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Leo Bersani
         "Ardent Masturbation" (Descartes, Freud, and Others)
R. John Williams
         Tekhnê-Zen and the Spiritual Quality of Global Capitalism
Evan Kindley
         Big Criticism
Bernard Dionysius Geoghegan
         From Information Theory to French Theory: Jakobson, Lévi-Strauss
            and the Cybernetic Apparatus
Daniel Morgan
         Max Ophuls and the Limits of Virtuousity: On_the_Aesthetics_and
            Ethics of Camera Movement
Anmol Chaddha and William Julius Wilson
         "Way Down in the Hole": Systematic Urban Inequality_and The_Wire
Patrick Jagoda
         Critical Response I. Wired
Kenneth W. Warren
         Critical Response II. Sociology and The Wire
Linda Williams
         Critical Response III.  Ethnographic Imaginary: The Genesis and
            Genius ofThe Wire
Anmol Chaddha and William Julius Wilson
         Critical Response IV. The Wire's Impact: A Rejoinder
Ricardo L. Nirenberg, David Nirenberg
         Badiou's Number: A Critique of Mathematics as Ontology
         When an English translation of Being and Event appeared in 2005,
            Alain Badiou took the opportunity to reminisce about the initial
            French publication some twenty years before: "at that moment
            I was quite aware of having written a &lsquo;great' book of
            philosophy." He located that greatness in four
            "affirmations" and one "radical thesis."
Joseph DeLappe, David Simpson
         Visual Commemoration: The Iraqi Memorial Project
         Except under extraordinary circumstances, most of us do not look
            forward with any eagerness to our own deaths. That said, one of the
            few positive thoughts that can accompany the prospect of dying is
            the possibility of being remembered with affection or respect.
            Those of us living ordinary lives out of the public eye would
            expect to be lamented by our loved ones and commemorated in their
            living memories and perhaps by some modest headstone or plaque in a
            place that had meant something to us or to those we leave behind.
            Few of us anticipate a future in which there are no memories of who
            we were and no record of at least our names.
Sandra Laugier
         Introduction to the French Edition of Must We_Mean_What_We_Say?
         Must We Mean What We Say? is Stanley Cavell's first book, and, in a
            sense, it is his most important. It contains all the themes that
            Cavell continues to develop masterfully throughout his philosophy.
            There is a renewed usage of J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts,
            and, in the classic essay "The Availability of Wittgenstein's
            Later Philosophy," he establishes the foundations of a
            radical reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein (later taken up in The Claim
            of Reason), the connections among skepticism, acknowledgement, and
            Shakespearean tragedy (which one finds in Disowning Knowledge and,
            in a positive form, in Pursuits of Happiness); there is the
            reflection on the ordinary that runs throughout his later works (In
            Quest of the Ordinary and A Pitch of Philosophy); and, finally,
            there is the original aesthetic approach that defines Cavell's
            work, through his objects which range from William
            Shakespeare to Samuel Beckett and pass through Hollywood comedies
            and melodrama, and opera and, above all, through his style
            and method.
Susan Gubar
         In the Chemo Colony
         When I first agreed to undergo chemotherapy, I found myself haunted
            by Franz Kafka's parable "In the Penal Colony." The
            grisly short story was easy to translate into language pertinent to
            my ominous sense of the standard treatment of advanced (and thus
            probably incurable) ovarian cancer. About to be attached to a
            remarkable piece of apparatus, the condemned woman tastes fear
            rising off her tongue as she finds herself led forward into a maze
            of equipment, but is assured that the machinery should go on
            working continuously for six hours or six days. If anything were to
            go wrong, it would only be a small matter that could then be set
            right at once by the uniformed technician. So my variation began.
Stefan Helmreich
         What Was Life? Answers from Three Limit Biologies
         What is life? A gathering consensus in anthropology, science
            studies, and philosophy of biology suggests that the theoretical
            object of biology, "life," is today in transformation,
            if not dissolution. Proliferating reproductive technologies, along
            with genomic reshufflings of biomatter in such practices as
            cloning, have unwound the facts of life.
Gil Anidjar
         The Meaning of Life
         The starting point of this essay is that there is a contradiction
            at the heart of our current and hyperbolic understandings of life.
            To be more precise, on the one hand there is the historical novelty
            of biology as a modern science and set of technologies. On the
            other hand, life is simultaneously understood according to
            biological protocols that seem void of history.
Mark Seltzer
         The Official World
         The great microsociologist of social interaction rituals, Erving
            Goffman, notes, in the opening part of his underknown collection of
            essays Forms of Talk, this little moment in the "gamelike
            back-and-forth process" between a speaker and a respondent:
            "In this case, [the respondent] ignores the immediately
            preceding sentences to which he has probably not paid attention
            since his idea occurred to him, and he interrupts to present his
            idea despite the non-sequitur element of his sentence."
David Antin
         hiccups
Jerome Rothenberg
         A Round of Renshi and the Poet as_Other:_An_Experiment_in_Poesis
         I first heard about renshi from Hiromi Itō, a remarkable and
            justifiably celebrated Japanese poet and writer, who has also been
            our neighbor in Encinitas, California, for most of the last two
            decades. Her presence among us goes back to 1991 and to my first
            visit to Japan, a contact I hadn't had before but have been
            able to repeat six times since then.
Jennifer Scappettone
         Tuning as Lyricism: The Performance of Orality in_the_Poetics_of
            Jerome Rothenberg and David Antin
         Tuning might be the figure best suited to joining this pair of
            apparently incongruous texts, tuning in the sense defined by David
            Antin as "a negotiated concord or agreement based on
            vernacular physical actions with visible outcomes like walking
            together," as opposed to understanding, which is predicated,
            Antin contends, "on a geometrical notion of
            congruence."
Gertrud Koch
         Eulogy for Miriam Hansen
         Miriam and I were born in 1949, only a month apart. The world we
            were born to was deeply marked by then-recent history. Our
            playgrounds were the rubble fields in the streets and the extended
            woods between Frankfurt, where I grew up, and Darmstadt, where
            Miriam grew up, some twenty-five miles apart.
William Connolly
         Critical Response I -  The Complexity of Intention
         Ruth Leys starts with accounts that reduce emotion to a few simple
            states and emphasize the degree to which it is genetically wired
            (see Ruth Leys, "The Turn to Affect," 
            37 [Spring 2011]: 434 72). She then argues that other
            cultural theorists who emphasize the role of affect are driven in
            this direction, too, even when they wish to avoid such a
            trajectory. Much of the argument revolves around the charge of
            "anti-intentionalism" against us. Because of
