it is
the fate of all such speculative discussions that while the one party
attacks the weaker side of his opponent he infallibly lays open his own
weaknesses
The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest tribunal
for all speculative disputes for it is not involved in these disputes
which have an immediate relation to certain objects and not to the laws
of the mind but is instituted for the purpose of determining the rights
and limits of reason
Without the control of criticism reason is as it were in a state
of nature and can only establish its claims and assertions by war
Criticism on the contrary deciding all questions according to the
fundamental laws of its own institution secures to us the peace of
law and order and enables us to discuss all differences in the more
tranquil manner of a legal process In the former case disputes are
ended by victory which both sides may claim and which is followed by a
hollow armistice in the latter by a sentence which as it strikes
at the root of all speculative differences ensures to all concerned a
lasting peace The endless disputes of a dogmatizing reason compel us
to look for some mode of arriving at a settled decision by a critical
investigation of reason itself just as Hobbes maintains that the state
of nature is a state of injustice and violence and that we must leave
it and submit ourselves to the constraint of law which indeed limits
individual freedom but only that it may consist with the freedom of
others and with the common good of all
This freedom will among other things permit of our openly stating the
difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to solve without
being decried on that account as turbulent and dangerous citizens
This privilege forms part of the native rights of human reason which
recognizes no other judge than the universal reason of humanity and
as this reason is the source of all progress and improvement such a
privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable It is unwise moreover
to denounce as dangerous any bold assertions against or rash attacks
upon an opinion which is held by the largest and most moral class of
the community for that would be giving them an importance which they
do not deserve When I hear that the freedom of the will the hope of
a future life and the existence of God have been overthrown by the
arguments of some able writer I feel a strong desire to read his
book for I expect that he will add to my knowledge and impart greater
clearness and distinctness to my views by the argumentative power shown
in his writings But I am perfectly certain even before I have opened
the book that he has not succeeded in a single point not because
I believe I am in possession of irrefutable demonstrations of these
important propositions but because this transcendental critique which
has disclosed to me the power and the limits of pure reason has fully
convinced me that as it is insufficient to establish the affirmative
it is as powerless and even more so to assure us of the truth of
the negative answer to these questions From what source does this
freethinker derive his knowledge that there is for example no Supreme
Being This proposition lies out of the field of possible experience
and therefore beyond the limits of human cognition But I would not
read at all the answer which the dogmatical maintainer of the good
cause makes to his opponent because I know well beforehand that he
will merely attack the fallacious grounds of his adversary without
being able to establish his own assertions Besides a new illusory
argument in the construction of which talent and acuteness are shown
is suggestive of new ideas and new trains of reasoning and in this
respect the old and everyday sophistries are quite useless Again
the dogmatical opponent of religion gives employment to criticism
and enables us to test and correct its principles while there is no
occasion for anxiety in regard to the influence and results of his
reasoning
But it will be said must we not warn the youth entrusted to academical
care against such writings must we not preserve them from the knowledge
of these dangerous assertions until their judgement is ripened or
rather until the doctrines which we wish to inculcate are so firmly
rooted in their minds as to withstand all attempts at instilling the
contrary dogmas from whatever quarter they may come
If we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure in the
sphere of pure reason and find ourselves unable to settle such
disputes otherwise than by becoming a party in them and setting
counterassertions against the statements advanced by our opponents
there is certainly no plan more advisable for the moment but at the
same time none more absurd and inefficient for the future than this
retaining of the youthful mind under guardianship for a time and thus
preserving itfor so long at leastfrom seduction into error But
when at a later period either curiosity or the prevalent fashion
of thought places such writings in their hands will the socalled
convictions of their youth stand firm The young thinker who has in his
armoury none but dogmatical weapons with which to resist the attacks of
his opponent and who cannot detect the latent dialectic which lies in
his own opinions as well as in those of the opposite party sees the
advance of illusory arguments and grounds of proof which have the
advantage of novelty against as illusory grounds of proof destitute
of this advantage and which perhaps excite the suspicion that the
natural credulity of his youth has been abused by his instructors He
thinks he can find no better means of showing that he has out grown the
discipline of his minority than by despising those wellmeant warnings
and knowing no system of thought but that of dogmatism he drinks deep
draughts of the poison that is to sap the principles in which his early
years were trained
Exactly the opposite of the system here recommended ought to be pursued
in academical instruction This can only be effected however by a
thorough training in the critical investigation of pure reason For in
order to bring the principles of this critique into exercise as soon as
possible and to demonstrate their perfect even in the presence of the
highest degree of dialectical illusion the student ought to examine the
assertions made on both sides of speculative questions step by step and
to test them by these principles It cannot be a difficult task for him
to show the fallacies inherent in these propositions and thus he begins
early to feel his own power of securing himself against the influence of
such sophistical arguments which must finally lose for him all their
illusory power And although the same blows which overturn the edifice
of his opponent are as fatal to his own speculative structures if such
he has wished to rear he need not feel any sorrow in regard to this
seeming misfortune as he has now before him a fair prospect into the
practical region in which he may reasonably hope to find a more secure
foundation for a rational system
There is accordingly no proper polemic in the sphere of pure reason
Both parties beat the air and fight with their own shadows as they
pass beyond the limits of nature and can find no tangible point
of attackno firm footing for their dogmatical conflict Fight as
vigorously as they may the shadows which they hew down immediately
start up again like the heroes in Walhalla and renew the bloodless and
unceasing contest
But neither can we admit that there is any proper sceptical employment
of pure reason such as might be based upon the principle of neutrality
in all speculative disputes To excite reason against itself to place
weapons in the hands of the party on the one side as well as in those of
the other and to remain an undisturbed and sarcastic spectator of the
fierce struggle that ensues seems from the dogmatical point of view
to be a part fitting only a malevolent disposition But when the
sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy and blindness and a pride
which no criticism can moderate there is no other practicable course
than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy similar feelings and
pretensions on the other side equally well or ill founded so that
reason staggered by the reflections thus forced upon it finds it
necessary to moderate its confidence in such pretensions and to listen
to the advice of criticism But we cannot stop at these doubts much
less regard the conviction of our ignorance not only as a cure for the
conceit natural to dogmatism but as the settlement of the disputes in
which reason is involved with itself On the contrary scepticism is
merely a means of awakening reason from its dogmatic dreams and exciting
it to a more careful investigation into its own powers and pretensions
But as scepticism appears to be the shortest road to a permanent peace
in the domain of philosophy and as it is the track pursued by the
many who aim at giving a philosophical colouring to their contemptuous
dislike of all inquiries of this kind I think it necessary to present
to my readers this mode of thought in its true light
Scepticism not a Permanent State for Human Reason
The consciousness of ignoranceunless this ignorance is recognized to
be absolutely necessary ought instead of forming the conclusion of
my inquiries to be the strongest motive to the pursuit of them All
ignorance is either ignorance of things or of the limits of knowledge
If my ignorance is accidental and not necessary it must incite me in
the first case to a dogmatical inquiry regarding the objects of which I
am ignorant in the second to a critical investigation into the bounds
of all possible knowledge But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary
and unavoidable and that it consequently absolves from the duty of all
further investigation is a fact which cannot be made out upon empirical
groundsfrom observationbut upon critical grounds alone that is by
a thoroughgoing investigation into the primary sources of cognition It
follows that the determination of the bounds of reason can be made only
on a priori grounds while the empirical limitation of reason which
is merely an indeterminate cognition of an ignorance that can never be
completely removed can take place only a posteriori In other words
our empirical knowledge is limited by that which yet remains for us to
know The former cognition of our ignorance which is possible only on a
rational basis is a science the latter is merely a perception and we
cannot say how far the inferences drawn from it may extend If I regard
the earth as it really appears to my senses as a flat surface I am
ignorant how far this surface extends But experience teaches me that
how far soever I go I always see before me a space in which I can
proceed farther and thus I know the limitsmerely visualof my actual
knowledge of the earth although I am ignorant of the limits of the
earth itself But if I have got so far as to know that the earth is a
sphere and that its surface is spherical I can cognize a priori and
determine upon principles from my knowledge of a small part of this
surfacesay to the extent of a degreethe diameter and circumference
of the earth and although I am ignorant of the objects which this
surface contains I have a perfect knowledge of its limits and extent
The sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be
a level surface with an apparent horizonthat which forms the limit
of its extent and which has been termed by us the idea of unconditioned
totality To reach this limit by empirical means is impossible and all
attempts to determine it a priori according to a principle are alike in
vain But all the questions raised by pure reason relate to that which
lies beyond this horizon or at least in its boundary line
The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human reason
who believe that they have given a sufficient answer to all such
questions by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our
knowledgea horizon which however Hume was unable to determine His
attention especially was directed to the principle of causality and he
remarked with perfect justice that the truth of this principle and even
the objective validity of the conception of a cause was not commonly
based upon clear insight that is upon a priori cognition Hence
he concluded that this law does not derive its authority from its
universality and necessity but merely from its general applicability
in the course of experience and a kind of subjective necessity
thence arising which he termed habit From the inability of reason to
establish this principle as a necessary law for the acquisition of all
experience he inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to
pass the region of the empirical
This procedure of subjecting the facta of reason to examination and
if necessary to disapproval may be termed the censura of reason This
censura must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all transcendent
employment of principles But this is only the second step in our
inquiry The first step in regard to the subjects of pure reason and
which marks the infancy of that faculty is that of dogmatism The
second which we have just mentioned is that of scepticism and it
gives evidence that our judgement has been improved by experience But
a third step is necessaryindicative of the maturity and manhood of the
judgement which now lays a firm foundation upon universal and necessary
principles This is the period of criticism in which we do not examine
the facta of reason but reason itself in the whole extent of its
powers and in regard to its capability of a priori cognition and thus
we determine not merely the empirical and evershifting bounds of our
knowledge but its necessary and eternal limits We demonstrate from
indubitable principles not merely our ignorance in respect to this
or that subject but in regard to all possible questions of a certain
class Thus scepticism is a resting place for reason in which it may
reflect on its dogmatical wanderings and gain some knowledge of the
region in which it happens to be that it may pursue its way with
greater certainty but it cannot be its permanent dwellingplace It
must take up its abode only in the region of complete certitude whether
this relates to the cognition of objects themselves or to the limits
which bound all our cognition
Reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane of the
bounds of which we have only a general knowledge it ought rather to
be compared to a sphere the radius of which may be found from the
curvature of its surfacethat is the nature of a priori synthetical
propositionsand consequently its circumference and extent Beyond
the sphere of experience there are no objects which it can cognize nay
even questions regarding such supposititious objects relate only to the
subjective principles of a complete determination of the relations
which exist between the understandingconceptions which lie within this
sphere
We are actually in possession of a priori synthetical cognitions as is
proved by the existence of the principles of the understanding which
anticipate experience If any one cannot comprehend the possibility
of these principles he may have some reason to doubt whether they
are really a priori but he cannot on this account declare them to be
impossible and affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have
taken under their guidance He can only say If we perceived their
origin and their authenticity we should be able to determine the
extent and limits of reason but till we can do this all propositions
regarding the latter are mere random assertions In this view the
doubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy which proceeds without the
guidance of criticism is well grounded but we cannot therefore deny
to reason the ability to construct a sound philosophy when the way has
been prepared by a thorough critical investigation All the conceptions
produced and all the questions raised by pure reason do not lie in
the sphere of experience but in that of reason itself and hence they
must be solved and shown to be either valid or inadmissible by that
faculty We have no right to decline the solution of such problems on
the ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of
things and under pretence of the limitation of human faculties for
reason is the sole creator of all these ideas and is therefore bound
either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature
The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist
who erects a system of philosophy without having examined the
fundamental objective principles on which it is based for the purpose
of evidencing the futility of his designs and thus bringing him to a
knowledge of his own powers But in itself scepticism does not give
us any certain information in regard to the bounds of our knowledge All
unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are facia which it is always
useful to submit to the censure of the sceptic But this cannot help
us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason cherishes of
better success in future endeavours the investigations of scepticism
cannot therefore settle the dispute regarding the rights and powers of
human reason
Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical
philosophers and his writings have undoubtedly exerted the most
powerful influence in awakening reason to a thorough investigation into
its own powers It will therefore well repay our labours to consider
for a little the course of reasoning which he followed and the errors
into which he strayed although setting out on the path of truth and
certitude
Hume was probably aware although he never clearly developed the notion
that we proceed in judgements of a certain class beyond our conception
if the object I have termed this kind of judgement synthetical As
regard the manner in which I pass beyond my conception by the aid
of experience no doubts can be entertained Experience is itself a
synthesis of perceptions and it employs perceptions to increment the
conception which I obtain by means of another perception But we feel
persuaded that we are able to proceed beyond a conception and to extend
our cognition a priori We attempt this in two wayseither through the
pure understanding in relation to that which may become an object of
experience or through pure reason in relation to such properties of
things or of the existence of things as can never be presented in any
experience This sceptical philosopher did not distinguish these
two kinds of judgements as he ought to have done but regarded this
augmentation of conceptions and if we may so express ourselves the
spontaneous generation of understanding and reason independently of the
impregnation of experience as altogether impossible The socalled a
priori principles of these faculties he consequently held to be invalid
and imaginary and regarded them as nothing but subjective habits of
thought originating in experience and therefore purely empirical
and contingent rules to which we attribute a spurious necessity and
universality In support of this strange assertion he referred us to
the generally acknowledged principle of the relation between cause and
effect No faculty of the mind can conduct us from the conception of a
thing to the existence of something else and hence he believed he could
infer that without experience we possess no source from which we can
augment a conception and no ground sufficient to justify us in framing
a judgement that is to extend our cognition a priori That the light of
the sun which shines upon a piece of wax at the same time melts it
while it hardens clay no power of the understanding could infer from
the conceptions which we previously possessed of these substances
much less is there any a priori law that could conduct us to such a
conclusion which experience alone can certify On the other hand we
have seen in our discussion of transcendental logic that although we
can never proceed immediately beyond the content of the conception which
is given us we can always cognize completely a prioriin relation
however to a third term namely possible experiencethe law of its
connection with other things For example if I observe that a piece of
wax melts I can cognize a priori that there must have been something
the suns heat preceding which this law although without the aid
of experience I could not cognize a priori and in a determinate manner
either the cause from the effect or the effect from the cause
Hume was therefore wrong in inferring from the contingency of the
determination according to law the contingency of the law itself and
the passing beyond the conception of a thing to possible experience
which is an a priori proceeding constituting the objective reality of
the conception he confounded with our synthesis of objects in actual
experience which is always of course empirical Thus too
he regarded the principle of affinity which has its seat in the
understanding and indicates a necessary connection as a mere rule of
association lying in the imitative faculty of imagination which can
present only contingent and not objective connections
The sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose principally
from a defect which was common to him with the dogmatists namely that
he had never made a systematic review of all the different kinds of
a priori synthesis performed by the understanding Had he done so he
would have found to take one example among many that the principle of
permanence was of this character and that it as well as the principle
of causality anticipates experience In this way he might have been
able to describe the determinate limits of the a priori operations of
understanding and reason But he merely declared the understanding to be
limited instead of showing what its limits were he created a
general mistrust in the power of our faculties without giving us any
determinate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and unavoidable
ignorance he examined and condemned some of the principles of
the understanding without investigating all its powers with the
completeness necessary to criticism He denies with truth certain
powers to the understanding but he goes further and declares it to be
utterly inadequate to the a priori extension of knowledge although he
has not fully examined all the powers which reside in the faculty and
thus the fate which always overtakes scepticism meets him too That is
to say his own declarations are doubted for his objections were based
upon facta which are contingent and not upon principles which can
alone demonstrate the necessary invalidity of all dogmatical assertions
As Hume makes no distinction between the wellgrounded claims of the
understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason against which
however his attacks are mainly directed reason does not feel itself
shut out from all attempts at the extension of a priori cognition and
hence it refuses in spite of a few checks in this or that quarter to
relinquish such efforts For one naturally arms oneself to resist an
attack and becomes more obstinate in the resolve to establish the
claims he has advanced But a complete review of the powers of reason
and the conviction thence arising that we are in possession of a limited
field of action while we must admit the vanity of higher claims puts
an end to all doubt and dispute and induces reason to rest satisfied
with the undisturbed possession of its limited domain
To the uncritical dogmatist who has not surveyed the sphere of his
understanding nor determined in accordance with principles the limits
of possible cognition who consequently is ignorant of his own powers
and believes he will discover them by the attempts he makes in the field
of cognition these attacks of scepticism are not only dangerous but
destructive For if there is one proposition in his chain of reasoning
which be he cannot prove or the fallacy in which he cannot evolve in
accordance with a principle suspicion falls on all his statements
however plausible they may appear
And thus scepticism the bane of dogmatical philosophy conducts us to
a sound investigation into the understanding and the reason When we are
thus far advanced we need fear no further attacks for the limits of
our domain are clearly marked out and we can make no claims nor become
involved in any disputes regarding the region that lies beyond these
limits Thus the sceptical procedure in philosophy does not present any
solution of the problems of reason but it forms an excellent exercise
for its powers awakening its circumspection and indicating the
means whereby it may most fully establish its claims to its legitimate
possessions
This critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to extend
the bounds of knowledge by means of pure speculation are utterly
fruitless So much the wider field it may appear lies open to
hypothesis as where we cannot know with certainty we are at liberty
to make guesses and to form suppositions
Imagination may be allowed under the strict surveillance of reason
to invent suppositions but these must be based on something that is
perfectly certainand that is the possibility of the object If we
are well assured upon this point it is allowable to have recourse to
supposition in regard to the reality of the object but this supposition
must unless it is utterly groundless be connected as its ground of
explanation with that which is really given and absolutely certain
Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis
It is beyond our power to form the least conception a priori of the
possibility of dynamical connection in phenomena and the category
of the pure understanding will not enable us to excogitate any such
connection but merely helps us to understand it when we meet with
it in experience For this reason we cannot in accordance with the
categories imagine or invent any object or any property of an object
not given or that may not be given in experience and employ it in a
hypothesis otherwise we should be basing our chain of reasoning upon
mere chimerical fancies and not upon conceptions of things Thus we
have no right to assume the existence of new powers not existing in
naturefor example an understanding with a nonsensuous intuition
a force of attraction without contact or some new kind of substances
occupying space and yet without the property of impenetrabilityand
consequently we cannot assume that there is any other kind of community
among substances than that observable in experience any kind of
presence than that in space or any kind of duration than that in time
In one word the conditions of possible experience are for reason the
only conditions of the possibility of things reason cannot venture
to form independently of these conditions any conceptions of things
because such conceptions although not selfcontradictory are without
object and without application
The conceptions of reason are as we have already shown mere ideas and
do not relate to any object in any kind of experience At the same time
they do not indicate imaginary or possible objects They are purely
problematical in their nature and as aids to the heuristic exercise
of the faculties form the basis of the regulative principles for the
systematic employment of the understanding in the field of experience
If we leave this ground of experience they become mere fictions of
thought the possibility of which is quite indemonstrable and they
cannot consequently be employed as hypotheses in the explanation of
real phenomena It is quite admissible to cogitate the soul as simple
for the purpose of enabling ourselves to employ the idea of a perfect
and necessary unity of all the faculties of the mind as the principle
of all our inquiries into its internal phenomena although we cannot
cognize this unity in concreto But to assume that the soul is a simple
substance a transcendental conception would be enouncing a proposition
which is not only indemonstrableas many physical hypotheses arebut
a proposition which is purely arbitrary and in the highest degree rash
The simple is never presented in experience and if by substance is
here meant the permanent object of sensuous intuition the possibility
of a simple phenomenon is perfectly inconceivable Reason affords no
good grounds for admitting the existence of intelligible beings or
of intelligible properties of sensuous things althoughas we have no
conception either of their possibility or of their impossibilityit
will always be out of our power to affirm dogmatically that they do not
exist In the explanation of given phenomena no other things and no
other grounds of explanation can be employed than those which stand
in connection with the given phenomena according to the known laws of
experience A transcendental hypothesis in which a mere idea of reason
is employed to explain the phenomena of nature would not give us any
better insight into a phenomenon as we should be trying to explain what
we do not sufficiently understand from known empirical principles by
what we do not understand at all The principles of such a hypothesis
might conduce to the satisfaction of reason but it would not assist
the understanding in its application to objects Order and conformity to
aims in the sphere of nature must be themselves explained upon natural
grounds and according to natural laws and the wildest hypotheses if
they are only physical are here more admissible than a hyperphysical
hypothesis such as that of a divine author For such a hypothesis would
introduce the principle of ignava ratio which requires us to give
up the search for causes that might be discovered in the course of
experience and to rest satisfied with a mere idea As regards the
absolute totality of the grounds of explanation in the series of these
causes this can be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of
phenomena because as they are to us nothing more than phenomena we
have no right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis of
the series of their conditions
Transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible and we cannot
use the liberty of employing in the absence of physical hyperphysical
grounds of explanation And this for two reasons first because such
hypothesis do not advance reason but rather stop it in its progress
secondly because this licence would render fruitless all its exertions
in its own proper sphere which is that of experience For when the
explanation of natural phenomena happens to be difficult we have
constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation which lifts
us above the necessity of investigating nature and our inquiries are
brought to a close not because we have obtained all the
requisite knowledge but because we abut upon a principle which is
incomprehensible and which indeed is so far back in the track of
thought as to contain the conception of the absolutely primal being
The next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its
sufficiency That is it must determine a priori the consequences
which are given in experience and which are supposed to follow from the
hypothesis itself If we require to employ auxiliary hypotheses the
suspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions because the
necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in the
case of the original hypothesis and thus their testimony is invalid
If we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause we possess
sufficient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to aims the
order and the greatness which we observe in the universe but we
find ourselves obliged when we observe the evil in the world and the
exceptions to these laws to employ new hypothesis in support of the
original one We employ the idea of the simple nature of the human soul
as the foundation of all the theories we may form of its phenomena but
when we meet with difficulties in our way when we observe in the soul
phenomena similar to the changes which take place in matter we require
to call in new auxiliary hypotheses These may indeed not be false
but we do not know them to be true because the only witness to their
certitude is the hypothesis which they themselves have been called in to
explain
We are not discussing the abovementioned assertions regarding the
immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being as
dogmata which certain philosophers profess to demonstrate a priori but
purely as hypotheses In the former case the dogmatist must take care
that his arguments possess the apodictic certainty of a demonstration
For the assertion that the reality of such ideas is probable is as
absurd as a proof of the probability of a proposition in geometry Pure
abstract reason apart from all experience can either cognize nothing
at all and hence the judgements it enounces are never mere opinions
they are either apodictic certainties or declarations that nothing can
be known on the subject Opinions and probable judgements on the nature
of things can only be employed to explain given phenomena or they may
relate to the effect in accordance with empirical laws of an actually
existing cause In other words we must restrict the sphere of opinion
to the world of experience and nature Beyond this region opinion is
mere invention unless we are groping about for the truth on a path not
yet fully known and have some hopes of stumbling upon it by chance
But although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the questions
of pure speculative reason they may be employed in the defence of these
answers That is to say hypotheses are admissible in polemic but
not in the sphere of dogmatism By the defence of statements of this
character I do not mean an attempt at discovering new grounds for their
support but merely the refutation of the arguments of opponents All a
priori synthetical propositions possess the peculiarity that although
the philosopher who maintains the reality of the ideas contained in the
proposition is not in possession of sufficient knowledge to establish
the certainty of his statements his opponent is as little able to prove
the truth of the opposite This equality of fortune does not allow
the one party to be superior to the other in the sphere of speculative
cognition and it is this sphere accordingly that is the proper arena
of these endless speculative conflicts But we shall afterwards show
that in relation to its practical exercise Reason has the right of
admitting what in the field of pure speculation she would not be
