vol5num1cov290x435.jpg]
Ted Cohen
         Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy
         I want to suggest a point in metaphor which is independent of the
            question of its cognitivity and which has nothing to do with its
            aesthetical character. I think of this point as the achievement of
            intimacy. There is a unique way in which the maker and the
            appreciator of a metaphor are drawn closer to one another. Three
            aspects are involved: (1) the speaker issues a kind of concealed
            invitation; (2) the hearer expends a special effort to accept the
            invitation; and (3) this transaction constitutes the
            acknowledgement of a community. All three are involved in any
            communication, but in ordinary literal discourse their involvement
            is so persuasive and routine that they go unremarked. The use of
            metaphor throws them into relief, and there is a point in that.
             
            An appreciator of a metaphor must do two things: he must realize
            that the expression is a metaphor, and he must figure out the point
            of the expression. His former accomplishment induces him to
            undertake the latter. Realizing the metaphorical character of an
            expression is often easy enough; it requires only the assumption
            that the speaker is not simply speaking absurdly or uttering a
            patent falsehood. But it can be a more formidable task: not every
            figurative expression which can survive a literal reading is a mere
            play on words. (You will not find more artful changes rung on this
            theme than those in the first sentence of Joyce's "The Dead":
            "Lily, the caretaker's daughter, was literally run off her feet.")
             
            Ted Cohen is chairman of the department of philosophy at the
            University of Chicago. He has written on language, aesthetics, and
            taste and has coedited a collection entitled Essays on Kant's
            Aesthetics. His contribution to , "Reflexions on
            Las Meninas: Paradox Lost", was written with Joel Snyder in the
            Winter 1980 issue.
Paul de Man
         The Epistemology of Metephor
         Finally, our argument suggests that the relationship and the
            distinction between literature and philosophy cannot be made in
            terms of a distinction between aesthetic and epistemological
            categories. All philosophy is condemned, to the extent that it is
            dependent upon figuration, to be literary and, as the depository of
            this very problem, all literature is to some extent philosophical.
            The apparent symmetry of these statements is not as reassuring as
            it sounds since what seems to bring literature and philosophy
            together is, as in Condillac's argument about mind and object, a
            shared lack of identity or specificity.
             
            Contrary to common belief, literature is not the place where the
            unstable epistemology of metaphor is suspended by aesthetic
            pleasure, although this attempt is a constitutive moment of its
            system. It is rather the place where the possible convergence of
            rigor and pleasure is shown to be a delusion. The consequences of
            this lead to the difficult question whether the entire semantic,
            semiological, and performative field of language can be said to be
            covered by tropological models, a question which can only be raised
            after the proliferating and disruptive power of figural language
            has been fully recognized.
             
            Paul de Man, Tripp Professor in the humanities and chairman of the
            comparative literature department of Yale University, is the author
            of Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary
            Criticism. His previous contribution to ,
            "Political Allegory in Rousseau," appeared in the Summer 1976 issue
            and appears in his book Allegories in Reading.
Donald Davidson
         What Metaphors Mean
         The concept of metaphor as primarily a vehicle for conveying ideas,
            even if unusual ones, seems to me as wrong as the parent idea that
            a metaphor has a special meaning. I agree with the view that
            metaphors cannot be paraphrased, but I think this is not because
            metaphors say something too novel for literal expression but
            because there is nothing there to paraphrase. Paraphrase, whether
            possible or not, inappropriate to what is said: we try, in
            paraphrase, to say it another way. But if I am right, a metaphor
            doesn't say anything beyond its literal meaning (nor does its maker
            say anything, in using the metaphor, beyond the literal). This is
            not, of course, to deny that a metaphor has a point, nor that that
            point can be brought out by using further words. . . . My
            disagreement is with the explanation of how metaphor works its
            wonders. To anticipate: I depend on the distinction between what
            words mean and what they are used to do. I think metaphor belongs
            exclusively to the domain of use. It is something brought off by
            the imaginative employment of words and sentences and depends
            entirely on the ordinary meanings of those words and hence on the
            ordinary meanings of the sentences they comprise.
             