            limitations of space, my response concentrates on my own thinking
            in this domain, though I suggest some lines of connection to other
            theories of affect. I will not always try to unpack Leys's
            views but will focus more on where mine deviate from her account of
            them.
Ruth Leys
         Critical Response II -  Affect and Intention: A_Reply_to_William_E.
            Connolly
         William Connolly is in error when he remarks that I begin my
            article with a discussion of scientific accounts that reduce the
            emotions to a few genetically wired categories and that I suggest
            that the cultural theorists who are interested in affect are driven
            in the same reductive direction (William E. Connolly, "The
            Complexity of Intention,"  37 [Summer 2011]:
            792 99).
Andrew F. March
         Critical Response - Speaking about Muhammad, Speaking for_Muslims
         In a recent article, Saba Mahmood has presented an intriguing
            account of what was at stake morally and emotionally for a large
            number of Muslims in the Danish cartoon controversy (Saba Mahmood,
            "Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable
            Divide?"  35 [Summer 2009]: 836 62). In
            doing so, she offers a framework for thinking about such instances
            that takes the place of accounts that portray the conflict as one
            between a liberal, secular commitment to free speech and a
            religious commitment to combating blasphemy.
W.J.T. Mitchell
         Poetic Justice: 9-11 to Now
         The author, Editor of , discusses our new website
            and the changing face of criticism in the age of terror.
Elias Khoury
         Rethinking the Nakba
         On the representation of the Nakba in regional literature and film.
Meir Wigoder
         The Acrobatic Gaze and the Pensive Image in Palestinian_Morgue
            Photography
         The topic of my essay is Palestinian morgue photography in the wake
            of the Israeli air strikes and the ground invasion of Gaza, during
            Operation Cast Lead. I especially focus on a fashionable angle that
            is prevalent among the local Palestinian press-photographers.  I
            term it the acrobatic gaze: from the heights of the fridges in the
            morgue the photographers try to be omniscient absently-present
            witnesses that are capable of combining in a single composition
            both the faces of the standing relatives and the faces of the
            supine bodies. These photographs raise ethical, aesthetical, and
            political questions about the representation of the dead who are
            displayed to their families and to the photographers for propaganda
            reasons as well.  
Gavin Arnall, Laura Gandolfi, Enea Zaramella, Jacues
            Rancière
         Aesthetics and Politics Revisited: An Interview with Jacques
            Rancière
         In this interview, Jacques Rancière describes the character of the
            aesthetic regime and the relationship between politics and
            aesthetics in his work, along with the role of artistic practices,
            technological innovations, and the institution of the museum in the
            redistribution of the sensible and the similarities and differences
            between his theories and Walter Benjamin's work on modernity.
             Rancière argues that the aesthetic regime entails both a rupture
            with what came before it and the possibility of recycling and
            reinterpreting works of the past, what Benjamin described as the
            surrealist practice of evoking the outmoded.  While emphasizing the
            political and military preconditions to the aesthetic regime over
            technological or economic considerations, Rancière also warns
            against drawing strict parallels between aesthetic regimes and
            political presuppositions of equality or inequality.  Furthermore,
            Rancière refuses to privilege Marcel Duchamp's readymades in
            the aesthetic regime's redistribution of the sensible,
            pointing, instead, to Emile Zola's Le ventre de Paris and the
            creation of the modern institution of the museum as key moments
            that broke with preexisting distributions of the sensible.
             Rancière also distinguishes his discussion of novelistic realism
            and narration from Benjamin's characterization of modernity
            as the decline in the ability to narrate experience, critiquing
            Benjamin's nostalgia for the past while recognizing as
            fruitful his linking of new possibilities in aesthetic experience
            to the creation of new technologies.
Richard Moran
         Kant, Proust, and the Appeal of Beauty
         Beauty is a contested concept insofar as it seeks to mark a
            categorical distinction among the sources of pleasure, typically in
            terms of oppositions such as objective/subjective, universal/
            particular, necessity/contingency.  Kant represents a culmination
            of this tradition in defining the judgment of beauty in terms of
            the requirement for universal agreement, modeling the judgment of
            beauty as closely as possible to ordinary factual judgments.   A
            different tradition of thinking about beauty, however, while still
            seeking to mark a categorical distinction by reference to the idea
            of necessity, finds the relevant sense of necessity not in
            conditions of agreement but necessities of erotic love and the
            sense of requirement felt toward its objects.  This paper explores
            the consequences of taking this other tradition seriously, using
            Proust as a representative exemplar, as a way both of making sense
            of some of the features Kant ascribes to the concept of the
            beautiful, while avoiding the paradoxes stemming from his focus on
            the conditions for universal agreement. 
Adélékè Adéè̇ó
         From Orality to Visuality: Panegyric and Photography in
            Contemporary Lagos, Nigeria
             # A new line of self projection magazines that started blooming
                  in Lagos, Nigeria, about the mid-1990s defined itself by
                  filling almost completely every issue with photographs that
                  depict politicians, businesspeople, sports and show business
                  stars enjoying fruits of their extraordinary achievements on
                  festive occasions. The magazine's cozy coverage of the
                  rich and famous irks a lot of serious cultural and literary
                  critics who believe that this style resembles praise singing
                  too closely. This paper, unlike mainline criticisms of the
                  pictorial magazines, takes praise singing to be a serious
                  subject. Its central proposition is that the Nigerian
                  magazine culture embraced these magazines because they have
                  successfully translated into photography the panegyric
                  tendency that pervades popular, self-projection arts in the
                  underlying Yorùbá cultural environment of southwestern
                  Nigeria. The sub-genre of Yorùbá panegyric that the
                  magazines rework into the photographic medium is oríkì
                  bọ̀rọ̀kìnní, or praise chants of the eminent. The paper
                  analyzes sample issues of Ovation magazine to outline ways of
                  placing contemporary African cultural forms in a long
                  perspective and to propose an example of how inter-mediality
                  operates today in popular cultures. In the concluding
                  section, the essay proposes that a "poetic"
                  understanding of photography, as opposed to
                  "theatricality" and or melancholic substitution,
                  represents the best way to think about the type of festive
                  portraiture practiced in Ovationand its imitators.
             