justified in supposing except upon perfectly sufficient grounds
because all such suppositions destroy the necessary completeness of
speculationa condition which the practical reason however does not
consider to be requisite In this sphere therefore Reason is
mistress of a possession her title to which she does not require to
provewhich in fact she could not do The burden of proof accordingly
rests upon the opponent But as he has just as little knowledge
regarding the subject discussed and is as little able to prove the
nonexistence of the object of an idea as the philosopher on the other
side is to demonstrate its reality it is evident that there is an
advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains his proposition
as a practically necessary supposition melior est conditio
possidentis For he is at liberty to employ in selfdefence the same
weapons as his opponent makes use of in attacking him that is he has a
right to use hypotheses not for the purpose of supporting the arguments
in favour of his own propositions but to show that his opponent knows
no more than himself regarding the subject under discussion and cannot
boast of any speculative advantage
Hypotheses are therefore admissible in the sphere of pure reason
only as weapons for selfdefence and not as supports to dogmatical
assertions But the opposing party we must always seek for in ourselves
For speculative reason is in the sphere of transcendentalism
dialectical in its own nature The difficulties and objections we have
to fear lie in ourselves They are like old but never superannuated
claims and we must seek them out and settle them once and for ever if
we are to expect a permanent peace External tranquility is hollow and
unreal The root of these contradictions which lies in the nature of
human reason must be destroyed and this can only be done by giving it
in the first instance freedom to grow nay by nourishing it that it
may send out shoots and thus betray its own existence It is our duty
therefore to try to discover new objections to put weapons in the
bands of our opponent and to grant him the most favourable position
in the arena that he can wish We have nothing to fear from these
concessions on the contrary we may rather hope that we shall thus
make ourselves master of a possession which no one will ever venture to
dispute
The thinker requires to be fully equipped the hypotheses of pure
reason which although but leaden weapons for they have not been
steeled in the armoury of experience are as useful as any that can
be employed by his opponents If accordingly we have assumed from a
nonspeculative point of view the immaterial nature of the soul and
are met by the objection that experience seems to prove that the growth
and decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the sensuous
organismwe can weaken the force of this objection by the assumption
that the body is nothing but the fundamental phenomenon to which as
a necessary condition all sensibility and consequently all thought
relates in the present state of our existence and that the separation
of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous exercise of our
power of cognition and the beginning of the intellectual The body
would in this view of the question be regarded not as the cause of
thought but merely as its restrictive condition as promotive of the
sensuous and animal but as a hindrance to the pure and spiritual life
and the dependence of the animal life on the constitution of the body
would not prove that the whole life of man was also dependent on the
state of the organism We might go still farther and discover new
objections or carry out to their extreme consequences those which have
already been adduced
Generation in the human race as well as among the irrational animals
depends on so many accidentsof occasion of proper sustenance of the
laws enacted by the government of a country of vice even that it is
difficult to believe in the eternal existence of a being whose life has
begun under circumstances so mean and trivial and so entirely dependent
upon our own control As regards the continuance of the existence of the
whole race we need have no difficulties for accident in single cases
is subject to general laws but in the case of each individual it
would seem as if we could hardly expect so wonderful an effect from
causes so insignificant But in answer to these objections we
may adduce the transcendental hypothesis that all life is properly
intelligible and not subject to changes of time and that it neither
began in birth nor will end in death We may assume that this life is
nothing more than a sensuous representation of pure spiritual life that
the whole world of sense is but an image hovering before the faculty of
cognition which we exercise in this sphere and with no more objective
reality than a dream and that if we could intuite ourselves and
other things as they really are we should see ourselves in a world of
spiritual natures our connection with which did not begin at our birth
and will not cease with the destruction of the body And so on
We cannot be said to know what has been above asserted nor do we
seriously maintain the truth of these assertions and the notions
therein indicated are not even ideas of reason they are purely
fictitious conceptions But this hypothetical procedure is in perfect
conformity with the laws of reason Our opponent mistakes the absence
of empirical conditions for a proof of the complete impossibility of all
that we have asserted and we have to show him that he has not exhausted
the whole sphere of possibility and that he can as little compass that
sphere by the laws of experience and nature as we can lay a secure
foundation for the operations of reason beyond the region of experience
Such hypothetical defences against the pretensions of an opponent must
not be regarded as declarations of opinion The philosopher abandons
them so soon as the opposite party renounces its dogmatical conceit
To maintain a simply negative position in relation to propositions which
rest on an insecure foundation well befits the moderation of a true
philosopher but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as
proofs of the opposite statement is a proceeding just as unwarrantable
and arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who
advances affirmative propositions regarding such a subject
It is evident therefore that hypotheses in the speculative sphere
are valid not as independent propositions but only relatively to
opposite transcendent assumptions For to make the principles of
possible experience conditions of the possibility of things in general
is just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain the objective reality
of ideas which can be applied to no objects except such as lie without
the limits of possible experience The judgements enounced by pure
reason must be necessary or they must not be enounced at all Reason
cannot trouble herself with opinions But the hypotheses we have been
discussing are merely problematical judgements which can neither be
confuted nor proved while therefore they are not personal opinions
they are indispensable as answers to objections which are liable to
be raised But we must take care to confine them to this function
and guard against any assumption on their part of absolute validity a
proceeding which would involve reason in inextricable difficulties and
contradictions
It is a peculiarity which distinguishes the proofs of transcendental
synthetical propositions from those of all other a priori synthetical
cognitions that reason in the case of the former does not apply its
conceptions directly to an object but is first obliged to prove a
priori the objective validity of these conceptions and the possibility
of their syntheses This is not merely a prudential rule it is
essential to the very possibility of the proof of a transcendental
proposition If I am required to pass a priori beyond the conception
of an object I find that it is utterly impossible without the guidance
of something which is not contained in the conception In mathematics
it is a priori intuition that guides my synthesis and in this case
all our conclusions may be drawn immediately from pure intuition
In transcendental cognition so long as we are dealing only with
conceptions of the understanding we are guided by possible experience
That is to say a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does
not show that the given conception that of an event for example leads
directly to another conception that of a causefor this would be a
saltus which nothing can justify but it shows that experience itself
and consequently the object of experience is impossible without the
connection indicated by these conceptions It follows that such a
proof must demonstrate the possibility of arriving synthetically and a
priori at a certain knowledge of things which was not contained in our
conceptions of these things Unless we pay particular attention to this
requirement our proofs instead of pursuing the straight path indicated
by reason follow the tortuous road of mere subjective association The
illusory conviction which rests upon subjective causes of association
and which is considered as resulting from the perception of a real and
objective natural affinity is always open to doubt and suspicion
For this reason all the attempts which have been made to prove the
principle of sufficient reason have according to the universal
admission of philosophers been quite unsuccessful and before the
appearance of transcendental criticism it was considered better as
this principle could not be abandoned to appeal boldly to the common
sense of mankind a proceeding which always proves that the problem
which reason ought to solve is one in which philosophers find great
difficulties rather than attempt to discover new dogmatical proofs
But if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure reason
and if I aim at passing beyond my empirical conceptions by the aid of
mere ideas it is necessary that the proof should first show that such
a step in synthesis is possible which it is not before it proceeds
to prove the truth of the proposition itself The socalled proof of
the simple nature of the soul from the unity of apperception is a very
plausible one But it contains no answer to the objection that as
the notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which is directly
applicable to a perception but is an idea which must be inferredif
at allfrom observation it is by no means evident how the mere fact of
consciousness which is contained in all thought although in so far a
simple representation can conduct me to the consciousness and cognition
of a thing which is purely a thinking substance When I represent to my
mind the power of my body as in motion my body in this thought is so
far absolute unity and my representation of it is a simple one and
hence I can indicate this representation by the motion of a point
because I have made abstraction of the size or volume of the body But
I cannot hence infer that given merely the moving power of a body
the body may be cogitated as simple substance merely because the
representation in my mind takes no account of its content in space and
is consequently simple The simple in abstraction is very different
from the objectively simple and hence the Ego which is simple in the
first sense may in the second sense as indicating the soul itself
be a very complex conception with a very various content Thus it is
evident that in all such arguments there lurks a paralogism We guess
for without some such surmise our suspicion would not be excited
in reference to a proof of this character at the presence of the
paralogism by keeping ever before us a criterion of the possibility of
those synthetical propositions which aim at proving more than experience
can teach us This criterion is obtained from the observation that such
proofs do not lead us directly from the subject of the proposition to
be proved to the required predicate but find it necessary to presuppose
the possibility of extending our cognition a priori by means of ideas
We must accordingly always use the greatest caution we require
before attempting any proof to consider how it is possible to extend
the sphere of cognition by the operations of pure reason and from
what source we are to derive knowledge which is not obtained from
the analysis of conceptions nor relates by anticipation to possible
experience We shall thus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless
labour by not expecting from reason what is beyond its power or rather
by subjecting it to discipline and teaching it to moderate its vehement
desires for the extension of the sphere of cognition
The first rule for our guidance is therefore not to attempt a
transcendental proof before we have considered from what source we are
to derive the principles upon which the proof is to be based and what
right we have to expect that our conclusions from these principles will
be veracious If they are principles of the understanding it is vain to
expect that we should attain by their means to ideas of pure reason
for these principles are valid only in regard to objects of possible
experience If they are principles of pure reason our labour is alike
in vain For the principles of reason if employed as objective are
without exception dialectical and possess no validity or truth except
as regulative principles of the systematic employment of reason in
experience But when such delusive proof are presented to us it is
our duty to meet them with the non liquet of a matured judgement and
although we are unable to expose the particular sophism upon which the
proof is based we have a right to demand a deduction of the principles
employed in it and if these principles have their origin in pure
reason alone such a deduction is absolutely impossible And thus it
is unnecessary that we should trouble ourselves with the exposure and
confutation of every sophistical illusion we may at once bring all
dialectic which is inexhaustible in the production of fallacies before
the bar of critical reason which tests the principles upon which all
dialectical procedure is based The second peculiarity of transcendental
proof is that a transcendental proposition cannot rest upon more than
a single proof If I am drawing conclusions not from conceptions but
from intuition corresponding to a conception be it pure intuition as
in mathematics or empirical as in natural science the intuition which
forms the basis of my inferences presents me with materials for many
synthetical propositions which I can connect in various modes while
as it is allowable to proceed from different points in the intention I
can arrive by different paths at the same proposition
But every transcendental proposition sets out from a conception
and posits the synthetical condition of the possibility of an object
according to this conception There must therefore be but one ground
of proof because it is the conception alone which determines the
object and thus the proof cannot contain anything more than the
determination of the object according to the conception In our
Transcendental Analytic for example we inferred the principle Every
event has a cause from the only condition of the objective possibility
of our conception of an event This is that an event cannot be
determined in time and consequently cannot form a part of experience
unless it stands under this dynamical law This is the only possible
ground of proof for our conception of an event possesses objective
validity that is is a true conception only because the law of
causality determines an object to which it can refer Other arguments
in support of this principle have been attemptedsuch as that from the
contingent nature of a phenomenon but when this argument is considered
we can discover no criterion of contingency except the fact of an
eventof something happening that is to say the existence which is
preceded by the nonexistence of an object and thus we fall back on the
very thing to be proved If the proposition Every thinking being is
simple is to be proved we keep to the conception of the ego which
is simple and to which all thought has a relation The same is the
case with the transcendental proof of the existence of a Deity which is
based solely upon the harmony and reciprocal fitness of the conceptions
of an ens realissimum and a necessary being and cannot be attempted in
any other manner
This caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all
propositions of reason When reason employs conceptions alone only one
proof of its thesis is possible if any When therefore the dogmatist
advances with ten arguments in favour of a proposition we may be sure
that not one of them is conclusive For if he possessed one which proved
the proposition he brings forward to demonstrationas must always be
the case with the propositions of pure reasonwhat need is there for
any more His intention can only be similar to that of the advocate who
had different arguments for different judges this availing himself of
the weakness of those who examine his arguments who without going into
any profound investigation adopt the view of the case which seems most
probable at first sight and decide according to it