            Donald Davidson is University Professor of philosophy at the
            University of Chicago. He is the author of many important essays,
            including "Actions, Reasons and Causes," "Causal Relations," and
            "Truth and Meaning," coauthor of Decision-Making: An Experimental
            Approach, and coeditor of Words and Objections, Semantics of
            Natural Language, and The Logic of Grammar.
Wayne C. Booth
         Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation
         What I am calling for is not as radically new as it may sound to
            ears that are still tuned to positivist frequencies. A very large
            part of what we value as our cultural monuments can be thought of
            as metaphoric criticism of metaphor and the characters who make
            them. The point is perhaps most easily made about the major
            philosophies. Stephen Pepper has argued, in World Hypotheses,1 that
            the great philosophies all depend on one of the four "root
            metaphors," formism, mechanism, organicism, and contextualism, and
            they are great precisely because they have so far survived the
            criticism of rival metaphors. Each view of the totality of things
            claims supremacy, but none has been able to annihilate the others.
            They all thus survive as still plausible, pending further criticism
            through further philosophical inquiry. In this view, even the great
            would-be literalists like Hobbes and Locke are finally
            metaphorists simply committed to another kind of metaphor,
            one that to them seems literal. Without grossly oversimplifying we
            could say that the whole work of each philosopher amounts to an
            elaborate critique of the inadequacy of all other philosophers'
            metaphors. What is more, the very existence of a tradition of a
            small group of great philosophies is a sign that hundreds of lesser
            metaphors for the life of mankind have been tested in the great
            philosophical that is, critical wars and found wanting.
             
            ·  1. World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (Berkeley, 1942). In
            Concept and Quality: A World Hypothesis (Lasalle, Ill., 1966),
            Pepper suggests that "the purposive act" is a fifth root metaphor.
             
            Wayne C. Booth's is the author of, among other works, Critical
            Understanding: The Powers and Limits of Pluralism. His
            contributions to  include "Kenneth Burke's Way of
            Knowing" (September 1974), "Irony and Pity Once Again: Thais
            Revisited" (Winter 1975), "M. H. Abrams: Historian as Critic,
            Critic as Pluralist" (Spring 1976), "'Preserving the Exemplar': Or,
            How Not to Dig our Own Graves" (Spring 1977), "Notes and Exchanges"
            (Autumn 1977), with Wright Morris: "The Writing of Organic Fiction:
            A Conversation" (Autumn 1976), and with Robert E. Streeter, W. J.
            T. Mitchell: "Sheldon Sacks 1930-1979" (Spring 1979).
Karsten Harries
         Metaphor and Transcendence
         Ever since Aristotle, metaphor has been placed in the context of a
            mimetic theory of language and of art. Metaphors are in some sense
            about reality. The poet uses metaphor to help reveal what is. He,
            too, serves the truth, even if his service is essentially lacking
            in that "Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs
            to something else."1 Thus it is an improper naming. This
            impropriety invites a movement of interpretation that can come to
            rest only when metaphorical has been replaced with a more proper
            speech. This is not to say, however, that such replacement is
            possible nor that interpretation can ever come to rest. What
            metaphor names may transcend human understanding so that our
            language cannot capture it. In that case, proper speech would be
            denied to man. But regardless of whether we seek proper speech with
            man, for example, with the philosopher, or locate it beyond man
            with God, or think it only an idea that cannot find adequate
            realization, as long as we understand metaphor as an improper
            naming, we place its telos beyond poetry.
             
            ·  1. Aristotle Poetics 21. 1457b. 6-7.
             
            Karsten Harries, chairman of the department of philosophy at Yale
            University, is the author of several works on aesthetics, including
            The Meaning of Modern Art: A Philosophical Interpretation. He is
            currently writing a book on the Bavarian rococo church.
             