             
            Responses to "Badiou's Number," by Ricardo L. Nirenberg and David
            Nirenberg (Summer 2011).
Alain Badiou
         Critical Response I: To Preface the Response to the
            &lsquo;Criticisms' of Ricardo Nirenberg and David Nirenberg
          
A. J. Bartlett, Justin Clemens
         Critical Response II: Neither Nor
          
By Ricardo L. Nirenberg, David Nirenberg
         Critical Response III: Reply to Badiou, Bartlett, and_Clemens
          
             
            Responses to "Against Literary Darwinism," by Jonathan Kramnick
            (Winter, 2011)
             
Paul Bloom
         Critical Response I: Who Cares about the Evolution of_Stories?
             
Brian Boyd
         Critical Response II: For Evocriticism: Minds Shaped to Be_Reshaped
          
Joseph Carroll
         Critical Response III: An Open Letter to Jonathan Kramnick
          
Vanessa L. Ryan
         Critical Response IV: Living in Duplicate: Victorian Science and
            Literature Today
          
G. Gabrielle Starr
         Critical Response V: Evolved Reading and the Science(s) of_Literary
            Study: A Response to Jonathan Kramnick
          
Blakey Vermeule
         Wit and Poetry and Pope, or The Handicap_Principle
          
Jonathan Kramnick
         Literary Studies and Science: A Reply to My_Critics
          
Erwin Panofsky
         On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting Works_of_the_Visual
            Arts
         In the eleventh of his Antiquarian Letters, Gotthold Ephraim
            Lessing discusses a phrase from Lucian's description of the
            painting by Zeuxis called A Family of Centaurs: &lsquo;at the top
            of the painting a centaur is leaning down as if from an observation
            point, smiling' (ano de tes eikonos hoion apo tinos skopes
            Hippokentauros tis …). &lsquo;This as if from an observation point,
            Lessing notes, obviously implies that Lucian himself was uncertain
            whether this figure was positioned further back, or was at the same
            time on higher ground. We need to recognize the logic of ancient
            bas-reliefs where figures further to the back look over those at
            the front, not because they are actually positioned above them but
            because they are meant to appear as if standing behind.'1
             
            · 1. The passage is in George Lessing, Briefe, antiquarischen
            Inhalts (Berlin, 1778), p. 81. Panofsky's discussion does not note
            that the original text of Lucian (Zeuxis or Antiochus 3) makes
            clear that what is described is a copy of the original painting
            (already said by Lucian to be lost). This means that some of the
            issues of misunderstanding situated by Lessing and Panofsky in
            Lucian's court may in principle be attributable to the copyist.
            This makes no difference to the conceptual thrust of Panofsky's
            case. Trans.
Jaś Elsner, Katharina Lorenz
         The Genesis of Iconology
         Erwin Panofsky explicitly states that the first half of the opening
            chapter of Studies in Iconology his landmark American
            publication of 1939 contains &lsquo;the revised content of a
            methodological article published by the writer in 1932',
            which is now translated for the first time in this issue
            of .1 That article, published in the philosophical
            journal Logos, is among his most important works. First, it marks
            the apogee of his series of philosophically reflective essays on
            how to do art history,2 that reach back, via a couple of major
            pieces on Alois Riegl, to the 1915 essay on Heinrich
            Wölfflin.3 Under the influence of his colleague at Hamburg Ernst
            Cassirer, the principal interpreter of Kant in the 1920s, Panofsky
            from 1915 on exhibits in his work ever more Kantian thinking and
            language.4 But Logos was not an art-historical review or one
            dedicated to aesthetics but a principal mainstream journal of the
            philosophy of culture. So &lsquo;On the Problem of Describing and
            Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts' has a good claim to be
            the culmination of Panofsky's philosophical thinking in his German
            period under the Weimar Republic.
             