The third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a proof
is that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or indirect
but always ostensive or direct The direct or ostensive proof not only
establishes the truth of the proposition to be proved but exposes the
grounds of its truth the apagogic on the other hand may assure us of
the truth of the proposition but it cannot enable us to comprehend
the grounds of its possibility The latter is accordingly rather an
auxiliary to an argument than a strictly philosophical and rational
mode of procedure In one respect however they have an advantage over
direct proofs from the fact that the mode of arguing by contradiction
which they employ renders our understanding of the question more
clear and approximates the proof to the certainty of an intuitional
demonstration
The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in different sciences
is this When the grounds upon which we seek to base a cognition are too
various or too profound we try whether or not we may not discover
the truth of our cognition from its consequences The modus ponens of
reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the truth of a proposition
would be admissible if all the inferences that can be drawn from it are
known to be true for in this case there can be only one possible ground
for these inferences and that is the true one But this is a quite
impracticable procedure as it surpasses all our powers to discover all
the possible inferences that can be drawn from a proposition But this
mode of reasoning is employed under favour when we wish to prove
the truth of an hypothesis in which case we admit the truth of the
conclusionwhich is supported by analogythat if all the inferences
we have drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed all
other possible inferences will also agree with it But in this way an
hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth The modus
tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition
is not only a rigorous but a very easy mode of proof For if it can
be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false then the
proposition must itself be false Instead then of examining in an
ostensive argument the whole series of the grounds on which the
truth of a proposition rests we need only take the opposite of this
proposition and if one inference from it be false then must the
opposite be itself false and consequently the proposition which we
wished to prove must be true
The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where
it is impossible to mistake a subjective representation for an objective
cognition Where this is possible it is plain that the opposite of a
given proposition may contradict merely the subjective conditions of
thought and not the objective cognition or it may happen that both
propositions contradict each other only under a subjective condition
which is incorrectly considered to be objective and as the condition
is itself false both propositions may be false and it will
consequently be impossible to conclude the truth of the one from the
falseness of the other
In mathematics such subreptions are impossible and it is in this
science accordingly that the indirect mode of proof has its true
place In the science of nature where all assertion is based upon
empirical intuition such subreptions may be guarded against by the
repeated comparison of observations but this mode of proof is of little
value in this sphere of knowledge But the transcendental efforts of
pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective which is the
real medium of all dialectical illusion and thus reason endeavours
in its premises to impose upon us subjective representations for
objective cognitions In the transcendental sphere of pure reason
then and in the case of synthetical propositions it is inadmissible
to support a statement by disproving the counterstatement For only
two cases are possible either the counterstatement is nothing but
the enouncement of the inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the
subjective conditions of reason which does not affect the real case
for example we cannot comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the
existence of a being and hence every speculative proof of the existence
of such a being must be opposed on subjective grounds while the
possibility of this being in itself cannot with justice be denied or
both propositions being dialectical in their nature are based upon an
impossible conception In this latter case the rule applies non entis
nulla sunt predicata that is to say what we affirm and what we deny
respecting such an object are equally untrue and the apagogic mode of
arriving at the truth is in this case impossible If for example we
presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its totality
it is false either that it is infinite or that it is finite and
limited in space Both are false because the hypothesis is false For
the notion of phenomena as mere representations which are given in
themselves as objects is selfcontradictory and the infinitude of
this imaginary whole would indeed be unconditioned but would be
inconsistent as everything in the phenomenal world is conditioned
with the unconditioned determination and finitude of quantities which is
presupposed in our conception
The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illusions which
have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical
philosophy It may be compared to a champion who maintains the honour
and claims of the party he has adopted by offering battle to all who
doubt the validity of these claims and the purity of that honour while
nothing can be proved in this way except the respective strength of the
combatants and the advantage in this respect is always on the side
of the attacking party Spectators observing that each party is
alternately conqueror and conquered are led to regard the subject of
dispute as beyond the power of man to decide upon But such an opinion
cannot be justified and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners
the remark
Non defensoribus istis
Tempus eget
Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental deduction
of the grounds of proof employed in his argument and thus enable us to
see in what way the claims of reason may be supported If an opponent
bases his assertions upon subjective grounds he may be refuted with
ease not however to the advantage of the dogmatist who likewise
depends upon subjective sources of cognition and is in like manner
driven into a corner by his opponent But if parties employ the direct
method of procedure they will soon discover the difficulty nay the
impossibility of proving their assertions and will be forced to appeal
to prescription and precedence or they will by the help of criticism
discover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been
mocked and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to
speculative insight and to confine itself within the limits of its
proper spherethat of practical principles
It is a humiliating consideration for human reason that it is
incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation but on the
contrary stands in need of discipline to check its deviations from the
straight path and to expose the illusions which it originates But
on the other hand this consideration ought to elevate and to give it
confidence for this discipline is exercised by itself alone and it is
subject to the censure of no other power The bounds moreover which it
is forced to set to its speculative exercise form likewise a check upon
the fallacious pretensions of opponents and thus what remains of its
possessions after these exaggerated claims have been disallowed is
secure from attack or usurpation The greatest and perhaps the only
use of all philosophy of pure reason is accordingly of a purely
negative character It is not an organon for the extension but a
discipline for the determination of the limits of its exercise and
without laying claim to the discovery of new truth it has the modest
merit of guarding against error
At the same time there must be some source of positive cognitions which
belong to the domain of pure reason and which become the causes of error
only from our mistaking their true character while they form the goal
towards which reason continually strives How else can we account for
the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm footing in
some region beyond the limits of the world of experience It hopes to
attain to the possession of a knowledge in which it has the deepest
interest It enters upon the path of pure speculation but in vain We
have some reason however to expect that in the only other way that
lies open to itthe path of practical reasonit may meet with better
success
I understand by a canon a list of the a priori principles of the proper
employment of certain faculties of cognition Thus general logic in
its analytical department is a formal canon for the faculties of
understanding and reason In the same way Transcendental Analytic was
seen to be a canon of the pure understanding for it alone is competent
to enounce true a priori synthetical cognitions But when no proper
employment of a faculty of cognition is possible no canon can exist
But the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason is as has been
shown completely impossible There cannot therefore exist any canon
for the speculative exercise of this facultyfor its speculative
exercise is entirely dialectical and consequently transcendental
logic in this respect is merely a discipline and not a canon
If then there is any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure
reasonin which case there must be a canon for this facultythis canon
will relate not to the speculative but to the practical use of reason
This canon we now proceed to investigate
There exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture beyond
the field of experience to attempt to reach the utmost bounds of all
cognition by the help of ideas alone and not to rest satisfied until
it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions into a
selfsubsistent systematic whole Is the motive for this endeavour to be
found in its speculative or in its practical interests alone
Setting aside at present the results of the labours of pure reason in
its speculative exercise I shall merely inquire regarding the problems
the solution of which forms its ultimate aim whether reached or
not and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and
intermediate These highest aims must from the nature of reason
possess complete unity otherwise the highest interest of humanity could
not be successfully promoted
The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things the
freedom of the will the immortality of the soul and the existence of
God The speculative interest which reason has in those questions is
very small and for its sake alone we should not undertake the labour
of transcendental investigationa labour full of toil and ceaseless
struggle We should be loath to undertake this labour because the
discoveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in the sphere
of concrete or physical investigation We may find out that the will is
free but this knowledge only relates to the intelligible cause of our
volition As regards the phenomena or expressions of this will that is
our actions we are bound in obedience to an inviolable maxim without
which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of experience to explain
these in the same way as we explain all the other phenomena of nature
that is to say according to its unchangeable laws We may have
discovered the spirituality and immortality of the soul but we cannot
employ this knowledge to explain the phenomena of this life nor the
peculiar nature of the future because our conception of an incorporeal
nature is purely negative and does not add anything to our knowledge
and the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely fictitious If
again we prove the existence of a supreme intelligence we should be
able from it to make the conformity to aims existing in the arrangement
of the world comprehensible but we should not be justified in deducing
from it any particular arrangement or disposition or inferring any
where it is not perceived For it is a necessary rule of the speculative
use of reason that we must not overlook natural causes or refuse to
listen to the teaching of experience for the sake of deducing what we
know and perceive from something that transcends all our knowledge
In one word these three propositions are for the speculative reason
always transcendent and cannot be employed as immanent principles in
relation to the objects of experience they are consequently of no use
to us in this sphere being but the valueless results of the severe but
unprofitable efforts of reason
If then the actual cognition of these three cardinal propositions is
perfectly useless while Reason uses her utmost endeavours to induce us
to admit them it is plain that their real value and importance relate
to our practical and not to our speculative interest
I term all that is possible through free will practical But if the
conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical reason can
have only a regulative and not a constitutive influence upon it and
is serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its empirical
laws In the moral philosophy of prudence for example the sole
business of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends which
are aimed at by our inclinations into one ultimate endthat of
happinessand to show the agreement which should exist among the
means of attaining that end In this sphere accordingly reason cannot
present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action for our
guidance towards the aims set up by the senses and is incompetent to
give us laws which are pure and determined completely a priori On the
other hand pure practical laws the ends of which have been given by
reason entirely a priori and which are not empirically conditioned but
are on the contrary absolutely imperative in their nature would be
products of pure reason Such are the moral laws and these alone belong
to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason and admit of a canon
All the powers of reason in the sphere of what may be termed pure
philosophy are in fact directed to the three abovementioned problems
alone These again have a still higher endthe answer to the question
what we ought to do if the will is free if there is a God and a future
world Now as this problem relates to our in reference to the highest
aim of humanity it is evident that the ultimate intention of nature in
the constitution of our reason has been directed to the moral alone
We must take care however in turning our attention to an object which
is foreign to the sphere of transcendental philosophy not to injure
the unity of our system by digressions nor on the other hand to fail
in clearness by saying too little on the new subject of discussion
I hope to avoid both extremes by keeping as close as possible to the
transcendental and excluding all psychological that is empirical
elements
I have to remark in the first place that at present I treat of the
conception of freedom in the practical sense only and set aside the
corresponding transcendental conception which cannot be employed as a
ground of explanation in the phenomenal world but is itself a problem
for pure reason A will is purely animal arbitrium brutum when it is
determined by sensuous impulses or instincts only that is when it is
determined in a pathological manner A will which can be determined
independently of sensuous impulses consequently by motives presented by
reason alone is called a free will arbitrium liberum and everything
which is connected with this free will either as principle or
consequence is termed practical The existence of practical freedom can
be proved from experience alone For the human will is not determined
by that alone which immediately affects the senses on the contrary we
have the power by calling up the notion of what is useful or hurtful in
a more distant relation of overcoming the immediate impressions on
our sensuous faculty of desire But these considerations of what is
desirable in relation to our whole state that is is in the end good
and useful are based entirely upon reason This faculty accordingly
enounces laws which are imperative or objective laws of freedom and
which tell us what ought to take place thus distinguishing themselves
from the laws of nature which relate to that which does take place The
laws of freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws
Whether reason is not itself in the actual delivery of these laws
determined in its turn by other influences and whether the action
which in relation to sensuous impulses we call free may not in
relation to higher and more remote operative causes really form a part
of naturethese are questions which do not here concern us They are
purely speculative questions and all we have to do in the practical
sphere is to inquire into the rule of conduct which reason has to
present Experience demonstrates to us the existence of practical
freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature that is it shows
the causal power of reason in the determination of the will The idea
of transcendental freedom on the contrary requires that reasonin
relation to its causal power of commencing a series of phenomenashould
be independent of all sensuous determining causes and thus it seems to
be in opposition to the law of nature and to all possible experience
It therefore remains a problem for the human mind But this problem does
not concern reason in its practical use and we have therefore in a
canon of pure reason to do with only two questions which relate to
the practical interest of pure reason Is there a God and Is there
a future life The question of transcendental freedom is purely
speculative and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come
to treat of practical reason Besides we have already discussed this
subject in the antinomy of pure reason
Reason conducted us in its speculative use through the field of
experience and as it can never find complete satisfaction in that
sphere from thence to speculative ideaswhich however in the end
brought us back again to experience and thus fulfilled the purpose of
reason in a manner which though useful was not at all in accordance
with our expectations It now remains for us to consider whether pure
reason can be employed in a practical sphere and whether it will here
conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason
as we have just stated them We shall thus ascertain whether from
the point of view of its practical interest reason may not be able to
supply us with that which on the speculative side it wholly denies us
The whole interest of reason speculative as well as practical is
centred in the three following questions
WHAT CAN I KNOW
WHAT OUGHT I TO DO
WHAT MAY I HOPE
The first question is purely speculative We have as I flatter myself
exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible and have at last
found the reply with which reason must content itself and with which it
ought to be content so long as it pays no regard to the practical But
from the two great ends to the attainment of which all these efforts of
pure reason were in fact directed we remain just as far removed as if
we had consulted our ease and declined the task at the outset So far
then as knowledge is concerned thus much at least is established
that in regard to those two problems it lies beyond our reach
The second question is purely practical As such it may indeed fall
within the province of pure reason but still it is not transcendental
but moral and consequently cannot in itself form the subject of our
criticism
The third question If I act as I ought to do what may I then hopeis
at once practical and theoretical The practical forms a clue to
the answer of the theoretical andin its highest formspeculative
question For all hoping has happiness for its object and stands in
precisely the same relation to the practical and the law of morality as
knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature
The former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is which
determines the ultimate end because something ought to take place the
latter that something is which operates as the highest cause because
something does take place
Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires extensive in regard
to their multiplicity intensive in regard to their degree and
protensive in regard to their duration The practical law based on the
motive of happiness I term a pragmatical law or prudential rule but
that law assuming such to exist which has no other motive than the
worthiness of being happy I term a moral or ethical law The first
tells us what we have to do if we wish to become possessed of
happiness the second dictates how we ought to act in order to deserve
happiness The first is based upon empirical principles for it is only
by experience that I can learn either what inclinations exist which
desire satisfaction or what are the natural means of satisfying them
The second takes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying
them and regards only the freedom of a rational being and the
necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonize with
the distribution of happiness according to principles This second law
may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason and may be cognized a
priori
I assume that there are pure moral laws which determine entirely a
priori without regard to empirical motives that is to happiness the
conduct of a rational being or in other words to use which it makes of
its freedom and that these laws are absolutely imperative not merely
hypothetically on the supposition of other empirical ends and
therefore in all respects necessary I am warranted in assuming this
not only by the arguments of the most enlightened moralists but by
the moral judgement of every man who will make the attempt to form a
distinct conception of such a law
Pure reason then contains not indeed in its speculative but in
its practical or more strictly its moral use principles of the
possibility of experience of such actions namely as in accordance
with ethical precepts might be met with in the history of man For
since reason commands that such actions should take place it must
be possible for them to take place and hence a particular kind of
systematic unitythe moralmust be possible We have found it is
true that the systematic unity of nature could not be established
according to speculative principles of reason because while reason
possesses a causal power in relation to freedom it has none in relation
to the whole sphere of nature and while moral principles of reason can
produce free actions they cannot produce natural laws It is then in
its practical but especially in its moral use that the principles of
pure reason possess objective reality
I call the world a moral world in so far as it may be in accordance
with all the ethical lawswhich by virtue of the freedom of reasonable
beings it can be and according to the necessary laws of morality it
ought to be But this world must be conceived only as an intelligible
world inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all conditions ends
and even of all impediments to morality the weakness or pravity of
human nature So far then it is a mere ideathough still a practical
ideawhich may have and ought to have an influence on the world of
sense so as to bring it as far as possible into conformity with itself
The idea of a moral world has therefore objective reality not as
referring to an object of intelligible intuitionfor of such an
object we can form no conception whateverbut to the world of
senseconceived however as an object of pure reason in its practical
useand to a corpus mysticum of rational beings in it in so far as the
liberum arbitrium of the individual is placed under and by virtue of
moral laws in complete systematic unity both with itself and with the
freedom of all others
That is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason
which relate to its practical interest Do that which will render thee
worthy of happiness The second question is this If I conduct myself
so as not to be unworthy of happiness may I hope thereby to obtain
happiness In order to arrive at the solution of this question we must
inquire whether the principles of pure reason which prescribe a priori
the law necessarily also connect this hope with it
I say then that just as the moral principles are necessary according
to reason in its practical use so it is equally necessary according
to reason in its theoretical use to assume that everyone has ground to
hope for happiness in the measure in which he has made himself worthy
of it in his conduct and that therefore the system of morality is
inseparably though only in the idea of pure reason connected with that
of happiness
Now in an intelligible that is in the moral world in the conception
of which we make abstraction of all the impediments to morality
sensuous desires such a system of happiness connected with and
proportioned to morality may be conceived as necessary because freedom
of volitionpartly incited and partly restrained by moral lawswould
be itself the cause of general happiness and thus rational beings
under the guidance of such principles would be themselves the authors
both of their own enduring welfare and that of others But such a system
of selfrewarding morality is only an idea the carrying out of which
depends upon the condition that everyone acts as he ought in other
words that all actions of reasonable beings be such as they would be if
they sprung from a Supreme Will comprehending in or under itself all
particular wills But since the moral law is binding on each individual
in the use of his freedom of volition even if others should not act
in conformity with this law neither the nature of things nor the
causality of actions and their relation to morality determine how the
consequences of these actions will be related to happiness and the
necessary connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing
endeavour to become worthy of happiness cannot be cognized by reason
if we take nature alone for our guide This connection can be hoped for
only on the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason
which governs according to moral laws
I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect
will united with supreme blessedness is the cause of all happiness in
the world so far as happiness stands in strict relation to morality
as the worthiness of being happy the ideal of the supreme Good It is
only then in the ideal of the supreme original good that pure reason
can find the ground of the practically necessary connection of
both elements of the highest derivative good and accordingly of an
intelligible that is moral world Now since we are necessitated by
reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such a world while the
senses present to us nothing but a world of phenomena we must assume
the former as a consequence of our conduct in the world of sense since
the world of sense gives us no hint of it and therefore as future in
relation to us Thus God and a future life are two hypotheses which
according to the principles of pure reason are inseparable from the
obligation which this reason imposes upon us
Morality per se constitutes a system But we can form no system of
happiness except in so far as it is dispensed in strict proportion to
morality But this is only possible in the intelligible world under a
wise author and ruler Such a ruler together with life in such a world
which we must look upon as future reason finds itself compelled to
assume or it must regard the moral laws as idle dreams since the
necessary consequence which this same reason connects with them must
without this hypothesis fall to the ground Hence also the moral laws
are universally regarded as commands which they could not be did they
not connect a priori adequate consequences with their dictates and thus
carry with them promises and threats But this again they could not
do did they not reside in a necessary being as the Supreme Good which
alone can render such a teleological unity possible
Leibnitz termed the world when viewed in relation to the rational
beings which it contains and the moral relations in which they stand
to each other under the government of the Supreme Good the kingdom of
Grace and distinguished it from the kingdom of Nature in which these
rational beings live under moral laws indeed but expect no other
consequences from their actions than such as follow according to the
course of nature in the world of sense To view ourselves therefore as
in the kingdom of grace in which all happiness awaits us except in
so far as we ourselves limit our participation in it by actions which
render us unworthy of happiness is a practically necessary idea of
reason
Practical laws in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions
that is subjective principles are termed maxims The judgements
of moral according to in its purity and ultimate results are framed
according ideas the observance of its laws according to according to
maxims
The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims but this
is impossible unless with the moral law which is a mere idea reason
connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct which is in
conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or in another
life which is in exact conformity with our highest aims Thus without
a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for the
glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approbation and of
admiration but cannot be the springs of purpose and action For they do
not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every rational being and
which are determined a priori by pure reason itself and necessary
Happiness alone is in the view of reason far from being the complete
good Reason does not approve of it however much inclination may desire
it except as united with desert On the other hand morality alone
and with it mere desert is likewise far from being the complete good
To make it complete he who conducts himself in a manner not unworthy
of happiness must be able to hope for the possession of happiness Even
reason unbiased by private ends or interested considerations cannot
judge otherwise if it puts itself in the place of a being whose
business it is to dispense all happiness to others For in the practical
idea both points are essentially combined though in such a way
that participation in happiness is rendered possible by the moral
disposition as its condition and not conversely the moral disposition
by the prospect of happiness For a disposition which should require the
prospect of happiness as its necessary condition would not be moral and
hence also would not be worthy of complete happinessa happiness which
in the view of reason recognizes no limitation but such as arises from
our own immoral conduct
Happiness therefore in exact proportion with the morality of rational
beings whereby they are made worthy of happiness constitutes alone
the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport
ourselves according to the commands of pure but practical reason
This world is it is true only an intelligible world for of such a
systematic unity of ends as it requires the world of sense gives us no
hint Its reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a
supreme original good In it independent reason equipped with all
the sufficiency of a supreme cause founds maintains and fulfils the
universal order of things with the most perfect teleological harmony
however much this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense
This moral theology has the peculiar advantage in contrast with
speculative theology of leading inevitably to the conception of a sole
perfect and rational First Cause whereof speculative theology does
not give us any indication on objective grounds far less any convincing
evidence For we find neither in transcendental nor in natural theology
however far reason may lead us in these any ground to warrant us in
assuming the existence of one only Being which stands at the head of
all natural causes and on which these are entirely dependent On the
other band if we take our stand on moral unity as a necessary law of
the universe and from this point of view consider what is necessary to
give this law adequate efficiency and for us obligatory force we
must come to the conclusion that there is one only supreme will which
comprehends all these laws in itself For how under different wills
should we find complete unity of ends This will must be omnipotent
that all nature and its relation to morality in the world may be
subject to it omniscient that it may have knowledge of the most secret
feelings and their moral worth omnipresent that it may be at hand to
supply every necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give
rise eternal that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail
and so on
But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligenceswhich
as mere nature is only a world of sense but as a system of freedom
of volition may be termed an intelligible that is moral world regnum
gratiaeleads inevitably also to the teleological unity of all things
which constitute this great whole according to universal natural
lawsjust as the unity of the former is according to universal and
necessary moral lawsand unites the practical with the speculative
reason The world must be represented as having originated from an idea
if it is to harmonize with that use of reason without which we cannot
even consider ourselves as worthy of reasonnamely the moral use
which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good Hence the
investigation of nature receives a teleological direction and becomes
in its widest extension physicotheology But this taking its rise
in moral order as a unity founded on the essence of freedom and
not accidentally instituted by external commands establishes the
teleological view of nature on grounds which must be inseparably
connected with the internal possibility of things This gives rise to
a transcendental theology which takes the ideal of the highest
ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity and this