            See also: "On Thinking about Aristotle's 'Thought'" by James E.
            Ford in Vol. 4, No. 3
David Tracy
         Metaphor and Religion: The Test Case of Christian_Texts
         The Christian religion shares with all major religions a vision
            (more exactly, a redescription) of reality informed by a specific
            cluster of metaphors. The Christian religion also shares with its
            parent religion, Judaism, and with the other major Western
            religion, Islam, the peculiarity that it is a religion of the book.
            The latter statement demands further elaboration. To speak of
            Western religions as religions of the book does not mean that they
            are only religions of a text; indeed, specific historical persons
            and events are central to all Western religions, and one need not
            insist upon a "theology of word" as distinct from either a
            "theology of events" or a "theology of sacrament" to admit
            scriptural normativity. In fact, not only Reformed Christianity
            insists that certain texts (which Christians name the Old and New
            Testaments) be taken as normative for interpreting Christianity's
            root metaphors. Whatever their hesitation over the sixteenth-
            century Reformer's formulation of Sola Scripturaand however strong
            their insistence upon uniting Sacrament (or manifestation) to Word
            (or proclamation) for a full understanding of the root metaphors of
            Christianity, Catholic and Orthodox Christians have joined their
            Protestant colleagues in insisting upon the priority of the
            Scriptures. Indeed, to interpret the root metaphors of the
            Christian religion, the Scriptures must function, in the words of
            the Roman Catholic theologian Karl Rahner as the norma normans non
            normata for all Christian theologies.
             
            David Tracy, author of Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in
            Theology and The Analogical Imagination in Contemporary Theology,
            is professor of theology at the University of Chicago Divinity
            School.
Richard Shiff
         Art and Life: A Metaphorical Relationship
         When the modern artist is seen as moving about in a nebulous area
            between two opposing worlds, that of life or immediate experience
            and that of art or established truth, I think it is appropriate to
            discuss this activity in terms of metaphor. Indeed the present
            concern for metaphor in the academic and artistic communities is
            but one of many reflections of our sense that life is a process of
            the gradual attainment of knowledge through experience, whether
            sensuous or intellectual. Like our artists, we strive to create a
            picture of our world, yet that picture is never complete; for we
            continually pass on to new experiences and new images of reality.
            Not only do we grow and change but our world seems to change with
            us. Although the truths revealed through our art are founded in our
            experience, they seem more permanent and public than the acts of
            discovery leading to them. A principle once established and
            integrated with a body of other established truths enters into
            recorded history perhaps to be revered, disputed, or reinterpreted,
            but nevertheless to remain. The individual experience or discovery,
            however, passes; with the individual, only the sense of the
            continuing search yields personal identity. In a changing world,
            metaphor renders the truth of experience as the truth of knowledge,
            for it is the means of passing from individual immediacy to an
            established public world; the new must be linked to the old, and
            the experience of any individual must be connected with that of his
            society. Excluding the possibility of the creation of entirely new
            worlds and the resultant transformation of all personal identities,
            acts of genius or dramatic breakthroughs in fields of study can
            affect our present world order only if they are joined to it by
            means of a powerful metaphor. Indeed establishing the metaphoric
            bridge itself may be considered the act of genius, and the entry
            into new areas of knowledge is its consequence.
             
            Richard Shiff is associate professor of art at the University of
            North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His contributions to Critical
            Inquiry are "Seeing Cézanne" (Summer 1978) and, with Carl Pletsch,
            "History and Innovation" (Spring 1981).
Howard Gardner and Ellen Winner
         The Development of Metaphoric Competence: Implications for
            Humanistic Disciplines
         In lieu of hand-waving, let us begin our treatment of psychological
            research on metaphor by considering some common interests shared by
            psychologists, on the one hand, and by philosophically oriented
            humanists, on the other. At least four areas have proved
            sufficiently central to both groups to merit extensive discussion
            in the respective literatures. At first issue centers on the
            specificity of the processes involved in metaphor: Is metaphoric
            skill a capacity especially intertwined with linguistic skills, or
            is it a much broader human capacity, one identified with general
            perceptual and conceptual processes? A related question has arisen
            within the area of language: Is metaphor a special kind of trope,
            with its own rules, properties, and applications, or should it be
            closely allied (or even collapsed) with such other tropes as
            similes, analogies, or hyperbole? The third issue moves yet further
            within the circle of metaphor to treat the question of whether all
            metaphors are of a piece, or whether various types of metaphor
            (cross-sensory, perceptual, psychological-physical, predicative,
            etc.) each require their own analysis. And a final issue of concern
            to both groups is the question of whether metaphoric usage (for
            instance, the semantic features of the topic and vehicle) or by
            considering its pragmatic aspects the various speech acts
            employed within a community.1 One could go on to state other
            issues, but this tetrad should suffice to indicate the common body
            of concern addressed by experimental and humanistic researchers.
             