            · 1. Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the
            Art of the Renaissance (1939; New York, 1967), p. xv; hereafter
            abbreviated SI. See Panofsky, &lsquo;Zum Problem der Beschreibung
            und Inhaltsdeutung von Werken der bildenden Kunst', Logos 21
            (1932): 103 19; trans. Jaś Elsner and Katharina Lorenz under
            the title &lsquo;On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting
            Works of the Visual Arts',  38 (Spring 2012):
            467 82; hereafter abbreviated &lsquo;P'.
            · 2. See the discussion in Carlo Ginzburg, &lsquo;From Aby Warburg
            to E. H. Gombrich: A Problem of Method', Myths, Emblems,
            Clues, trans. John and Anne C. Tedeschi (London, 1990), pp.
            17 59, esp. pp. 36 41.
            · 3. See Panofsky, &lsquo;Das Problem des Stils in der bildenden
            Kunst', Deutschsprachige Aufsåtze, ed. Karen Michels and
            Martin Warnke, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1998), 2:1009 18; &lsquo;Der
            Begriff des Kunstwollens',Deutschsprachige Aufsåtze, 2:
            1019 34, trans. Kenneth J. Northcott and Joel Snyder under
            the title &lsquo;The Concept of Artistic Volition', Critical
            Inquiry 8 (Autumn 1981): 17 33; and &lsquo;Über das
            Verhåltnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie: Ein Beitrag zu der
            Erörterung über die Möglichkeit kunstwissenschaftlicher
            Grundbegriffe', Deutschsprachige Aufsåtze, 2: 1035 63,
            trans. Lorenz and Elsner under the title &lsquo;On the Relationship
            of Art History and Art Theory: Towards the Possibility of a
            Fundamental System of Concepts for a Science of
            Art',  35 (Autumn 2008): 43 71.
            · 4. On neo-Kantianism in pre-Nazi Germany, see Michael Friedman, A
            Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chicago,
            2000), pp. 25 37; Éric Dufour and T. Z. R. Créteil, &lsquo;Le
            Statue du singulier: Kant et le néokantisme de l'École de
            Marbourg', Kantstudien 93 (Sept. 2002): 324 50; Edward
            Skidelsky, Ernst Cassirer: The Last Philosopher of Culture 
            (Princeton, N.J., 2008), pp. 22 51; and Peter E.
            Gordon, Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, Davos (Cambridge,
            Mass., 2010), pp. 52 86. Specifically on the Cassirerian
            Kantianism of Panofsky, see Michael Podro, The Critical Historians
            of Art (New Haven, Conn., 1982), pp. 181 82; Michael Ann
            Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History (Ithaca, N.Y.,
            1984), pp. 91 92, 147 52; Silvia Ferretti, Cassirer,
            Panofsky, and Warburg: Symbol, Art, and History, trans. Richard
            Pierce (New Haven, Conn., 1989), pp. 174 77, 182 84;
            David Summers, &lsquo;Meaning in the Visual Arts as a Humanistic
            Discipline', in Meaning in the Visual Arts: Views from the
            Outside, ed. Irving Lavin (Princeton, N.J., 1995), pp. 9 24;
            Mark A. Cheetham, Kant, Art, and Art History: Moments of
            Discipline (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 68 77; Paul Crowther, The
            Transhistorical Image: Philosophizing Art and Its History 
            (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 70 73; Allister Neher,
            &lsquo;"The Concept of Kunstwollen", Neo-Kantianism,
            and Erwin Panofsky's Early Art Theoretical Essays', Word and
            Image 20 (Jan. Mar. 2004): 41 51; Georges Didi-
            Huberman,Confronting Images: Questioning the Ends of a Certain
            History of Art, trans. John Goodman (University Park, Pa., 2005),
            pp. 4 6, 90 138; and Lorenz and Elsner,
            &lsquo;Translators' Introduction', 35 (Autumn
            2008): 33 42, esp. pp. 38, 40 42.
Tommie Shelby
         The Ethics of Uncle Tom's Children
         How should one live? This central philosophical question can be
            separated into at least two parts. The first concerns the conduct
            and attitudes morality requires of each of us. The second is about
            the essential elements of a worthwhile life; it's about what it
            means to flourish, which includes meeting certain moral demands but
            is not exhausted by this. Answering this two-pronged question
            traditionally falls within the subdiscipline of ethics, broadly
            construed. Philosophers have also sought to explain what makes a
            society just or good, to specify the values and principles by which
            we are to evaluate institutional arrangements and political
            regimes. This is the traditional domain of political philosophy.
            This essay addresses a question that arises where ethics and
            political philosophy meet.
Mark McGurl
         The Posthuman Comedy
         According to Wai Chee Dimock, scholars of American literature
            should study it in a bigger historical context than the one
            beginning in 1776 or even 1620, freeing themselves in this way from
            the narrow-minded nationalism that has so often drawn a border
            around their research. To view American literature in light of the
            longer durée of ancient civilizations is to see Henry David Thoreau
            reading the Bhagavad Gita, Ralph Waldo Emerson the Persian poet
            Hāfez, and rediscover in these and other extensive sympathies the
            kinship of American literature with world literature. Dramatically
            expanding the tracts of space-time across which literary scholars
            might draw valid links between author and author, text and text,
            and among author, text, and the wide world beyond, the perspective
            of deep time holds the additional promise, for Dimock, of
            reinvigorating "our very sense of the connectedness among
            human beings" and of dissuading us, thereby, from the wisdom
            of war.1 At the very least we might hope that American soldiers
            wouldn't look idly on, as they did on 14 April 2003, as the
            cultural treasures of the Iraqi National Library which are
            the treasures of all humankind were looted and burned.
             
            · 1. Wai Chee Dimock, Through Other Continents: American Literature
            across Deep Time (Princeton, N.J., 2006), p. 5; hereafter
            abbreviated T.
Andreas Mayer
         Gradiva's Gait: Tracing the Figure of a Walking_Woman
         Many patients were surprised or confused by their first visit to
            Dr. Freud's office. Lying on the famous couch, they found
            themselves surrounded by a plethora of objects and images they
            would never have associated with the business of the psychoanalytic
            cure. Statuettes, masks, and portraits from ancient times were
            arranged in showcases, on the shelves and on desks within a room
            whose walls were covered with depictions of mythological scenes and
            portraits of Freud's mentors (fig. 1). The patient's first
            impressions of this peculiar display, which has been faithfully
            preserved by Anna Freud in their last London home at Maresfield
            Gardens, were frequently strong ones. One of the most articulate of
            Freud's patients, Hilda Doolittle, herself a lover of antiquities,
            did not hesitate to tell him how "overwhelmed and
            upset" she was to find him "surrounded by these
            treasures, in a museum, a temple." During her own analysis, a
            variety of these "toys," as she called them, seemed to
            act as replicas or "ghosts" of the figures appearing in
            her dreams or memories: "We are all haunted houses."1
             
            · 1. H. D. [Hilda Doolittle], "Advent," Tribute to
            Freud (Boston, 1974), pp. 119, 146.
Fabien Locher, Jean-Baptiste Fressoz
         Modernity's Frail Climate: A Climate History of Environmental
            Reflexivity
         We believe that a historical understanding of past environmental
            discourses is essential for contemporary social and green theory
            because the dominant narratives used to reflect upon the
            contemporary environmental crisis are too simple. There is an
            assumption shared by most postmodern thinkers today that for about
            two generations we have been experiencing a complete transformation
            of our relationship with the environment. After three centuries of
            frenetic modernism, we entered, at last, an enlightened era of
            environmental awareness. Landmark writers of social theory have
            coined new labels to name our epoch and express its radical
            novelty: risk society (as opposed to industrial society), reflexive
            modernization, second modernization, or high modernity, while
            philosophers have reflected on the recent transformation of the
            nature of human action.1
             