principle connects all things according to universal and necessary
natural laws because all things have their origin in the absolute
necessity of the one only Primal Being
What use can we make of our understanding even in respect of
experience if we do not propose ends to ourselves But the highest ends
are those of morality and it is only pure reason that can give us the
knowledge of these Though supplied with these and putting ourselves
under their guidance we can make no teleological use of the knowledge
of nature as regards cognition unless nature itself has established
teleological unity For without this unity we should not even possess
reason because we should have no school for reason and no cultivation
through objects which afford the materials for its conceptions But
teleological unity is a necessary unity and founded on the essence of
the individual will itself Hence this will which is the condition of
the application of this unity in concreto must be so likewise In this
way the transcendental enlargement of our rational cognition would be
not the cause but merely the effect of the practical teleology which
pure reason imposes upon us
Hence also we find in the history of human reason that before the
moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined and
before men had attained to a perception of the systematic unity of
ends according to these conceptions and from necessary principles the
knowledge of nature and even a considerable amount of intellectual
culture in many other sciences could produce only rude and vague
conceptions of the Deity sometimes even admitting of an astonishing
indifference with regard to this question altogether But the more
enlarged treatment of moral ideas which was rendered necessary by
the extreme pure moral law of our religion awakened the interest and
thereby quickened the perceptions of reason in relation to this object
In this way and without the help either of an extended acquaintance
with nature or of a reliable transcendental insight for these have
been wanting in all ages a conception of the Divine Being was arrived
at which we now bold to be the correct one not because speculative
reason convinces us of its correctness but because it accords with the
moral principles of reason Thus it is to pure reason but only in its
practical use that we must ascribe the merit of having connected with
our highest interest a cognition of which mere speculation was able
only to form a conjecture but the validity of which it was unable to
establishand of having thereby rendered it not indeed a demonstrated
dogma but a hypothesis absolutely necessary to the essential ends of
reason
But if practical reason has reached this elevation and has attained to
the conception of a sole Primal Being as the supreme good it must not
therefore imagine that it has transcended the empirical conditions of
its application and risen to the immediate cognition of new objects it
must not presume to start from the conception which it has gained and
to deduce from it the moral laws themselves For it was these very laws
the internal practical necessity of which led us to the hypothesis of an
independent cause or of a wise ruler of the universe who should give
them effect Hence we are not entitled to regard them as accidental
and derived from the mere will of the ruler especially as we have no
conception of such a will except as formed in accordance with these
laws So far then as practical reason has the right to conduct us
we shall not look upon actions as binding on us because they are the
commands of God but we shall regard them as divine commands because
we are internally bound by them We shall study freedom under the
teleological unity which accords with principles of reason we shall
look upon ourselves as acting in conformity with the divine will only in
so far as we hold sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the
nature of actions themselves and we shall believe that we can obey
that will only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in
others Moral theology is therefore only of immanent use It teaches
us to fulfil our destiny here in the world by placing ourselves in
harmony with the general system of ends and warns us against the
fanaticism nay the crime of depriving reason of its legislative
authority in the moral conduct of life for the purpose of directly
connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being For this
would be not an immanent but a transcendent use of moral theology
and like the transcendent use of mere speculation would inevitably
pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason
The holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our understanding
which may rest on objective grounds but requires also subjective
causes in the mind of the person judging If a judgement is valid for
every rational being then its ground is objectively sufficient and it
is termed a conviction If on the other hand it has its ground in the
particular character of the subject it is termed a persuasion
Persuasion is a mere illusion the ground of the judgement which lies
solely in the subject being regarded as objective Hence a judgement
of this kind has only private validityis only valid for the individual
who judges and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot
be communicated But truth depends upon agreement with the object and
consequently the judgements of all understandings if true must be in
agreement with each other consentientia uni tertio consentiunt inter
se Conviction may therefore be distinguished from an external point
of view from persuasion by the possibility of communicating it and by
showing its validity for the reason of every man for in this case the
presumption at least arises that the agreement of all judgements with
each other in spite of the different characters of individuals rests
upon the common ground of the agreement of each with the object and
thus the correctness of the judgement is established
Persuasion accordingly cannot be subjectively distinguished from
conviction that is so long as the subject views its judgement simply
as a phenomenon of its own mind But if we inquire whether the grounds
of our judgement which are valid for us produce the same effect on
the reason of others as on our own we have then the means though only
subjective means not indeed of producing conviction but of detecting
the merely private validity of the judgement in other words of
discovering that there is in it the element of mere persuasion
If we can in addition to this develop the subjective causes of the
judgement which we have taken for its objective grounds and thus
explain the deceptive judgement as a phenomenon in our mind apart
altogether from the objective character of the object we can then
expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by it although if
its subjective cause lies in our nature we cannot hope altogether to
escape its influence
I can only maintain that is affirm as necessarily valid for everyone
that which produces conviction Persuasion I may keep for myself if it
is agreeable to me but I cannot and ought not to attempt to impose it
as binding upon others
Holding for true or the subjective validity of a judgement in relation
to conviction which is, at the same time, objectively valid has the
three following degrees opinion belief and knowledge Opinion is a
consciously insufficient judgement subjectively as well as objectively
Belief is subjectively sufficient but is recognized as being
objectively insufficient Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively
sufficient Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction for myself
objective sufficiency is termed certainty for all I need not dwell
longer on the explanation of such simple conceptions
I must never venture to be of opinion without knowing something at
least by which my judgement in itself merely problematical is brought
into connection with the truthwhich connection although not perfect
is still something more than an arbitrary fiction Moreover the law of
such a connection must be certain For if in relation to this law
I have nothing more than opinion my judgement is but a play of the
imagination without the least relation to truth In the judgements of
pure reason opinion has no place For as they do not rest on empirical
grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is that of necessary truth
and a priori cognition the principle of connection in it
requires universality and necessity and consequently perfect
certaintyotherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all Hence
it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics we must know or
abstain from forming a judgement altogether The case is the same with
the maxims of morality For we must not hazard an action on the mere
opinion that it is allowed but we must know it to be so In the
transcendental sphere of reason on the other hand the term opinion
is too weak while the word knowledge is too strong From the merely
speculative point of view therefore we cannot form a judgement at
all For the subjective grounds of a judgement such as produce belief
cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries inasmuch as they cannot
stand without empirical support and are incapable of being communicated
to others in equal measure
But it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically
insufficient judgement can be termed belief Now the practical reference
is either to skill or to morality to the former when the end proposed
is arbitrary and accidental to the latter when it is absolutely
necessary
If we propose to ourselves any end whatever the conditions of its
attainment are hypothetically necessary The necessity is subjectively
but still only comparatively sufficient if I am acquainted with no
other conditions under which the end can be attained On the other hand
it is sufficient absolutely and for everyone if I know for certain
that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions under which the
attainment of the proposed end would be possible In the former case my
suppositionmy judgement with regard to certain conditionsis a merely
accidental belief in the latter it is a necessary belief The physician
must pursue some course in the case of a patient who is in danger but
is ignorant of the nature of the disease He observes the symptoms and
concludes according to the best of his judgement that it is a case
of phthisis His belief is even in his own judgement only contingent
another man might perhaps come nearer the truth Such a belief
contingent indeed but still forming the ground of the actual use of
means for the attainment of certain ends I term Pragmatical belief
The usual test whether that which any one maintains is merely his
persuasion or his subjective conviction at least that is his firm
belief is a bet It frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions
with so much boldness and assurance that he appears to be under no
apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error The offer of
a bet startles him and makes him pause Sometimes it turns out that
his persuasion may be valued at a ducat but not at ten For he does not
hesitate perhaps to venture a ducat but if it is proposed to stake
ten he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being
mistakena possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation If
we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole
life on the truth of any proposition our judgement drops its air of
triumph we take the alarm and discover the actual strength of our
belief Thus pragmatical belief has degrees varying in proportion to
the interests at stake
Now in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in
reference to some object and where accordingly our judgement is
purely theoretical we can still represent to ourselves in thought
the possibility of a course of action for which we suppose that we have
sufficient grounds if any means existed of ascertaining the truth of
the matter Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements an analogon of
practical judgements to which the word belief may properly be applied
and which we may term doctrinal belief I should not hesitate to stake
my all on the truth of the propositionif there were any possibility of
bringing it to the test of experiencethat at least some one of the
planets which we see is inhabited Hence I say that I have not merely
the opinion but the strong belief on the correctness of which I would
stake even many of the advantages of life that there are inhabitants in
other worlds
Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to
doctrinal belief For although in respect to the theoretical cognition
of the universe I do not require to form any theory which necessarily
involves this idea as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena
which the universe presents but on the contrary am rather bound so
to use my reason as if everything were mere nature still teleological
unity is so important a condition of the application of my reason to
nature that it is impossible for me to ignore itespecially since in
addition to these considerations abundant examples of it are supplied
by experience But the sole condition so far as my knowledge extends
under which this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature
is the assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things
according to the wisest ends Consequently the hypothesis of a wise
author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the investigation
of natureis the condition under which alone I can fulfil an end which
is contingent indeed but by no means unimportant Moreover since
the result of my attempts so frequently confirms the utility of this
assumption and since nothing decisive can be adduced against it it
follows that it would be saying far too little to term my judgement
in this case a mere opinion and that even in this theoretical
connection I may assert that I firmly believe in God Still if we use
words strictly this must not be called a practical but a doctrinal
belief which the theology of nature physicotheology must also
produce in my mind In the wisdom of a Supreme Being and in the
shortness of life so inadequate to the development of the glorious
powers of human nature we may find equally sufficient grounds for a
doctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul
The expression of belief is in such cases an expression of modesty
from the objective point of view but at the same time of firm
confidence from the subjective If I should venture to term this merely
theoretical judgement even so much as a hypothesis which I am entitled
to assume a more complete conception with regard to another world and
to the cause of the world might then be justly required of me than I
am in reality able to give For if I assume anything even as a mere
hypothesis I must at least know so much of the properties of such a
being as will enable me not to form the conception but to imagine the
existence of it But the word belief refers only to the guidance which
an idea gives me and to its subjective influence on the conduct of
my reason which forces me to hold it fast though I may not be in a
position to give a speculative account of it
But mere doctrinal belief is to some extent wanting in stability
We often quit our hold of it in consequence of the difficulties which
occur in speculation though in the end we inevitably return to it
again
It is quite otherwise with moral belief For in this sphere action is
absolutely necessary that is I must act in obedience to the moral law
in all points The end is here incontrovertibly established and there
is only one condition possible according to the best of my perception
under which this end can harmonize with all other ends and so have
practical validitynamely the existence of a God and of a future
world I know also to a certainty that no one can be acquainted with
any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the
moral law But since the moral precept is, at the same time, my maxim
as reason requires that it should be I am irresistibly constrained to
believe in the existence of God and in a future life and I am sure
that nothing can make me waver in this belief since I should thereby
overthrow my moral maxims the renunciation of which would render me
hateful in my own eyes
Thus while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond the
limits of experience end in disappointment there is still enough left
to satisfy us in a practical point of view No one it is true will be
able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a future life for
if he knows this he is just the man whom I have long wished to find
All knowledge regarding an object of mere reason can be communicated
and I should thus be enabled to hope that my own knowledge would
receive this wonderful extension through the instrumentality of his
instruction No my conviction is not logical but moral certainty and
since it rests on subjective grounds of the moral sentiment I must
not even say It is morally certain that there is a God etc but I
am morally certain that is my belief in God and in another world is so