            ·  1. Cf. Cohen, "The Semantics of Metaphor" and John Searle,
            "Presentation on Metaphor and Pragmatics" (Conference on Metaphor
            and Thought).
             
            Howard Gardner, a developmental psychologist, is codirector of
            Harvard Project Zero and a clinical investigator at the Boston
            Veterans Administration Hospital. His books include The Quest for
            Mind, The Arts and Human Development, and, most recently,
            Developmental Psychology: An Introduction. Ellen Winner teaches in
            the psychology department of Boston College and is a research
            associate at Harvard Project Zero. A developmental psychologist,
            she has conducted research on the development and breakdown of
            metaphoric language capacities and has examined the emergence of
            metaphoric capacities in very young children.
Paul Ricoeur
         The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling
         But is not the word "metaphor" itself a metaphor, the metaphor of a
            displacement and therefore of a transfer in a kind of space? What
            is at stake is precisely the necessity of these spatialmetaphors
            about metaphor included in our talk about "figures" of speech. . .
            . But in order to understand correctly the work of resemblance in
            metaphor and to introduce the pictorial or ironic moment at the
            right place, it is necessary briefly to recall the mutation
            undergone by the theory of metaphor at the level of semantics by
            contrast with the tradition of classical rhetoric. In this
            tradition, metaphor was correctly described in terms of deviance,
            but this deviance was mistakenly ascribed to denomination only.
            Instead of giving a thing its usual common name, one designates it
            by means of a borrowed name, a "foreign" name in Aristotle's
            terminology. The rationale of this transfer of name was understood
            as the objective similarity between the things themselves or the
            subjective similarity between the attitudes linked to the grasping
            of these things. As concerns the goal of this transfer, it was
            supposed either to fill up a lexical lacuna, and therefore to serve
            the principle of economy which rules the endeavor of giving
            appropriate names to new things, new ideas, or new experiences, or
            to decorate discourse, and therefore to serve the main purpose of
            rhetorical discourse, which is to persuade and to please.
             
            Paul Ricoeur is professor of philosophy at the Université de Paris
            (Nanterre) and John Nuveen Professor at the University of Chicago.
            He is editor of Revue de métaphysique et de morale and the author
            of many influential works on phenomenology, hermeneutics, and the
            philosophy of language. His most recent work to appear in English
            is The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation
            of Meaning in Language. He has also contributed "Narrative Time"
            (Autumn 1980) to .
W. V. Quine
         A Postscript on Metaphor
         Besides serving us at the growing edge of science and beyond,
            metaphor figures even in our first learning of language; or, if not
            quite metaphor, something akin to it. We hear a word or phrase on
            some occasion, or by chance we babble a fair approximate ourselves
            on what happens to be a pat occasion and are applauded for it. On a
            later occasion, then, one that resembles the first occasion by our
            lights, we repeat the expression. Resemblance of occasions is what
            matters, here as in metaphor. We generalize our application of the
            expression by degrees of subjective resemblance of occasions, until
            we discover from other people's behavior that we have pushed
            analogy too far and exceeded the established usage. If the crux of
            metaphor is creative extension through analogy, then we have forged
            a metaphor at each succeeding application of that early word of
            phrase. These primitive metaphors differ from the deliberate and
            sophisticated ones, however, in that they accrete directly to our
            growing store of standard usage. They are metaphors stillborn.
             
            It is a mistake, then, to think of linguistic usage as literalistic
            in its main body and metaphorical in its trimming. Metaphor, or
            something like it, governs both the growth of language and our
            acquisition of it. What comes as a subsequent refinement is rather
            cognitive discourse itself, at its most dryly literal. The neatly
            worked inner stretches of science are an open space in the tropical
            jungle, created by clearing tropes away.
             