            · 1. See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans.
            Mark Ritter (London, 1992); Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self
            Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford,
            Calif., 1991); Niklas Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory, trans.
            Rhodes Barrett (New York, 1993); and Hans Jonas, The Imperative of
            Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age,
            trans. Jonas and David Herr (Chicago, 1984).
Chris Lorenz
         If You're So Smart, Why Are You under_Surveillance?_Universities,
            Neoliberalism, and New Public Management
         Although universities have undergone changes since the dawn of
            their existence, the speed of change started to accelerate
            remarkably in the 1960s. Spectacular growth in the number of
            students and faculty was immediately followed by administrative
            reforms aimed at managing this growth and managing the demands of
            students for democratic reform and societal relevance. Since the
            1980s, however, an entirely different wind has been blowing along
            the academic corridors. The fiscal crisis of the welfare states and
            the neoliberal course of the Reagan and Thatcher governments made
            the battle against budget deficits and against government spending
            into a political priority. Education, together with social security
            and health care, were targeted directly. As the eighties went on,
            the neoliberal agenda became more radical smaller state and
            bigger market attacking the public sector itself through
            efforts to systematically reduce public expenditure by privatizing
            public services and introducing market incentives. At the same time
            the societal relevance of the universities demanded by critical
            students was turned on its head to become economic relevance to
            business and industry in the knowledge society.
Hannan Hever, Lisa Katz
         The Post-Zionist Condition
         In the summer of 1991, the first issue of the Israeli
            journal Teoria Ubikoret (Theory and Criticism) published an essay
            of mine on Anton Shammas, a Palestinian citizen of Israel, who
            wrote the Hebrew novel Arabeskot (Arabesques).1 In this essay I
            traced Shammas's subversion of the Jewish ethnocentrism of the
            Hebrew literary canon.2 Shammas's novel reveals how the Hebrew
            canon in Israel, in the guise of the apparently neutral term Hebrew
            Literature, which only apparently bases itself on the Hebrew
            language as the common literary language of Jews and Arabs, has in
            fact imposed an exclusionary policy. That is, in order to enter its
            realm, those who write in Hebrew must be Jewish. Shammas, I argued,
            sought to de-Judaize the Hebrew language and turn it into a
            language shared by all Israelis, Jews and Arabs alike.
            Now, twenty years later, Teoria Ubikoret has published a different
            essay of mine, this time on Tuvya haholev (Tuvya the Dairyman), Dan
            Miron's Hebrew translation of the great Yiddish writer Shalom
            Aleichem's novel Tevye der Milhiker. I claim that while Miron's
            Hebrew indeed Hebraicizes Aleichem's Yiddish, it also moves in the
            opposite direction; it Yiddishizes Hebrew, giving Yiddish a
            prominent presence in the Hebrew translation and thus decentering
            Israeli subjectivity and undermining the cohesive force of Hebrew.3
             