interwoven with my moral nature that I am under as little apprehension
of having the former torn from me as of losing the latter
The only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion is
that this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral sentiments
If we give up this assumption and take a man who is entirely
indifferent with regard to moral laws the question which reason
proposes becomes then merely a problem for speculation and may indeed
be supported by strong grounds from analogy but not by such as
will compel the most obstinate scepticism to give way But in these
questions no man is free from all interest For though the want of good
sentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral interests still
even in this case enough may be left to make him fear the existence of
God and a future life For he cannot pretend to any certainty of the
nonexistence of God and of a future life unlesssince it could only
be proved by mere reason and therefore apodeicticallyhe is prepared
to establish the impossibility of both which certainly no reasonable
man would undertake to do This would be a negative belief which could
not indeed produce morality and good sentiments but still could
produce an analogon of these by operating as a powerful restraint on
the outbreak of evil dispositions
But it will be said is this all that pure reason can effect in
opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience Nothing more than
two articles of belief Common sense could have done as much as this
without taking the philosophers to counsel in the matter
I shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the
laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human
reasoneven granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be
only negativefor on this point something more will be said in the next
section But I ask do you require that that knowledge which concerns
all men should transcend the common understanding and should only be
revealed to you by philosophers The very circumstance which has called
forth your censure is the best confirmation of the correctness of
our previous assertions since it discloses what could not have been
foreseen that Nature is not chargeable with any partial distribution of
her gifts in those matters which concern all men without distinction
and that in respect to the essential ends of human nature we cannot
advance further with the help of the highest philosophy than under the
guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding
By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system
Without systematic unity our knowledge cannot become science it will
be an aggregate and not a system Thus architectonic is the doctrine of
the scientific in cognition and therefore necessarily forms part of our
methodology
Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and
rhapsodistic state but requires that the sum of our cognitions should
constitute a system It is thus alone that they can advance the ends
of reason By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under one
idea This idea is the conceptiongiven by reasonof the form of a
whole in so far as the conception determines a priori not only the
limits of its content but the place which each of its parts is to
occupy The scientific idea contains therefore the end and the form of
the whole which is in accordance with that end The unity of the end to
which all the parts of the system relate and through which all have a
relation to each other communicates unity to the whole system so that
the absence of any part can be immediately detected from our knowledge
of the rest and it determines a priori the limits of the system thus
excluding all contingent or arbitrary additions The whole is thus an
organism articulatio and not an aggregate coacervatio it may grow
from within per intussusceptionem but it cannot increase by external
additions per appositionem It is thus like an animal body the
growth of which does not add any limb but without changing their
proportions makes each in its sphere stronger and more active
We require for the execution of the idea of a system a schema that
is a content and an arrangement of parts determined a priori by the
principle which the aim of the system prescribes A schema which is not
projected in accordance with an idea that is from the standpoint of
the highest aim of reason but merely empirically in accordance
with accidental aims and purposes the number of which cannot be
predetermined can give us nothing more than technical unity But the
schema which is originated from an idea in which case reason presents
us with aims a priori and does not look for them to experience forms
the basis of architectonical unity A science in the proper acceptation
of that term cannot be formed technically that is from observation
of the similarity existing between different objects and the purely
contingent use we make of our knowledge in concreto with reference to
all kinds of arbitrary external aims its constitution must be framed on
architectonical principles that is its parts must be shown to possess
an essential affinity and be capable of being deduced from one supreme
and internal aim or end which forms the condition of the possibility
of the scientific whole The schema of a science must give a priori the
plan of it monogramma and the division of the whole into parts in
conformity with the idea of the science and it must also distinguish
this whole from all others according to certain understood principles
No one will attempt to construct a science unless he have some idea to
rest on as a proper basis But in the elaboration of the science he
finds that the schema nay even the definition which he at first gave
of the science rarely corresponds with his idea for this idea lies
like a germ in our reason its parts undeveloped and hid even from
microscopical observation For this reason we ought to explain and
define sciences not according to the description which the originator
gives of them but according to the idea which we find based in reason
itself and which is suggested by the natural unity of the parts of
the science already accumulated For it will of ten be found that the
originator of a science and even his latest successors remain attached
to an erroneous idea which they cannot render clear to themselves and
that they thus fail in determining the true content the articulation or
systematic unity and the limits of their science
It is unfortunate that only after having occupied ourselves for a long
time in the collection of materials under the guidance of an idea which
lies undeveloped in the mind but not according to any definite plan of
arrangementnay only after we have spent much time and labour in the
technical disposition of our materials does it become possible to view
the idea of a science in a clear light and to project according to
architectonical principles a plan of the whole in accordance with the
aims of reason Systems seem like certain worms to be formed by a kind
of generatio aequivocaby the mere confluence of conceptions and to
gain completeness only with the progress of time But the schema or
germ of all lies in reason and thus is not only every system organized
according to its own idea but all are united into one grand system
of human knowledge of which they form members For this reason it is
possible to frame an architectonic of all human cognition the formation
of which at the present time considering the immense materials
collected or to be found in the ruins of old systems would not indeed
be very difficult Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan
of the architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason and we begin
from the point where the main root of human knowledge divides into two
one of which is reason By reason I understand here the whole higher
faculty of cognition the rational being placed in contradistinction to
the empirical
If I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition objectively
considered all cognition is from a subjective point of view either
historical or rational Historical cognition is cognitio ex datis
rational cognitio ex principiis Whatever may be the original source of
a cognition it is in relation to the person who possesses it merely
historical if he knows only what has been given him from another
quarter whether that knowledge was communicated by direct experience
or by instruction Thus the Person who has learned a system of
philosophysay the Wolfianalthough he has a perfect knowledge of all
the principles definitions and arguments in that philosophy as well
as of the divisions that have been made of the system possesses really
no more than an historical knowledge of the Wolfian system he knows
only what has been told him his judgements are only those which he has
received from his teachers Dispute the validity of a definition and
he is completely at a loss to find another He has formed his mind
on anothers but the imitative faculty is not the productive His
knowledge has not been drawn from reason and although objectively
considered it is rational knowledge subjectively it is merely
historical He has learned this or that philosophy and is merely a
plaster cast of a living man Rational cognitions which are objective
that is which have their source in reason can be so termed from
a subjective point of view only when they have been drawn by the
individual himself from the sources of reason that is from principles
and it is in this way alone that criticism or even the rejection of
what has been already learned can spring up in the mind
All rational cognition is again based either on conceptions or on
the construction of conceptions The former is termed philosophical the
latter mathematical I have already shown the essential difference of
these two methods of cognition in the first chapter A cognition may be
objectively philosophical and subjectively historicalas is the case
with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the
limits of their system and who remain in a state of pupilage all their
lives But it is remarkable that mathematical knowledge when committed
to memory is valid from the subjective point of view as rational
knowledge also and that the same distinction cannot be drawn here as in
the case of philosophical cognition The reason is that the only way
of arriving at this knowledge is through the essential principles of
reason and thus it is always certain and indisputable because reason
is employed in concretobut at the same time a priorithat is in pure
and therefore infallible intuition and thus all causes of illusion
and error are excluded Of all the a priori sciences of reason
therefore mathematics alone can be learned Philosophyunless it be
in an historical mannercannot be learned we can at most learn to
philosophize
Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition We must use
this term in an objective sense if we understand by it the archetype of
all attempts at philosophizing and the standard by which all subjective
philosophies are to be judged In this sense philosophy is merely the
idea of a possible science which does not exist in concreto but
to which we endeavour in various ways to approximate until we have
discovered the right path to pursuea path overgrown by the errors
and illusions of senseand the image we have hitherto tried in vain to
shape has become a perfect copy of the great prototype Until that time
we cannot learn philosophyit does not exist if it does where is
it who possesses it and how shall we know it We can only learn
to philosophize in other words we can only exercise our powers of
reasoning in accordance with general principles retaining at the same
time the right of investigating the sources of these principles of
testing and even of rejecting them
Until then our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic
conceptiona conception that is of a system of cognition which we are
trying to elaborate into a science all that we at present know being
the systematic unity of this cognition and consequently the logical
completeness of the cognition for the desired end But there is also a
cosmical conception conceptus cosmicus of philosophy which has always
formed the true basis of this term especially when philosophy was
personified and presented to us in the ideal of a philosopher In this
view philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to
the ultimate and essential aims of human reason teleologia rationis
humanae and the philosopher is not merely an artistwho occupies
himself with conceptionsbut a lawgiver legislating for human reason
In this sense of the word it would be in the highest degree arrogant to
assume the title of philosopher and to pretend that we had reached the
perfection of the prototype which lies in the idea alone
The mathematician the natural philosopher and the logicianhow far
soever the first may have advanced in rational and the two latter in
philosophical knowledgeare merely artists engaged in the arrangement
and formation of conceptions they cannot be termed philosophers Above
them all there is the ideal teacher who employs them as instruments
for the advancement of the essential aims of human reason Him alone
can we call philosopher but he nowhere exists But the idea of his
legislative power resides in the mind of every man and it alone teaches
us what kind of systematic unity philosophy demands in view of
the ultimate aims of reason This idea is therefore a cosmical
conception
In view of the complete systematic unity of reason there can only be
one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind To this all other
aims are subordinate and nothing more than means for its attainment
This ultimate end is the destination of man and the philosophy which
relates to it is termed moral philosophy The superior position occupied
by moral philosophy above all other spheres for the operations of
reason sufficiently indicates the reason why the ancients always
included the ideaand in an especial mannerof moralist in that of
philosopher Even at the present day we call a man who appears to have
the power of selfgovernment even although his knowledge may be very
limited by the name of philosopher
The legislation of human reason or philosophy has two objectsnature
and freedomand thus contains not only the laws of nature but also
those of ethics at first in two separate systems which finally merge
into one grand philosophical system of cognition The philosophy of
nature relates to that which is that of ethics to that which ought to
be
But all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure reason or
the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical principles The former
is termed pure the latter empirical philosophy
The philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic that is an
inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure a priori cognition
and is termed critical philosophy or it is secondly the system of
pure reasona science containing the systematic presentation of the
whole body of philosophical knowledge true as well as illusory given
by pure reasonand is called metaphysic This name may however be
also given to the whole system of pure philosophy critical philosophy
included and may designate the investigation into the sources or
possibility of a priori cognition as well as the presentation of the a
priori cognitions which form a system of pure philosophyexcluding at
the same time all empirical and mathematical elements
Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the
practical use of pure reason and is accordingly either the metaphysic
of nature or the metaphysic of ethics The former contains all the pure
rational principlesbased upon conceptions alone and thus excluding
mathematicsof all theoretical cognition the latter the principles
which determine and necessitate a priori all action Now moral
philosophy alone contains a code of lawsfor the regulation of our
actionswhich are deduced from principles entirely a priori Hence the
metaphysic of ethics is the only pure moral philosophy as it is not
based upon anthropological or other empirical considerations The
metaphysic of speculative reason is what is commonly called metaphysic
in the more limited sense But as pure moral philosophy properly forms a
part of this system of cognition we must allow it to retain the name
of metaphysic although it is not requisite that we should insist on so
terming it in our present discussion
It is of the highest importance to separate those cognitions which
differ from others both in kind and in origin and to take great care
that they are not confounded with those with which they are generally
found connected What the chemist does in the analysis of substances
what the mathematician in pure mathematics is in a still higher
degree the duty of the philosopher that the value of each different
kind of cognition and the part it takes in the operations of the mind
may be clearly defined Human reason has never wanted a metaphysic
of some kind since it attained the power of thought or rather of
reflection but it has never been able to keep this sphere of thought
and cognition pure from all admixture of foreign elements The idea of a
science of this kind is as old as speculation itself and what mind does