            W. V. Quine is the Edgar Pierce professor emeritus of philosophy at
            Harvard University. His many influential works include Methods of
            Logic, Word and Object, and The Roots of Reference. "On the Nature
            of Moral Values," his previous contribution to ,
            appeared in the Spring 1979 issue.
Don R. Swanson
         Toward a Psychology of Metaphor
         How and why does a metaphor work? What happens to us when we hear
            or read one? My guess is that a metaphor, because it is an
            erroneous statement, conflicts with our expectations. It releases,
            triggers, and stimulates our predisposition to detect error and to
            take corrective action. We do not dismiss or reject a metaphor as
            simply a false statement for we recognize it as a metaphor and know
            as [Donald] Davidson suggests that it alludes to something else
            that we might wish to notice. It preempts our attention and propels
            us on a quest for the underlying truth. We are launched into a
            creative, inventive, pleasurable act. To turn Piaget around, to
            invent is to understand. For the hearer or reader of a metaphor to
            detect, by himself, the nature of the error and to invent his own
            (conjectural) version of the truth entails understanding and
            achievement and thus pleasure. Such pleasure perhaps owes its
            origin to, and is enhanced by an echo from, the metaphoric
            playfulness of childhood.
             
            A metaphor is a peremptory invitation to discovery. What is
            discoverable are the various allusive ties, or common attributes,
            between the metaphor and the underlying truth to which it points.
            It is plausible to guess that the pleasure, and hence power, of the
            metaphor depends on two factors. It is the more powerful and
            effective the greater the number of allusive ties discovered and
            the greater the speed or suddenness with which the discoveries are
            made. A metaphor that packs all of its allusions into one or a few
            words should be more effective than a metaphor on which the same
            allusions are scattered throughout a long chain of words or
            sentences. The number of allusive ties in some sense reflects how
            close the metaphor approaches the truth how near it is to
            being on target. Perhaps the closer it is, the more compelling the
            urge to correct the error like the pull of a magnet.
             
            Don R. Swanson is professor and dean of the graduate library school
            at the University of Chicago.
Karsten Harries
         The Many Uses of Metaphor
         Even when we confine ourselves to poetry, we have to agree with
            Ortega y Gasset's observation that "the instrument of metaphoric
            expression can be used for many diverse purposes." It can be used
            to embellish or ennoble things or persons Campion's poem
            offers a good example. Such embellishment need not involve semantic
            innovation. Metaphors can also function as weapons turned against
            reality. There are metaphors that negate the referential function
            of language so successfully that talk about truth or, for that
            matter, about lattices or lenses seems inappropriate. Yet as poetry
            pushes towards this extreme, it may acquire a revelatory power all
            its own: from the ruins of literal sense emerges not a new semantic
            congruence but a silence that is heard as the language of
            transcendence. This is not to deny that metaphors can effect
            semantic change or help to establish a new world. As David Tracy's
            contribution to this symposium shows, Scripture furnished the most
            obvious example. Heidegger's claim that poetry establishes the
            world can indeed be shown to rest on this paradigm. It is a claim
            that tends to ascribe something of the prophetic power of Scripture
            to all great poetry. But, although we may long to rediscover the
            prophet in the poet, to what extent does the scriptural paradigm
            help to illuminate poetry in general and, more especially, the
            poetry of this godless age? Most modern poetry has an aesthetic
            character that is incompatible with a religious world view.
            Theories of poetic metaphor cannot afford to neglect the history of
            poetry, just as general theories of metaphor cannot afford to
            neglect the many uses of metaphor.
Wayne C. Booth
         Ten Literal "Theses"
         Because my paper was often metaphorical, some participants on the
            symposium expressed puzzlement about my literal meaning, especially
            about the passage from Mailer. Here are ten literal "theses" that
            the paper either argues for, implies, or depends on.
            1. What metaphor is can never be determined with a single answer.
            Because the word has now become subject to all of the ambiguities
            of our notions about similarity and difference, the irreducible
            plurality of philosophical views of how similarities and
            differences relate will always produce conflicting definitions that
            will in turn produce different borderlines between what is metaphor
            and what is not. We thus need taxonomies, not frozen single
            definitions, of this "essentially contested  concept."
Margret Schaefer
         Psychoanalysis and the Marionette Theater: Interpretation Is Not
            Depreciation
         At the end of his attack on my use of the psychoanalytic model for
            the interpretation of literature, Heller raises the question
            concerning what the task of the literary critic is or ought to be.
            His own "sketch of the Kleistean theme's historical ancestry and
            its later development," he says, seeks to deepen and enrich the
            reader's appreciation of Kleist's literary art, the artistry of his
            phrasing, the persuasiveness of his incidents, the conclusiveness
            of his examples." By implication he suggests that my method does
            not have this end that is, appreciation for its goal.
            In this he is partially right. "Appreciation" in Heller's sense is
            not as directly a goal for me. But does Heller's method of
            intellectual history and literary relation meet his own criteria of
            deepening and enriching the reader's appreciation of Kleist? In his
            capsule treatment of Great Thinkers of the Western World from Plato
            to Marx, we learn that many writers besides Kleist treated Kleist's
            theme of man's fall from unconscious grace. What exactly does this
            tell us about Kleist's treatment of it? How does it deepen the
            reader's appreciation of Kleist's literary art, the artistry of his
            phrasing, the persuasiveness of his incidents? It doesn't. It isn't
            even about Kleist. Although Heller tells us that it is the
            "thought" and "imagery" which "make for the great distinction of
            the essay" (p. 419), his evidence for this consists, in the case of
            the former, in his tracing the history of the essay's thought and,
            in the case of the latter, in his statements that Kleist's use of
            the puppet as the exemplar of the unselfconscious graceful being is
            "unusual" and "novel" and that his bear story, though it may lack
            "in immediate plausibility," "gains in making Kleist's point" and
            is "a memorable exemplar" of the "art of grotesque inventions that
            are capable of floating for quite a while above and between the
            comic and the serious before landing with scintillating effect in
            one domain or the other" (p. 421).
             