            · 1. See Anton Shammas, Arabeskot (Tel Aviv, 1986); trans.Vivien
            Eden under the title Arabesques(Berkeley, 2001).
            · 2. See Hannan Hever, "Ivrit be-eto shel
            aravi," Teoria Ubikoret 1 (Summer 1991): 23 38,
            "Hebrew in an Israeli Arab Hand: Six Miniatures on Anton
            Shammas's Arabesques," The Nature and Context of Minority
            Discourse, ed. Abdul R. JanMohamed and David Lloyd (Oxford, 1990),
            pp. 264 93, andProducing the Modern Hebrew Canon: Nation
            Building and Minority Discourse (New York, 2002), pp.
            175 204.
            · 3. See Hever, "Tuvia haholev beivrit," review
            of Tuvya Haholev by Shalom Aleichem, trans. Dan Miron,Teoria
            Ubikoret 36 (Spring 2010): 227 30.
Cecelia Watson
         Points of Contention: Rethinking the Past, Present, and_Future_of
            Punctuation
         The rule books, though they claimed to heed only the call of logic,
            were nonetheless bound by their historical context: punctuation
            guidelines have been heavily indebted to intellectual, cultural,
            and aesthetic trends. No matter what analytical authority rule
            books claimed, their codifications had at least as much to do with
            their historical context as with syntax. When punctuation is
            properly contextualized, it can yield insight into problems that
            transcend disciplinary boundaries: it asks us to consider how we
            communicate within the disciplines and beyond them and how
            disciplines create and maintain interpretive norms. It is this
            account of punctuation that I begin to develop here.
            I want to track the much-maligned semicolon and its fellow
            punctuation marks as rules for their usage were established and
            evolved. I consider the consequences of the nineteenth-century
            explosion of systems of grammar rules by way of the story of a
            semicolon in a statute that deprived Bostonians of late-night
            liquor from 1900 1906. The "Semicolon Law," as it
            came to be known, exemplifies problems of interpretation still live
            in legal theory. I contrast the demands of legal formalism with the
            expectations of close reading in the humanities and social
            sciences. I conclude by attending to the inheritance left to us by
            nineteenth-century grammarians' impassioned attempts to bring order
            to English: The Chicago Manual of Style. I raise some critical
            questions about our attitudes towards rules, and consider how those
            attitudes influence our approach to punctuation and our passions
            about semicolons.
Diarmuid Costello and Margaret Iversen
         Introduction: Photography between Art History and Philosophy
         The essays collected in this special issue of  are
            devoted to reflection on the shifts in photographically based art
            practice, exhibition, and reception in recent years and to the
            changes brought about by these shifts in our understanding of
            photographic art. Although initiated in the 1960s, photography as a
            mainstream artistic practice has accelerated over the last two
            decades. No longer confined to specialist galleries, books,
            journals, and other distribution networks, contemporary art
            photographers are now regularly the subject of major retrospectives
            in mainstream fine-art museums on the same terms as any other
            artist. One could cite, for example, Thomas Struth at the
            Metropolitan Museum in New York (2003), Thomas Demand at the Museum
            of Modern Art (MoMa) (2005), or Jeff Wall at Tate Modern and MoMA
            (2006 7). Indeed, Wall's most recent museum show, at the time
            of writing, The Crooked Path at Bozar, Brussels (2011), situated
            his photography in relation to the work of a range of contemporary
            photographers, painters, sculptors, performance artists, and
            filmmakers with whose work Wall considers his own to be in
            dialogue, irrespective of differences of media. All this goes to
            show that photographic art is no longer regarded as a subgenre
            apart. The situation in the United Kingdom is perhaps emblematic of
            both photography's increasing prominence and its increased
            centrality in the contemporary art world over recent years. Tate
            hosted its first ever photography survey, Cruel and Tender, as
            recently as 2003, and since then photography surveys have become a
            regular biannual staple of its exhibition programming, culminating
            in the appointment of Tate's first dedicated curator of photography
            in 2010. A major shift in the perception of photography as art is
            clearly well under way.
Jeff Wall
         Conceptual, Postconceptual, Nonconceptual: Photography and the
            Depictive Arts
         I would like to set aside, for now, the distinction between art and
            art with a capital A because this distinction may not exist, except
            as a polemical tool or an expression of personal opinion.
            Fifteen years ago, in "Marks of Indifference" I
            proposed that it was the dialectic of negation in which conceptual
            art implicated photography that paradoxically breached the final,
            most subtle, barriers to the acceptance of photography as art.
            That implied, I think, that photography played some central role in
            the elaboration of conceptual art, what I am going to call the
            conceptual reduction of autonomous art. I don't know whether I
            meant to imply that or not, but, if I did, I shouldn't have because
            photography had nothing to do with the success of conceptual art;
            photography played no significant role in it. Photography was a
            sort of passenger on that trip. We can put it even more strongly
            and say that the very presence of photographs in works or discourse
            distracted or diminished the logic of the arguments conceptual
            artists were making.
            The most rigorous conceptual artists had little or nothing to do
            with photography because they had no need for it and recognized
            that, as depiction, it could contribute nothing to the reduction
            they were seeking to establish.
Carol Armstrong
         Automatism and Agency Intertwined: A Spectrum of Photographic
            Intentionality
         A concatenation of forces surrounded the rise of the photographic
            to the center of contemporary art practice. During the sixties the
            author-function was seriously critiqued. Roland Barthes announced
            the death of the author in 1967, and Michel Foucault answered his
            own question, what is an author? deconstructively in 1969,
            replacing what William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley had already
            termed the intentional fallacy with a model of the cultural
            constructedness of all notions of creative agency. At the same
            time, notions of automatism generated by psychoanalytic models of
            mind and dada and surrealist conceptions of artistic and literary
            practice joined forces with sixties anticanonical,
            postexpressionist notions of the artwork as the deskilled,
            mechanical product of a consumerist society whose forces yielded
            the fantasy of individual will. Meanwhile, also during the sixties,
            painters such as Andy Warhol and Robert Rauschenberg began to use
            found photographs very overtly either as part and parcel of the
            generative process of their work or inside their work along with
            other kinds of materials. And thus the medium-specific boundaries
            between the photographic and the painterly, just to take the two,
            began to crumble for good, though the art-school disciplines and
            museum departments dedicated to these two media continued to hold
            sway.
Patrick Maynard
         Arts, Agents, Artifacts: Photography's Automatisms
         By the time photography was introduced to the public at the end of
            the 1830s, the fine arts idea was already exhibiting resilience
            through shifts of both extension and meaning. As to extension, one
            of Immanuel Kant's candidates, oratory, dropped out quickly. Music
            has always posed a problem for the mimesis constituent. In
            intension or cognitive meaning the components soon began
            internecine jostling, with shifting alliances rather like
            ancient Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and Persia. Famously, the mental-
            content constituent, arising from "genius," expanded in
            meaning and importance, at notable expense to craft and
            mimesis thus the emergence of romanticism, as a popular term
            for creativity and self-expression. This is already well
            exemplified in John Stuart Mill's 1833 essays on poetry and genius,
            which demoted craft and deemphasized mimesis in favor of what he
            called "the expression or uttering forth of
            feeling." Thirteen years later, Edgar Allan Poe responded
            with a craft-rhetoric put-down of genius and self-expression,
            although he later emphasized beauty. As for the aesthetic
            component, while Mill was willing to finesse a case for beauty in
            terms of self-expression, by the end of the century Leo Tolstoy's
            self-expression approach in What Is Art? would banish Poe's beauty
            from the answer as decadent hedonism. The pace did not slow in the
            twentieth century, when, leaping ahead, R. G. Collingwood
            explicitly demoted craft in favor of expression, thereby taking
            down mimesis as were artists of the time while
            Benedetto Croce placed beauty in the mental expression of the
            beholder. We scarcely need reminding of what came next: the