not speculateeither in the scholastic or in the popular fashion At
the same time it must be admitted that even thinkers by profession have
been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two elements
of our cognitionthe one completely a priori the other a posteriori
and hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition and
with it the just idea of a science which has so long and so deeply
engaged the attention of the human mind has never been established
When it was said Metaphysic is the science of the first principles
of human cognition this definition did not signalize a peculiarity in
kind but only a difference in degree these first principles were thus
declared to be more general than others but no criterion of distinction
from empirical principles was given Of these some are more general
and therefore higher than others andas we cannot distinguish what is
completely a priori from that which is known to be a posterioriwhere
shall we draw the line which is to separate the higher and socalled
first principles from the lower and subordinate principles of
cognition What would be said if we were asked to be satisfied with a
division of the epochs of the world into the earlier centuries and those
following them Does the fifth or the tenth century belong to the
earlier centuries it would be asked In the same way I ask Does the
conception of extension belong to metaphysics You answer Yes Well
that of body too Yes And that of a fluid body You stop you are
unprepared to admit this for if you do everything will belong
to metaphysics From this it is evident that the mere degree of
subordinationof the particular to the generalcannot determine the
limits of a science and that in the present case we must expect to
find a difference in the conceptions of metaphysics both in kind and in
origin The fundamental idea of metaphysics was obscured on another
side by the fact that this kind of a priori cognition showed a certain
similarity in character with the science of mathematics Both have the
property in common of possessing an a priori origin but in the
one our knowledge is based upon conceptions in the other on the
construction of conceptions Thus a decided dissimilarity between
philosophical and mathematical cognition comes outa dissimilarity
which was always felt but which could not be made distinct for want
of an insight into the criteria of the difference And thus it happened
that as philosophers themselves failed in the proper development of the
idea of their science the elaboration of the science could not
proceed with a definite aim or under trustworthy guidance Thus too
philosophers ignorant of the path they ought to pursue and always
disputing with each other regarding the discoveries which each asserted
he had made brought their science into disrepute with the rest of the
world and finally even among themselves
All pure a priori cognition forms therefore in view of the peculiar
faculty which originates it a peculiar and distinct unity and
metaphysic is the term applied to the philosophy which attempts to
represent that cognition in this systematic unity The speculative part
of metaphysic which has especially appropriated this appellationthat
which we have called the metaphysic of natureand which considers
everything as it is not as it ought to be by means of a priori
conceptions is divided in the following manner
Metaphysic in the more limited acceptation of the term consists of two
partstranscendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason
The former presents the system of all the conceptions and principles
belonging to the understanding and the reason and which relate to
objects in general but not to any particular given objects Ontologia
the latter has nature for its subjectmatter that is the sum of given
objectswhether given to the senses or if we will to some other kind
of intuitionand is accordingly physiology although only rationalis
But the use of the faculty of reason in this rational mode of regarding
nature is either physical or hyperphysical or more properly speaking
immanent or transcendent The former relates to nature in so far as our
knowledge regarding it may be applied in experience in concreto the
latter to that connection of the objects of experience which transcends
all experience Transcendent physiology has again an internal and
an external connection with its object both however transcending
possible experience the former is the physiology of nature as a whole
or transcendental cognition of the world the latter of the connection
of the whole of nature with a being above nature or transcendental
cognition of God
Immanent physiology on the contrary considers nature as the sum of
all sensuous objects consequently as it is presented to usbut still
according to a priori conditions for it is under these alone that
nature can be presented to our minds at all The objects of immanent
physiology are of two kinds 1 Those of the external senses or
corporeal nature 2 The object of the internal sense the soul or in
accordance with our fundamental conceptions of it thinking nature
The metaphysics of corporeal nature is called physics but as it must
contain only the principles of an a priori cognition of nature we must
term it rational physics The metaphysics of thinking nature is called
psychology and for the same reason is to be regarded as merely the
rational cognition of the soul
Thus the whole system of metaphysics consists of four principal parts Ontology Rational Physiology Rational cosmology and
Rational theology The second partthat of the rational doctrine of
naturemay be subdivided into two physica rationalis and psychologia
rationalis
The fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity
dictates this division it is therefore architectonicalin accordance
with the highest aims of reason and not merely technical or according
to certain accidentallyobserved similarities existing between the
different parts of the whole science For this reason also is the
division immutable and of legislative authority But the reader may
observe in it a few points to which he ought to demur and which may
weaken his conviction of its truth and legitimacy
In the first place how can I desire an a priori cognition or metaphysic
of objects in so far as they are given a posteriori and how is
it possible to cognize the nature of things according to a priori
principles and to attain to a rational physiology The answer is this
We take from experience nothing more than is requisite to present us
with an object in general of the external or of the internal sense
in the former case by the mere conception of matter impenetrable and
inanimate extension in the latter by the conception of a thinking
beinggiven in the internal empirical representation I think As to
the rest we must not employ in our metaphysic of these objects any
empirical principles which add to the content of our conceptions by
means of experience for the purpose of forming by their help any
judgements respecting these objects
Secondly what place shall we assign to empirical psychology which has
always been considered a part of metaphysics and from which in our time
such important philosophical results have been expected after the hope
of constructing an a priori system of knowledge had been abandoned I
answer It must be placed by the side of empirical physics or physics
proper that is must be regarded as forming a part of applied
philosophy the a priori principles of which are contained in pure
philosophy which is therefore connected although it must not be
confounded with psychology Empirical psychology must therefore be
banished from the sphere of metaphysics and is indeed excluded by
the very idea of that science In conformity however with scholastic
usage we must permit it to occupy a place in metaphysicsbut only
as an appendix to it We adopt this course from motives of economy
as psychology is not as yet full enough to occupy our attention as
an independent study while it is, at the same time, of too great
importance to be entirely excluded or placed where it has still less
affinity than it has with the subject of metaphysics It is a stranger
who has been long a guest and we make it welcome to stay until it can
take up a more suitable abode in a complete system of anthropologythe
pendant to empirical physics
The above is the general idea of metaphysics which as more was
expected from it than could be looked for with justice and as these
pleasant expectations were unfortunately never realized fell into
general disrepute Our Critique must have fully convinced the reader
that although metaphysics cannot form the foundation of religion
it must always be one of its most important bulwarks and that human
reason which naturally pursues a dialectical course cannot do without
this science which checks its tendencies towards dialectic and by
elevating reason to a scientific and clear selfknowledge prevents the
ravages which a lawless speculative reason would infallibly commit in
the sphere of morals as well as in that of religion We may be sure
therefore whatever contempt may be thrown upon metaphysics by those who
judge a science not by its own nature but according to the accidental
effects it may have produced that it can never be completely abandoned
that we must always return to it as to a beloved one who has been for a
time estranged because the questions with which it is engaged relate
to the highest aims of humanity and reason must always labour either
to attain to settled views in regard to these or to destroy those which
others have already established
Metaphysic thereforethat of nature as well as that of ethics but in
an especial manner the criticism which forms the propaedeutic to all the
operations of reasonforms properly that department of knowledge which
may be termed in the truest sense of the word philosophy The path
which it pursues is that of science which when it has once been
discovered is never lost and never misleads Mathematics natural
science the common experience of men have a high value as means for
the most part to accidental endsbut at last also to those which are
necessary and essential to the existence of humanity But to guide them
to this high goal they require the aid of rational cognition on the
basis of pure conceptions which be it termed as it may is properly
nothing but metaphysics
For the same reason metaphysics forms likewise the completion of the
culture of human reason In this respect it is indispensable setting
aside altogether the influence which it exerts as a science For its
subjectmatter is the elements and highest maxims of reason which form
the basis of the possibility of some sciences and of the use of all
That as a purely speculative science it is more useful in preventing
error than in the extension of knowledge does not detract from its
value on the contrary the supreme office of censor which it occupies
assures to it the highest authority and importance This office it
administers for the purpose of securing order harmony and wellbeing
to science and of directing its noble and fruitful labours to the
highest possible aimthe happiness of all mankind
This title is placed here merely for the purpose of designating a
division of the system of pure reason of which I do not intend to treat
at present I shall content myself with casting a cursory glance from
a purely transcendental point of viewthat of the nature of pure
reasonon the labours of philosophers up to the present time They have
aimed at erecting an edifice of philosophy but to my eye this edifice
appears to be in a very ruinous condition
It is very remarkable although naturally it could not have been
otherwise that in the infancy of philosophy the study of the nature
of God and the constitution of a future world formed the commencement
rather than the conclusion as we should have it of the speculative
efforts of the human mind However rude the religious conceptions
generated by the remains of the old manners and customs of a less
cultivated time the intelligent classes were not thereby prevented from
devoting themselves to free inquiry into the existence and nature of
God and they easily saw that there could be no surer way of pleasing
the invisible ruler of the world and of attaining to happiness in
another world at least than a good and honest course of life in this
Thus theology and morals formed the two chief motives or rather the
points of attraction in all abstract inquiries But it was the former
that especially occupied the attention of speculative reason and which
afterwards became so celebrated under the name of metaphysics
I shall not at present indicate the periods of time at which the
greatest changes in metaphysics took place but shall merely give a
hasty sketch of the different ideas which occasioned the most important
revolutions in this sphere of thought There are three different ends in
relation to which these revolutions have taken place
In relation to the object of the cognition of reason philosophers
may be divided into sensualists and intellectualists Epicurus may be
regarded as the head of the former Plato of the latter The distinction
here signalized subtle as it is dates from the earliest times and was
long maintained The former asserted that reality resides in sensuous
objects alone and that everything else is merely imaginary the latter
that the senses are the parents of illusion and that truth is to
be found in the understanding alone The former did not deny to the
conceptions of the understanding a certain kind of reality but with
them it was merely logical with the others it was mystical The former
admitted intellectual conceptions but declared that sensuous objects
alone possessed real existence The latter maintained that all real
objects were intelligible and believed that the pure understanding
possessed a faculty of intuition apart from sense which in their
opinion served only to confuse the ideas of the understanding
In relation to the origin of the pure cognitions of reason we find
one school maintaining that they are derived entirely from experience
and another that they have their origin in reason alone Aristotle may
be regarded as the bead of the empiricists and Plato of the noologists
Locke the follower of Aristotle in modern times and Leibnitz of Plato
although he cannot be said to have imitated him in his mysticism
have not been able to bring this question to a settled conclusion
The procedure of Epicurus in his sensual system in which he always
restricted his conclusions to the sphere of experience was much more
consequent than that of Aristotle and Locke The latter especially
after having derived all the conceptions and principles of the mind
from experience goes so far in the employment of these conceptions and
principles as to maintain that we can prove the existence of God and
the existence of God and the immortality of them objects lying beyond
the soulboth of them of possible experiencewith the same force of
demonstration as any mathematical proposition
Method is procedure according to principles
We may divide the methods at present employed in the field of inquiry
into the naturalistic and the scientific The naturalist of pure reason
lays it down as his principle that common reason without the aid of
sciencewhich he calls sound reason or common sensecan give a more
satisfactory answer to the most important questions of metaphysics than
speculation is able to do He must maintain therefore that we can
determine the content and circumference of the moon more certainly
by the naked eye than by the aid of mathematical reasoning But this
system is mere misology reduced to principles and what is the most
absurd thing in this doctrine the neglect of all scientific means is
paraded as a peculiar method of extending our cognition As regards
those who are naturalists because they know no better they are
certainly not to be blamed They follow common sense without parading
their ignorance as a method which is to teach us the wonderful secret
how we are to find the truth which lies at the bottom of the well of
Democritus
Quod sapio satis est mihi non ego curo Esse quod
Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones PERSIUS
Satirae iii 7879
is their motto under which they may lead a pleasant and praiseworthy
life without troubling themselves with science or troubling science
with them
As regards those who wish to pursue a scientific method they have now
the choice of following either the dogmatical or the sceptical while
they are bound never to desert the systematic mode of procedure When I
mention in relation to the former the celebrated Wolf and as regards
the latter David Hume I may leave in accordance with my present
intention all others unnamed The critical path alone is still open
If my reader has been kind and patient enough to accompany me on this
hitherto untravelled route he can now judge whether if he and others
will contribute their exertions towards making this narrow footpath
a high road of thought that which many centuries have failed to
accomplish may not be executed before the close of the presentnamely
to bring Reason to perfect contentment in regard to that which has
always but without permanent results occupied her powers and engaged
her ardent desire for knowledge