            Margret Schaefer is a lecturer in the department of psychiatry at
            Northwestern University Medical School. She responds here to Erich
            Heller's "The Dismantling of a Marionette Theater; or, Psychology
            and the Misinterpretation of Literature" (Spring 1978), in which he
            discussed her article, "Kleist's 'About the Puppet Theater,"
            (American Imago 32 [Winter 1975]).
Heinz Kohut
         A Reply to Margret Schaefer
         I will return to the second point in a different context later; at
            this moment I will discuss only the issue raised by my pointing up
            the fact that the essay in question was written by someone in
            Professor Heller's field. What motivated me to make the statement
            was not my belief that the use of psychoanalysis in the
            interpretation of art should be restricted to certified
            psychoanalysts indeed, I have always been a staunch advocate
            of the opposite view. My motive for this, I assumed harmless, and
            not, of course, irrelevant, indiscretion was that I wanted to show
            that Professor Heller's critique of psychoanalysis was not broadly
            based, that his representative example was a piece that happened to
            have crossed his way, that he was not using the work of an
            established writer in the field that he was condemning. My
            statement that your essay is an unacceptable text in a sermon
            preaching against applied analysis is unrelated to the value of
            your article. Even if in the future it should turn out that your
            essay as far as I know your first contribution to applied
            psychoanalysis was the forerunner of a significant oeuvre
            that would put you into the class of the great contributors of
            psychoanalytic interpretations of literature, it is at this point
            not an acceptable text for a sermon against our field.
             
            Heinz Kohut, M.D., is Professorial Lecturer in Psychiatry at the
            University of Chicago, teacher and training analyst at the Chicago
            Institute for Psychoanalysis, and author of many influential works
            on the psychology of the self. His works include The Restoration of
            the Self, The Analysis of the Self: A Systematic Approach to the
            Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders -
            which has appeared in German, French, and Italian translations -
            and a collection of his essays, Scientific Empathy and Empathic
            Science. His "Psychoanalysis and the Interpretation of Literature:
            A Correspondence with Erich Heller" was published in the Spring
            1978 issue of .
Kenneth Burke
         A Critical Load, Beyond That Door; or, Before_the_Ultimate
            Confrontation; or, When Thinking of Deconstructionist
            Structuralists; or, A Hermeneutic Fantasy
         Dedicated to the humanisticissimus and/or humanisticissima
            Editoreality of, an enterprise that is doing all
            possible to restore forCriticism its rightful home, namely: a state
            of perpetualCrisis.
             
            How now?
            You say
            "The man
            walks down the street."
             
            Then tell me how
            (in the name of whatever)
            your words
            make sense.
             
            Kenneth Burke's contributions to  are "In Response
            to Booth: Dancing with Tears in my Eyes" (September 1974), " Post-
            Poesque Derivation of a Terministic Cluster" (Winter 1977), "
            (Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action" (Summer 1978),and
            "Methodological Repression and/or Strategies of Containment"
            (Winter 1978).