            historic phase of aesthetic or formalist counterattacks against
            mimesis later, even against self-expression with which
            religious thinkers such as Jacques Maritain had shown little
            patience from the start.
Robin Kelsey
         Playing Hooky/Simulating Work: The Random  Generation of John
            Baldessari
         As traditional patronage gave way to new markets in the modern
            period, artists went in search of a public. The public sphere,
            driven inward by the private interests of capitalism, increasingly
            offered art a pure exchange-value and the role of a luxury good
            (something to match the couch). Artists, seeing no place else to
            go, pursued an endgame, sustaining art's vitality through
            inventive, elemental, and critically intelligent forms of negation.
            A key question was how to contend with the sham of taste and
            artistic subjectivity more generally as a refuge or antidote
            to the crass engines of the market.
Susan Laxton
         As Photography: Mechanicity, Contingency, and Other-Determination
            in Gerhard Richter's Overpainted Snapshots
         Of the generation of post-1960s artists who looked to photography
            for a new set of conceptual tools, Gerhard Richter stands apart
            because he has uniquely professed a desire to "use painting
            as a means to photography," that is, to bring painting to the
            structure and sensibility of the photograph.2 To ascribe
            sensibility or perceptive acuity to a process so mechanical as
            photography may strike the reader as either romantically fey or
            even offensively anthropomorphizing, given that the aesthetic
            questions at stake have exactly to do with philosophy's
            "mind-independent" designation of the medium. But the
            metaphor has pedigree among historians of photography, having been
            articulated by Walter Benjamin in his "Little History of
            Photography," where he characterizes photography as a medium
            possessed of an "optical unconscious," a nature
            specifically "other" in its ability to present the
            "spark of contingency, of the here and now, with which
            reality has (so to speak) seared the subject."3 It is
            precisely on the basis of this picture making outside of human
            agency, Benjamin insists, that "the dubious project of
            authenticating photography in terms of painting" fails, for
            it is an attempt to "legitimize the photographer before the
            very tribunal he was in the process of overturning."4
            Certainly, it is from this premise of photography's revolutionary
            capacity that the first critical assessments of the work of
            "artists using photography" proceeded in the 1970s and
            continued through the 1980s into the present decade.5 This is
            particularly important to keep in mind when assessing what has been
            called the recent turn to the pictorial in photographic practices
            because this move has been accompanied by, on one hand, a general
            pulling away from easily legible, unambivalent documentary content
            in photographic practices a tendency that may itself be
            considered part of a quietly growing, renewed interest in the
            critical capacity of painting among a new generation of
            artists and, on the other, a nuanced exploration of the
            appropriative lessons of postmodernism, manifested in recent
            interest in the repurposing of found, or what Benjamin might call
            "other-determined," imagery.6
Margaret Iversen
         Analogue: On Zoe Leonard and Tacita Dean
         It is only now, with the rise of digitalization and the near-
            obsolescence of traditional technology, that we are becoming fully
            aware of the distinctive character of analogue photography. This
            owl-of-Minerva-like appreciation of the analogue has prompted
            photographic art practices that mine the medium for its
            specificity. Indeed, one could argue that analogue photography has
            only recently become a medium in the fullest sense of the term, for
            it is only when artists refuse to switch over to digital
            photographic technologies that the question of what constitutes
            analogue photography as a medium is self-consciously posed. While
            the benefits of digitalization in terms of accessibility,
            dissemination, speed, and efficiency are universally
            acknowledged, some people are also beginning to reflect on what is
            being lost in this great technological revolution. In this context,
            artists' use of analogue film and the revival of early photographic
            techniques should be regarded as timely interventions, although
            these may strike some as anachronistic. This essay does not attempt
            an ontological inquiry into the essential nature of the analogue;
            rather, it is an effort to articulate something about the meaning
            of analogue photography as an artistic medium for contemporary
            artists by paying close attention to its meaning and stakes for
            particular artists. Instead of presenting a general survey, I want
            to consider the work of just two artists, Zoe Leonard and Tacita
            Dean, both of whose work is concerned with what is being lost. As
            Leonard put it: "New technology is usually pitched to us as
            an improvement. … But progress is always an exchange. We gain
            something, we give something else up. I'm interested in looking at
            some of what we are losing."1 Tellingly, both artists have
            produced exhibitions simply called Analogue. Leonard gave the title
            to a large project she did between 1998 and 2009 consisting of 412
            silver gelatin and c-prints of local shop fronts in lower Manhattan
            and poor market stalls around the world.2 Dean used it for a 2006
            retrospective exhibition of her films, photographs, and drawings.
Diarmuid Costello
         Automat, Automatic, Automatism: Rosalind Krauss and Stanely Cavell
            on Photography and the Photographically Dependent Arts
         How might philosophers and art historians make the best use of one
            another's research? That, in nuce, is what this special issue
            considers with respect to questions concerning the nature of
            photography as an artistic medium; and that is what my essay
            addresses with respect to a specific case: the dialogue, or lack
            thereof, between the work of the philosopher Stanley Cavell and the
            art historian-critic Rosalind Krauss. It focuses on Krauss's late
            appeal to Cavell's notion of automatism to argue that artists now
            have to invent their own medium, both to provide criteria against
            which to judge artistic success or failure and to insulate serious
            art from the vacuous generalization of the aesthetic in a media-
            saturated culture at large.1 Much in the spirit of &lsquo;Avant-
            Garde and Kitsch', paying attention to the medium is once
            again an artist's best line of defence against the encroachment of
            new media, the culture industry, and spectacle. That Krauss should
            appeal to Cavell at all, let alone in such a Greenbergian frame of
            mind, is surprising if one is familiar with the fraught history of
            debate about artistic media in art theory since Greenberg. Cavell's
            work in this domain has always been closely associated with that of
            Michael Fried, and the mutual estrangement of Fried and Krauss, who
            began their critical careers as two of Greenberg's leading
            followers, is legendary.2
            I have written about the close connection between Fried's and
            Cavell's conceptions of an artistic medium before.3 Whereas Fried's
            and Cavell's early conception of an artistic medium was in a sense
            collaborative, emerging from an ongoing exchange of ideas at
            Harvard in the latter half of the 1960s, Krauss's much later appeal
            to the ideas of automatism and the automatic underpinning Cavell's
            conception of the photographic substrate of film from the early
            1970s is not. In what follows, I try to clarify both the grounds of
            this appeal and its upshot. Does Krauss's account shed new light on
            Cavell's, or is she trying to press his terms into service for
            which they are ill-served? Both could of course be true, the former
            as a consequence of the latter perhaps. Conversely, do the art
            historical and philosophical accounts pass one another by? Note
            that even if the latter were true, its explanation might still
            prove instructive in the context of an interdisciplinary volume
            seeking to bring art historians and philosophers into dialogue
            around the themes of agency and automatism, which is precisely what
            Krauss's appeal to Cavell turns on.
Dominic McIver Lopes
         Afterword: Photography and the "Picturesque Agent"
         Even as art theory and analytic philosophy have failed to connect
            in their studies of photography, the two disciplines have joined in
            tying conceptions of the specific character of photography to ideas
            about automaticity and agency.1 In rough caricature, the
            philosopher reasons: "An item is a work of art only insofar
            as it is the product of agency, so a photograph is not an art work
            insofar it is not the product of artistic agency. After all, in
            Lady Eastlake's colorful words, the &lsquo;obedience of the
            machine' in photography is no &lsquo;picturesque
            agent.'"2 This much is accepted both by philosophers
            who go on to conclude that photography is not an art and also by
            those who defend the contrary.3 The reasoning on the side of theory
            and criticism often goes, again in caricature, as follows:
            "Art works sometimes result from a suppression of agency, and
            the distinctive &lsquo;obedience of the machine' in
            photography is no &lsquo;picturesque agent,' so the
            automatism of the photographic machine shapes the distinctive
            profile of photographic art." The triadic assemblage of the
            medium, automatism, and agency is clearly more than a trope in
            writing on photography; it regulates and structures reasoning about
            photography, even as it sends that reasoning off in remarkably
            divergent directions in different disciplines. In the spirit of the
            nudge towards convergence that this special issue represents, this
            afterword develops some thoughts that are sparked by and that offer
            a friendly challenge to the preceding papers. In brief, the triad
            that controls thinking about photography across disciplines depends
            on some rather demanding conceptions of agency and automatism. As
            it turns out, less demanding conceptions of agency and automatism
            pave the way to a new and more modest conception of the specificity
            of photography as an art medium. If our common ground is what keeps
            us apart, perhaps we should find some new common ground?
Adam Frank and Elizabeth A. Wilson
         Like-Minded
         Ruth Leys ("The Turn to Affect: A Critique," Critical
            Inquiry 37 [Spring 2011]: 434 72) raises a number of
            important questions about the conceptual and empirical
            underpinnings of the affect theories that have emerged in the
            critical humanities, sciences, and social sciences in the last
            decade. There are a variety of frameworks for thinking about what
            constitutes the affective realm (neurological, psychological,
            social, cultural, philosophical), and there are different
            preferences for how such frameworks could be deployed. We would
            like to engage with just one part of that debate: the contributions
            of Silvan Tomkins's affect theory. We take issue with Leys's
            formulation that Tomkins's work along with that of Brian Massumi,
            William Connolly, and Paul Ekman form a group of like-minded
            theorists. We do not believe this represents an accurate account of
            the conceptual and empirical commitments of these various authors.
            By bundling their work together, Leys misses much of what is
            compellingly critical in each of these writers, and she overlooks
            what is most invigorating in the debates amongst them. In addition,
            the specificities of Tomkins's work have been badly served in
            Leys's essay. In four volumes stretching from 1962 to 1992 (and
            elaborated in various other empirical and theoretical papers)
            Tomkins laid out a complex and captivating theory of the human
            affect system, in which mechanisms of neurological feedback, social
            scripts, and facial behavior coassemble as affective events. Our
            response to Leys's essay is motivated by a wish to see more
            detailed engagements with this theory the distinctiveness of
            which we believe has yet to be fully explored in this new affective
            turn.
Charles Altieri
         Affect, Intentionality, and Cognition: A Response to Ruth_Leys
         One does not have to share William Connolly's vitalist affiliations
            in order to have serious reservations about Ruth Leys's essay and
            response.1 Simple phenomenological concerns will do to make one
            suspicious of her core claim:
            From my perspective, intentionality involves concept-possession;
            the term intentionality carries with it the idea that thoughts and
            feelings are directed to conceptually and cognitively appraised and
            meaningful objects in the world. The general aim of my paper is to
            propose that affective neuroscientists and the new affect theorists
            are thus making a mistake when they suggest that emotion or affect
            can be defined in nonconceptual or nonintentional terms.2
            I worry about the difficulty of defining the boundaries of a notion
            like conceptual, especially since on the next page Leys claims an
            equivalence between cognition and signification. There seems at
            least a tendency toward tautology in equating
            "nonconceptual" with "nonintentional," as
            if one could be used to define the other. But then signification
            enters the picture, although criteria for signification involve
            simple recognition and do not implicate the awareness of logical
            connectives that seem necessary for conceptual and cognitive
            appraisal. And the Wittgenstein in me worries even more why Leys
            thinks that intentionality should be confined to only one set of
            traits despite the fact that a great variety of language games
            depend on something like intentional awareness.
Ruth Leys
         Facts and Moods: Reply to My Critics
         The purpose of my article, "The Turn to Affect: A
            Critique," was to show that the theorists whose work I
            analyzed are all committed to the mistaken idea that affective
            processes are responses of the organism that occur independently of
            cognition or intention.1 My aim was not to emphasize the
            differences among the authors under consideration differences
            that, as I noted in my article, of course do exist but rather
            to demonstrate that those theorists share certain erroneous
            assumptions about the separation presumed to obtain between the
            affect system on the one hand and intention, cognition, and meaning
            on the other and to lay out the unfortunate consequences of their
            doing so.
            If Adam Frank and Elizabeth A. Wilson wish for another kind of
            essay than the one I have written an essay that would stress
            the divergences between the ideas of Silvan S. Tomkins and those of
            the other affect theorists I consider, especially those of Paul
            Ekman, in order to show what was distinctive about Tomkins's
            contributions let them write it. But in such an essay they
            will have to acknowledge certain facts about the relationship
            between Tomkins and Ekman that, in their haste to separate
            Tomkins's theories from Ekman's, they are in danger of neglecting
            or misrepresenting.
W. J. T. Mitchell
         Report from Morocco
         Every once in awhile an academic drudge gets to visit a place that
            dreams are made of. We all know the little game in which American
            scholars compete to mention the exotic locations they have been to:
            Paris, London, Beijing, Mumbai. But I have never aroused such open
            jealousy in my colleagues until I uttered the word
            "Casablanca."
            For knowledgeable tourists, this is something of a puzzle.
            Casablanca is routinely disrespected by the guidebooks for its lack
            of an authentically ancient medina or a labyrinthine souk, and its
            paucity of museums leaves the tourist with relatively few obvious
            destinations. One suspects that much of the aura surrounding the
            city's name comes from the wholly fictional movie and the
            associated mystique of Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman.
            Moroccans are notably marginal in the film, which, in a kind of
            doubling of colonial occupation, treats Casablanca as an outpost of
            the Vichy French regime under the thumb of the Nazis. Rick's Café
            Américain never existed until quite recently, when a retired
            American diplomat decided to capitalize on the legendary bistro
            with a simulacrum. The real city is quite modern, with the relics
            of 1920s colonial art-deco-French architecture serving as a main
            attraction, along with the thoroughly contemporary mosque of Hassan
            II, designed by a French architect and finished only in the 1990s.
            There is also the Corniche, with its surfing beaches and exclusive
            cafés, clubs, and hotels.
James Williams
         Editorial Note
         We would like to announce the addition of two coeditors to Critical
            Inquiry. Haun Saussyis University Professor in the Department of
            Comparative Literature at the University of Chicago. He is the
            author of The Problem of a Chinese Aesthetic (1993) and Great Walls
            of Discourse and Other Adventures in Cultural China (2001), and he
            has edited or coedited a number of volumes, including Ferdinand de
            Saussure's Course in General Linguistics (with Perry Meisel; 2011).
            He is currently working on a book about the concept of rhythm in
            psychology, linguistics, literature, and folklore. Patrick Jagodais
            Assistant Professor in  the Departments of English and Cinema and
            Media Studies at the University of Chicago. His research examines
            how contemporary American literature, film, television, and new
            media deploy different forms to render the complexities of global
            networks.
            We would also like to announce the latest additions to our
            editorial staff. First, Hank Scotch has been hired to replace Irene
            Hsiao as our new manuscript editor. Previously an editorial
            assistant at the journal for three years, Hank is a graduate
            student in the Department of English at the University of Chicago.
            He has just completed his dissertation entitled Oceanic America.
            Andrew Yale, a graduate student in the Department of English at the
            University of Chicago, rejoins the staff as an editorial assistant.
            Finally, Jason de Stefano joins Louis Sterrett as our newest
            editorial intern.
